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ABSTRACT
DISPOSABLE LABOR: URBAN AND RURAL AGRICULTURAL MIGRANTS FROM
THE MONTERREY CENTER THROUGH THE NUEVO LEON CORRIDOR TO
SAN ANTONIO, 1915-1925
Edward Bates, Ph.D.
Department of History
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Barbara M. Posadas, Director

This dissertation examines south Texas from 1915 to 1925 and covers four subjects: a
government-sponsored worker program, ethnic employment agencies, the inclusion of
Mexicans into the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and a mutual aid organization in San
Antonio, Sociedad de la Unión. The federal government’s guest-worker program suspended
portions of the Immigration Act of 1917 so that poor and illiterate Mexican immigrants could
continue to enter the United States as inexpensive agricultural laborers during World War I.
Ethnic employment agencies provided Mexican migrants with jobs in the United States, but
often had to evade both federal and Texas regulations. Although considered necessary
workers by some farmers, the government program and the agencies produced an increased
presence of Mexicans in the United States which added to their denigration. An AFL
organizer of Mexican heritage and la Unión both worked to reduce this disparagement and
although not always successful, demonstrated the agency that Mexican laborers possessed
despite their reception in the United States. The guest-worker program and the employment
agencies, in conjunction with nativism that surfaced in the United States during the early
1920s, established a view of Mexicans as “disposable labor.” This term describes people
accepted for their inexpensive and dependable work, but vilified for their continued presence.
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INTRODUCTION:
Immigration historians have long argued that between the two aspects of migration,
push and pull, one of the pair usually remains stronger than the other—push representing
the factors that encourage people to leave their homeland and pull being the aspects that
cause migrants to choose a specific receiving nation. The choice to leave a homeland
involves a departure from many important aspects of a person’s life including their culture,
extended family, national heritage, and often, their language. Such a decision does not
come without a great deal of consideration, mostly affected by the economic and political
realities within the home nation. For instance, with the Mexican Revolution raging
followed by the chaotic aftermath during the 1915 to 1925 period, would Mexican citizens
have left the land of their fathers if this political and economic calamity had not profoundly
affected their lives? Undoubtedly not, since the push factors in this scenario, as well as in
most immigration circumstances, remained the stronger motivation in the decision to leave.
Moreover, another element exists within this process: the reception in the receiving nation.
Mexican immigrants to the United States during the early twentieth century
experienced a dual response from Americans. First, their propensity to perform job
functions dependably and cheaply meant that Anglo employers welcomed Mexicanos to the
nation.1 However, once the requisite employment had ended, their continued presence

The term “Mexicano,” used throughout this dissertation, refers to people of Mexican origin in the
United States, both Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants. Further, this dissertation uses
1

2

became a problem. Has this really changed, roughly 100 years later? Are Mexicanos, no
matter their U.S. or Mexican citizenship, viewed as fellow citizens by all American
Anglos? “Disposable labor” seems to be an appropriate term for the relationship that many
Anglos associate with Mexicanos in both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Accept
the workers when a need arises, but abhor their company after completion of the task.
When did such a mindset become pervasive in the minds of some Anglo Americans?
During a century when many other ethnic groups such as Italians, Poles, and the Irish
became accepted and celebrated nationalities, Mexicanos remained the proverbial “other,”
unable to escape from this stereotypical portrayal. But before explaining how this
dissertation will probe the question of when all of this began, an apropos story from the
early twentieth century in San Antonio, Texas, assists in introducing the subject.
“One and a Quarter Million Flies Swatted by San Antonio Boys” claimed the page
the term “Anglo” to describe any persons considered white within the community. Given the
national background of the white population of San Antonio at this time, the Anglo term primarily
refers to persons of Anglo-Saxon and German origins. This definition pertains to the dictionary
description of Anglo: “A non-Hispanic white inhabitant of the U.S.” See The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster Incorporated, 1997), 45. Therefore, the use of the
terms Mexicano and Anglo assists in not only differentiating the two groups, but although not
entirely precise, these titles also emphasize the concept that during the early twentieth century, race
and nationality intertwined in meaning. See: James R. Barrett and David Roediger, “Inbetween
Peoples: Race, Nationality and the ‘New Immigrant’ Working Class,” Journal of American Ethnic
History, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Spring, 1997), 3-44. Also, Neil Foley provides an excellent argument on
the amalgam of different ethnicities merged into a single race for expediency purposes as has been
done with African Americans, but also applies to Anglos and Mexicans, see The White Scourge:
Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1997), 9. Finally, a Work Projects Administration study on San Antonio from 1940
expressed this view: Mexicanos object “to use of the term ‘white’ in such a way as to exclude
Mexicans. They prefer to call whites of European extraction ‘Anglo-Americans’ or ‘Anglos.’ . . .
They jealously guard against any move that would set them apart from the self-styled ‘white race.’”
See: Selden C. Menefee and Orin C. Cassmore, “The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio: The Problem
of Underpaid and Unemployed Mexican Labor,” in Mexican Labor in the United States, edited by
Carlos E. Cortes (New York: Arno Press, 1974 [1940]), 51.

3

seven headline of the San Antonio Express on Tuesday, July 4, 1911. The newspaper
began a fly swatting contest for local boys on June 14 by offering cash prizes designed to
“make money to help celebrate the Fourth of July.” Complete with pictures of the winners
and the precise counting of flies by contest officials, the Express also photographed a threefoot high by five-foot wide pile of dead flies that the boys supplied (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: San Antonio Express, July 4, 1911. Source: “One and a
Quarter Millions Flies Swatted by San Antonio Boys,” San Antonio
Express, July 4, 1911, 7.

Robert Basse, the winning swatter, offered 484,320 insects as proof of his victory as
he far out distanced runner-up Walter Scruggs who bagged a mere 264,025. The Express
went on to declare that a trillion and a half germs died as a result of this effort, and spared
the city of an appalling quantity of pests. Although the Express claimed that over a
thousand boys participated in the contest, no Hispanic names appeared amongst the

4

victors.2 The newspaper barred girls from the contest, but did offer a special prize the
following day to the only one who had nonetheless participated, Rosita Thomson, for her
killing of two thousand flies. Apparently concerned that the child’s ethnicity remained
clear, given her surname, the paper also published a photograph of the nine-year old, a
petite blond in a gingham-print dress.3
Sponsored by San Antonio Chamber of Commerce Secretary John B. Carrington, the
fly swatting contest addressed early twentieth-century fears regarding hygiene in the
growing city’s environment. An emphasis on cleanliness emerged in early twentieth
century urban settings; often portrayed as modernization as well as patriotism—not unlike
a fly swatting contest for the Fourth of July — this movement frequently targeted the poor
in the expanding cities.4 Anglo racial order and civil control combined as this purity
campaign represented one of many anxieties concerning an increasing immigrant
population; in San Antonio, the Mexican minority lived in segregated poverty on the near
West Side of the city. The fly story also suggests the transitional character of the city
during the period between 1910 and 1920 when Mexican migration reached higher levels
due to the ongoing revolution in Mexico.5 In a related event, Carrington also supplied the

“One and a Quarter Millions Flies Swatted by San Antonio Boys,” San Antonio Express, July 4,
1911, 7. Even though the contest called for male youth to report potential breeding grounds for the
insect, the Express failed to indicate any results in that area.
2

“Rosita, Who Killed Two Thousand Flies, Gets a Special Girls’ Prize,” San Antonio Express, July
5, 1911, 14.
3

4

Laura Hernández-Ehrisman, Inventing the Fiesta City: Heritage and Carnival in San Antonio
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008), 58-59.
5

Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 19001940 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 25. John A. Adams, Jr., Conflict and Commerce on

5

inspiration and leadership for a newly created “Order of the Alamo” in 1909. His group
reorganized the Battle of Flowers celebration begun in 1891 that honored the “heroes of the
Alamo” with an annual parade on April 21, the anniversary of the Battle of San Jacinto that
avenged the mission tragedy. Carrington’s renewed celebration featured an obvious
separation of Anglos and Mexicans as he evolved the festivity from one with elite
participants and various groups of spectators to a commemoration reserved solely for the
privileged.6 The Anglo elite in San Antonio strove to form a community identity separate
from the current reality of increased Mexican immigration, but that still commemorated the
nostalgia of the Spanish past. Anglos may have embraced Mexicano laborers, but they
loathed their presence.
The central premise of this dissertation is that events such as the “fly story”
demonstrate that the increase of Mexican immigration and resultant visibility added to the
condemnation of Mexicano people and culture by the predominant Anglo population in
south Texas. But the fundamental question of the dissertation is whether the existence of a
Great War guest-worker program as well as ethnic employment agencies in south Texas
also added to the denigration of Mexicanos. This is important because in establishing the
reasons for early twentieth-century disparagement of Mexicanos in south Texas, an
increased understanding of why this derision continued throughout the twentieth century
and even to the present may be determined. Further, the actions of the federal and state
governments that implemented the guest-worker program and eliminated the Texas
the Rio Grande: Laredo, 1755-1955 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), xii.
6

Hernández-Ehrisman, Inventing the Fiesta City, 49-53, 59.

6

employment agencies, respectively, may have negatively impacted the lives of Mexicanos
living in the United States before a mass repatriation in the 1930s of immigrants and
citizens of Mexican descent. This is significant as it possibly demonstrates that the
demeaning of Mexicano culture in the United States did not just occur in the private sector;
it may have been facilitated by federal and state agencies. Writing about historical topics
may be compared to piecing together a jigsaw puzzle, but doing so without benefit of the
entire image. Similarly, this dissertation involves bringing together several different topics
and views a completed picture of the entire story concerning immigration from northern
Mexico to south Texas from 1915 to 1925.
Moreover, this dissertation is about people. Although statistics will be used to track
migration trends, guest and employment agency workers, as well as the business owners,
their names, and in several cases, the stories of their lives, will be an essential part of the
dissertation. To that end, this narrative will also examine one individual, a Tejano named
Clemente Idar, and a mutual assistance organization, Sociedad de la Unión, both of which
demonstrate “agency” among Mexicanos in San Antonio. The discussion of Idar and la
Unión adds another element to the story of early twentieth-century migrants from Mexico.
The people of Mexican heritage in south Texas, primarily San Antonio, did not simply
accept their fate as a denigrated minority, but took specific actions to maintain their
integrity and culture.
The first three chapters of this dissertation provide context for the four to follow by
reviewing the reasons why Mexicans left their homeland, their methods of transportation,
and the employment that drew them to the United States. This will be intertwined with

7

information about the reception that the migrants received from the native-born Anglo
populace. Chapter 1, entitled “The South Texas and Northern Mexico Borderland during
the Early Twentieth Century,” explores the reasons for the decision to migrate from
northern Mexico to the United States as the movement continually increased during the
1910s and beyond. Chapter 1 also provides an historical overview of south Texas and
northeastern Mexico and reveals some of the occurrences that provided a basis for the
derogatory views of Mexicanos. For instance, Mexican-born Ricardo Rodriguez, the focus
of the famous legal case, In re Rodriguez (1897),7 supplies a context for how some Anglos
schemed to prevent Mexicanos from attaining citizenship. Although Rodriguez prevailed,
the judgment did not necessarily hold true for all Mexicanos, and the attempt to
disenfranchise him symbolized the disparagement of persons of Mexican heritage.
The first chapter also reveals that, as the 1920s unfolded, the United States
experienced many disparate movements ranging from the ongoing Black migration to the
North to the rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan. These activities reverberated throughout the
United States, but other events resonated more significantly in Texas. For instance, the
Mexican Revolution promoted a negative view of Mexicanos and lynching episodes in
Texas increased during the decade.8 Nonetheless, persons of Mexican ancestry such as

7

In re Rodriguez. 81 F. 337, 349 (W.D.Tex. 1897).

William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, “The Lynching of Persons of Mexican Origin or Descent in
the United States, 1848-1928,” Journal of Social History, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Winter, 2003): 415.
8

Although the Revolution provided the most noteworthy rationale for leaving Mexico,
economic difficulties added to the movement; see Josef Barton, Edge of Endurance: Mexican
Migrant Workers and the Making of a North American Working Class, 1880-1945 (Paper presented
at the Labor History Seminar at the Newberry Library in Chicago, Illinois, on September 21, 2012).

8

Adina De Zavala labored to control the characterization of Mexicanos through her efforts
in regard to the preservation of the Alamo. Despite her limited success, De Zavala
demonstrated that Mexicanos possessed agency and endeavored to positively impact their
ethnicity’s reputation versus the Anglo elite in San Antonio.9 “The Monterrey Center,” a
specific area within the three northeastern Mexican states connected to the United States by
rail lines, remained an essential source for the sending of immigrants to south Texas.
“Nuevo Leon, the International and Great Northern Railroad, and the Nuevo Leon
Corridor,” the focus of Chapter 2, establishes that railroad development during the late
nineteenth century through northern Mexico into southern Texas offered migrants a viable
carrier to utilize for their trip north. This transportation mode assisted in the creation of a
“corridor” of migration and augmented the Mexican population in many communities
along the way.10 The “Nuevo Leon Corridor” that extended from the Monterrey Center to
San Antonio utilized the Mexican National Railway to connect with the International and
Great Northern Railway and the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railroad that
crossed the border at Laredo and Eagle Pass, Texas, respectively. However, the West Side
of San Antonio still became the primary dwelling place for migrants as they usually
traveled through the border cities during the trek north. This mass movement of railroad

9

Richard R. Flores, Remembering the Alamo: Memory, Modernity, and the Master Symbol (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2002), 61-77.
10

Fred Wilbur Powell, The Railroads of Mexico (Boston: The Stratford Publishers, 1921), 91-95,
127, 134. These ideas also reflect those of Rodolfo F. Acuña who wrote about the migratory routes
from central Mexico through El Paso to Los Angeles. See Rodolfo F. Acuña, Corridors of
Migration: The Odyssey of Mexican Laborers, 1600-1933 (Tucson: The University of Arizona
Press, 2007), x-xi, 3.

9

migrants parallels a similar exodus of African Americans from the U.S. South to northern
cities in search of employment.11 Ironically, the employment vacuum left by the Black
migration assisted in the opening of agricultural jobs for Mexican immigrants. The story of
railroad workers such as Elías Garza and Iglesias Wenceslao demonstrated that Mexicanos
not only traveled on the railroad during their journey, but also maintained and even built
the northbound tracks.12 Once arriving in south Texas, many migrants sought farming jobs
within several different agricultural businesses.
Chapter 3, entitled “Agricultural Employment Outside and Inside the Alamo City:
Cotton, Onions, and Pecans,” reviews the agricultural-employment possibilities that drew
Mexicanos to San Antonio and the surrounding area. During the early twentieth century,
the southwestern United States, particularly Texas, experienced an agricultural expansion
that required increased labor for planting, harvesting, and processing. This growth
involved traditional cotton harvests in addition to newly developed “truck crops” such as
onions and spinach. Within south Texas, cotton production expanded in the Blackland
Prairie area northeast of San Antonio whereas truck crops prospered in the farms near
Laredo and Eagle Pass. Coupled with a labor shortage as a result of U.S. entry into the
Great War and the related necessity of enlarged troop levels as well as the exodus of
African Americans, the need for workers from Mexico became apparent to agricultural
owner growers. Many Mexicanos had experience laboring on farms throughout south
11

James R. Grossman, Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration (The
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 3-4.
12

Manuel Gamio, The Life Story of the Mexican Immigrant, reprint of original 1930 publication
(New York: Dover Publications, 1971), 149-150, 176-177.

10

Texas during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and owner growers became
accustomed to utilizing inexpensive workers. Moreover, Anglo farmers often manipulated
the market by soliciting more workers than needed and, resultantly, kept wages low and
profits high.13 Francisco and Eulalio Segura, father and son, in addition to Juan Burciaga
and his two sons, Ygnacio and Manuel, all traveled from Zaragoza, Coahuila, to work near
Hindes, a small community south of San Antonio. The experience of the two families
demonstrates the existence of migration chains from northern Mexico as well as the
migrant workers’ adverse treatment at the hands of Anglo employers.14 Located in San
Antonio, the pecan-shelling industry also flourished during the early twentieth century
because of the low-cost Mexicano labor available on the West Side of the city.15 Cotton
picking, truck-crop harvesting, and pecan shelling became the primary agricultural
employment opportunities for immigrant workers. Due to the overlapping seasonal nature
of these enterprises, sometimes Mexicanos and their families labored in two or even three
of the businesses.
After Chapters 1, 2, and 3 provide the background, transportation means, and
employment possibilities, Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 present the primary research of this
dissertation on, respectively, guest workers, employment agencies, Clemente Idar, and
13

Paul Schuster Taylor, An American-Mexican Frontier: Nueces County, Texas (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1934), 105-108.
14

Declarations of Intention for Citizenship and Petitions for Naturalization 1915-1925, Series from
Record Group 21: Records of District Courts of the United States, 1685 - 2004, National Archives
and Records, Federal Government Office, 1400 John Burgess Drive, Fort Worth, Texas.
Kenneth P. Walker, “The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio and Mechanization,” The Southwestern
Historical Quarterly, Volume 69, No. 1 (July, 1965), 44-48.
15

11

Sociedad de la Unión. Due to the need for agricultural workers in the southwest, the
dispersal of Mexicans due to the Revolution, the corridor created by the railroad, and the
longtime connection of southern Texas communities to Mexico, the San Antonio area
remained a city in transition during the 1910s and into the 1920s. Government programs
and ethnic employment agencies both contributed to an anti-Mexicano shift in
governmental policy and public perception, but the expansion of the American Federation
of Labor (AFL) and the organization of a mutualista, Sociedad de la Unión, demonstrates
agency on the part of Mexicanos.
Chapter 4, “The Bureau of Immigration and the First Bracero Program,” concerns the
actions of the federal government in dealing with Mexican immigration. First, the
Immigration Act of 1917 placed restrictions on migration as it required that all aliens be
literate and pay an eight dollar “head tax” to gain entry into the United States. Since many
immigrants from Mexico arrived with little education or money, the 1917 Immigration Act
provisions threatened to stall migration from south of the Rio Grande.16 Consequently,
Southwestern agricultural and railroad employers successfully lobbied Congress to utilize a
provision in the 1917 Act that enabled the Secretary of Labor to allow temporary workers
to enter the United States as needed.17 Although the government never referred to this
exception as a “Bracero Program,” the title, modified by the addition of “First,” has been
generally assigned to it because of a later endeavor that began during World War II and

16

Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow, 6.

Otey M. Scruggs, “The First Mexican Farm Labor Program,” Arizona and the West 2 (Winter
1960): 319-320.
17

12

continued until 1963.18 Moreover, the Bracero Program, by increasing migration from
Mexico to areas in the United States beyond the immediate border area, contributed to the
vilification of Mexicanos in many U.S. states. However, some migrants endured onerous
circumstances without ever leaving south Texas. Jesus and Alcario Villanueva, a father
and son from Monterrey, Mexico, experienced difficulties emanating from both the Bracero
Program as well as the Immigration Act of 1917. They came to Texas as Bracero workers
only to experience poor treatment at the hands of their Anglo employer. Subsequently,
after a return to Mexico, their attempted re-crossing of the border became problematic
because of the Immigration Act of 1917. Jesus could not read or write, but Alcario was
literate and came back to the United States without his father, with whom he had hoped to
remain.19 In addition to the laws and programs developed by the federal government, the

18

For simplification purposes, the agricultural worker exception to the Immigration Act of 1917
will be hereafter referred to in this dissertation as the “First Bracero Program” or, simply, the
Bracero Program. Many words in the Spanish language do not transfer completely to English. The
name often given to Mexican laborers was a derivative of the Spanish word for arm, brazo. The
literal meaning, “arm-man” hints at their function in the agricultural economy, translating more
accurately than may appear. Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration
and the I.N.S. (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1992), 1.
19

Sworn statement of Ignacio Hernandez and Alcario Villanueva, both dated May 25, 1919, in
Folder I, Box 2864, File 54261/202, RG85, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Ancestry.com.
Border Crossings: From Mexico to U.S., 1895-1964 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA:
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state of Texas also implemented regulations that affected Mexican immigrants.
Governmental policies in Texas eventually impacted ethnic employment agencies that
assisted Mexican immigrants in finding jobs in the United States. Chapter 5, “Ethnic
Employment Agencies in the Alamo City,” examines employment agencies located in
cities such as San Antonio that typically included a Mexican owner or enganchadore,
literally, a labor “coupler.”20 Before the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in 1910,
recruiters traveled into Mexico and illegally contracted laborers,21 but during the
Revolution, many laborers traversed the border on their own to find employment. Mexican
worker employment agencies flourished in San Antonio from 1915 to 1925 as couplers
took advantage of their cultural connection with workers and filled the labor need left by
Anglos headed into the Great War as well as due to the decrease in European immigration.
These agencies solicited vast numbers of laborers to many U.S. locations, sometimes 5,000
at a time and, depending on the distance to the work site, at a higher rate of pay.22 During
the 1920s, the Texas state legislature continually instituted laws that made it increasingly
difficult for the agencies to continue. Free state agencies, run by the Texas government,

d&new=1&rank=1&msT=1&gsfn=alcario&gsln=villanueva&MSAV=1&uidh=jr5&pcat=40&fh=2
&h=12156263&recoff=&ml_rpos=3.
Enganchadore literally translates from Spanish as “the hook,” whereas enganchado refers to “the
hooked.” The former describes the actions of the labor recruiter and the latter refers to the worker.
20

21

The illegality of these actions due to the Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885 (23 Stat. 332, 1885)
failed to stop them from being widely violated. See Neil Foley, The White Scourge, 46-47.
La Prensa, 4-30-1920, page 7. Readex: A Division of News Bank, “Hispanic American
Newspapers, 1808-1980,” Newspaper Titles, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iwsearch/we/HistArchive. Accessed 8/21/2013.
22

14

eventually replaced the ethnic ones.23 The story of Cesario Campa, a Mexican immigrant
who owned an agency in San Antonio, represents the common experience of
enganchadores in the United States. Responding to the actions by the Texas legislature,
Campa attempted to continue his business by operating an employment agency disguised as
a car service that simply transported laborers to work sites, but eventually succumbed to the
state restrictions.24 As a result of the demise of the ethnic agencies, Mexican immigrants
had to deal with the state bureaucracy, and their legal status in the United States now
became an issue. Moreover, the First Bracero Program and private employment agencies
in San Antonio, Texas, supply two important subjects for this dissertation.
The First Bracero Program and the ethnic agencies, by supplying workers throughout
the United States, increased the visibility of Mexicano workers and promulgated a negative
view of Mexican immigrants. When combined with the nativism that expanded in the early
1920s in the United States, as well as an economic recession that threw many Anglos out of
work, Mexicanos became a group to be eliminated, no matter their citizenship status.
Considered to be disposable labor, Mexican immigrants, highly valued due to their work
ethic and inexpensive wage demands, became castoffs, and even faced deportation, after
completion of their jobs. However, two more positive activities occurred in south Texas
during the 1915 to 1925 period and also remain essential to this dissertation.
Analyzing the relationship between Tejanos, persons of Mexican ancestry born in
23
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Texas, and immigrants offers a crucial way to understand the reception afforded migrants
from Mexico. Chapter 6, “AFL Organizer Clemente Idar and Mexican Immigrant
Naturalization,” explores this topic by examining the career of Clemente Idar, a Tejano and
American Federation of Labor organizer. Working for an organization such as the AFL,
which by policy objected to the introduction of additional migrants into the United States,
Idar could have opposed Mexican migration.25 However, although emanating from a more
affluent background than most Tejanos and virtually all Mexican immigrants, Idar still
possessed a sense of obligation to his fellow Mexicanos. Initially committed to just
Tejanos, Idar evolved during his tenure with the AFL and began to emphasize that Mexican
immigrants should become U.S. citizens rather than remain alien residents.26 Although this
citizenship endeavor proved mostly unfruitful, the poor treatment that Mexican immigrants
received from Anglos in the United States probably contributed more to their failure to
naturalize than any shortfall on Idar’s part. Instead of embracing naturalization and
becoming U.S. citizens, Mexican immigrants sought out mutuality with their fellow
ethnics, including Texas-born persons of Mexican heritage.
Mexicano mutuality dominated the West Side of San Antonio in the early twentieth
century. “Sociedad de la Unión and the Roman Catholic Church,” Chapter 7, examines an
ethnic organization that provided tangible benefits to fellow Mexicanos and attempted to
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moderate the impact of Anglo disparagement of Mexican immigrants and Mexican
Americans. La Unión, a Mexican mutualista, worked to assist Mexicanos in San Antonio
beginning in 1893 and offered aid to workers including those associated with the Bracero
Program and ethnic labor agencies. Adolfo Arispe and his son, Adolfo Jr., became
members of the organization and received support from fellow la Unión constituents. The
father, operating several different stores on the West Side of the city, probably counted on
his fellow mutualista members as customers. Adolfo Jr. eventually became a musician, a
common and successful trade for Mexicanos during the early twentieth century.27 He also
surely received assistance from his fellow mutualista associates, since many of the la Unión
members worked as musicians.28 With Mexicanos segregated from and ostracized by the
Anglo community, mutualistas such as la Unión successfully aided members with many
tangible benefits such as funeral expenses and short-term loans, but also offered more
abstract yet important camaraderie. Although the traditions of the Virgin of Guadalupe in
Mexico assisted Mexicanos in remaining loyal to Catholicism, migrants did not experience
the same positive relationship with the Church in the United States. Although the Roman
Catholic Church attempted to aid Mexicanos in San Antonio, cultural differences between
the Church hierarchy and the parishioners prevented any meaningful uplift. While the
Church established Mexican parishes and provided priests from Spain, such actions simply
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continued the segregation of congregations and disparaged Mexican culture.
The Bracero Program, ethnic employment agencies, the AFL’s organizing of
Mexicanos, and Sociedad de la Unión remained important entities in the lives of Mexican
immigrants in San Antonio during the 1915 to 1925 period. The Bracero Program and
ethnic employment agencies increased the migration of Mexicans and their visibility which
added to the condemnation of Mexicano people and culture by the predominantly Anglo
population in south Texas, as well as in other areas of the United States. Due to the actions
of the federal government, in addition to the state of Texas, Mexicanos became a group
seen stereotypically as expendable. No matter their citizenship status, all persons of
Mexican heritage became appreciated for their work, but vilified for their presence:
disposable workers. Nonetheless, people such as Clemente Idar worked to move persons of
Mexican heritage beyond this disparagement as he pushed for the acceptance of Mexicano
laborers within the United States. Idar’s effort did not just involve supporting immigrants
because of their value as workers, but also for their inclusion in U.S. society. La Unión
also strove to improve the lives of its Mexicano laborers, but on their own terms rather than
by embracing Anglo culture. The reception afforded Mexican immigrants in the United
States as dispensable workers enhanced the ability of mutualistas such as la Unión to attract
members.
This dissertation focuses on how the notion of “disposable labor” developed as a
result of government programs and private labor agencies. The First Bracero Program and
ethnic employment agencies in south Texas attracted workers escaping the Mexican
Revolution and economic hardship into urban and rural agricultural employment. However,
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both entities, the government project and the agencies, transported laborers throughout the
United States into areas previously unacquainted with Mexicanos. As a result of this
dispersal, Anglos in many areas of the United States formed a stereotypical view of
Mexicanos as inexpensive and dependable workers, but also foreign and discardable.
Further, both due to their reception from Anglos in the United States as well as a propensity
to return to their home nation, most Mexican immigrants shunned naturalization.
Mexicanos, both Mexican and American born, became a group categorized as cheap and
dependable labor, but not an ethnicity worthy of U.S. citizenship.29 Throughout the 1900s
when ethnic groups from around the world became accepted and even celebrated,
Mexicanos continue to suffer under the yoke of a stereotype born during the early portion
of the century.
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CHAPTER 1
THE SOUTH TEXAS AND NORTHERN MEXICO BORDERLAND DURING THE
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
During the early twentieth century, as Mexican immigration to south Texas began to
increase, several occurrences contributed to a worsening of the Anglo perception of
Mexicanos. The Mexican Revolution during the 1910s not only augmented the growth in
immigration, but also the negative view of Mexicanos. The conflict regularly spilled over
the border, most notably due to the events surrounding the Plan of San Diego (Texas) in
1915 that threatened a revolution by minorities throughout the Southwest as well as the raid
by forces loyal to Pancho Villa on Columbus, New Mexico, in 1916. Despite the
escalation of the Great War in Europe throughout this period, these events along the border
with Mexico contributed to unease among Anglos in south Texas as the Revolution
appeared to be menacing the United States. One symptom of this fear involved the
lynching of Mexicanos which significantly expanded in Texas during the 1910s. Also, the
Ku Klux Klan became powerful in the following decade and even gained control of the
Texas State Legislature by 1923.
However, the growth of agriculture during the early twentieth century provided a
catalyst for Mexican workers to immigrate to the United States as farmers in south Texas
encouraged a flow of inexpensive labor. Further, railroads that had been completed during
the late nineteenth century provided an expedient transportation method for the Mexicanos
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to travel to south Texas. Therefore, an ambiguity arose in south Texas: Mexicanos were to
be both feared and needed. This chapter and two following explore the situation within the
border areas of Texas and Mexico, as well as the railroads and the expansion of
commercial agriculture during the early twentieth century. However, these occurrences
and views that began during the period had origins in the previous century and also
involved political ramifications. A legal question regarding Mexican immigrants becoming
U.S. citizens provided the impetus for a court case in San Antonio during the 1890s.
On May 3, 1897, Judge T.S. Maxey of the United States Circuit Court in the District
of Texas at San Antonio issued an important ruling regarding the naturalization of Ricardo
Rodriguez, a Mexican national who had resided in Texas for about ten years. Two San
Antonio politicians, Populist T.J. McMinn and Republican Jack Evans, had attempted to
prevent Rodriguez from attaining citizenship. However, the judge concluded that the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended the Mexican American War in 1848 had allowed
for the U.S. citizenship of Mexicans who lived in the territories ceded to the United States
as a part of the agreement. Therefore, Rodriguez’ petition for citizenship could be
accepted. In effect, Judge Maxey ruled that treaty and conquest trumped naturalization
law. Due to a 1790 statute that allowed for “white-only” citizenship and the 14th
Amendment of 1868 that ruled anyone born in the United States a citizen, before the
Rodriguez case, only whites, African Americans, and persons of Mexican ancestry born
here or living in the U.S. Southwest prior to 1848 could be designated as citizens.1

1
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Supposedly, due to Judge Maxey’s decision, Mexican immigrants could now become
naturalized citizens of the nation without any undue difficulties.
Commonly referred to as In re Rodriguez, the case represented an exception to other
judicial rulings during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries due to its reliance
on a treaty rather than the law. From 1878 to 1909, U.S. courts denied eleven other
petitions for naturalization filed by Asians and Native Americans. Nonetheless, in reality,
Judge Maxey did not rule Rodriguez to be “white.” The ensuing legal ambiguity resulted
in future judgments that diluted this decision such as Morrison v California, 291 U.S. 82
(1934), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled Mexicans as white amounted to an
“unsettled question.” Moreover, instead of beginning a period of greater acceptance of
Mexican immigrants to the United States, the Rodriguez case signaled the commencement
of their degradation as migration from Mexico increased during the first three decades of
the twentieth century.2 As the Mexican population flourished in localities such as the West
Side of San Antonio, Texas, where Ricardo Rodriguez lived, the concentration of newly
arrived immigrants in one portion of the city caused the total number of Mexicanos in the
Amendment. Technically, Mexican citizens living in the Southwest in 1848 had to choose whether
to remain Mexican or become U.S. citizens within one year of the Treaty. Those who did not state
a choice automatically became U.S. citizens. See Yale Law School, The Avalon Project, Treaty of
Guadalupe Hildalgo, February 2, 1848, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp
(Article VIII), accessed 3/20/15. Also see: Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American
Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 6-7.
2
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Alamo City to appear more considerable than their actual number.
According to the official record of the case that began in Judge Maxey’s courtroom in
May of 1896, a year earlier than the final decision, the 37-year-old Rodriguez had been
born in Ojuelos, Mexico, a town about 50 miles southwest of the city of San Luis Potosi,
north of central Mexico. He had migrated to Laredo, Texas, in 1883 before proceeding to
San Antonio shortly thereafter.3 Rodriguez filed his Declaration of Intention on January
25, 1893 in San Antonio and indicated an “X” for his signature as he apparently could not
write.4 Finding someone with a common name such as Ricardo Rodriguez offers some
difficulty, but according to city directories, he appears to have lived within the poorest
barrio of the West Side of San Antonio at 104 South East Street in 1892 and at the corner
of Monterrey and South Leones Streets in 1894, both years shortly before the court case.5
The litigation record listed Rodriquez as a “laborer” and the testimony at the court hearing
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substantiated this characterization as a witness before the court, James G. Fisk, commented
that Rodriguez worked for the city, “cleaning the ditches and river.” Fisk testified that
despite Rodriguez’ apparent illiteracy, he still maintained a “good moral character,” and
lived as a “law-abiding citizen.” Further, when asked about Rodriguez’ ability to sustain
the standards of the U.S. Constitution, Fisk stated: “whatever the principles of the
constitution of the United States might be, that he [Rodriguez] would uphold them if he
knew what they were.” Judge Maxey noted that a man of Fisk’s standing, a practicing
lawyer, spoke well of Rodriguez. In his summation, since the objectors to the Petition of
Naturalization had argued that Rodriquez lacked the ability to understand and comprehend
the U.S. Constitution, Judge Maxey wrote:
That the applicant is lamentably ignorant is conceded . . . his untrained mind is found
deficient in the power to elucidate or define the principles of the constitution. But the
testimony discloses that he is a very good man, peaceable and industrious, of good
moral character, and law abiding ‘”to a remarkable degree.” And hence it may be
said of him, notwithstanding his inability to undergo an examination on questions of
constitutional law, that by his daily walk, during a residence of 10 years in the city of
San Antonio, he has illustrated and emphasized his attachment to the principles of the
constitution. Congress has not seen fit to require of applicants for naturalization an
educational qualification, and courts should be careful to avoid judicial legislation.6
Moreover, to suggest that Judge Maxey ruled Rodriguez as “white” as some historians have
contended does not accurately portray the decision. Rodriguez had claimed to not be an
“Indian,” and, instead, a “pure blooded Mexican,” thus demonstrating his understanding of
nationality. The court did not rule on Rodriguez’ race in deciding eligibility, but due to the
judge’s use of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the case determined that a Mexican
national could become a citizen; Judge Maxey had based his ruling on Rodriguez’
6
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nationality.7 If anything, this decision led to the view of Mexican racial status as somewhat
indeterminable, but did hold that they could not be classified as White, Black, Asian, or
Native American.
At the time of In re Rodriguez, roughly eighty-five percent of Mexican-born persons
in the United States lived in Texas.8 Clearly, Texas had become the main place in the
nation where persons of Mexican ancestry lived, worked, and coexisted with Anglos. As
immigration to the state continually increased in the following decades, the perception of
Mexicanos by whites in Texas moved steadily lower. The discussions in connection with
the Rodriguez case, when added to a succession of events that followed, demonstrated the
expanding denigration of Mexicanos in south Texas. The Rodriguez decision, in a sense,
had begun this higher profile recognition of Mexican immigrants by becoming a much
discussed court case within the Anglo newspapers in San Antonio from May, 1896 to May
of 1897 and beyond. The attempt by two local politicians at preventing Rodriquez from
attaining naturalization, despite failing, set a tone for Anglo perceptions of Mexican
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immigration long after Judge Maxey issued his ruling.
Nonetheless, the specific motivations of the objectors to Rodriquez’ petition for
citizenship remain unclear. The two San Antonio politicians that originated the opposition,
McMinn and Evans, claimed that this action involved the prevention of immigrants from
voting. However, if adjudicated in their favor, the decision would have possibly denied
many persons of Mexican birth from exercising their suffrage rights. If Judge Maxey had
ruled Rodriguez ineligible to be a citizen, this could have been interpreted as meaning that
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo erred in granting Hispanics citizenship and, further, the
14th Amendment only applied to persons born in the United States. 9 Although other
Populist politicians, as well as McMinn himself, claimed that this action did not constitute
a political act, the San Antonio Express suggested that the rationale involved the Party’s
failure to attract Mexicanos to their faction. Further, the idea surfaced that a favorable
decision for the objectors could be detrimental to the Democratic Party, the Populists’ key
rival, and would change the political dynamic of the southwestern United States.10
Demonstrating his political credentials, McMinn secured the position of delegate for three
different precincts to the Populist Party state convention as well as the nomination to
become an Associate Justice to the State Supreme Court within the next month after the
Rodriguez court action began. McMinn provided a few remarks at the state convention and
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slammed the Democrats for having “stolen the income tax plank from the Populists.”11
Local newspapers further weighed in on the case while awaiting a ruling from the
judge. Clearly showing a prejudice against Mexican immigrants, the San Antonio Light
wrote: “The People who desire a clean honest ballot will rejoice in the elimination of a
large class of purchasable alien people who have no interest in our country or institutions,
who only vote because they are paid to vote.”12 Also, during the period before the judge
announced his decision, McMinn and Evans provided a lengthy defense of their legal
position in the San Antonio Light. In this article, they attempted to reverse the argument
and portray their views as “beneficial” to Mexican immigrants. In reference to the idea that
Rodriguez did not have a case for naturalization, McMinn and Evans indicated that: “This
proposition cannot be gainsaid [proved false] unless the denier wishes to rank as a judicial
ass, and a willful deceiver of ignorant Mexicans, for vile purposes.”13 Moreover, the
newspaper acknowledged that McMinn and Evans had reacted to cries of objection
regarding their role in the case from the local Mexicano community.
A group of about 200 local Mexicanos met in October, 1896 to discuss the Rodriguez
case and the possible ramifications of an unfavorable decision. A.L. Montalbo, who lived
within the Mexicano community on the West Side of San Antonio, led the Spanish“The Pops in Session,” San Antonio Light, June 14, 1896, pages 4 and 8. McMinn lost the race
for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1898; see “Big Precinct In,” San Antonio Light,
November 13, 1898, page 5.
11
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language rally and urged the Texas-Mexicans to back the Democratic Party in the coming
election. He argued that the Populists, as well as Republicans, sought to disenfranchise
Mexican Americans. Specifically calling out McMinn and Evans, Montalbo contended
these two men and their respective parties desired to strip the Mexican Americans of their
civil rights. All of the men at the meeting lent their support to the principles established by
Montalbo.14 Tellingly, Montalbo worked as a printer for a company named Guessaz and
Ferlet that published periodicals in downtown San Antonio. Oscar C. Guessaz, part owner
of the company, supported James L. Slayden, a San Antonio Democrat, as well as William
Jennings Bryan, unsuccessful candidate for president on the Democratic ticket in 1896.15 It
would appear that both sides of the public argument on the Rodriguez case harbored a
political motive for their activities.
During the early twentieth century, the legacy of In re Rodriguez in the United States
involved court cases such as Morrison v California mentioned above and, in general, held
that Mexican racial status remained indeterminable. For instance, Secretary of Labor
James Davis remarked in 1929 that “making an effort to exclude them [Mexicans] from
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admission or citizenship because of their racial status is practically impossible.”16
However, the U.S. Census Bureau viewed Mexicans as a separate race for the 1930
headcount. By 1929, this ambiguity in policy resulted in the exclusion of Mexican
immigrants to the United States through the administrative process. Legal provisions such
as the contract labor ban, literacy test requirements, and the “likely to become a public
charge” prohibition resulted in the common rejection of visas for migrants from Mexico.
Legal Mexican immigration plummeted virtually overnight.17 Also, In re Rodriguez
demonstrated the political hopelessness of Mexicanos as disenfranchisement had been
prevented only by the unusual decision of one judge. As seen in the confrontations
between Populists and Democrats, political parties did wage electoral warfare over this
issue, however, only by fighting for votes rather than by accepting Mexicanos as part of
their constituency.18 Moreover, even the conflict over votes would soon end.
In the coming decades, the Democratic Party held complete control of Texas state
politics, and the party no longer required the votes of Mexicanos to instill its will in the
political arena. Although the party instituted rules to reduce the influence of machine
politicians who regularly paid for the votes of poor Mexicanos, new ordinances effectively
disenfranchised all voters of Mexican ancestry. Beginning in 1902, a state-wide poll tax
made voting difficult for minorities and the poor. However, the most egregious action took
16
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place in 1904 when the State Democratic Executive Committee recommended to the
county organizations within the party that primary voters be white Democrats. Since the
Democratic Party’s victories in the general election remained a foregone conclusion, the
primary represented the main place for contested polling. Although the “White Man’s
Primary,” as it became known, would be challenged all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court
more than once, the Democrats regularly found ways around the rulings as the last of such
practices did not end until 1952.19
The United States during the 1910s
The 1920s in the United States has been referred to as the “New Era” because of the
flourishing economy and revolution in communication that assisted in the creation of a
national culture. However, most of these innovations had their origins during the previous
decade of the 1910s which also contained several of the most seminal occurrences in
United States history. Early in the period, the Progressive movement became influential in
both political parties and led to such disparate constitutional actions as the Prohibition and
Women’s Suffrage Amendments.20 Muckrakers, including Upton Sinclair, wrote of both
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the evils of modern industry, as well as the degradation of European immigrants.21 The
Great Migration of African Americans from southern portions of the nation to northern
industrial cities continued to gain momentum.22 The Socialist Party of America achieved
its highest popular vote percentage during the 1912 presidential election, and unionism,
with the adoption of the Clayton Act in 1914, enjoyed a legal acceptance not witnessed
beforehand in United States history.23 William J. Simmons, a Methodist Episcopal minister
from Atlanta, Georgia, organized a “new” version of the Ku Klux Klan that would become
virtually nationwide by 1920. New technologies became more conventional as evidenced
by the growth of automobile sales due to the affordability enhanced by Henry Ford’s
assembly line.24 The Great War, referred to as “the war to end all wars,” appeared middecade in Europe and within three years, the United States became involved. The war
contributed to the global spread of an influenza epidemic that reportedly killed 675,000
U.S. citizens.25 Finally, increasing concern over the soaring number of foreign immigrants
culminated in the Immigration Act of 1917 that included restrictions such as the institution
of an eight-dollar head tax, the need for a passport, and a literacy requirement for incoming
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migrants.26
Clearly, the United States remained a nation in transition, and while south Texas
experienced all of these occurrences, several of the events became particularly important to
this portion of the nation. The Great Migration resulted in thousands of Black Texans
relocating to the northern United States. This exodus assisted in opening up additional
manual-labor employment for Mexicanos in the state. Although railroad lines that traveled
north had existed since the late nineteenth century, they now served as conduits for both the
African Americans traveling to northern industrial cities, as well as transportation for
Mexican immigrants searching for more lucrative employment by crossing the international
border into Texas.27 Many Anglos did not enthusiastically greet the new arrivals from the
south. Groups that remained as ideologically different as the American Federation of
Labor and the Ku Klux Klan objected to, respectively, labor competition and Roman
Catholic foreigners. Some of the efforts of these factions became both subtle and violent in
their attempts to rally the public against immigration.28 Further, the Great War proved
important to increased Mexican immigration to Texas as agricultural owner-growers
believed that they needed additional labor to replace men who entered the military. In
conjunction with the recruitment of Mexicano laborers, the passage of the Immigration Act
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of 1917 resulted in both obstacles and advantages. The law created affordability hardships
for low-wage laborers attempting to cross the border, but an exception in the ruling allowed
“guest workers” to enter the country without undue difficulty.29 Texas occupied an
important position within the ongoing debate as groups such as the Immigration Restriction
League argued that migration should be curtailed.30 Although this discussion involved all
immigrants to the nation, in Texas, the conversation mostly concerned Mexican migrants.
Immigration to South Texas during the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
A significant dynamic regarding Mexico involves the variegated nature of the
topography, climate, and people. In his broad synthesis of Mexican history, Many
Mexicos, Lesley Simpson utilized the title to illustrate this important national feature.
These differences intensified the existence of various forms of agriculture, difficulties
regarding transportation, weather patterns, as well as the ability of peoples to create large
political units.31 All of these divergences accentuated the local nature of the existing
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communities, and this premise holds true for the discussion of Mexican immigration in this
dissertation. Moreover, additional attention should be given to the variants between one
Mexican state and another to understand fully the reasons for immigration to the United
States. For instance, the northern Mexican state of Nuevo Leon demonstrated this diversity
within its borders. Many authors have concentrated on the immigration that moved
through the El Camino Royal corridor from central Mexico through the northern state of
Chihuahua to the border city of El Paso and eventually to Los Angeles.32 However, the
Sierra Madre Oriental Mountains effectively block easy passage to the west for migrants
from Monterrey and most of the state of Nuevo Leon, as well as Tamaulipas, the
neighboring state to the east. Also, the Chihuahua Desert in the western part of the
Mexican state of Coahuila, located west of Nuevo Leon, blocks routes to the west. The
path north from these three northern Mexican states, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and
Tamaulipas, logically flowed north through the U.S. border communities of Eagle Pass and
Laredo toward San Antonio, Texas. Geography is an essential element in considering
migration patterns. Instead of a “corridor” of migration between the three northern
Mexican states and south-central Texas, “tracks,” whether railroad, wagon, or footprints,
across a seemingly endless stretch of flat land leading northeast of the Sierra Madre
Oriental Mountains, may afford an apt description.
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During the late nineteenth century, Mexican President Porfirio Diaz significantly
improved his nation’s economy; however, Diaz accomplished this with an infusion of
foreign capital, primarily from the United States. The building of railroads throughout the
country proved beneficial for this development and the north-south alignment of the tracks
also encouraged emigrational movement north, toward the United States. Further, Diaz
supported a land policy that perpetrated the growth of large haciendas to the detriment of
small farmers and communally maintained property.33 These policies affected the now
landless peasants who toiled under heightened economic pressure, particularly in the three
central plateau states of Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacán. The new railroad links
provided a vehicle for passage to the north and the central U.S. debarkation point of El
Paso as Texas became the most significant receiver of Mexican labor.34 Additionally, due
to the border proximity of the northern Mexican states of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and
Tamaulipas, as well as the railroad connections leading toward the United States, many
immigrants traveled through the Texas cities of Laredo and Eagle Pass enroute to popular
locations such as San Antonio, Texas.35 Border restrictions remained minimal, and the
Mexican government encouraged movement because of concerns regarding over
population in Mexico, in addition to the belief that experience in the United States would

33

Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 20-22. Michael Gonzales, The Mexican Revolution,
1910-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 5-11.
34

35

Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow, 16-17. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 65.

Emilio Zamora, The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas (College Station: Texas A & M
University Press, 1993), 15, 59. JMora-Torres, The Making of the Mexican Border, 9, 89-92.

35

“improve” immigrants’ “economic and social position upon their return.”36 The late
nineteenth-century changes in Mexico formulated by the government, particularly the
economic ones that depressed the working class, set the stage for the Revolution that
followed during the 1910s.
The Mexican Revolution, generally dated from 1910 to 1920, added a further
dimension to this northward migration. The landless led this uprising against landowners
who ignored their needs. Additionally, the unchecked allowance of foreign economic
intervention by the United States exacerbated the circumstances as this upheaval took aim
at the long-time Diaz administration. The decade of the 1920s witnessed continued unrest
with presidential assassinations in addition to the Cristero Rebellion which began in 1926
in response to the government’s actions that established direct control over the Catholic
Church.37 Although these events occurred at different times during the entire period and in
various locations throughout the nation, the destabilization of the country stimulated
continued migration out of Mexico.38
Simultaneously with these events in Mexico, labor needs developed within the United
States; although primarily in agriculture, railroad and mining work also proliferated.
Asians had long toiled in agricultural endeavors, especially in California, but due to
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continuing legal issues as well as the tendency of Chinese and Japanese to become small
farm operators, growers increasingly turned to the burgeoning Mexican labor force.
Further, many believed that Mexicans remained docile, as evidenced by a grower magazine
in 1907 which concluded that the migrants “are plentiful, generally peaceable, and are
satisfied with very low social conditions.”39 The Mexican workers required lesser wages
and dealt with oppressive working conditions because both concerns amounted to
improvements as compared to circumstances in their native land. Texas initially received
the most migrants, workers who toiled in land clearing operations; growers in California
also began to import labor during the first decade of the new century.40 Additionally, the
southwestern United States, and especially Texas, experienced an agricultural expansion of
crops that required increased labor for planting and harvesting. This growth involved
traditional cotton harvests as well as newly developed “truck crops” such as onions and
spinach. Within south Texas, cotton production expanded in the Blackland Prairie area
northeast of San Antonio whereas truck crops prospered in the farms nearer Laredo.
Coupled with a labor shortage as a result of U.S. entry into the Great War and the related
necessity of enlarged troop levels, the need for additional workers from Mexico became
apparent to agricultural owner-growers.41
39
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Implementation of the Immigration Act of 1917 caused difficulties for the incoming
migrants due to the institution of policies such as a literacy test, medical exam, head tax,
and the “likely to become a public charge” impediment. Although these hardships proved
an often humiliating imposition to many, close scrutiny could be easily circumvented by
arriving via railroad. Immigration officials recognized that these travelers presumably
worked on the railroad or would be hired on a seasonal basis by employers down the line.42
Nonetheless, the imposition of further restrictions by the Immigration Act of 1924,
including a passport requirement and visa in addition to the installation of a Border Patrol
which insured boundary enforcement, amounted to immigration restriction. The U.S.
government had clearly defined an “illegal” status.43
As immigration restriction became more prevalent during the 1920s, concerns
regarding migration from Mexico increased. As long as the migrants maintained a
transient status, most Anglos found them acceptable. However, the possibility of their
residency in the United States began to raise alarms as the decade continued. Although
restrictionists never achieved a quota system applicable to Mexico, they triumphed through
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increased enforcement regarding the existing policies on visas, head taxes, and more.44 By
1930, the economic situation in the United States had deteriorated with the Great
Depression, and the coming decade began a repatriation of Mexicanos, both immigrants
and U.S. citizens.45
South Texas in the Early Twentieth Century
In her book, Vision, Race, and Modernity, historian Deborah Poole discussed how
ideas about race evolved along with the advancement of new imagery models that primarily
resulted from the proliferation of photography. Although her argument involved
nineteenth-century South America, her premise that modernity and views of race developed
along with the advancement of image technology also applies to San Antonio newspaper
articles during the early twentieth century.46 In mid-1911, the San Antonio Express ran an
article entitled “Dreaded Colima;” this feature story appeared to connect Mexicans and the
Revolution to the only “continuously active fire mountain on the North American
continent.” Complete with photographs and a headline that distorted the title words as if to
suggest turmoil, the account seemed to establish a visual connection between the fomenting
of revolution, the people of Mexico, and the “Dreaded Colima.”47 In another pictorial story
on the same day, the Express section headline used biblical terms in describing the pyramid
44
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Cholula in Puebla, Mexico, as “America’s Tower of Babel.”48 Such articles demonstrated
a demeaning attitude toward Mexico, its people, and their “race” that proliferated in the
Alamo City by the beginning of the 1910s. This type of material also revealed a
fascination with Mexico as an exotic place, but one to maintain a distance from; an
amusement, suitable for viewing through the lens of the newspaper camera, but not for
embracing. A week later, the Express ran a story with pictures of the San Antonio missions
and the reasons for their construction during the eighteenth century. The newspaper
nostalgically heralded the city’s Spanish past, but the article also pictured a group of poor
people who lived in the vicinity, standing in front of their “jaecal,” [sic] as a “typical
family.” Even when celebrating the importance of their Spanish heritage, the newspaper
included stereotypical views of Mexicans as the proverbial “other.”49 The profundity of
visual images of Mexico and its people as exotic and nostalgic, but at the same time
threatening and poor, persisted as the Mexican Revolution of the 1910s continued (see
Figure 2).
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Figure 2: “America’s Tower of Babel” and “Why the Missions Were Built near San Antonio.”
Source: San Antonio Express, June 25 and July 2, 1911.

The demeaning treatment of Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants became an
important subject for a new organization as The First Mexican Congress (El Primer
Congreso Mexicanista) met in September, 1911 to protest this abuse. Although this event
took place in Laredo, Texas, San Antonio delegates to the Congress, as well as the direct
railroad connection between the two cities on the International and Great Northern
Railroad, demonstrated the mission city’s link to the assembly. Organized by Nicasio Idar,
publisher of La Crónica in Laredo, this gathering formed due to the growing domination of
the Mexican community by Anglos in the South Texas area. The conference focused on
five key borderland issues: economic conditions of Texas-Mexicans, the loss of Mexican
culture and the Spanish language, social prejudice, educational discrimination, and the
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lynching of Texas-Mexicans.50 The San Antonio Express covered the event, but
disregarded the grievances of the delegates. The newspaper article reported that the
convention focused on the uplift of the Mexican population in the state and “that its
principal work will be the enlightenment and elevation of the Mexican element in the State
of Texas with a view of making them more desirable and better citizens and a credit to the
Texas cities in which they make their homes.”51 The Express turned the idea of the
convention around by concentrating on what Mexicans needed to accomplish rather than
Anglos. The San Antonio Light failed to cover the event; the newspaper’s page one
emphasis during this period concerned cross-border raiding by Mexican “outlaws” stealing
horses. Also, the Light contended that revolutionary Magónistas engaged in similar illegal
activity in preparation for their planned rebellious raid on Mexico.52 Such newspaper
coverage demonstrates that concerns over activities surrounding the unfolding Mexican
Revolution eclipsed voices from the Mexican-American community that Latinos consider
José E. Limón, “El Primer Congreso Mexicanista de 1911: A Precursor to Contemporary
Chicanismo.” Aztlan, Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (Spring and Fall, 1974): 85-88. Elliott Young discussed why
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the beginning of Chicano activism.
Throughout the early days of the Mexican Revolution, San Antonio’s newspapers
reported on the unfolding of events. Large page one headlines such as “Warships to Guard
American Citizens,” in regard to a siege on Acapulco, Guerrero, “Armistice Off: Madero is
Closing in,” “Federals now at Bay in Heart of Juarez,” and “Juarez and Agua Prieta have
Fallen” included news of the continuing revolution, accompanied by photographic images
of the conflict.53 Editorials added to the story and expressed concern over the continuing
violence. For instance, in response to the ascension of Francisco Madero to the presidency
in 1911, the Light stated: “the revolution has caused the United States much expense and
considerable anxiety, and it will be a relief to know that there is no longer danger of a
serious situation that might compel intervention.”54 This editorial exemplifies mediacoverage during the early days of the revolution; the uprising continued with threatening
events, but most believed that peace would soon follow. However, subtle forms of U.S.
involvement in Mexico began to occur. General Bernard Reyes, once the governor of the
neighboring Mexican state of Nuevo Leon, traveled to San Antonio in October 1911.
Reyes, hoping to ascend to the Mexican presidency, opposed Madero, but failed to gain
enough support in his home country. The general escaped to San Antonio and enjoyed an
initial welcome from the mayor and other local elites. However, once his intention of
fomenting a new revolution surfaced, authorities jailed Reyes and his followers, and seized
“Warships to Guard American Citizens,” “Armistice Off: Madero is Closing in,” “Federals now
at Bay in Heart of Juarez,” and “Juarez and Agua Prieta have Fallen,” San Antonio Light, May 5, 6,
9, and 10, 1911, 1
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their supplies. Madero had plotted his revolution in San Antonio a year earlier, but
attitudes changed as U.S. citizens feared the violence would spill over the border.55
The Plan of San Diego thrust a new terror into the minds of Anglos in South Texas,
that of racial war. Intended to begin on February 20, 1915, this conspiracy originated
amongst revolutionaries jailed in Monterrey, Mexico, as the instigators plotted a war
against Anglo oppression in the Southwestern United States. Hoping to obtain the support
of other non-white groups, their goal involved separating a large section of the United
States and distributing land to Latin, Black, and Asian laborers.56 Details of this scheme
did not surface publically until the San Antonio Express detailed the arrest of organizer
Basilio Ramos in mid-August, 1915 and this account came long after many of the
conspirators’ raids had taken place. Moreover, the Express also revealed information that
implied Mexican government participation in this cross-border conflict.57 These
revolutionaries gained inspiration from Ricardo Magón’s newspaper, Regeneración,
published in San Antonio beginning in 1904, and moving to St. Louis the following year.
The rebels’ dissatisfaction emanated from the agricultural changes in South Texas that
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displaced many U.S. citizens of Mexican descent as well as immigrants from Mexico.58
The Plan of San Diego subsequently fell apart, but not until after the deaths of many on
both sides of the turmoil. Further, vigilantes murdered many Mexicans in Texas not
connected to the schemers, apparently due to fears regarding the increased immigration
from Mexico.59 Additionally, the raid on Columbus, New Mexico, in early 1916 by
supporters of Francisco “Pancho” Villa resulted in an increased U.S. military presence
along the border and, eventually, the invasion of Mexico.
Historians have long debated the precise reason for Villa’s attack on Columbus, a
town in New Mexico not far from the border with Mexico. Nonetheless, the event
profoundly influenced Anglo views of not only the Mexican raider, but also about the
nation of Mexico, as well as its citizens and emigrants. Pancho Villa had suffered difficult
defeats at Celaya and Agua Prieta, Mexico, in 1915 that not only hurt his military standing
versus the “pre-constitutional president” Venustiano Carranza, but the losses also destroyed
his support from the United States government. Villa sought revenge against the United
States because Carranza’s army had crossed American territory without protest to assist the
constitutionalist’s forces in the Agua Prieta battle. Subsequently, the “Villista” raids on
58
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U.S. citizens at Santa Isabel, Chihuahua, in January 1916 and the Columbus attack in
March heightened concerns in the United States over this marauder’s intentions.60 Details
of Santa Isabel blazed across the San Antonio Light headline: “Murder of 17 Americans in
Mexico Stirs Congress; Satisfaction Asked,” and “Americans Capture and Kill Bandits; El
Pasoans Organize to Enter Mexico.”61 Villa’s subsequent assault on Columbus, New
Mexico, two months later, resulted in similar stories with banner headlines in the Light:
“Villa Raids Columbus, N.M., 16 Dead” and “American Troops Reported in Mexico.”62
Occurring not long after the public learned of the Plan of San Diego, the sensationalized
reporting of these events in the newspaper added to suspicions regarding Mexicans and
their motives. Owing to the close association of the Mexican Revolution to the ever
increasing immigrant population in San Antonio, these occurrences and their portrayal
added to the continual growth of negativity regarding “Mexicans” in general. However, the
failure of U.S. military expeditions in Mexico to locate and destroy Villa demonstrated the
difficulty, if not the impracticality, of an intervention there.63 Particularly in Texas, events
involving diplomatic relations with Mexico that assisted in influencing the United States’
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entry into the Great War added to the concern regarding the ongoing Mexican Revolution.
The beginning of war in Europe presented a potential distraction from the ongoing
Mexican Revolution for the people of San Antonio. However, many San Antonians
expressed more concern over the continuing crises along the border than with the events
associated with the Great War. This proved especially true in the mission city due to the
large population of German ancestry who controlled the commercial sector and also
influenced local newspapers. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson enhanced his popularity
with South Texans by toughening the nation’s stand with Mexico in 1915 and then sending
General John Pershing into Mexico in pursuit of Villa after the Columbus incident. The
San Antonio newspapers regularly reported more heavily on the border conflicts connected
to the Revolution as the war in Europe stayed in a subordinate position. This media
coverage highlighted an apprehension regarding the Mexican nation and its people.64 The
view of the Great War changed after Texans learned of the “Zimmerman telegram” from
German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmerman to Mexico in March, 1917, that offered an
alliance in exchange for the Southwestern United States. Public opinion regarding
Germany now plummeted among Texans fearful of the relationship between Mexico and
Germany. Nonetheless, the San Antonio Express declined making any editorial comment
so as to not affront the German commercial elite in the city. In early April, when the
Express backed Wilson’s war declaration, the editorial emphasized that the coming conflict
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involved the German government rather than the people.65 German immigrants, despite
some concerns regarding their loyalty to the United States, posed a lesser threat in Texas
than Mexicans who loomed not only within the state, but directly across the border.
Further, San Antonio’s population included a sizeable number of German-Americans, but
the immigrant percentage had dwindled to the considerably lower level of 3.7 percent by
1910 and 1.6 percent in 1920.66 The attitude toward Mexican immigrants and the
presumption of their revolutionary activities against the United States also helped
encourage the despicable practice of lynching Mexicans and Mexican-Americans.
During the nineteenth century, the lynching of African Americans and Mexicans in
the United States occurred on a regular basis. For persons of Mexican ancestry, the
frequency of these episodes declined during the late nineteenth century and the first decade
of the twentieth. However, the decade of the Mexican Revolution, the 1910s, witnessed a
sharp rise in this activity, followed by an equally steep decline during the following ten
years. These statistics demonstrate the correlation between lynchings in the United States
and Anglo fears regarding the Revolution (see Table 1). Further, close to fifty percent of
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the lynchings during the 1910s occurred in Texas including some of the most publicized
ones.67
Table 1
Lynching of Persons of Mexican Ancestry in the United States
Decade

Lynchings

1851-1860
1861-1870
1871-1880
1881-1890

160
43
147
73

Decade
1891-1900
1901-1910
1911-1920
1921-1930

Lynchings
24
8
124
10

Source: William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, “The Lynching of
Persons of Mexican Origin or Descent in the United States, 18481928,” Journal of Social History, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Winter, 2003): 423.

The lynching of fourteen-year-old Antonio Gomez, who allegedly killed a German
man during a racial confrontation, occupied the front page of the San Antonio Light on June
22, 1911. The accompanying articles indicated that persons of German descent not only
seized the boy out of the Thorndale, Texas, jail and lynched him within hours of the
altercation, but also threatened his entire family who left the community shortly
thereafter.68 This page one reporting took place three days following the actual event and
only after the Mexican consul in San Antonio began to look into the occurrence.69
Although both the Light and Express included articles over the next few months regarding
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the injustice of the lynching, juries eventually cleared all of the accused of the charges
against them. The Express reported in a small article that a “love feast” occurred amongst
the last defendant and his numerous supporters after the return of a not guilty verdict.70
This incident proved indicative of many lynchings in Texas during this period; Anglos
avoided prosecution in all of the cases, and victims usually came from the ranks of poor
Mexican laborers. Also, Anglos often justified actions against Mexicans by stereotyping
these impoverished people as possessing a natural tendency toward criminal activities.
During the Mexican Revolution, as many migrants escaped the violence of the rebellion,
this itinerant population bore the brunt of Anglo revenge for the illegal behaviors of a few.
Ventures into Texas by outlaws and rebels from Mexico resulted in Anglos doubting the
lawfulness of any persons of Mexican origin within the state. These Anglo actions also
brought about a response by Mexican activists in San Antonio who formed La Agrupación
(The Association) shortly after the Gomez lynching to supply legal assistance to their
countrymen who faced similar fates.71 An organization that became synonymous with
lynching, the Ku Klux Klan, experienced a rebirth after its demise during the post-Civil
War period and began to expand throughout the United States during the late-1910s.
Eventually, this secretive society surfaced within the state of Texas.
The Ku Klux Klan arrived in Houston, Texas, during the fall of 1920 and within the
next five weeks, over one hundred communities in the state had organized local affiliates.

70

“Ezra Stephens is Acquitted,” San Antonio Express, May 11, 1912, 1.

Carrigan and Webb, “The Lynching of Persons of Mexican Origin or Descent in the United
States,” 417-425.
71

50

An estimated 97,000 to 170,000 Klan members lived in Texas at its high point, and the
organization wielded a considerable political presence in the state. The San Antonio Klan
number 31 contained several prominent members of the community’s elite including
attorney Marvin A. Childers of the law firm Douglas, Carter, and Childers. After the Klan
unsuccessfully attempted to elect a state governor in 1924, Childers became the “Grand
Dragon” of Texas and moved the state headquarters from Dallas to San Antonio. This
relocation followed the practice of previous Klan leaders and did not necessarily indicate
that the Klan maintained a large presence in the Alamo City. Moreover, at this point, the
Klan in Texas had lost much of its previous prestige, and the membership began to wane,
falling to 780 state-wide by 1930. Although the San Antonio Klan never rose to a similar
prominence by comparison with cities such as Dallas, the anti-immigration, opposition to
the Roman Catholic Church, and English-only language principles of the organization
would have definitely found Mexican immigrants in the Alamo City problematic.72 Others
shared some of the Klan’s views.
Although the American Federation of Labor (AFL) maintained a much different
public image than the Klan, the anti-immigration stance of the organization offers a parallel
to the secret society. Samuel Gompers, the originator and long-time leader of the
72
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American Federation of Labor (AFL), hired Clemente Idar in 1918 as a liaison to Spanishspeaking workers in southern Texas.73 Idar, an American of Mexican ancestry who lived
adjacent to the San Antonio barrio, represented an incongruity concerning immigrants that
lived in the Alamo City versus the principles of his employer, the AFL. Gompers opposed
immigration to the United States, including from Mexico, on the grounds that new workers
took the jobs of existing citizens. The union leader’s comments in a 1921 letter to
Secretary of Labor James J. Davis regarding allowing additional guest workers from
Mexico to enter the United States demonstrates this resistance: “Now it is proposed to
induce other Mexican laborers, with your permission, to enter the United States to still
further break down the standards of living of the American workers. They are not needed
in this country.”74 Of English and Jewish origins, Samuel Gompers harbored racist views
toward European immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. After the Great War, he
moved toward immigration restriction not only for economic reasons, but also due to fears
regarding an erosion of “Americanism,” supposedly posed by Bolsheviks and other nonnorthern European immigrants.75 Gompers began a parallel association to the AFL, the Pan
American Federation of Labor, to strengthen labor organizations in other nations and,
thereby, prevent migration to the United States. This principle especially applied to
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immigration from Mexico.76 Idar’s role in Gompers’ strategy involves several
complexities. As a Texas American and representative of the AFL, he embodied the antiimmigration views harbored by the organization. However, as a Spanish-speaking member
of the San Antonio community, Idar’s ancestral allegiance remained with Mexicanos
including those who migrated from Mexico.77 This apparent ambiguity will be thoroughly
explored in Chapter 6. Since San Antonio contained the largest population in the southern
portion of the state as well as the most significant Mexicano community, the city offers the
ideal place for evaluating the continuing denigration of Mexican Americans and
immigrants.
San Antonio
Between 1910 and 1920, immigration from Mexico to San Antonio accelerated as the
Mexican Revolution created political and economic hardships that convinced people to
seek refuge in the United States. Despite the long-time presence of a significant population
of Mexican ancestry in San Antonio as well as an appreciation of Spanish heritage, the
Anglo population increasingly separated and denigrated Mexicans as the decade
progressed. This trend portended increasingly hostile attitudes towards Mexicanos
throughout the twentieth century.
Before 1910 in San Antonio, Mexicano and Anglo groups developed an increasing
intolerance of one another. Moreover, the overall percentage of Mexican-born population,
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once the dominant group within the city, steadily decreased during the period beginning in
1870. A review of U.S. Census data for Bexar County, with San Antonio as the key city,
reveals that the Mexican-born population declined from over fourteen percent of the total in
1870 to under seven percent by 1900 (see Table 2). This decrease occurred because of the
influx of Anglo migrants during the nineteenth century as well as the inter-marriage of
Mexican Americans within other ethnicities. During the beginnings of the Texas Republic
and annexation by the United States, many Mexicans enjoyed prosperity and a prestigious
background as the original inhabitants of the city. This position deteriorated during the
nineteenth century as a small stream of poorer Mexican migrants made their way into the
community. Further, new German and existing Anglo merchants began to dominate the
retail trade as they catered to their own populations. Mexican-American employment
continually gravitated toward manual labor.78 With the coming of the Mexican Revolution
in 1910, political and economic migration increased, and whatever tolerance remained in
the Anglo community toward the migrants diminished to the point of outright rejection as
well as fear.79 By 1920, the Mexican-born population increased to over sixteen percent of
the total and resided in a segregated area on the city’s West Side. However, this evolution
demonstrated a multi-dimensional dynamic as the city continued to celebrate its Spanish
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heritage while denigrating this new migration as well as the nation of Mexico.80 As the
number of immigrants from Germany dwindled (see Table 2) and those from Mexico
increased, Mexicanos comprised the primary migrant presence in San Antonio. The
Alamo, long a symbol of the community’s separation from Mexico, now became the center
of attention for these divisive developments within the city. Changes in historical memory
regarding the battle for the old mission formed the basis of a renewed conflict to claim the
dominant identity in the city.
Table 2
Bexar County, Texas: Mexican and German Population Totals 1870-1920
Year
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920

Bexar County Bexar County
Total
Mexican Born
16,043
2,309 (14.4%)
30,470
3,498 (11.5%)
49,266
3,561 (7.2%)
69,422
4,752 (6.8%)
119,676
13,266 (11%)
202,096
32,934 (16.3%)

Bexar County
German Born
1,829 (11.4 %)
2,621 (8.6 %)
4,039 (8.2%)
3,958 (5.7%)
4,423 (3.7%)
3,331 (1.6%)

Source: University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data Center,
“Historical Census Browser,” http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/. To
view the exact information from this website, click on "white persons
born in Mexico" or “Germany” under Ethnicity/Race/Place of Birth on
the first screen and click submit, then indicate "Texas" from the state list
and click on "Retrieve County-Level" on the subsequent page. A list of
totals by county, as well as the state, follows.

Historian Richard Flores examined San Antonio between 1880 and 1920 in
Remembering the Alamo (2002). In seeking to account for varying interpretations of the
battle that took place at the Alamo in 1836, Flores argued that a new perception of the past
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emerged because of the changing dynamics in the city at the turn-of-the century. The
revised “history” represented the increased migration from Mexico after 1900 rather than
the actual events of the Alamo. Flores asserted that during the 1880 to 1920 era he termed
“Texas Modern,” the Alamo—as a sacred place and Davy Crockett as a key hero—
experienced a new emergence in the minds of the Anglo hierarchy of the city. Whereas it
had long been a symbol of Texas’ heroic past, the Alamo now became “a master symbol of
modernity” as the city moved from a wide open western town to a modern twentiethcentury metropolis. In a now racialized interpretation, the Alamo conflict emerged as a
battle between Mexican invaders and Anglo-only defenders, despite the historical
inaccuracy of that position. Many Tejanos fought alongside Anglos at the Alamo, a central
point about the original conflict now lost in the “racial” battle that characterized the early
twentieth-century retelling.81 The memory of the historical events that took place at the
Alamo changed to validate a contemporary objective as competing forces attempted to gain
control of the old mission.
During a period commonly referred to as the “second battle of the Alamo,” two
women squared off over control of the old battle site, as well as command of an
organization begun in 1891, the Daughters of the Texas Republic (DTR). Clare Driscoll, a
wealthy Anglo socialite from Corpus Christi, and Adina De Zavala, a native of San
Antonio and descendant of a Mexican family who sought to preserve the genuine history of
the Alamo, led their respective branches of the DTR in this skirmish over which group
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would seize the historical definition of the Alamo. Driscoll attended private schools in San
Antonio and New York and used her own funds to assist in purchasing the crumbling
structure until the state of Texas agreed to finalize the acquisition. Once Texas completed
this transaction in early 1905, the legislature accorded custodianship of the Alamo to
Driscoll’s chapter of the DRT. Driscoll, as quoted in the San Antonio Express, believed
that the DRT’s primary function involved the preservation of the chapel rather than the rest
of the site.82 She desired to convert the remainder of the grounds “into a beautiful park
filled with swaying palms and tropical verdure, enclosed by a low way [sic], with arched
gateway of Spanish architecture.”83 After several years of legal wrangling between the two
sides that included lawsuits, as well as De Zavala barricading herself within the walls of the
ancient site, Driscoll and her backers won out. By 1912, the DRT voted De Zavala’s group
out of the organization, and she began the Texas Historical Landmarks Association to
continue her historical mission throughout the state. Nonetheless, De Zavala succeeded in
preventing the destruction of some of the original mission walls which remained one of her
main points of contention with the Driscoll people. She also wished to preserve the
historical value of the site as a memorial to all who actually served there, Indian, Spanish,
Mexican, Texan, and American, rather than only allow its use as a modern-day racialized
symbol. De Zavala, a descendant of one of the old Mexican families in the city,
represented the ongoing decline of influence that group experienced in the management of
city affairs. On the other hand, Driscoll, as the daughter of a prosperous Anglo railroad and
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ranching owner who remained deeply involved in the displacement of the Mexican
community in south Texas, symbolized the new control exercised by the white elite.84
These events portended the future with De Zavala representative of the end of an era in San
Antonio; nevertheless, she continued her fight for control of the rhetoric until her death.
This clash represented a conflict for possession of San Antonio’s identity between the
Spanish San Antonio of De Zavala and the Anglo aristocracy represented by Driscoll.
Owing to the forging of a new memory regarding the battle for the Alamo, the Driscoll elite
emerged victorious. Driscoll died in 1945 and lay in state at the Alamo before burial as if
to stake final claim for her cause just as De Zavala accomplished when barricading herself
there in 1908. A Hollywood film could not recount a more appropriate script as the 1955
De Zavala funeral procession merely drove by the battle site to honor her as a former
“combatant.”85
Another battle over San Antonio’s identity and the memory of the Alamo
materialized in the emerging venue of the cinema. The film Martyrs of the Alamo (1915)
reflected the increasingly hostile attitude toward the Mexican populace during the post1910 period as Mexican immigration accelerated. Produced under the supervision of D.W.
Griffith, Martyrs subjected Mexicans to a treatment similar to that accorded African
Americans in Birth of a Nation (1914).86 In portraying Mexican soldiers as slovenly and
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sex-crazed for Anglo women, the images from Martyrs resonated with the public as an
Anglo versus Mexican tale despite the historical distortions. Further altering history, the
film depicted all of the defenders of the Alamo as Anglos wearing coon-skin caps, clearly
associating them with the U.S. frontier. Billed as a “historical drama” on one of the first
title cards in the silent film, an ensuing one indicated that “Santa Anna had failed to reckon
with the undaunted valor of the hardy American pioneers of that age.” Another card read
“Under the dictator’s rule the honor and life of American womanhood was held in
contempt.” In the following scene, drunk and disorderly Mexican soldiers continually
harassed the Anglo residents of San Antonio and pursued a blonde-haired woman
attempting to hide behind her aging protector. Dramatically, the next title card read
“Memories of the days when the stars and stripes gave them the right to protection” as her
guardian lamented his vulnerable position. During the fictionalized battle, the action
shifted rapidly from one location to the next as a stationary camera filmed the actors
moving in and out of frame. In one scene, Davy Crockett died gloriously at the hands of
dozens of Mexican soldiers who cornered him along one of the mission walls. Portraying
Santa Anna as using drugs and engaged in an orgy shortly before the Battle of San Jacinto,
the film also introduced a new “historical” character, “silent” Smith, who saved the day at
that same campaign by feigning hearing loss and stealing the enemy’s plans. Although
only seventy minutes in length compared to the much longer Birth of a Nation, Martyrs’
depiction of Mexicans followed the same stereotype used in the earlier production
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regarding African Americans.87 After viewing the film in early 1916, members of
Driscoll’s DRT commented to the San Antonio Light newspaper: the film “is not only
beautiful and educational, but productive of a feeling of deeper reverence for the history of
Texas . . . .88 In another scene reflective of the desire during the 1910s to manage the
immigrant populace in San Antonio, the cinematic Anglos briefly maintained authority
over the city before the actual fighting over the Alamo began. Consequently, the Mexican
citizenry all behaved in a “civilized” manner during this period of Anglo control.89 This
scene provided an unmistakable statement; it viewed Mexicans as incapable of governing
themselves in a civilized manner. Only under Anglo governance could they exhibit proper
conduct. Clearly, the film represented the period of its production rather than the actual
historical event. The genre of “historical memory” provides a context for this obviously
skewed version of the battle of the Alamo.
In one of the first studies on historical memory, historian John Bodnar described two
types of culture in the United States: official culture, as created by national leaders and
served a specific purpose, and vernacular culture that represented how society really felt.
Bodnar asserted that historical memory represented the present more than the past and that
political leaders depended on this whereas "ordinary people" stayed interested in the
87
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defense of their own social segments.90 Anglo societal leaders in San Antonio matched
Bodnar’s parameters in their advancement of a new Alamo narrative during the period
when the production of Martyrs of the Alamo occurred. Anglo elites, as well as the society
they led, believed that the present situation in the city implored them to take action in
defense of their own social order. Bodnar’s assertions also assist in fitting Flores’ 1880 to
1920 study into the argument of this dissertation as Anglo elites used the memory of the
Alamo to denigrate contemporary Mexicanos.
A further downward evolution of this prejudiced opinion regarding Mexicans
occurred as a result of the escalating immigration after 1910 that transpired in conjunction
with the Mexican Revolution. The 1890 to 1910 period began this transformation, but the
post-1910 changes took the Anglo/Mexican relationship to a lower level and culminated in
calls for immigration restriction throughout the borderlands in the period after 1920.91 In a
related topic, the association between early twentieth-century Anglos and the city’s Spanish
identity often materialized within the pages of the local newspapers.
The ambiguous connection between San Antonio’s Anglos and the area’s Spanish
heritage resulted in a city that “segregated the Mexicans but employed them, loved their
culture but disliked them. In essence, it needed their labor, but rejected their presence.”92
90

John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration and Patriotism in the
Twentieth Century (Princeton University Press, 1992), 14-20.
91

Mae Ngai has repeatedly demonstrated that despite a lack of formal Western Hemisphere
immigration restriction in the early 1920s, requirements for a passport and visa in addition to the
implementation of a Border Patrol which insured boundary enforcement amounted to immigration
restriction. See Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 7, 19, 58-64.
92

Garcia, Rise of the Mexican Middle Class, 24.

61

The Mexican community in San Antonio operated as a “town within a city,” but these
immigrants also assisted the city’s change from a frontier to a modern metropolis.93 The
San Antonio Express newspaper offered articles about the importance of allowing Mexican
migrants to take jobs in agriculture, mining, and railroads left vacant by Anglo soldiers
after U.S. entry into World War I. However, in a “Texas for Texans” argument, the
newspaper included statements of concern regarding the corruption of politics if these same
immigrants became citizens and voted.94 Adding to the degradation of Mexicanos, ethnicowned employment agencies proliferated in San Antonio, particularly during the early
1920s. Viewed by the state as abusive of the Mexican laborers that they served, the labor
recruiters nonetheless served an important function in connecting migrants to jobs.95
Moreover, because the agencies added more migrants to the streets of the city, Anglos
denigrated both the workers and the agents. San Antonio maintained a unique relationship
with the Mexican cities directly south of Texas that sent most of the immigrants to the city.
San Antonio occupied a unique position in the “borderlands” between Mexico and the
United States. A significantly-sized city approximately 150 miles from the international
boundary, its role as a “border” community may appear suspect. However, the Alamo City
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maintained enduring social and economic connections between the two nations, and also
retained a political element as evidenced by the organization of the United States Border
Patrol in 1924 when Congress designated three districts of control. The San Antonio
District comprised an area from Del Rio, Texas, to the Gulf of Mexico despite the main
office’s distance from the border.96
As the year 1915 approached, Anglo society continued to denigrate the burgeoning
Mexican population in San Antonio. This chapter has demonstrated that the disparagement
began well before 1915, certainly as early as the 1896 to 1897 period when the In re
Rodriguez decision resonated throughout the city. However, the premise of this
dissertation maintains that this maligning of Mexicanos in San Antonio continued to
escalate throughout the 1915 to 1925 timeframe as various events and programs heightened
the exposure and proliferation of people of Mexican ancestry in the Alamo City as well as
the United States.

Immigrants needed a reliable method of transportation for their trip

north from the Monterrey-center to San Antonio, Texas. Railroads, such as the
International and Great Northern Railway, flourished during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Construction of railroads in both Mexico and the United States
became vital to industrialization as well as modernization. Also, passenger transportation
on the railroads offered a viable method for immigrants to traverse north in search of
employment. Migrants from different states in Mexico tended to use specific rail lines.
Those who began in the states of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas, particularly the
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“Monterrey Center,” tended to come through Laredo or Eagle Pass, Texas. The “corridors”
or “tracks” traveled by Mexican immigrants assisted in determining where they eventually
ended up as well as the type of work performed.
Nonetheless, many Mexican migrants ended up in San Antonio for various reasons.
First, the Alamo City remained a point of disembarkation on a historical basis as the first
permanent Spanish settlement in the Mexican state of Tejas. Next, urban employees and
agricultural workers lived within the West Side barrio and, as necessary, traveled to distant
locations of employment. Most of the agricultural workers labored in cotton picking,
truck-crop farming, and pecan shelling. The West Side, despite the poor housing
conditions, offered camaraderie with fellow Mexicanos, cheap rents, and mutual support
organizations. Finally, the depot for the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad that provided
transportation to employment areas in northern Texas and Kansas, as well as the terminal
of the International and Great Northern Railway that traversed the boundary at Laredo,
both resided within the West Side barrio. This dissertation now moves to a discussion of
the history of these two railroads, as well as other pertinent rail lines, and their respective
impact on migration from northern Mexico to San Antonio within the Nuevo Leon
corridor.
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CHAPTER 2
THE INTERNATIONAL AND GREAT NORTHERN RAILROAD AND
THE NUEVO LEON CORRIDOR
Elías Garza came from the Mexican state of Morelos during the Porfiriato, but after
several return trips to his home country as well as difficulties in the United States, he had
remained in America when interviewed by sociologist Manuel Gamio around 1930.
Garza witnessed many occurrences that involved racism during his stay in the United
States and also endured his own share. His experiences undoubtedly tell a common tale
regarding men who initially came to the United States to work on the railroad. Crossing
the border into El Paso, Garza worked on laying new tracks all the way to Kansas for the
decent wage of $1.50 per day, but was ultimately gouged at the “Commissary camp” by
having to pay extraordinarily high prices. However, Garza still managed to send money
home to his mother in Mexico.1 Another worker on the railroad in Kansas, Iglesias
Wenceslao, told Gamio that “Americans” working on the railroad, presumably Anglos,
refused to stay in the same train car with Mexicans and insured that meal time saw the
whites take all the “best” food. When Wenceslao subsequently worked for the railroad in
Texas, they experienced segregation in the local restaurants and had to eat with “the
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Negroes.”2 Mexican immigrants such as Garza and Wenceslao contributed to the
building of the railroads that allowed them to travel to the United States for employment
and earn a better living than possible in Mexico.
In his book, Corridors of Migration: The Odyssey of Mexican Laborers, 1600-1933,
Rodolfo Acuña presented a new theory regarding the history of migration. He
maintained that “corridors contain and connect natural open spaces; they follow rivers,
streams, washes, or other natural courses. Like hallways, they channel human movement
back and forth between areas that support life. Historians sometimes call them ‘cultural
and historical routes.’”3 Acuña concentrated on migration through El Paso, Texas, to Los
Angeles. Nonetheless, this premise may be applied to San Antonio; the Sierra Madre
Oriental Mountains run to the east of Acuña’s “El Camino Real Corridor,” and the
Mexican state of Nuevo Leon lies further to the east of the mountains with Monterrey as
its key city.4 The subsequent formation of the “Nuevo Leon Corridor” that travels from
the Monterrey area to San Antonio, Texas, demonstrates the importance of northern
Mexico to immigration during the 1915 to 1925 period, as well as the prominence of the
International and Great Northern Railway (I&GN)5 as the vehicle for this migration. Due

2

Ibid., 176-177.

3

Rodolfo F. Acuña, Corridors of Migration: The Odyssey of Mexican Laborers, 1600-1933
(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2007), xi.
4

Ibid., x-xi, 3.

Although referred to as the “International” and Great Northern Railway, the railroad only crossed
the national border at Laredo to deliver freight to the Mexican side. The term came from one of the
two companies, The International Railway Company, which formed in 1870 “with the intent of
making connections at both ends to other railroads” between Laredo and northeastern Texas. See:
Hugh Hemphill, The Railroads of San Antonio and South Central Texas, (San Antonio: Maverick
5
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to the significance of the Nuevo Leon Corridor and the I&GN Railway to immigration
from northern Mexico to San Antonio within this timeframe, these two entities comprise
the focus of this chapter. Further, another rail line, the Galveston, Harrisburg, and San
Antonio (GH&SA), also constituted an important migratory route from Monterrey to the
Alamo City. The GH&SA connected to a secondary link of the Mexican National
Railway that traveled between Monterrey and Piedras Negras,6 a city across the Rio
Grande from Eagle Pass, Texas. Two railroads, the I&GN and the GH&SA in
conjunction with the Mexican National Railway, brought a majority of immigrants from
northern Mexico to San Antonio where they would obtain both rural and urban
employment, but also experience racial degradation and segregation in the Alamo City.
The two railroads both linked the Monterrey Center, mentioned in Chapter 1, to south
Texas, and particularly, San Antonio. Moreover, the I&GN Railway that connected to
the Mexican railroad at Laredo linked with San Antonio along traditional migratory
routes.
Fred Wilbur Powell, writing in 1921 about The Railroads of Mexico, identified a prerailroad route that moved north through Mexico from the city of San Luis Potosi to
Saltillo, Monterrey, and Nuevo Laredo, and then toward San Antonio. The railway
expansion between Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo, finished in 1882, fulfilled part of the
Mexican International system that connected to the I&GN extension, completed in 1881
Publishing Co., 2006), 19.
6

The name of Piedras Negras changed to Ciudad Porfirio Diaz in 1888 to honor long-time
President Diaz. It reverted to Piedras Negras during the Mexican Revolution in 1911. See:
http://www.piedrasnegras.gob.mx/2010/06/historia/.

67

from San Antonio to Laredo (see Figure 3).7 With the establishment of this connection,
Mexican immigrant workers gained a direct and historic route to travel to the United
States by rail. By 1917, the San Antonio Express, an English language morning daily,
also recognized the importance of Monterrey to the Alamo City’s reputation as a
noteworthy distribution center for U.S. and Mexican products.8
However, before moving on to a discussion of the Nuevo Leon Corridor and the
I&GN, a review of the circumstances in northern Mexico and the beginnings of the
Mexican railroads supplies information on how and why immigrants arrived at Laredo
and Eagle Pass. Migrants often took rail transportation within Mexico before arriving at
either of these Texas ports along the Rio Grande. The development of Mexican railroads
proved essential to the stimulation of immigration from northern Mexico to San Antonio
as these lines offered quick and reliable movement to the north.

7

Fred Wilbur Powell, The Railroads of Mexico (Boston: The Stratford Publishers, 1921), 94-95,
127, 134.
H.M. Compton, “City Is Distributing Point for Mexico,” San Antonio Express, January 2, 1918,
Section A, 1. Linda B. Hall and Don M. Coerver demonstrated that San Antonio showed the largest
increase in import/export trade with Mexico during the latter portion of the 1910s. See Revolution
on the Border: The United States and Mexico, 1910-1920 (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1988), 154. Historian Richard Garcia also noted that San Antonio developed as a
commerce, trade, and labor center in the eighteenth century; he continued that by the early
twentieth century, the attraction of agricultural work created a “magnet for immigration” in the city.
See: Richard A. Garcia, Rise of the Mexican Middle Class: San Antonio, 1929-1941 (College
Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1991), 16, 29.
8
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Figure 3: Mexican Railroads by 1914 with Connections to U.S. Lines. Source: Hemphill, The
Railroads of San Antonio, x, 7, 55, 72. Drawn by author on: http://dmaps.com/carte.php?&num_car=28599&lang=en.
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Northern Mexico
As may be observed in Figure 3, the Mexican state of Nuevo Leon lies largely to the
east of the Sierra Madre Oriental Mountains. Monterrey, the capital of Nuevo Leon, also
maintained the largest population in the immediate three-state area during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and has done so even to the present. The threestate portion of Northern Mexico consists of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas,
reading from left to right across the map, and adjacent to the Rio Grande. Unimproved
roads had subsisted in Mexico during the colonial period and continued throughout the
nineteenth century after Mexican Independence in 1821. Often consisting of little more
than trails, these routes served as economic trade corridors for goods transported by
wagons, two-wheeled carts, and pack animals as the Spanish practice of inadequate road
construction traveled to the New World. The two-wheeled vehicle, known as a carro, and
pulled by as many as sixteen mules, often moved in large caravans for protection from
Native American raiders. Moreover, these difficult to navigate roads also served the
purpose of isolating and controlling indigenous people. Despite the collection of tolls on
many roadways, the availability of funds from governmental sources for road improvement
and maintenance proved scarce due to the cost associated with the mountainous topography
encountered all through the nation and because of financial difficulties experienced by
Spain and then, Mexico. A significant pre-railroad route, Camino Real de la Tierra
Adentro (Royal Road of the Inland), began in Mexico City and traveled northwest to Santa
Fe, but divided into a second road from San Luis Potosi through Saltillo, Monterrey, and
Nuevo Laredo, toward San Antonio and, thereby, revealed the historical importance of the
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Alamo City to northern Mexico. See within Figure 4: Santa Fe resides to the north of El
Paso, Texas, and San Antonio lies above Laredo, Texas. Although this route traversed the
northern territories of Mexico, after the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that
ended the Mexican-American War in 1848, San Antonio lay north of the re-drawn
international border between the two nations.9

Figure 4: Pre-railroad Routes in Mexico. Source: Powell, The
Railroads of Mexico 93-95. Map based on Powell’s description and
drawn on http://www.news-articles.org/mexico.php.

Further reinforcing evidence of a distinct corridor from northern Mexico to south
Texas, the pathways transporting commerce north along these primitive roads had
functioned as trade routes long before the introduction of the railroad. Migrant workers

9

John H. Coatsworth, Growth Against Development: the Economic Impact of Railroads in
Porfirian Mexico (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981), 17-24. Powell, The Railroads
of Mexico, 91-95. S.G. Reed, A History of the Texas Railroads (Houston: St. Clair Publishing Co.,
1941), 23. These ideas also reflect those of Rodolfo F. Acuña who wrote about the migratory
routes from central Mexico through El Paso to Los Angeles. See Acuña, Corridors of Migration, xxi, 3.
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also traversed these commercial highways in search of employment in northern Mexico and
the United States, thereby establishing patterns that would continue into the early twentieth
century. Because of the lack of navigable rivers in Mexico, coastal and ocean shipping
lanes also offered alternative methods of transportation. However, most evidence indicates
that coastal traffic remained small, whereas ocean shipping had long occupied a significant
position in the development of the Mexican economy, especially through the eastern port
on the Gulf of Mexico at Vera Cruz.
During the administration of President Porfirio Diaz, railroads began to appear
throughout the Mexican countryside, and the first rail line constructed in Mexico linked the
capital city to Vera Cruz in 1873. Subsequently, the Nuevo Leon to San Antonio railroad
corridor became a reality after the completion of the Monterrey to Nuevo Laredo
connection by the Mexican National Railway. This Mexican rail line spur, completed in
1882, then coupled to the I&GN link from Laredo to San Antonio that had been finished in
1881. Following the establishment of rail connections, railroad freight traffic from central
Mexico to northern border cities soon rose substantially by comparison with traffic going to
coastal ports.10 Table 3 demonstrates the fluctuation of exports among the coastal ports and
three cities on the northern border that attained the most significant export movement. The
addition of the northerly railroad routes by 1882 definitely diminished the exports shipped
from the eastern coast of Mexico. Further, over time, the freight transported across the Rio
Grande from Piedras Negras and Nuevo Laredo steadily developed in comparison with
Ciudad Juárez, across from El Paso. As discussed in Chapter 1, the increase at these two
10

Coatsworth, Growth Against Development, 25-26. Powell, The Railroads of Mexico, 127,134.
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border cities reflects the continuing growth of Monterrey as an industrial center and San
Antonio as a distribution point.
Table 3: Distribution of Exports by Region/Port (percent of total exports)
Region or Port
1881 1886 1891 1896 1901
1906 1911
All Gulf Coast
73.7 55.7
51.6
56.6
59.6
66.1
62.7
Ciudad Juárez (El Paso)
__
24.3
22.7
18.7
14.4
9.9
10.0
Piedras Negras (Eagle Pass)
.4
1.8
4.3
2.9
4.2
6.6
7.2
Nuevo Laredo (Laredo)
.8
3.1
5.3
3.1
4.7
5.8
8.4
Source: Coatsworth, Growth Against Development, 28-29. Coatsworth used El Colegio
de Mexico as his source.
Just as freight crossed the Rio Grande, so too did railway passengers. With the
establishment of this connection to the north, workers possessed a rapid, direct, and historic
route to travel to the United States border and beyond by rail via the Nuevo Leon Corridor.
Clearly, immigrants passed through one of two key ports of entry that led to San Antonio,
the major one in Laredo and another in Eagle Pass, Texas. However, migrants initially had
to arrive at the border to take the I&GN from Laredo or the GH&SA at Eagle Pass. The
train lines between the two countries cannot be considered “international” since passengers
on Mexican railroads needed to disembark, cross the bridge over the Rio Grande, and
proceed to the U.S. train station. Movement from the Monterrey Center through the Nuevo
Leon Corridor depended on railroads in Mexico to arrive at Laredo and Eagle Pass. The
Mexican National Railway with spurs that originated in Monterrey served Nuevo Laredo
and Piedras Negras, across the border from Laredo and Eagle Pass respectively, and
assisted in creating the Nuevo Leon Corridor. Once complete, the Mexican rail lines
provided the vehicle for immigrant movement north to the United States.
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Nuevo Leon, Mexico, during the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
Within the three northern border Mexican states of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and
Tamaulipas that reside directly south of San Antonio, nine municipalities contained more
than 20,000 inhabitants within the 1921 Mexican Census. Three of these municipal areas
lie within each of the three states, and Table 4 reveals the population data for each of the
nine areas. The locations of these various municipalities hold importance in evaluating the
migratory trends of Mexicans to San Antonio. According to the distribution of applicants
from 1915 to 1925 to a mutual assistance organization in San Antonio named Sociedad de
la Unión, a majority of those born in Mexico, close to seventy percent, originated in the
three northern states of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. Further, the Monterrey
Center, comprised of Monterrey, Saltillo, Montemorelos, and Linares, contributed the
largest overall total of the Mexican-born applicants to la Unión at over twenty-six
percent.11 These statistics assist in establishing the importance of the Monterrey area to
migration to San Antonio. The Monterrey municipality and its immediate environs offer
the most significant information to assess regarding immigration from northern Mexico to
San Antonio, Texas, during the 1915 to 1925 period. Therefore, this dissertation will
concentrate on the political and economic situation in La Sultana (Monterrey) that
encouraged migration to south Texas.

11

Libro de Actas, 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921, 1922-1926, Sociedad de la Unión Collection,
1893-1980, Our Lady of the Lake University, 411 S.W. 24th Street, San Antonio, Texas (hereafter,
referred to as Libro de Actas). The number of applicants to Sociedad de la Unión and included in
this discussion amounts to 1178.
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Table 4
Municipal Population of Areas 20,000 or Higher within Coahuila,
Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas, 1921
Municipality
Monterrey
Tampico
Saltillo
Torreon
San Pedro
Victoria
Linares
Montemorelos
Matamoros

State
Nuevo Leon
Tamaulipas
Coahuila
Coahuila
Coahuila
Tamaulipas
Nuevo Leon
Nuevo Leon
Tamaulipas

Population
98,305
94,667
60,705
56,449
51,464
22,599
22,090
20,905
20,250

Source: Estados Unidos Mexicana, Departamento de las Estadística
Nacional, Censo General de Habitantes (Talleres Graphicos de la
Nación, 1921), 105-134.

The year 1848 marked an important change for Nuevo Leon and other northern states
in Mexico. After the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo ended the Mexican American War in
that year, Nuevo Leon transformed from a frontier state in the lightly populated north to a
border area directly south of a burgeoning United States. However, before the significant
rise of its industrial base beginning around 1890, Monterrey, located in the state of Nuevo
Leon, languished as a northern border area far from the central core of the nation in Mexico
City. Once the urban area of Monterrey developed a considerable quantity of both
industrial and commercial manufacturing facilities after 1890, the municipality became a
magnet for additional companies and migrants from within Mexico. The city’s location
along the main railroad route north from Mexico City to San Antonio, Texas, enhanced the
power of the industrial entities by allowing quick intake of raw materials as well as a fast
turnaround to the larger market of the Mexican nation. The industries in Monterrey
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included steel and cement which both aided the prolific boom in Mexican infrastructure
growth during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Cervecería
Cuauhtémoc brewery became a popular and successful company by distributing beer
throughout the nation and also enhancing other industries such as glass works, cork
manufacturing, and packaging. Many of the companies retained a vertical integration by
owning commercial companies that sold the manufactured product. This also meant that
the industrial leaders maintained a positive connection with their employees due to a
parallel relationship with the workers of Monterrey as consumers. The political
establishment in Nuevo Leon, led by long-time governor Bernardo Reyes, benefitted the
growth of industry with favorable zoning laws, tariffs, and other legislation designed for
their success. Fifteen to twenty families, the regiomontano (“Monterrey,” literally, “Royal
Mountain”) capitalists, dominated industrial ownership by applying horizontal integration.
Due to the birth of many children as well as inter-marriage amongst their class, an elite
society emerged in the city of Monterrey. Most importantly, the city developed this
significant industrial base during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries due to
Monterrey’s proximity to both the domestic market of Mexico and the foreign one in the
United States. The expansion of the railroad through Laredo and on to San Antonio, Texas,
helped insure the close relationship between Monterrey and the United States.12

12

Juan Mora-Torres, The Making of the Mexican Border: the State, Capitalism, and Society in
Nuevo Leon, 1848-1910 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 2-3, 89-100. Alex M. Saragoza,
The Monterrey Elite and the Mexican State, 1880-1940 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988),
32-33, 35, 36-37. Vivienne Bennett, The Politics of Water: Urban Protest, Gender, and power in
Monterrey, Mexico (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 11-12. Mario Cerutti, “Monterrey and Its
Ambito Regional, 1850-1910: Historical Context and Methodological Recommendations,” in
Mexico’s Regions: Comparative History and Development, edited by Eric Van Young (San Diego:
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Life in the countryside of Nuevo Leon provided a much different experience for
manual workers during this late nineteenth and early twentieth-century period. As
Monterrey forged ahead, the rest of Nuevo Leon remained mired in the past with a
lackluster economy. Between 1877 and 1910, the population of Monterrey increased from
seven to twenty-one percent of the state total due to a significant flow of migrants into the
city in search of employment. Because of the many mountains, hills, and low water
resources throughout Nuevo Leon, a small portion of the state offered agricultural
possibilities. Further, due to the proximity of the mountains, the unpredictability of the
weather proved detrimental to the basic crops such as maize and wheat being grown there.
Governmental policy in the state favored the escalating Monterrey industry over the
restrained countryside.13 Meanwhile, “Mexico’s Chicago,” a title attributed to Monterrey,
attracted migrants not only from Nuevo Leon, but due to the skills often required for
industrial work, from other Mexican states, Europe, and the United States. Labor scarcity
in La Sultana became a regular problem as rural migrants often returned to their traditional
homes at harvest time or headed north to Texas and seasonal employment there. Foreign
workers also proved to be a challenge for the regiomontano due to their propensity to
engage in organized-labor activity in addition to the desire to return to their homeland. All

Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1992), 155. John A. Adams, Jr., Conflict and Commerce on the
Rio Grande: Laredo, 1755-1955 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 113. Note:
vertical integration involves the control of production from raw material to consumer outlets.
Horizontal integration refers to the control of all companies in one facet of the industrial process.
See: Thomas Carson and Mary Bonk, Gale Encyclopedia of U.S. Economic History, Volume II
(Detroit: Gale Group, 1999), 953-954, 1008-1009.
13

Mora-Torres, The Making of the Mexican Border, 86, 103, 105, 121.
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of this meant that competition for labor between companies in Monterrey proved
advantageous for workers as higher wages and other employment benefits persisted.14
During the years 1913 to 1917 of the Mexican Revolution, socio-economic order
became problematic for Monterrey industry as active warfare, railroad interruption,
separation from outlying consumer markets, and shifting political control all contributed to
disruption. The national political situation appeared to have deteriorated since Francisco
Madero had toppled the long-lasting authoritarian administration led by Porfirio Diaz. By
1913, the regiomontano elite had lost “their” governor in Reyes and caudillo (strongman)
Victoriano Huerta replaced the idealistic national presidency of Madero. Revolutionary
troops occupied the Cervecería Cuauhtémoc brewery from 1914 to 1917, and a crippling
strike at the Fundidora Iron and Steel Works that began in 1918 demonstrated that
businessmen in Monterrey could not depend on the successful environment of the previous
two decades. Industrialists had to deal with fraud and confiscation perpetuated by rebel
leaders who used the brewery to gain needed capital in the ongoing conflict. Some elite
families fled to San Antonio as other businessmen ended up jailed by the rebels and forced
to pay a ransom. Most workers endured the difficulties associated with the Revolution by
remaining in Monterrey and experiencing unemployment, food scarcity, and disease
outbreaks as best they could. Many others in the countryside escaped to the relative
“safety” in the city, and a few managed to flee to the United States. Labor leaders,
14

Michael Snodgrass, Deference and Defiance in Monterrey: Workers, Paternalism, and
Revolution in Mexico, 1895-1950 (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11-19, 21-23. Bennett, The
Politics of Water, 33. The term La Sultana del Norte appears to originate from the industrial
prowess of Monterrey, but a definitive source cannot be ascertained. See Mora-Torres, The Making
of the Mexican Border, 85.
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emboldened by the efficacy of the Revolution as well as grievances expressed shortly
before it began, moved to create a new order in which the working class benefited from the
changes.15
In the wake of the Revolution, business leaders in Monterrey needed to build new
alliances in the national and state governments to enjoy a relationship similar to the
positive one from the past. However, the period from 1920 to 1927 saw wide swings in the
relationship between business and political leaders, and although the Great War had a
positive effect on the economy, the post-war period produced a North American recession.
Further, nationwide railroad reorganization proved hurtful to business during 1920 and
early 1921, and labor activities at the Fundidora also proved difficult for the Monterrey
industrialists during the summer of 1920. Steel mill workers, faced with possible layoffs
and high inflation, insisted that their wages double; after management rejected the demand,
a strike commenced involving 4000 workers. A dozen of the skilled workers actually left
for plants in Michigan, and many others threatened to follow unless management
succumbed to their appeal. After holding out for a month, the remaining strikers agreed to
a lesser settlement as divisiveness between various factions of the labor movement in
Mexico proved problematic to their cause. Moreover, continuing into 1921, an
overabundance of labor now prevailed as about one-half of workers in Monterrey sought
employment and prices stayed high.16
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Saragoza, The Monterrey Elite and the Mexican State, 97-98, 105-106. Snodgrass, Deference
and Defiance in Monterrey, 32-34, 37-38. Bennett, The Politics of Water, 12.
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The evolution of Nuevo Leon from a frontier to border area significantly affected the
eventual proliferation of industry there. Subsequently, the proximity of this northern
Mexican state to the United States became a significant factor regarding the successes of
the area and, perhaps, the propensity of residents to migrate to a more thriving nation. The
railroad industry in Mexico, similarly to the United States, proved important to the
economic progress of the nation.
Mexican Railroads
After over fifty years of political, economic, and societal turmoil directly related to
the nation’s emergence from centuries of Spanish colonial rule in 1821, Mexico began to
modernize during the administration of Porfirio Diaz. The inauguration of Diaz’
presidency in 1876, commonly referred to as the Porfiriato, resulted in significant progress
in political solidification and economic expansion. The railroad provided an economic
vehicle for modernization just as it had in the United States throughout the pre and postCivil War period. However, one of the key reasons for the Mexican Revolution that began
in 1910 concerned how the president rolled out the development of the railroads at the
expense of the lower classes in Mexico due to his reliance on foreign investment and nonnative labor that negated any employment gain. Despite Diaz’ success in utilizing railroad
expansion to assist with the modernization of Mexico, he also provoked an uprising of the
lower classes who believed this supposed progress only benefitted the administration and
in Monterrey in 1920: “[A]pproxiamately half the laborers of Monterrey are out of work, prices
continue [to be] high . . . and there is no relief in sight.” Also, see: J.R. Vernon, “The 1920-21
Deflation, the Role of Aggregate Supply,” Economic Inquiry, Volume 29, Issue 3 (July 1991), 572580.
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the privileged.17 Consequently, the Mexican Revolution encouraged the migration of
Mexicans to the United States to escape the economic chaos caused by the conflict. The
completion of the railroad system in Mexico modernized the nation, contributed to the
Revolution, and sparked additional immigration to cities such as San Antonio.
Mexico remained behind the United States in railroad construction in 1876 with only
416 miles of track at a time when the United States had developed its railway system for
several decades and completed a transcontinental railroad. The Mexican president realized
that just as railroads had provided the path to U.S. industrialization, Mexico could also
benefit from the development of its rail lines. The building of the railroads assisted Diaz in
unifying a diverse Mexican culture, not only through the physical expansion of the
railroads, but also by utilizing the transportation industry to characterize the president’s
thematic goal of “order and progress.” The railroad symbolized and generated the material
changes that the country experienced, as well solidifying the political stability of his
administration. Initially, the sources for capital to construct the railroads involved
domestic investors. However, due to a shortage of Mexican financiers, Diaz initiated a
building program primarily funded by foreign investment from the United States beginning
in 1880.18
17

Michael Gonzales, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2002), 2.
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Paul Garner, Porfirio Diaz: Profiles in Power (New York: Longman, 2001), 176-179. Michael
Matthews, The Civilizing Machine: A Cultural History of Mexican Railroads, 1876-1910, (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 3-9. Coatsworth, Growth Against Development, 4-9.
Ironically, the administration’s efforts in bonding a pluralistic populace also served to influence
Diaz’ adversaries who contributed cultural expressions designed to refute the president’s objective.
In writing about de viaje (travel), many writers described the less than desirable aspects of rail
travel such as the lack of privacy in the cars and even the escalating existence of riders from the
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Diaz granted land concessions and financial subsidies to two U.S. railroad
consortiums for routes through the center of Mexico. Although the two companies’ often
catered to the same markets in the center of the nation, the Mexican Central Railway
constructed the line to Ciudad Juárez, across the border from El Paso, and became known
as Mexico’s greatest railroad. The second line, the Mexican National Railway, ended at
Nuevo Laredo, across from Laredo (see Figure 3 on page 68). By 1882, the Mexican
National opened between Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo and a connection with Saltillo, in
far eastern Coahuila, became operational in 1883. This Saltillo link connected another city
of significant size to the Mexican National Railway and eventually led to an additional spur
that traveled straight north to Piedras Negras, also completed in 1883.19 These two rail
links, one from Monterrey to Nuevo Laredo and the other from Monterrey to Saltillo and
Piedras Negras provided the most feasible routes for Mexican laborers to travel from the
Monterrey Center to San Antonio. Together, these two routes comprise the Nuevo Leon
corridor.
Mexico’s track mileage soared to 15,360 by 1910. By one U.S. government estimate,
American businesses had financed approximately 500 million dollars or eighty percent of
the total capital expenditure for the expansion, and this outlay climbed to 750 million in

United States. See Matthews, 100-101.
19

Powell, The Railroads of Mexico, 127-135. Garner, Porfirio Diaz, 177-178. The Mexican
National operated the shortest distance between Mexico City and the United States at 1700
kilometers in comparison to the Mexican Central’s 2000 kilometer, sixty-hour trek to El Paso.
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1907 and over a billion by 1912. However, domestic expenditures by the Mexican nation
on the railways amounted to about sixteen percent of all government spending on an annual
basis, and Mexico assumed substantial debt in the process. Additionally, due to Diaz’ fear
that U.S. companies would dominate the two main north/south trunk lines in Mexico, the
president began a nationalization effort in 1909 to obtain a controlling share of the National
Railways of Mexico. By 1910, the National Railways oversaw 8,392 miles of track, over
one half of the nation’s total, and included the links to the border communities of Laredo
and Eagle Pass.20 Nonetheless, due to the utilization of foreign investment and non-native
labor that Diaz used to build the Mexican railroads, he exacerbated class disparities and
contributed to the coming Revolution.
Accompanying the rollout of the railroads in the United States, many industries also
flourished because of railway building—steel, timber, and coal. However, in Mexico,
historians have argued that Diaz hurt the economy by spending considerable amounts of
capital that went to foreign sources, as well as inhibiting the development of domestic
markets for industries related to railroad construction as compared to the U.S. model.21
The depression of Mexican markets not only affected the economy of the nation, but also
prevented the establishment of jobs for low-wage workers and created animosity toward
the Diaz government. This economic disparity influenced the lower-classes to join
revolutionary forces or travel to the United States in search of employment. The railroads
20

Powell, The Railroads of Mexico, 1-5. Coatsworth, Growth Against Development, 35-46. Garner,
Porfirio Diaz, 178.
21
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also proved important in transporting these disgruntled workers to the U.S. border.22
Of course, not only workers travelled to the border, a fact reflected in the three levels
of service available on the trains. Both the Mexican National and Mexican Central offered
a first-class, luxurious Pullman car experience, a second-class with standard row-style
seating, and a third-class that amounted to an overcrowded and communal compartment
that sometimes involved open-aired accommodations that usually transported farm
animals.23 Migrants from Mexico seeking to escape economic difficulties in their own
nation undoubtedly traveled on third-class tickets. Monterrey, with northerly routes to
Nuevo Laredo and through Saltillo to Piedras Negras, soon became the second leading
railroad hub in Mexico, following only the nation’s capital.24 Although the Mexican
Revolution affected railway traffic throughout the nation, especially during the 1911 to
1917 period, some portions of the country suffered more than others. The Monterrey to
Laredo route and the trains from Monterrey to Saltillo and Eagle Pass remained two of the
least affected by railroad shutdowns during the Revolution, whereas, conflicts in Ciudad
Juárez disrupted service to El Paso more often.25 The Nuevo Leon Corridor from the
Monterrey Center remained relatively open during the Revolution which allowed for a
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constant stream of immigrants to San Antonio.
Although Diaz had promoted the railroads as the path to modernity in Mexico, the
utilization of foreign investments contributed to the dissolution of his presidency in 1911.
The lower classes also suffered due to the lack of jobs that could have been salvaged had
the president better utilized domestic sources for building the railroads. The resultant
Revolution encouraged immigration to the United States as migrants sought to escape the
mayhem and economic devastation that followed the rebellion. The railroads, whose
construction contributed to the Revolution, became the vehicle for migrants as they
traveled from the Monterrey Center through the Nuevo Leon Corridor to the United States.
The International and Great Northern Railway
The history of the International and Great Northern Railway illuminates the railroad’s
importance to immigration from northern Mexico to San Antonio. The I&GN began as two
separate railroad companies. In 1866, the Houston and Great Northern received a charter
from the state of Texas to build from Houston to the Texas border with Oklahoma, but only
managed 250 miles to Palestine, Texas, about 150 miles short of the boundary by 1873.
The International Railway Company began in 1870 with the task of creating a railway from
Laredo to northeast of Texas. The two combined in 1873 as the International and Great
Northern Railway and received land grants from the state to create the first major railroad
in Texas. Despite those financial inducements, the company fell into receivership in 1878,
a problem that the I&GN often experienced during the next 50 years. Construction
restarted in 1880, and the famous entrepreneur, Jay Gould, gained control of the company
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shortly thereafter. Although Gould did not arrive in San Antonio until March, 1881 to
discuss a railroad extension into Mexico, the first income-generating train entered San
Antonio with much fanfare on February 5, 1881. Soon after, Gould began complex
business dealings as demonstrated by the mid-1881 leasing of the I&GN to the MissouriKansas-Texas (Katy) Railroad that remained leased to the Missouri Pacific (MOPAC), a
company owned by the entrepreneur. Although Gould ran these businesses as one railroad,
legally, they remained autonomous. This economic arrangement became important when
the colorful industrialist lost control over one or the other railroad and legal battles ensued
between the now rival companies. Gould remained more adept at complex financial
arrangements and profiteering than actually operating a business, and as a result, the
I&GN, as well as the rest of his railroads, maintained a less than desirable safety record.26
Moreover, despite economic and other problems, the I&GN took on additional significance
for immigrants after the establishment of a connection to the Mexican railway system.
Traveling through the Nuevo Leon corridor from Monterrey to San Antonio, migrants
crossed the border at Laredo, Texas. The two railroads that met at Laredo, the Mexican
Nancy Beck Young, "Houston and Great Northern Railroad,” Handbook of Texas Online (Austin:
Texas State Historical Association, 2010),
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/eqh08, accessed June 08, 2014. Uploaded on
June 15, 2010. Hemphill, The Railroads of San Antonio and South Central Texas, 19-23. Reed, A
History of the Texas Railroads, 150-153. Interstate Commerce Commission Report, “Tentative
Valuation Report on the Property of the I&GN Railway Company as of June 30, 1917,” 7-9, 15,
Item #1522-2, Dale Walker Collection, Missouri Pacific Historical Society Archives, 3015 Barrett
Station Road, St. Louis, Missouri (hereafter referred to as “MOPAC Society Archives). A
“receivership” refers to a state of financial condition, but not a full bankruptcy. The company is
placed in the “custodial responsibility” of someone appointed by a bankruptcy court or government
regulator to protect the rights of investors or other stakeholders while the company seeks a
resolution to their situation. This is often a period of transition to a sale or dissolution of a
company. See: Ken Philip, and Kerin Kaminski, “Receivership: A Value-Adding Tool,” Secured
Lender, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan/Feb 2007), 30, 32.
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National and the I&GN, initially traversed the border on a temporary “pontoon” bridge
across the Rio Grande. However, several floods on the river shut down rail traffic across
the bridge in mid-1882 and hastened the approval for construction of a permanent structure
by the U.S. House of Representatives in early 1884. Although not finished until 1889, the
new bridge allowed not only freight traffic by rail, but also foot and streetcar access
between Laredo and Nuevo Laredo. Henceforth, the situation at the border involved a
Mexican train that brought the émigré to Nuevo Laredo, followed by a walk or a short
streetcar trip across the bridge to the U.S. train. Also in 1884, the U.S. House of
Representatives approved a similar crossing of the Rio Grande to Piedras Negras, and the
overpass became operational by 1888. This bridge allowed for rail and foot traffic across
the river between Eagle Pass and Piedras Negras.27 The finalization of the structures over
the Rio Grande at Laredo and Eagle Pass created an opportunity for Monterrey Center
immigrants to easily cross over to the United States and journey on to San Antonio.
Jay Gould died in 1892, and the reliability of the I&GN as a railway carrier then took
on a greater emphasis than the high-stakes finances of the past. Nonetheless, due to the
various combinations of previous railroad companies, travel through Texas on the I&GN
inevitably meant changing trains, cars, and regular delays in service. However, the lack of
27

John A. Adams, Jr., Conflict and Commerce on the Rio Grande: Laredo, 1755-1955 (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 112-114, 127-128. United States Congress, House
Committee on Commerce, Bridge Over the Rio Grande River, 48th Cong., Report #798, 1884, 1.
United States Congress, House Committee on Commerce, Bridge Over the Rio Grande River,
Between the City of Eagle Pass, Texas, and Piedras Negras, Mexico, 48th Cong., Report #800,
1884, 1. The per person charge for crossing the bridge was five cents if approaching on the U.S.
side and ten centavos if coming from Mexico. See Andrew M. Gault, “The Historic Laredo
Crossing of the Rio Grande,” American Bridge, Tunnel, and Turnpike Association, Inc. Quarterly,
December 1953, 41.

87

spurs and continuous structure of the I&GN’s Laredo to San Antonio section, meant that
northbound riders from the border to the Alamo City did not need to change trains.
Therefore, immigrants from northern Mexico could travel to San Antonio without the
undue delay often associated with shifting between trains or rail cars.
During the late nineteenth century, the extension of the railroad to many communities
through the Nuevo Leon Corridor enhanced their standing as transportation hubs. For San
Antonio, the arrival of the railroad, along with the parallel growth of commercial
agriculture, encouraged the migration of Mexicans into the area. Furthermore, southern
Texas continued as a cultural extension of Mexico despite its separation from Mexico
following the Mexican-American War.28 After the I&GN Railway completed the San
Antonio to Laredo extension in 1881, towns and vegetable agriculture blossomed
throughout the area bisected by the route. In particular, the I&GN traveled through the
counties of Webb, LaSalle, Frio, and Medina and, subsequently, enhanced their status as
agricultural outlets.29 Perishable “truck” products, including onions and spinach, moved
quickly on the rail lines that also brought workers from the south for servicing the labor
intensive crops. As the railroad expanded and new routes were built or purchased in areas
north of San Antonio, the agricultural economy transformed. Cotton production northeast
of San Antonio also flourished along with the railroad as this new method of product
transportation replaced wagon travel that had long proven slow and burdensome to the
28
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farmer.
On the near West Side of San Antonio, the area around the original terminal soon
experienced a real estate boom. Completed in 1881, the original I&GN depot generated a
vibrant new West Side commercial district that witnessed the city’s first electric traffic
light installed in 1900. During the same year, due to the devastation of the Galveston
hurricane, San Antonio became the largest city in Texas, a title it would hold until 1930.30
In 1908, the railroad erected a state-of-the-art passenger station at “the corner of Medina
and Commerce streets, [sic] it was a masterpiece, a veritable cathedral of commerce.”31
One of the passenger trains that utilized the terminal, the “Sunshine Special,” which
originated under that title in 1915 on the I&GN line, left Mexico City at 8:00 p.m., passed
through Laredo by 6:00 a.m., and arrived in San Antonio at 9:15 a.m.32 Throughout this
period of population increase due to Mexican immigration, San Antonio remained one of a
handful of key destinations for migrants and the “unofficial capital of US Mexicans at the
time.”33 Despite its significant role, the I&GN also faced economic trouble as the railroad
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fell into receivership once again in 1908, as well as 1914.
Although the I&GN regularly experienced economic difficulties, this problem did not
inhibit its basic service. Most of the trouble arose in conjunction with poor management
decisions regarding the quality of its cars and tracks, as well as the rail line being unable to
deal with the quickly expanding freight traffic that developed along its route. Some of the
growth along the I&GN route involved products such as truck crops and cotton that offered
employment possibilities to immigrants that traveled on the I&GN from Mexico. Although
most of the available information on the I&GN from this period deals with freight traffic,
undoubtedly, the railroad experienced a similar increase in passenger service. The “Report
of an Examination of the International & Great Northern Railway,” executed by E.W.
McKenna in June, 1914, presumably as a part of the receivership of that year, demonstrated
that the company had fallen on hard times. McKenna indicated that the poor condition of
many of the 112 passenger cars and 5,093 freight cars owed to their average age of about
10 to 12 years and that the inferiority of recently purchased equipment meant that it too
would soon render less than desirable service. On the other hand, McKenna’s report also
contained a note of optimism as this situation with the old and sub-standard freight cars
could be restored by purchasing better-quality equipment. He believed that the 5,093 total
represented a low “freight car per mile of road operated rate” and that additional cars
sale of “dry goods, drugs, agricultural machinery, and food supplies” constituted the major appeal
for sales within the Mexican market, but that continuing operational issues with the railroads in
Mexico prevented an increase in commodity flow. See: “City Closes a Record Year in Business,”
San Antonio Light, January 1, 1918, 4. Later in 1918, the Light also noted that although
immigration from Europe waned due to World War I, Mexican immigration had doubled during the
previous two years. See “Immigrants Coming from Latin Lands,” San Antonio Light, October 31,
1918, 18.
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would not only solve the decaying condition issue, but that sufficient opportunity existed
for additional rail traffic on the I&GN line. The railroad simply did not have enough cars
for the amount of available business.34 Presumably, the potential for passenger service,
including immigrants from Mexico in search of employment, could also be served by
additional equipment.
Both McKenna’s report and an Interstate Commerce Commission report of 1917 on
issues with the ongoing receivership expressed confidence regarding the growth of
agricultural products throughout the area served by the I&GN. Two situations impacted
this belief in growth potential for the rail line. First, in the area along the route from
Laredo to San Antonio, the development of truck gardens had been aided by deep-well
irrigation from the Rio Grande that had not existed until the last decade and represented
new traffic for the railroad. For instance, the shipment of over 400 freight cars full of
onions from Laredo during the first half of 1914, mostly to the I&GN terminus at
Longview, Texas, in the northeastern portion of the state, demonstrated the growing
potential of the product and the method of transportation. For the future, McKenna
indicated that the Pearson-Farquahar Syndicate at Natalia, Texas, in Medina County, about
28 miles south of San Antonio on the I&GN line, had nearly finished another irrigation
project aimed at allowing for the cultivation within the year of 50,000 additional acres.
Second, the I&GN passed through the most developed area of cotton production in the state
of Texas. The Blackland Prairie extended northeast from San Antonio toward the Texas
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and Arkansas border, the exact location of the company’s primary rail line north of the
Alamo City. Cotton reigned as the principal farm product in Texas, and the counties that
the railroad traveled through in the area northeast of San Antonio produced more of this
staple crop than any other portion of the state. McKenna noted that cotton represented over
fourteen percent of all tonnage shipped on the I&GN and that seventy-one percent of that
total originated from its own terminals. The receivership report further estimated that
cotton worth 56 million dollars had been shipped on the rail line for each year from 1909 to
1913.35 The proliferation of truck crops, in addition to the growth of cotton farming, both
associated with the success of the I&GN, stimulated immigration from northern Mexico
through the Nuevo Leon Corridor.
McKenna blamed the Mexican Revolution at least partially for some of the financial
woes of the I&GN that forced it into receivership in 1914. After rising in 1910 and 1911,
the income generated by the connection with the Mexican National Railroad at Laredo fell
from roughly $650 million to around $375 in both 1912 and 1913, a forty-two percent
decrease. A series of “unprecedented” floods during the same period resulted in losses
owing to repair costs, as well as lost revenue due to the resultant traffic shutdowns.
Regardless of these issues with the Revolution and other maintenance problems outlined by
McKenna that affected the earnings of the I&GN, he noted that the railroad still maintained
a higher “Gross Revenue per Mile” than eight other rail lines within Texas. He asserted
that “It is also very evident that it has not reached anything near the zenith of its
Interstate Commerce Commission Report, “Tentative Valuation Report on the Property of the
I&GN Railway Company,” 9, MOPAC Society Archives. E.W. McKenna, “Report of an
Examination of the International & Great Northern Railway,” 4, 6-8, MOPAC Society Archives.
35
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opportunities in the development of both classes of traffic [presumably freight and
passenger].” Continuing, McKenna noted that “Its physical condition has prevented it from
securing all of the traffic it might have secured . . . .”36 Despite some of the problems
associated with its operation, the I&GN occupied an enviable position among railroads in
Texas. As agricultural production in south Texas grew and as the Mexican Revolution
began to wane, the Laredo to San Antonio route became the most important freight and
passenger connection within the state, thereby ensuring the development of San Antonio as
a vital railroad crossroads in Texas. San Antonio also emerged as an expanding
employment market for immigrants from northern Mexico in search of farm-related work.
Monterrey Center immigrants also traveled to the Alamo City on a different railroad and
through a secondary border location located at Eagle Pass.
The Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railroad
The Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railroad (GH&SA) that connected Eagle
Pass and San Antonio also contributed to migration from the Monterrey Center to the
Alamo City. Although the I&GN saw the most traffic from northern Mexico, the GH&SA
transported a significant number of migrants to San Antonio. Because the Mexican
National Railway route to Eagle Pass began in Saltillo, part of the Monterrey Center, this
migration represents a parallel movement to those who traveled on the I&GN.
E.W. McKenna, “Report of an Examination of the International & Great Northern Railway,” 3031, 33-35, MOPAC Society Archives. The 1924 Missouri Pacific (MOPAC) outright purchase of
the I&GN, finalized in 1925, ended this period of the railroad continually falling into receivership.
However, MOPAC will experience more economic difficulty during the Great Depression. See
Hemphill, The Railroads of San Antonio, 24 and Reed, A History of the Texas Railroads, 325.
36
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The GH&SA became the first rail line to enter the Alamo City in early 1877 (see
Figure 3 on page 68) and eventually became part of the Southern Pacific Railroad that
traveled east and west through San Antonio. Initially arriving from Houston on the east,
the rail line began its westward construction from San Antonio in 1881 after the Southern
Pacific purchased a significant amount of stock in the GH&SA. The Southern Pacific had
already begun building a route from California and soon reached El Paso on the far western
edge of Texas. The production gangs from the two railroads met a short distance west of
the Pecos River, 225 miles west of San Antonio, in early 1883. The Southern Pacific
system, known as the Sunset Limited (not to be confused with the I&GN’s Sunshine
Special), became a transcontinental rail line in 1893 that crossed the Southern portion of
the United States. Moreover, within an area between San Antonio and the Pecos River, the
GH&SA built an additional spur from Spofford, Texas, to connect Eagle Pass, on the
border with Mexico, to the Southern Pacific system.37 From the outset, Jay Gould and the
I&GN aimed to compete with the GH&SA route to Mexico. The tracks of the two
railroads paralleled each other from central San Antonio for 25 miles to the Medina River,
southwest of the city.38 In addition, this connection with Eagle Pass proved to be the main
link for Mexican migrants traveling from the eastern portion of the state of Coahuila to San
Antonio. Just as migrants from the Monterrey Center traveled through the Nuevo Leon
Corridor enroute to San Antonio, the GH&SA added to the movement from cities such as
37
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Saltillo, and smaller communities within the state of Coahuila, through Eagle Pass to the
Alamo City.
The original GH&SA station erected near the northeast portion of downtown San
Antonio also served as the Missouri-Kansas-Texas (Katy) Railroad terminal until
construction of the latter’s depot in 1917 near the Mexican market on the West Side. In
1903, the Southern Pacific, with the GH&SA as one of the tenants, built its own depot in
the Mission Revival Style at 1174 East Commerce Street on the opposite side of downtown
from the I&GN terminal. Between two of the ornamental towers of the building, a replica
of the traditional roofline shape of the Alamo mission reflected the terminal’s connection to
Spanish architecture, as well as its San Antonio location.39 The positioning of this station
on the affluent side of San Antonio possibly resulted in difficult relations with Anglos for
the immigrants who traveled to the city by way of the Eagle Pass border. More prosperous
Anglos probably resented the increase of poor, often illiterate, and transient Mexicanos
arriving in their prosperous neighborhood. On the other hand, not all rail lines in San
Antonio included an international destination along their route as the Missouri-KansasTexas and the San Antonio, Uvalde and Gulf Railroads remained important to Mexican
migrants without ever crossing the Rio Grande.
The Missouri-Kansas-Texas and the San Antonio, Uvalde and Gulf Railroads
Although the Missouri-Kansas-Texas (Katy) Railroad did not traverse the Mexican
border, the rail line became important to immigrants in San Antonio. Several employment
39
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recruiters in the Alamo City sent migrant workers to far off locations throughout the United
States and, due to the proximity of the terminal to the West Side of the city, many took the
Katy to their places of employment. The Katy remained the only railroad in San Antonio
without any connections to the south. Passenger service on the Katy both to and from the
city began on May 3, 1901, with freight transportation commencing later the same day. By
building its own tracks instead of acquiring from others, the Katy could place greater
emphasis on the exact cities that it sought to serve. Express lines to both Dallas and Fort
Worth that subsequently connected to important locations such as Kansas City and St.
Louis proved especially useful to laborers headed north for employment. In 1917, after
leasing space from the GH&SA for 16 years, the Katy opened its own terminal on the near
West Side of San Antonio at Durango and South Flores Streets, close to the barrios where
most San Antonio Mexicanos lived and only a short distance from the I&GN station. Built
in a Mission Revival design similar to one of the local mission churches, the lavish station
included waiting rooms for Whites, “Negroes,” and “immigrants.”40 The existence of a
separate space for immigrants denoted the apparent proliferation of migrants that utilized
the railroad’s services in addition to the disdain expressed by Anglos toward Mexicanos.
The San Antonio, Uvalde and Gulf Railroad (SAU&G), affectionately known as “the
Sausage,” provided important transportation for truck crops to distant markets from the
Winter Garden area of south Texas that included both Laredo and Eagle Pass (see Figure 5
as well as Figure 3 on page 68). Completed in 1914, the SAU&G directly connected the
Winter Garden counties of Zavala and Dimmit to the GH&SA at Uvalde, Texas, a
40
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community located 85 miles directly west of San Antonio. Also, the east-west orientation
of the SAU&G’s Winter Garden line linked to the I&GN at Gardendale, Texas, 85 miles
southwest of San Antonio. In addition to the connections to San Antonio afforded by the
GH&SA and I&GN links, the SAU&G also maintained its own tracks north to San Antonio
and utilized the I&GN’s freight yard and depot in the Alamo City. The most important
aspect of the Sausage concerned the movement of truck crops to markets served by the
GH&SA, I&GN, and the connection to the deep-water Corpus Christi docks on the Gulf of
Mexico.41

Figure 5: The San Antonio, Uvalde, and Gulf Railroad. Source: Hemphill, The
Railroads of San Antonio, 72.

San Antonio remained a crossroads for many rail lines as evidenced by the existence
of railroads such as the I&GN, the GH&SA, the Katy, and the SAU&G. The four railroads
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supplemented the market for the key agricultural products in the area, particularly cotton,
truck crops, and pecans. As all four rail lines flourished, they also enhanced the
transportation choices for immigrants coming from northern Mexico to the Alamo City or
traveling on to employment throughout the state of Texas and beyond. The International
and Great Northern Railway (I& GN) that connected to the Mexican National Railway at
the border intersection between Laredo and Nuevo Laredo reinforced a connection with
San Antonio along a traditional migratory route. Laredo, the primary channel to San
Antonio, became an important entry point for northern-bound migrants.42
The Nuevo Leon Corridor
Although all of these railroads performed an important function in transporting
migrants from northern Mexico to San Antonio, the I&GN remained the most noteworthy
means for crossing the border. Many historians assert that El Paso provided a significant
conduit through which migrants moved during their travels from central Mexico to Los
Angeles. Despite a lack of historical attention, a closer review of U.S. Census data reveals
that Bexar County, with San Antonio as the key city, showed more similarity to El Paso
regarding this migration than commonly portrayed (see Table 5). Bexar County’s total
population increased from 119,676 in 1910 to 202,096 in 1920, an increase of close to
seventy percent. During the same period, El Paso County, the other area with a substantial
Mexican population and an important railway community on the border, grew from 52,599
42
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to 101,877, roughly doubling. Also, according to the Census, the Mexican-born population
in El Paso County increased by about 140 percent from 16,144 to 38,625 from 1910 to
1920, whereas Bexar County’s total changed from 13,226 to 32,934, an even greater
expansion of 149 percent. The Mexican-born population of 1920 in these two Texas
counties dwarfed the numbers in all others, including the border locations of Webb (City of
Laredo) with 15,140 and Maverick (City of Eagle Pass) with 3,082. Further, note that
Webb and Maverick Counties totaled a remarkably lower percentage increase of Mexicanborn population from 1910 to 1920 because migrants likely moved through, rather than
remaining in Laredo and Eagle Pass, when traveling northward on the railroad to San
Antonio.43 During this period of population increase due to Mexican immigration, San
Antonio continued as the only key destination considerably north of the border (150 miles)
for migrants. The Nuevo Leon corridor, running north from Monterrey provided the key
route by which this increased population arrived at San Antonio.
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Table 5: Texas State and County Population Data
Texas
State
total

Bexar El Paso
County County
total
total

Webb
Bexar
El Paso
Maverick
Texas
County
County
County
County
Mex-born
MexMex-born Mex-born
Mex-born
born

1910 Census 3,896,542 119,676 52,599

124,238

13,226

16,144

10,654

2188

1920 Census 4,663,228 202,096 101,877

249,652

32,934

38,625

15,140

3082

100.9

149.0

139.3

42.1

40.9

% Increase

19.7

68.9

93.7
th

Source: United States Bureau of the Census, 13 Population Census, 1910, Volume III (Bureau of
the Census. Washington, D.C., 1910), 799, 806, 816, 824, 828, 834, 848; United States Bureau of
the Census, 14th Population Census, 1920, Volume III (Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.,
1920) 984, 987, 991, 997, 1022-1024. Webb County represented the third highest Mexican-born
population in Texas after El Paso and Bexar Counties.

The Nuevo Leon corridor, through which Monterrey Center immigrants traveled to
San Antonio, proved to be an important conduit of migration. The pervasiveness of this
migration channel demonstrates that just as a substantial number of immigrants came from
central Mexico via El Paso to Los Angeles, so too, they journeyed from the Monterrey
Center to San Antonio. Based on the naturalization records for the U.S. District Court for
the San Antonio Division of the Western District of Texas, a majority of Mexicanos who
completed a Declaration of Intention in San Antonio between 1915 and 1925 arrived
through either Laredo or Eagle Pass when initially entering the United States. The statistics
regarding arrivals at Laredo and Eagle Pass indicate the importance of these two ports of
entry and, therefore, the significance of the I&GN, as well as the GH&SA that crossed the
border at Eagle Pass, to immigration from northern Mexico to San Antonio. During the
1915 to 1925 period, of the total 980 declarants at San Antonio who indicated that they first
arrived in the United States after the 1882 finalization of the railroad connections, 613 or
62.6 percent crossed the border at Laredo and 240 or 24.5 percent at Eagle Pass, 87.1

100

percent overall. Further, 512 of the 613 Laredo crossers specified that they had come to the
United States on the train and 182 of the 240 Eagle Pass migrants indicated that they
traversed the border by rail (see Table 6).
Table 6: Declaration of Intention, San Antonio from 1915 to 1925

Laredo
Eagle Pass
Total

Initial Entry
(% of 980 declarants)
613
62.6%
240
24.5%
853
87.1%

Train Entry
(% of city total)
512
83.5%
182
75.8%
694
81.4%

Train & Bridge Entry
(% of city total)
586
95.6%
221
92.1%
807
94.6%

Source: U.S. District Court for the San Antonio Division of the Western District of Texas
records, within the Declarations of Intention for Citizenship and Petitions for Naturalization
1915-1925, Series from Record Group 21: Records of District Courts of the United States,
1685 - 2004, National Archives and Records, Federal Government Office, 1400 John
Burgess Drive, Fort Worth, Texas (hereafter referred to as “NA-FW”).

However, the total arriving by train may be misleading. The declaration form asked:
“I emigrated to the United States of America from __________ on the vessel,
__________.” Under the second blank space, the form indicated: “(If the alien arrived
otherwise than by vessel, the character of the conveyance or name of transportation
company should be given).” Possibly, many of the migrants who ventured by train to and
from the border, may have indicated that they came to the United States by “foot bridge.”
Due to the wording of the question, the bridge and train situation at the border, and
conceivably because of language difficulties between the migrant and the questioner, the
actual total of immigrants arriving by train may be higher. Seventy-four declarants who
came through Laredo and thirty-nine Eagle Pass crossers indicated that they crossed “the
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bridge” to arrive in the United States. Given the circumstances at the border, this could
have meant a train trip to the Mexican border city, a walk across the bridge, and then the
boarding of a new train on the U.S. side. Moreover, even without the bridge crossers, the
percentage of train passengers’ totals 81.4 for these two border cities, and almost ninetyfive percent for both those who indicated that they came by rail and over the bridge.
Brownsville, at the far southern tip of Texas and across the river from Matamoros in the
state of Tamaulipas, had the next highest total of arrivals with only 31 crossers of whom 9
ventured into the United States by train and 8 by the foot bridge.44 These Declaration of
Intention records demonstrate that migrants traveling on the train through the Nuevo Leon
Corridor primarily passed through Laredo, although immigrants from Saltillo and other
towns in eastern Coahuila crossed the border at Eagle Pass.45
As mentioned in earlier in this chapter, the Monterrey Center through which the most
immigrants to San Antonio travelled included Monterrey, Saltillo, and smaller communities
44

Most of the 66 pre-1882 arrivals came by wagon/ox cart (26), ferry (13), or both (8). These
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in the immediate vicinity. According to the 1915 to 1925 Declaration of Intention records,
28.7 percent of the 980 San Antonio declarants that crossed the border after the finalization
of the rail links began their journey from the Monterrey Center. Further, 73.7 percent
emanated from the northern Mexican states of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas.46
Due to these shorter distances, immigration to San Antonio differs considerably from that
to Los Angeles via El Paso as migrants more readily moved back and forth to their
homeland.47 This ability to easily return to Mexico assisted the migrants in maintaining a
closer identification with their native country. In this sense, the immigrants to San Antonio
remained “more Mexican.” Additionally, the Mexican-born population grew just as rapidly
in San Antonio as El Paso which demonstrated the importance of the Alamo City to
migrants from Mexico (see Table 5 on page 99). The immigrants moved through cities
along the Rio Grande such as Laredo and Eagle Pass and traveled to another “border” city
in San Antonio, about 150 miles north. The railroad became the northern Mexican
migrants’ most common method of transportation with the I&GN as the most accessible
line. Most migrants chose their eventual location based upon its adjacency to where they
crossed the border. Migrants from central Mexico traveled on the Mexican Central
Railroad to El Paso and Los Angeles because of that rail line’s proximity to their point of
origin and the border city’s closeness to the ultimate destination. The I&GN and San
46
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Antonio offered a more feasible option to those originating from the Monterrey Center who
crossed at Laredo and Eagle Pass.48 The use of rail transportation by migrants in search of
economic opportunity does not only apply to Mexicanos coming to the United States. A
corresponding migration within the United States during a similar period to the Mexican
increase in immigration also involved the railroad and travelers who experienced cultural
degradation in their new environment. The movement of African Americans to northern
cities during the Great Migration afforded Mexican immigrants with an opportunity for
employment.
The Great Migration
Throughout the late nineteenth century and increasingly in the early twentieth,
African Americans left their traditional homeland in rural areas of the southern United
States to accept industrial employment in northern American cities. The Great War proved
important to this movement as industrialists in northern U.S. cities had accepted wartime
contracts and now required additional workers due to the lack of European immigrants
because of the warfare conditions in Europe. Additionally, companies needed to replace
U.S. soldiers that had departed for military service.49
The downward trend in the percentage of Black population also established new
opportunities for foreign migrants in places such as south Texas. The following
48
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information from the U.S. Census in Table 7 demonstrates the population changes for
African Americans and Mexican-born individuals in Bexar County from 1880 to 1920.
The population percentage for African Americans trended continually downward, whereas
the Mexican-born populace soared. Although many reasons may exist for population
increases and decreases, the dramatic rise for the Mexican-born population and definite fall
off in the enlargement of the Black populace indicates that a meaningful change occurred.
Additionally, although Bexar County does not qualify as a substantially “rural” area and
not all Blacks worked in agricultural employment, nevertheless, the decline in farms
operated by “Negroes and other Non-Whites” in Bexar County from 1900 to 1920
amounted to a 30 percent reduction during a period when the total farms in the county
enlarged by 36.8 percent.50 As many Blacks migrated to northern cities for industrial jobs,
Mexicanos took their place in both rural and urban employment, but based themselves
within a familiar environment in locations such as the West Side of San Antonio where
Mexicans had lived for some time.51

University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, “Historical Census Browser,”
http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/. The 1900 total came from the classification, “Colored Farmers”
which represented all such groups, owners and tenants. A combination of the “Negroes and Other
White Tenants” plus “Negroes and Other White Owners” provides the 1920 number.
50
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Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 19001940 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 5-6. Only in Texas did owner growers anticipate
labor needs as they recruited Mexican laborers beginning in the early 1900s. See: James R.
Grossman, Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration (The University of
Chicago Press, 1989), 40.
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Table 7: Bexar County Population Changes, 1880 to 1920
Year:
Total County Population
Percent Increase
White Population
Percent Increase
Black Population
Percent Increase
Mexican-born Population
Percent Increase
White Population
Percent to County total
Black Population
Percent to County total
Mexican-born Population
Percent to County total

1880
30,470

1890
49,266
61.7%
43,662
64.1%
5,504
42.3%
3,561
1.8%

1900
69,422
40.9%
60,831
39.3%
8,530
55.0%
4,752
33.4%

1910
119,676
72.4%
107,932
77.4%
11,642
36.5%
13,226
178.3%

1920
202,096
68.9%
186,183
72.5%
15,580
33.8%
32,934
149.0%

87.3%

88.6%

87.6%

90.2%

92.1%

12.7%

11.2%

12.3%

9.7%

7.7%

11.5%

7.2%

6.8%

11.1%

16.3%

26,603
3,867
3,498

Source: University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, “Historical Census
Browser,” http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/. To view the exact information from this
website, click on “white persons,” "white persons born in Mexico," or “Negro population”
under Ethnicity/Race/Place of Birth on the first screen and click submit, then indicate
"Texas" from the state list and click on "Retrieve County-Level Date" on the subsequent
page. A list of totals by county, as well as the state, follows. Note: county percentage totals
more than 100% due to Mexicans inclusion in white totals.

In Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration, James
Grossman confirmed a geographical connection for African Americans between the Jim
Crow South of the early twentieth century and the city of Chicago in the industrial North.
Grossman stressed the importance of railroad transportation along the route of the Illinois
Central Railroad and its tributaries and demonstrated that moving from a rural to an urban
setting took place for reasons that included economic hardship, oppression, and the
expectation of an improved existence. However, the industrial North proved something far
less than the “land of hope” that many had anticipated. Blacks suffered real estate
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redlining and job discrimination in the North that kept them confined to impoverished
neighborhoods and low-wage, blue collar employment with little expectation for change.52
Grossman’s findings appear to echo the experiences of Mexicans who moved to
Texas during the 1915 to 1925 period, a similar time frame to African-American migration.
Railroads, particularly the I&GN, brought migrants, often from rural areas in northern
Mexico, to San Antonio and an urban environment. Just as it had for African Americans
coming to the northern United States, the economic lure of America held a promise of hope
for the Mexicanos. However, as did Blacks in Chicago, Mexicans experienced segregation
by being relegated to inferior housing on the West Side of San Antonio, economic
difficulties due to the irregular and poor pay of the labor-intensive jobs that became
available, and general degradation based on their ethnicity.
In reference to African Americans traveling north to Chicago, Grossman contended
that “only an analysis of the total context of migration—North and South—affords an
understanding of either those decisions or the policy implications of responses to the
movement.”53 This passage demonstrates that place, and specifically geography, offered an
essential context for Grossman, as it also does for this study of migration between northern
Mexico and southern Texas from 1915 to 1925. The Illinois Central that transported
African Americans to Chicago and the International and Great Northern that moved
migrants from northern Mexico to San Antonio provided viable carriers that enhanced the
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possibility for ever-increasing movement. Most importantly, Grossman asserted that
Blacks “seized” the opportunities involved in their journey to the north; they demonstrated
an “agency” in their desire to improve their economic and social condition.54 So too,
Mexican immigrants, escaping the poor conditions in their home country that resulted from
a devastated economy and an unsettling revolution, used a railroad-assisted mobility to
improve their situation. Although employers beckoned for them to come, just as northern
industry did with African Americans, Mexicanos took the difficult step of deciding to leave
their nation and culture in search of their own betterment.55
The I&GN Railway brought the Mexican migrants to a U.S. society that appreciated
their low-cost labor, but shunned their presence within cities such as San Antonio. In other
words, they were seen as disposable laborers. As additional immigrants arrived by train,
whether through the auspices of the Bracero Program, recruited by ethnic employment
agencies, or as economic sojourners, the streets of the Alamo City flowed with Mexicanos
in need of work. Relegated by real-estate practices that segregated them to the West Side
of the city, Mexicanos worked in many occupations within the city, as well as outside of it.
Employment in farming provided the most likely possibility as truck crops and cotton
flourished in the San Antonio area, but another vocation, pecan shelling, offered an
agricultural-related job located within the city itself.
Mexicanos worked in agricultural-related employment inside and outside of San
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Antonio, but both groups still lived within the West Side. This dissertation now turns to a
discussion of agriculture and the jobs that it provided Mexicanos in south Texas. Truck
crops, cotton fields, and pecan shelling supplied the principle possibilities for work, and all
three involved low wages, poor conditions, and exploitive employers. Mexicanos took
these positions because, not unlike African Americans headed for Chicago during the Great
Migration, the conditions in their adopted locality amounted to an improvement when
compared to the circumstances in their native land. The I&GN offered the means of
transportation for Mexican immigrants traveling from the Monterrey Center and through
the Nuevo Leon corridor to San Antonio, but agriculture afforded their sustenance, albeit
meager and oppressive.
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CHAPTER 3
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT OUTSIDE AND INSIDE OF THE ALAMO CITY:
COTTON, ONIONS, AND PECANS
The coming of the railroad brought many changes to the rural Southwest during the
late nineteenth century. Because of the enlargement of the market to the eastern United
States associated with the expansion of the railroad, large cattle ranches operated mostly by
Anglos now proliferated in South Texas. With the invention and subsequent installation of
barbed wire, the fencing of the once wide-open prairie proved disadvantageous for small or
landless ranchers, including many Mexicanos, who could not graze their cattle as readily as
in the past.1 Owing to the attachment to the nationwide market economy and the recurrent
overabundance of products, prices for cattle frequently fluctuated and drove smaller,
Mexicano producers out of business. Also, Mexican herders, once in great demand
because of cattle drives, saw their importance diminish with the advent of the railroad.
Although some lower-class Anglos also suffered, the Mexicanos lost the foundation of their
once successful agricultural system in South Texas. During the late nineteenth century, the
Mexican-born population in Bexar County, with San Antonio as the main city, dwindled to

1

Paul S. Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States: Dimmit County, Winter Garden District,
South Texas, Volume I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930), 301, 310-320.
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7.2 percent of the total in 1890 and 6.8 percent in 1900.2 The arrival of the Galveston,
Harrisburg, and San Antonio (GH&SA) in 1877, followed by the International and Great
Northern (I&GN) in the next decade, negatively affected long-time Mexicano farmers in
south Texas by expanding the market for agricultural products and creating an attractive
investment for large-scale Anglo ranchers.
“Do You Want a Texas Farm?” This front page query appeared in the Texas
Almanac and State Industrial Guide for 1910 and proceeded to discuss the possibility of
farming cotton, corn, and more by purchasing a farm for “$12.00 to $17.50 Per Acre” as
agriculture prospects bloomed all over the state.3 The clearing of pine forests in Texas
continued throughout the 1920s. The number of farms increased during the 1910s at a 4.4
percent rate and expanded in the 1920s by 13.6 percent at a time when the establishment of
new farms began to level off or even drop in many states.4 In the narrative of the 1914
Almanac, Texas emerged as the leading agricultural producing state in the nation as
demonstrated by its value of commercial farm products when measured by the U.S. Census
2

Richard R. Flores, Remembering the Alamo: Memory, Modernity, and the Master Symbol (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2002), 46-48. Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and
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in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
3

Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide for 1910 with map (Dallas: A.H. Belo and Company,
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Thad Sitton and Dan K. Utley, From Can’t See to Can’t: Texas Cotton Farmers on the Southern
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Bureau in 1912. Cotton occupied the top position for field products in Texas with roughly
fifty-eight percent of total production value, followed by corn at approximately eighteen
percent. These two commodities dominated agricultural output in the state. However,
other crops not incorporated into these totals also represented a growth area and included
vegetables such as onions, spinach, and tomatoes as well as many other fruits. All of these
“truck crops” comprised over seven percent of the total production value, the third highest
category and one that had increased rapidly from under two percent in 1908.5 During the
early twentieth century, cotton and truck crops continued to require a significant quantity of
“stoop” labor for both planting and harvesting. For example, Mexican laborers followed
the blossoming of the cotton crop northward, and power-driven planting and picking did
not become widespread until the 1940s.6 Mechanical reaping affected wheat harvesting as
early as 1920, but cotton and truck crops continued to be picked by hand and resisted the
automated development for another two decades.7 Finally, pecan trees grew naturally
along rivers in the southern portion of the United States, and Texas possessed
approximately 8,000 miles of such streams. Due to the existence of cheap labor on the
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The Almanac listed the top ten states with Illinois second and Iowa third and California not even
mentioned. This report pre-dates the full development of the Central Valley in California. Texas
Almanac and State Industrial Guide for 1910 with map, 76. Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United
States, Volume I, 309.
6

Sitton and Utley, From Can’t See to Can’t, 217, 265.

Selden C. Menefee, “Mexican Migratory Workers of South Texas,” in Mexican Labor in the
United States, edited by Carlos E. Cortes (New York: Arno Press, 1974 [1941]), ix.
7

112

West Side of the city, San Antonio became a center for the shelling of pecans.8 These three
commodities, cotton, truck crops, and pecans, dominated south Texas’ urban and rural
agricultural employment for Mexicanos during the early twentieth century.9 However,
since these jobs proved less remunerative in comparison to the individual farming and
tenancy of the past, the net result of this agricultural evolution in south Texas meant that
Mexicanos’ ability to survive and prosper diminished.
This chapter will elaborate on the insufficiency of these three products, cotton, truck
crops, and pecans, in sustaining a viable living for Mexican migrants in south Texas. As
Mexican migrants continually crossed the border, particularly during the Mexican
Revolution of the 1910s, they sought jobs in agricultural employment. This work within
the farming industry not only meant that living conditions remained sparse, but also
resulted in the ongoing disparagement of Mexicanos by the Anglo community. Mexicans
became equated with low-wage agricultural employment as escape proved difficult for
workers who could barely sustain their basic livelihood. The West Side of San Antonio
housed, sometimes on a seasonal basis, many of these laborers who worked in Texas
agriculture.
San Antonio had developed into the key destination for workers in search of
employment, and cotton, truck crops, and pecans related in different ways to the Alamo
City. An important location for cotton farming in Texas, the Blackland Prairie area,
Selden C. Menefee and Orin C. Cassmore, “The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio: The Problem of
Underpaid and Unemployed Mexican Labor,” in Mexican Labor in the United States, edited by
Carlos E. Cortes (New York: Arno Press, 1974 [1940]), 5-7.
8
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extended northeast from San Antonio. Nonetheless, many migrant farm workers utilized
San Antonio as their home base both before and after following the ripening of the
blossoming cotton.10 Truck crops, particularly onions and spinach, grew primarily between
the border and San Antonio in a region known as the Winter Garden Area. Aided by newly
developed deep-well irrigation methods in addition to naturally flowing artesian wells,
truck crops expanded considerably during the first few decades of the century as railroads
continually enlarged the market. Most of the Mexicans who labored in the Winter Garden
Area came from other parts of Texas, but mainly San Antonio, and had originally migrated
to the United States from northeastern Mexico, principally from Coahuila. Truck-crop
labor dovetailed seasonally with cotton production so that many migrants continued to
work all year round in agricultural employment.11 Growing naturally throughout Texas
along river banks, pecans offered substantial income to those fortunate enough to own a
considerable quantity of this tree. However, the pecan required considerable effort to shell
the nut, causing entrepreneurs to seek “cheap” labor and increase their profit. San Antonio
provided a wealth of inexpensive labor for pecan shelling due to the number of Mexicanos
on the West Side of the city, including women and child laborers. Most of the shellers
originally migrated to Texas from the northern Mexican states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila,

10

Rebecca Sharpless, Fertile Ground, Narrow Choices: Women on Texas Cotton Farms, 19001940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 236-237. Sitton and Utley, From
Can’t See to Can’t, 217. George O. Coalson, The Development of the Migratory Farm Labor
System in Texas: 1900-1954 (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1977), 12-13.
11

Richard A. Garcia, Rise of the Mexican Middle Class: San Antonio, 1929-1941 (College Station:
Texas A & M University Press, 1991), 28-29.

114

San Luis Potosi, and Tamaulipas.12 San Antonio offered a key destination for Mexican
agricultural migrants due to the long-standing West Side community, the city’s railroad
access to Mexico, and jobs throughout Texas, as well as employment within the Alamo
City itself.13 Although the railroad contributed to the decline of Mexican farms in south
Texas, the trains also provided transportation for migratory workers, in addition to
conveying agricultural products to the market.
As discussed in Chapter 2, railroads such as the I&GN, in addition to the GH&SA,
offered the means of transportation for Mexican immigrants traveling from the Monterrey
Center through the Nuevo Leon corridor to San Antonio. The most central migratory labor
route in Texas extended along a line running south-southwest and north-northeast of the
Alamo City, the same corridor as the I&GN Railroad. Along this route lay the Winter
Garden onion area that included Laredo and Eagle Pass to the south-southwest of San
Antonio as well as the Blackland Prairie cotton region to the north-northeast. The peak
pecan-shelling period took place from November to March, the harvesting of onions
occurred during the April to June period, and cotton ripened for picking in a northerly
direction beginning in south Texas from July through October. As a result of the
development of the railroad and the three crops, San Antonio became a strategic hub for
migratory labor as many Mexicanos worked in two or even three of the agribusinesses
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located in Texas.14 Thus, by the late 1910s, migratory labor became increasingly
important to agricultural industries in south Texas, especially as the United States became
involved in the Great War.
Several factors also increased employment prospects for Mexicanos during the Great
War: the pace of European migration declined due to the conflict; Anglos laborers
departed for military service; and the Great Migration lured many Blacks into northern
industries. However, this trend had originated at the beginning of the twentieth century
when agricultural owner growers had increasingly employed Mexicanos as Anglo living
standards had expanded for blue-collar workers who strove for skilled positions and
shunned manual and poorly-paid employment. Further, due to an expanded need for
additional agricultural products associated with the Great War, farmers utilized any means
necessary to secure the employment of Mexicanos. Owner growers, particularly those who
raised cotton, regularly violated contract labor laws in pursuit of workers for their fields.
Procurement of labor for cotton picking became increasingly problematic because of new
restrictions.15
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An exception to the Immigration Act of 1917, previously titled the First Bracero
Program by this dissertation, enabled farmers to continue the use of low-cost laborers from
Mexico on a seasonal basis and became particularly useful to cotton and onion growers in
south Texas. However, when the First Bracero Program concluded in 1921, the workers’
common status as illiterate migrants mired in poverty proved problematic. Mexicanos, no
matter their immigration or citizenship status, became saddled with the reputation of being
low-wage agricultural workers who Anglos preferred for this type of employment while it
existed, but repulsed when the work ended.
San Antonio remained a key residential location for these workers no matter which of
the three agricultural areas they labored in, cotton, onions, or pecans. Due to the sheer size
of the yield and the location of productive lands adjacent to San Antonio, cotton offers the
most meaningful crop to evaluate in regard to the employment of Mexican workers. The
production of cotton provided an important agricultural commodity in south Texas as well
as a draw for Mexican migrants seeking work in the United States.
Cotton
Paul Schuster Taylor and his wife, Dorothea Lange, became world famous for their
documentation of the Dust Bowl during the 1930s. These two individuals, she with a
camera and he with a pen, witnessed and documented one of the saddest exoduses in U.S.
history, the migration of Great Plains’ farmers to California. A labor economist and social
scientist, Taylor’s work on the Great Depression can be described as a progressive view of
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the conditions in California.16 Moreover, during the late 1920s, Taylor traveled throughout
the United States examining the expanding Mexican American population for the Social
Science Research Council.17 A veteran of the Great War, he believed that the conflict
influenced him “to bear a responsibility for the lives of others.”18 Taylor’s populist
philosophy may be seen in his work entitled An American-Mexican Frontier: Nueces
County, Texas, which preceded his collaboration with Lange. Although largely ignored by
social scientists in the 1920s, Taylor’s narrative appeared during a period of segregation
and geographical isolation when the Mexicano community remained “invisible” to many
Americans. By spending time in conversations with land owners, tenant farmers, and
laborers, Taylor provided a picture of the conditions in Nueces County that included
Corpus Christi, its largest city. The location of the county, 125 miles southeast of San
Antonio, appears inappropriate to the south Texas area considerations of this dissertation.
However, Taylor’s work demonstrates a connection between San Antonio as the key
conduit through which farm laborers from Mexico traveled enroute to Nueces County and
agricultural employment. Taylor’s book contains many direct quotations from various
demographic groups in Nueces County. He identified unease between Mexican immigrants
and Tejanos, Mexican Americans born in Texas.19 To Anglos throughout south Texas,
16
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someone identified as a “Mexican” became vilified no matter their status as immigrant or
U.S. citizen. Often, this created resentment on the part of U.S.-born persons of Mexican
descent against migrants who traveled to the United States in search of employment.
Nonetheless, two quotations demonstrate a similar perception of Mexican identity
among both the foreign and native born. First, from someone born in Mexico: “There is no
difference between Texas-Mexicans and Mexicans from Mexico.” And according to a
native-born person: “I know I’m not American; I’m a Mexican.”20 The conditions that led
to this discernment by all Mexicanos began earlier in the century as the growth of
agriculture resulted in the supposed need for low-cost labor. As Mexican immigrants
accepted this employment, many Anglos classified all Mexicans as cheap labor.21 Taylor
noted the root cause of economic segregation by explaining that Anglos had become
farmers and most Mexicans, regardless of their origin, toiled as laborers: “The roles of the
two races in this development have been sharply distinguished.”22
Moreover, Taylor contended that many Anglo farmers paid Mexicans to do work that
they could have done themselves. One farmer made the observation that “I work only 100
days a year, except for the care of cows, etc. We have the Mexicans here and don’t
work.”23 Further, Taylor supported the Monterrey Center concept that a significant number
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of immigrants originated in northern Mexico as 60.8 percent of the “1078 Mexicans who
registered at the Mexican Consulate, Corpus Christi, during the nineteen months ending
July 31, 1929” came from Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, or Coahuila. Nuevo Leon had the
most significant total at 37.4 percent, and above the 15.3 percent of Tamaulipas, Coahuila
trailed at 8.1 percent, but this possibly reflected the Corpus Christi location, a substantial
distance from Coahuila.24 Some farmers continued to violate border and contract labor
laws. They indicated to Taylor that they often paid a “Mexican agent” to recruit in Mexico,
but that this rarely occurred by the late 1920s. Additionally, Taylor mentioned the
government Bracero Program from the Great War period that brought in “carloads of
Mexicans” to Nueces County on a temporary admission basis. Shortly after this operation
ceased to exist in 1921, the Rural Land Owners’ Association in the county spent $1000 on
“an advertising campaign for cotton pickers.”25 Although the Bracero Program and labor
agents often arranged for the transportation of workers to the fields, many migrants had to
find their own method of transportation to the places of employment. The conveyances
utilized by Mexicans in traveling to the cotton fields evolved throughout the early twentieth
century as many used vehicles other than trains to arrive at remote farming locations.
Many of the laborers in Taylor’s study journeyed as far as 400 miles in following the
cotton harvest north. One description indicated that entire Mexican families traveled in
various vehicles ranging from the back bed of trucks to horse-drawn wagons and often in
long transportation “trains” along the rural roadways to the cotton fields. Also during this
24
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period, railroad trains transported “a box-car or two to carry the overflow on the run of
about 125 miles from San Antonio.”26 However, by the 1920s, improved highways in
Texas resulted in more auto use for the delivery of pickers to the cotton fields. Some of
these workers came in their own vehicles, but most “were brought in trucks by farmers, or
by Mexican truckers who either ‘sold’ the pickers to a farmer for their transportation after
arrival, or were engaged by the farmer in advance to provide the transportation.” Taylor
indicated that the “San Antonio highway” transported migrants in all such vehicles and that
in 1929, Mexicans comprised ninety-seven percent of the cotton pickers used in the
county.27 Taylor also discussed the reality of “seasonal” labor in addition to widespread
misconceptions regarding worker shortages.
Taylor explained a misunderstanding regarding “seasonal” labor in the United States
perpetuated by the American public as well as the hiring farmers. He contended that the
common belief that most seasonal laborers returned to Mexico after the cotton harvest did
not appear to be true. Taylor evaluated post office money orders in August of 1927, 1928,
and 1929, the height of the picking season, and found that roughly ninety percent of the
remittances went to locations within the United States rather than Mexico. Hence most of
the seasonal labor used for picking cotton in Nueces County during this period came from
locations in the United States such as San Antonio and traveled the state, laboring in
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various agricultural sites.28 Taylor’s observation can also be verified by the applicants to
the mutualista, Sociedad de la Unión between 1915 and 1925. Forty-four percent of the
1173 candidates indicated Texas as their place of birth and over forty percent self-identified
as unskilled blue-collar laborers. In a review of the circumstances regarding supposed
labor shortages, Taylor discussed a situation that existed throughout the state of Texas. He
indicated that shortages remained minimal and that claims to the contrary involved the
seasonal movement of labor. Contentions of worker scarcity assisted in securing enough
labor to deal with an expansion of agriculture all over the state rather than being an actual
deficit based on the current crop acreage. Further, by obtaining more laborers than what
might be needed during a particular period, farmers could keep wages low because, in
reality, they succeeded in establishing a labor overage. Not only did Taylor specify that
this activity applied to the entire state, but almost all of his examples came from the 1912
to 1921 period.29
Taylor’s research provided a glimpse of seasonal cotton labor in Nueces County
during the late 1920s. Although the place and the timeframe differed from this dissertation,
his research offers insight concerning immigration to San Antonio from 1915 to 1925. His
study demonstrates that many Mexican cotton laborers came internally from San Antonio
to work in the cotton fields of Nueces County. Many of his examples and quotations from
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farmers indicate that this situation had existed long before the late 1920s, and that the
laborers had originally immigrated to the United States from northern Mexico, particularly
Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, the two closest Mexican states to Nueces County. Growers
apparently manipulated the labor market to their advantage by claiming shortages when
none existed and lowered wages in the process.30 Rather than Nueces County, the most
prolific area for cotton in Texas during the 1915 to 1925 period remained the region to the
northeast of San Antonio.
The Texas Blackland Prairie (see Figure 6), including San Antonio and Bexar County
at the far southern end of the area, supplied the most abundant cotton production in the
state. Covering a 30-county section extending northeastward from Bexar through Dallas
County and beyond, in 1912, this region produced 43.5 percent of all 500-pound cotton
bales ginned in an area that amounted to only 11.8 percent of all the counties in the state.
Conversely, a 30-county area that included virtually every county south of San Antonio
within the state of Texas, a similar 11.8 percent of all Texas counties, produced no more
than 5.1 percent of all 500-pound cotton bales in 1912.31 This comparison demonstrates
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the relative importance of the Blackland Prairie area in regard to a similar-sized vicinity
also adjacent to San Antonio. Further, due to the abundance of cotton farming within it, the
Blackland Prairie area provides a valid source for evaluating farmer tenancy in Texas.
Considerably more foreign-born tenants worked in the southern portion of the area, the
twelve counties stretching from Waco to San Antonio, than in the northern eighteen
counties. The U.S. Census in 1910 indicated that 4,009 foreign-born tenants farmed within
the southern section and 306 in the north, a percentage difference of 92.9 versus 7.1.32
Apparently, although some other nationalities may have been included within the total,
most Mexican immigrants did not venture more than 180 miles from San Antonio, the
distance to Waco. This fact demonstrates that Mexicanos remained as close to the border
as feasible, which enabled their ease of return to their home country. Moreover, most
Mexicanos worked as seasonal laborers rather than as tenant farmers.

percent total used above is undoubtedly lower. Also see Sharpless, Fertile Ground, Narrow
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Figure 6: The Texas Blackland Prairie. Source:
Sharpless, Fertile Ground, Narrow Choices, 5.

Mexican migratory laborers began picking cotton in the Blackland Prairie area as
early as 1870 when farmers from a locality north of Austin recruited “wagon loads” of
Mexicanos in San Antonio for assistance in harvesting cotton. Other migrants groups
traveled by foot throughout the length of the Blackland Prairie during the late nineteenth
century before returning to their homes in the southern portion of the state.33 By 1911, one
south Texas newspaper reported that demand had soared for Mexican cotton laborers as an
entire train coach full of workers traveled through San Antonio enroute to San Marcos,
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Texas, about fifty miles northwest of the Alamo City in the Blackland Prairie area.34
Although railroads continued as an important means of transportation, the widespread use
of automobiles due to road improvements allowed migratory workers access to remote
locations in securing employment.35
The need for seasonal labor to plant and then harvest cotton came in waves across the
state of Texas due to the respective planting and picking timeframe, based on the weather
south to north. For instance, the planting of cotton in Nueces County, a far southern
location within Texas, took place in March and ordinarily between the 5th and the 20th of
the month.36 In the Blackland Prairie area, the planting occurred from about April 10 to the
end of May.37 This information demonstrates the northerly movement required for
seasonal laborers as the season progressed. However, the Blackland Prairie planting period
required much less manpower than the harvesting, approximately one-seventh of the man
hours. Actually, the cultivation of the cotton in June and July necessitated about twice as
much labor as the planting, because most farmers also sowed corn to supplement their
income during this period. The picking of cotton in the Blackland Prairie, a more laborious
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undertaking, occurred in September and to a lesser extent in October.38 The widespread
use of mechanization in the spring also meant that more acres of cotton could be planted,
but because of reliance on hand picking in the fall, opportunities for migratory laborers
increased during the harvest portion of the year.39 Again, demonstrating the sporadic
nature of the seasonal labor in connection with cotton harvesting, the Nueces County
picking began in late July and continued through August.40 Based on this calendar, many
seasonal laborers could work throughout Texas from early March until late October,
although this required a significant amount of travel north and south across the state.
Moreover, the workers probably continued to use the I&GN in their trek through the
Blackland Prairie since the rail line roughly passed through the same territory. Also,
derived from Taylor’s information on workers from San Antonio as well as his
observations regarding postal money orders, many of these seasonal laborers apparently
made San Antonio their home and travelled throughout the state during cotton season only
to return to the Alamo City from November through February or work on truck crops in the
Winter Garden area.
To supplement their meager wages, migratory laborers often worked at numerous
sites and on various agricultural products to survive. During the 1920s, based on an
equivalency to the Mexican peso, workers in northern Mexico earned an average of $18 per
38
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month or about one-eighth of the basic subsistence wage of $143. Although paid poorly in
the United States as compared to most Anglo workers at $105 per month, this amounted to
a far higher income than received in Mexico. However, most cotton pickers earned less at
around $54 per month and while still higher than Mexico, this wage depended on regular
employment, transportation to migratory areas, employment agency fees, and a higher cost
of living in the United States. In other words, for many Mexican workers, the view of
employment in the United States appeared more attractive than reality.41 As a result of this
low compensation, Mexican workers would board up their homes in San Antonio before
embarking on their migratory journey through various agricultural employment locations
and enlist their children to assist as laborers.42 Schooling beyond just a few months a year
for the children of itinerant workers remained an economic impossibility. While working
in the cotton fields, housing amounted to “house, wood, and water” as the Mexicano shacks
actually brought praise regarding their frugality from their Anglo employers since whites
would not accept such accommodations.43 Schooling for their children, a stable home life,
and economic viability remained beyond the reach of the transitory laborers as they moved
from one agricultural product to the next to survive. Moreover, as important as cotton
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remained to agricultural output in Texas, the production of other commodities also
increased during the early twentieth century.
Truck Crops
Paul Taylor also researched the labor situation in Dimmit County, Texas, an area
adjacent to the Rio Grande in between Laredo and Eagle Pass and known for truck-crop
production. Taylor conducted extensive interviews with farmers and workers during the
late 1920s and identified both negatives and positives within the relationships between
employers and their laborers. For instance, one farmer commented on Mexicanos whom he
had employed since 1909: “They’re loyal; they’re as honest as any white man. I send
them to San Antonio with vegetables and tell them to give me all over agreed hauling costs,
and they bring me back more than I expect.”44 Another farmer told a much different story:
“They will all sit down in the field, and not work if they hear somebody is paying a couple
of cents more. You go out and either have to give it to them or fire them. Efficient? No,
they are no good.”45 Often, the employers compared Mexican workers to African
Americans: “The worse you treat them, the more they do. You can’t praise them like you
can a nigger.”46 Clearly, Taylor’s research identified that differences existed amongst
workers and employers in this south Texas area known for truck crops.
Several counties in south Texas, known as the Winter Garden Area, became the key
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locality for the growing of truck crops such as onions, spinach, and other vegetables. The
counties of Dimmit, Frio, LaSalle, Maverick, Webb, and Zavala included the cities of
Laredo and Eagle Pass, both communities important to this dissertation due to their railroad
connections to Mexico (see Figure 7). The late nineteenth-century detection of
underground artesian water resulted in the development of wells and dams for irrigation
purposes. From 1904 to 1909, the number of wells grew from 30 to 200 as cattle ranges in
the area yielded to the production of truck crops. Raising cattle, once the predominant
occupation, fell by fifty percent from 1910 to 1911 as truck farming began to prosper.
With the completion of the San Antonio, Uvalde, and Galveston Railroad (SAU&G) in
1914, truck crops and Anglo owner growers thrived in the Winter Garden Area.47

Figure 7: The Winter Garden Area. Source: Menefee,
“Mexican Migratory Workers,” 2.
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The arrival of railroads such as the SAU&G benefitted the truck-crop farmers due to
the rail line connections to markets in the Middle West and northeastern United States.
Many of the Mexicanos working in the Winter Garden Area also labored in cotton as they
migrated from one agricultural job to the next as the season unfolded. The most laborious
portion of the year for truck crops occurred from October to January and again during the
March and April period. These dates fit together with the Blackland Prairie cotton picking
previously mentioned that transpired in late April and May as well as August and
September.48 Migratory laborers could move from one agricultural season to the next and
maintain a regular flow of income, no matter how meager.
By the late 1910s and early 1920s, truck-crop production in the Winter Garden Area
had reached a meaningful level. As these crops developed, the need for additional manual
labor rose. Due to the proximity of this district to the Mexican border and the gateway
cities of Eagle Pass and Laredo, Mexican laborers flocked to locations such as Dimmit
County. Further, growers often brought in “truck loads of Mexicans from San Antonio and
from towns east of the Winter Garden” to augment labor needs at harvest time.49 During
and after the Great War, growers utilized the guest-worker, “Bracero,” program that had
exempted Mexican laborers from the Immigration Act of 1917. Labor agencies in San
Antonio and Eagle Pass also regularly supplied workers to the Winter Garden fields.
Claims of labor shortages regularly surfaced, but Taylor asserted that he never verified any
48
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actual proof of such a problem.50 Migrants from Mexico offered owner growers an
economical means for obtaining inexpensive workers.
Due to the Winter Garden’s proximity to the border crossings at Laredo and Eagle
Pass, Mexican immigrant workers offered a low-cost labor alternative in these sparsely
populated counties. Dimmit County, one of the primary Winter Garden entities, saw a
significant growth of Mexican migrants during the transition from wide-open ranges to
irrigation farming and the growth of truck crops. Taylor analyzed 793 native Mexicans
who baptized or married in Dimmit County’s Roman Catholic Churches from 1884 to
1928. 48.7 percent (386) of the total had migrated from Coahuila, 22.8 percent (181) from
Nuevo Leon, and 4.9 percent (39) from Tamaulipas for a total of over 76 percent from the
northern border states of Mexico.51 Figure 8, reprinted from one of Taylor’s publications,
demonstrates the proclivity of Mexicans from northern Mexico to migrate to the Winter
Garden Area. For the period from 1884 to 1928, each dot equals one percent. In contrast,
he identified only 369 Texas-born Mexicanos who baptized or married during the same
period, less than one-half of the immigrant totals. These statistics demonstrate the
considerable level of migration into the county throughout the early twentieth century.52
As additional Mexican migrants ventured into the Winter Garden Area, the profitability of
onion farmers rose considerably.
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Figure 8: Origins of Winter Garden Laborers. Source: Paul Taylor,
Mexican Labor in the United States, Migration Statistics, Volume IV
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934), 42.

The production of staple crops, such as onions, proved profitable to owner growers of
truck crops in Dimmit County. Onions comprised the principal agricultural product in
Dimmit County as 1,470 carlots53 of the commodity nearly exceeded the total of 1,711 for
all other vegetables in 1920. Dimmit and Webb (Laredo) counties produced the most
onions in Texas and the state marketed the largest amount in the United States. Moreover,
crops other than onions began to thrive as the Winter Garden Area flourished as a truck-

A “carlot” represents the shortened version of “carload” or “the quantity of goods that can be
carried in a railroad freight car.” See: Oxford Dictionaries at
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crop production region. Spinach occupied a formidable position in Dimmit County with
148 carlots, but well behind onion production.54 As the truck crops prospered, the sixcounty area grew rapidly, with the total population increasing 26.7 percent from 1910 to
1920 and 42.5 percent to 1930 at a time when all of Texas rose 19.7 and 24.9 percent,
respectively.55
Crystal City, a community located immediately north of Dimmit County in Zavala
County, became the center of spinach production in the Winter Garden Area. Spinach
production flourished after onions had boomed, but still shipped 913 carlots during the
1923 to 1924 season, and grew to 2,555 carlots two years later. Referred to as the “spinach
capital of the world,” the Crystal City area produced between one-fourth and one-half of
U.S. spinach crop during the 1920s. Just as with the onion bonanza, spinach prospered
with the introduction of irrigation, the railroads, and migratory labor as Mexican workers
had transitioned from ranching to spinach.56 Thus, the Crystal City vicinity became an
important location for transitory Mexicano laborers.
Similar to San Antonio, Crystal City became a winter home for migratory workers;
sixty percent of Mexicanos arrived in the town after 1920 during the spinach boom. Of the
workers who migrated directly from Mexico, eighty-five percent originated from
54
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northeastern Mexico, a majority from Coahuila. In similar fashion to the onion workers,
spinach laborers journeyed throughout the southwest to maintain their income, and ninety
percent left each spring to pick cotton in Texas or sugar beets in more northerly locations. 57
Again, the Great War guest-worker program proved important to the increase of Mexican
immigration into the community, and many of these laborers remained in Texas after the
arrangement ended in 1921. However, ethnic employment agencies also offered an
important service to farmers in search of inexpensive laborers.
Generally, owner growers of cotton, onions, and spinach preferred to use Mexican
labor contractors who transported workers from other portions of the state or Mexico rather
than locate laborers on their own. Although some workers resented the enganchadores,
their popularity amongst farmers persisted because transitory laborers could not easily
leave. They reluctantly accepted low wages and poor conditions rather than waste time and
transportation costs in seeking other employment. The Texas Farm Placement Service in
San Antonio, a branch of a state agency that procured workers for private employers, also
assisted the contractors by identifying labor shortage locations.58 However, actual labor
deficiencies seldom existed. One example represented a particularly extreme claim: “The
Placement Service had received a long distance telephone call stating that farmers in a
certain community were in need of 2,000 cotton pickers.” After an employee of the
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Service investigated, “He found that there was actual need for only 85 cotton pickers.”59
Exaggerations such as these allowed growers to take advantage of migratory workers who
arrived at a location only to find that plentiful jobs did not exist. The laborers would have
to settle for less than desirable pay or no employment at all. As a result of the low wages,
Mexican migrants in communities such as Crystal City suffered abominable living
conditions. Most of the shelters could be described as “shacks” or “huts” rather than
houses and while some had two, most amounted to only one room. “Patched together from
scraps of lumber, old signboards, tar paper, and flattened oil cans,” the poorer
accommodations had no stoves, indoor plumbing or electricity.60 Often, farmers found
creative methods for maintaining workers within the substandard environment.
Some employers utilized alternative methods for retaining Mexican workers.
Francisco and Eulalio Segura, presumably brothers, traveled from Zaragoza, Coahuila, and
traversed the border in a wagon that crossed the bridge to Eagle Pass, Texas, on September
14, 1906. Born further south in Coahuila at Nadadores, both men journeyed to the United
States with their wives and children. By 1910, the two men lived in the same rented farm
house in Atascosa County with another brother, Janaro, mother, Antonia, three wives,
twelve children, and another man, probably a widower brother-in-law. Twenty people
occupied this rural home while the four adult males, and possibly the entire family, worked
as farm laborers in the southwestern portion of the county, adjacent to the Winter Garden
Area. Three children had died in infancy among the four families; four of the living
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offspring had been born in Texas, making them U.S. citizens.61
In completing a Declaration of Intention to become citizens of the United States on
November 28, 1916, in San Antonio, Francisco and Eulalio indicated that they worked in
Hindes, Texas, a small farming community in far southwestern Atascosa County. Three
members of the Burciaga family also traveled with the Seguras from Hindes to complete
the Declaration. All born in Nadadores, Juan Burciaga and his two sons, Ygnacio and
Manuel, also came to Texas from Zaragoza, crossed the border in 1913, and worked in
Hindes. That these two families originated from the same small Mexican town of 5,000
residents and emigrated from Zaragoza, 8,000 inhabitants, to the same location in the
United States, did not reflect a coincidence.62 This evidence of “chain migration” has been
documented by many scholars, notably, historians of Mexican immigration Douglas S.
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Massey and Jorge Durand who elaborated on the “cumulative causation of migration” as
originally identified by sociologist Gunnar Myrdal.63 Massey and Durand argued that:
The causation of migration becomes cumulative because each act of migration alters
the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, thus
increasing the likelihood of additional movement. Once the number of network
connections in a community reaches a critical threshold, migration becomes selfperpetuating because each act of migration creates the social structure needed to
sustain it.64
By applying Massey and Duran’s premise to the migration of the Seguras and the
Burciagas, an example of chain migration emerges. The Seguras migrated first, and the
Burciagas, probably based on information from the other family, came to the United States
seven years later.
Frank D. Hindes, the son of George F. Hindes, who had originally settled the
community, signed the Declarations for Juan and Ygnacio, presumably due to their
illiteracy. The Hindes family not only founded the town, but donated adjacent land for the
SAU&G Railroad that moved truck crops to the larger market, as well as transporting
migratory workers from cities such as San Antonio to work in the Winter Garden Area.
Although the community’s population never exceeded 100, it served as an important stop
along the railroad as the truck-crop business began to boom.65
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The two Seguras and the three Burciagas all worked at the Hindes farm in Atascosa
County and presumably accepted the owner’s transportation to San Antonio to complete
the Declarations on the same November day in 1916. Their reason for filling out the
Declarations could have been patriotic, political, economic, or some combination of these
three. The patriotic possibility exists because the five men now lived in the United States
and attained their livelihood from that residency, no matter how meager. The rationale
could also be political and/or economic since Texas allowed voting by Mexicanos who
completed Declarations. As a result, politicians offered bribes for votes, and employers
regularly required voting for certain candidates as a condition of employment. By
furnishing the transportation for the five men to San Antonio, some sixty miles away,
Hindes likely expected political considerations and/or continued service from men that he
employed.66 None of the five men completed a Petition for Naturalization over the coming
decade within the San Antonio District Court system.
The story of these two families represents a common experience for Mexican
immigrants in and around the Winter Garden Area. Although living conditions remained
difficult, the families fared better in the United States as the Mexican Revolution continued
throughout the decade. However, beholden to their Anglo bosses, the five men likely
succumbed to fears regarding their continued employment, as well as economic survival,
and agreed to their employer’s requests. The general situation for truck crop workers in
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south Texas remained oppressive into the 1930s as “The ramshackle houses are
overcrowded, health condition are bad and medical care is inadequate . . . and the social life
of the Mexicans is hedged about with economic and racial restrictions.”67 The
circumstances for pecan shellers in San Antonio proved equally difficult for Mexicanos due
to the oppressive conditions fostered by their employers.
Pecans
By the early 1920s, San Antonio had been the center of the pecan-shelling industry
for nearly 40 years as the G.A. Duerler Company had opened in 1882. The pecan tree
offered one of the most lucrative crops in Texas and spawned an industry that produced
millions of pounds of product each year as approximately one-half of the pecans shelled in
San Antonio grew within a 250-mile radius of the city along the Brazos, Colorado, Trinity,
and Nueces Rivers. As agricultural industries flourished in south Texas during the early
twentieth century, pecan shelling companies joined cotton and truck-crop entrepreneurs in
seeking out Mexican workers as inexpensive labor. San Antonio proved especially useful
for obtaining labor due to the long-standing Mexican colony on the West Side, the city’s
proximity to cotton and truck-crop agricultural areas, and the employment of Mexicanos in
other industries in the community. Most of the shellers originally journeyed to the city
from the Mexican states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, San Luis Potosi, and Tamaulipas, and
just as had occurred with other Mexicanos, the shellers also worked in additional
agricultural businesses. During July and August, many shellers traveled to the Blackland
67
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Prairie cotton-picking region while still maintaining their San Antonio residences.68
The Commissioner of Labor for Texas wrote a report in 1917 on pecan shellers: “It
will be noted that extremely low wages are paid to female labor in this industry, due to the
availability of cheap Mexican labor. White and Negro labor have been practically crowded
out by the Mexican.”69 Despite the availability of mechanization during the early 1930s,
San Antonio businessmen preferred manual shelling because of the low rates paid to
Mexican laborers. This resulted in the West Side of San Antonio becoming one of the
worst “slums” in the United States as many of the shellers rented wooden shacks for fifty
cents to one dollar per week. Only twenty-five percent had electricity. These conditions
contributed to high rates of tuberculosis, low school attendance, and crime as the economic
situation for these Mexicanos tended to only deteriorate over time.70 The employers
maligned their Mexican workers as demonstrated by this quotation from one of the
shelling-company owners:
Compared to those shanties they live in, the pecan shelleries [sic] are fine. They are
glad to have a warm place to sit in the winter. They can be warm while they’re
shelling pecans, they can talk to their friends while they’re working, their kids come
in after school and play because it’s better than going home. If they get hungry they
can eat pecans. If they put the 25-cent minimum wage law over us, all these
Mexicans will be replaced by white girls. The Mexicans have no business here
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anyway. They flock into San Antonio with their kind, and then they cause labor
troubles or go on relief at the expense of the taxpayer.71
This quotation demonstrates why a labor activist such as Emma Tenayuca could readily
recruit thousands of the shellers to walk off the job.
Although Tenayuca’s movement transpired after the time frame of this dissertation,
the economic, political, and social disparities she uncovered demonstrated the conditions
that existed throughout the early twentieth century. During the 1930s, the pecan-shelling
industry operated in hundreds of work sheds on the West Side of San Antonio. Because of
its classification as “agricultural work,” minimum wage regulations did not apply to the
industry, and workers lived in poverty, earning as little as sixteen cents per week during the
Great Depression. Women comprised ninety percent of the workers and often had to “take
work home,” shelling pecans in their houses, to maintain their employment. After a 1934
walkout ended in an arbitration agreement, workers still faced wage reductions during a
1937 recession and a ruthless purging by the state of Texas of Mexicanos on welfare.
Tenayuca, a labor activist born in San Antonio who began attending labor rallies while in
high school, called for a strike in early 1938 and successfully convinced thousands of
workers to walk off the job. Jailed for her alleged communist-inspired activity, her
leadership motivated female pecan-shellers to enlist husbands and children to rally in
support of higher wages and improved working conditions. Anglos, higher-class Mexican
Americans, San Antonio newspapers, the American Federation of Labor, and even the
Roman Catholic Church assailed the work stoppage. Although some members of these

71

Menefee and Cassmore, “The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio,” 50.

142

groups sympathized with the workers’ plight, the supposed Red tinge and female leadership
of the Texas Pecan Shelling Workers Union (TPSWU) and its strike provoked the
disparagement. Moreover, the TPSWU affiliated with the United Canner, Agricultural,
Packing, and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA) under the umbrella of the Congress
of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The CIO sent field representatives to San Antonio who
lent support to the strikers and, along with Tenayuca’s release from jail, assisted in further
organizing the work stoppage. Brutality ensued when the local police broke up
demonstrations, and the women as well as their children ended up in jail. The city of San
Antonio also closed soup kitchens under the guise of unsanitary conditions; these food
distribution facilities had been set up for the workers by the Women’s International League
for Peace and Freedom. Eventually, the recognition of UCAPAWA Local 172 resulted in a
resolution that included various union benefits, including higher wages.72 The activities of
Tenayuca illustrate the difficulties for pecan-shelling workers during the early twentieth
century. Tenayuca and other labor leaders not only battled employers, but also had to
contend with the city government, the Church, the AFL, the local media, and higher
economic classes in the Alamo City. Based on the deteriorated position that Mexican
laborers found themselves in by the 1930s, the previous fifty years of pecan shelling in San
Antonio represented some of the most oppressive agricultural-related employment in south
Texas.
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The story of the pecan shellers in San Antonio provides an example of how Anglo
businessmen used the Mexicano work force to enhance their profits. While Emma
Tenayuca and CIO Local 172 won the battle over wages and conditions in the workplace,
they lost the “war.” Faced with having to pay higher wages, the companies turned back to
mechanization, and the number of workers required for shelling soon plummeted. Because
the shellers worked within San Antonio, their experience also demonstrated that Mexicano
workers did not have to leave the city for employment in an agriculture-related industry.
However, the conditions of their employment and housing revealed a situation that may
have represented some of the worst for any agricultural workers in south Texas. The San
Antonio pecan shellers persevered through difficult circumstances only to find themselves
unemployed and at the mercy of the Anglo establishment in the city. Moreover, since
many of the agricultural workers lived in the West Side of San Antonio and labored in the
truck-crop farms of the Winter Garden Area as well as the cotton fields of the Blackland
Prairie, the plight of the pecan shellers represented those of south Texas migratory workers
in general. The Anglo entrepreneurs who created an agricultural revolution in south Texas
that involved cotton, truck crops, and pecans, depended on Mexican migratory labor and
the low wages and poor housing conditions forced upon these workers to increase their
profits.
Three agricultural commodities, cotton, truck crops, and pecans, became the most
significant motivator for immigration from Mexico to south Texas and San Antonio during
the early twentieth century. Cotton had been a long time staple for Mexican migrants, but
their involvement with this product increased with the exodus of African Americans as
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discussed in Chapter 2, the reduction of immigrants from Europe, and U.S. participation in
World War I. Truck crops that proliferated near the Mexican border became increasingly
important during the 1910s as irrigation improved and agricultural entrepreneurs
transitioned their utilization of the land from ranching to farming. Pecan shelling, present
in San Antonio since the late nineteenth century, continued to grow and prosper during the
early twentieth century, but to the benefit of the factory owners rather than the workers
who labored in sheds and homes on the West Side of the city. To maintain their economic
viability, many Mexican migratory workers labored in two or three of these enterprises
despite the menial wages and poor working conditions. Although an improvement over
their financial possibilities in Mexico, particularly due to the Mexican Revolution, the
exploitation of these workers by employers, their poor treatment by Anglo society, and the
lack of viable alternatives, represented an economic reality that proved difficult to escape
from. Moreover, the Immigration Act of 1917 created new barriers to Mexican
immigration and reinforced older statutes that had not been well enforced.
This dissertation now moves to the first of four important areas of research: the First
Bracero Program. With the advent of the Immigration Act of 1917, Mexican immigrants
had to be literate, pay an increased head tax, and deal with a revised Contract Labor Law to
enter the United States. Nonetheless, due to alleged needs for labor as a result of the Great
War, the Department of Labor, in conjunction with the Immigration Bureau, suspended the
application of these three provisions for some Mexican agricultural migrants so that crop
production could continue and even increase. This deferral of portions of the Act, called
the First Bracero Program in this dissertation, proved initially beneficial to Mexican
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immigrant laborers as it allowed them to easily enter the United States despite the law’s
passage. However, Bracero migrants soon traveled deeper into the United States including
north Texas and the Middle West, and occupied areas not commonly associated with
Mexican immigration. National politicians, nativists, and labor leaders became vocal
opponents of the Bracero Program and successfully demonized Mexicanos as people who
took “American” jobs, regularly sought welfare, and resisted U.S. cultural influence.
Despite objections from other politicians and owner growers, the Bracero Program came to
a close in 1921 as repatriation of immigrants and other Mexicanos became commonplace.
The Immigration Act of 1917 established a long-standing attitude by Anglo Americans
regarding Mexicanos: White Americans accepted Mexican labor when needed, but
disparaged and deported the workers once the necessity ended . . . disposable laborers.
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CHAPTER 4
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE FIRST BRACERO PROGRAM
The railroads that crossed the border at Laredo and Eagle Pass, Texas, facilitated the
movement of Mexican migrants from the Monterrey Center through the Nuevo Leon
corridor to San Antonio. Cotton, onions, and pecans provided the agricultural products for
Mexicano migratory workers in south Texas. However, crossing the Rio Grande at Laredo
and Eagle Pass during the late 1910s became increasingly difficult as U.S. immigration law
began to tighten border controls and prevented some migrants from entering the nation.
The Immigration Act of 1917 included regulations such as a literacy requirement, an
increased head tax, and the need for a passport which proved restrictive for Mexican
migratory laborers. Moreover, the 1917 law did not purposefully single out Mexican
migrants as the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries witnessed a move toward
immigration restriction that primarily focused on concerns regarding southern and eastern
Europeans entering the United States. Bureaucrats and politicians came into conflict over
how best to reduce federal expenditures and deal with a recurrent perception that people
considered non-white by Anglo Americans represented a threat to the national heritage.
Although not the first review of the ramifications of the Immigration Act of 1917 and
resultant guest-worker exemption referred to as the First Bracero Program, this dissertation
discusses the subject in greater depth than past historical writings.
Mark Reisler, the most prolific writer on the First Bracero Program, apparently
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reviewed many of the same files that this chapter utilizes. Reisler argued that “The
Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, erected the first substantial barriers to the legal
immigration of Mexican workers,” but that “the temporary admissions program [also]
served as a catalyst for augmented immigration.”1 However, this chapter takes this
contention further by evaluating the arguments for and against the program as well as the
bureaucrats who implemented the exception to the Immigration Act of 1917. This
dissertation discusses the specific actions of the key players, rather than focusing primarily
on Labor Secretary William B. Wilson as Reisler did. Through a detailed examination of
immigration proponents and opponents, the negative view of Mexican labor that emanated
from the worker’s widespread presence in the United States may be more fully discerned.
This nationwide antipathy, I argue, originated with the migration associated with the First
Bracero Program and created a stigma regarding Mexican workers that persists to the
present: accept laborers from Mexico when needed, but abandon them once the required
work has been completed.2 The Program continued despite the Bureau of Immigration’s
knowledge that many of the demands for workers amounted to a scheme to obtain a surplus
of labor at lower wages. The Bureau of Immigration (BOI) acted as a padrone in soliciting
labor for private employers.
Frank W. Berkshire, the Supervising Inspector of the Mexican Border District
1
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headquartered at El Paso, Texas, and the administrator of the activities of all BOI agents
along the entire U.S.-Mexican border, occupied an essential role in implementing the First
Bracero Program. Berkshire’s background included positions with the Immigration Bureau
during the first decade of the century as a Chinese Inspector in Chicago, as well as in New
York, before his assignment to the Mexican border in 1908.3 By the time of the First
Bracero Program in 1917, Berkshire possessed a more comprehensive understanding of
Mexican immigration than his superiors and became the most influential person regarding
the implementation of the exception to the Immigration Act of 1917. Notably, Berkshire
stressed the letter of the law in regard to the program and, in the process, assisted in
creating a situation in which Mexicans would be viewed as “disposable” labor. The
Supervising Inspector understood the farmers’ demand for workers, no matter their
motivation, but he did not want the migrants to remain permanently in the United States.
The resultant expulsions primarily involved migrants who had not followed the rules of the
3
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program as they had deserted their original employer and accepted other employment.
Once the First Bracero Program ended and economic conditions turned sour, the removal
of Mexicans began to increase as industries and farmers abandoned surplus Mexican labor
in the wake of a post-war recession. Although Berkshire regularly decried a lack of
adequate funding to orchestrate the expulsions, he still cooperated in tracking down
Mexican migrants and instructed all border stations to follow the same procedures.4
This chapter begins with a brief history of the BOI as its formation provides
background for understanding the administrative developments of the Bureau during the
1910s. Next, the passage of the Immigration Act of 1917 reveals Congressional attitude
toward immigration, and more specifically illiteracy, an approach that had festered for two
decades before coming to fruition with the law’s enactment. Due to U.S. entry into the
Great War shortly before the Immigration Act of 1917 took effect, the need for additional
agricultural workers became a recurrent theme orchestrated by farmers who sought to
maintain their source of low-wage labor. Subsequently, Secretary Wilson approved a
4
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guest-worker program—the First Bracero program—that allowed a suspension of the 1917
law for certain migrants. The remainder of the chapter encompasses: the circumstances
under which this exception occurred; the lobbying supporting less immigration restriction
as well as those against the admission of illiterate Mexican migrants; and the evolution of
the program after the Great War Armistice including the rise of nativism. The Chinese
Exclusion Act, a reversal of an early nineteenth-century trend that supported migration,
played an important role in the establishment of the BOI.
The Bureau of Immigration
The Chinese Exclusion Act, passed by Congress in 1882, not only marked the
beginning of exclusionary immigration policy in the United States, but also necessitated a
Bureau of Immigration.5 Before that law, most immigrants readily gained entrance to the
United States as only convicted criminals and prostitutes could be denied admission.6
However, with the passage of the Exclusion Act that forbade Chinese laborers from
entering the nation, the U.S. government needed a bureaucratic agency to police the denial
of admittance. The specific beginning of direct administrative control of immigration
began in 1891 with the passage of an “Act in amendment of various acts relative to
immigration and the importation of aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor”
(26 Stat. L., 1084). While most federal agencies protected their constituents, the new
5
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Immigration Bureau tended to defend the nation from immigrants considered problematic. 7
Beginning during the 1890s, advocates of immigration restriction started to lobby the
U.S. Congress to adopt regulations that would slow down migration trends. Not
coincidentally, the restriction promoters, mostly from the Republican Party, began these
activities when immigration increased from areas that differed from the northern and
western European ancestors of the principal native-born population of the United States.
The new migrants, from southern and eastern Europe, tended to be Roman Catholic or
Jewish, also in contrast with native-born American Protestants. Subsequently, a new
concept began to circulate among those in favor of restriction: ban illiterate migrants and
assist low-wage workers already in the United States by eliminating competition from
newly-arrived immigrants. Economic difficulties associated with the Depression of 1893,
in addition to the activities of organized labor during the decade, served to intensify these
anti-immigrant voices.8
By using a socially acceptable reason for prohibiting undesirables, the literacy
requirement, the restriction advocates could effectively disguise their contempt for the
“new immigration.” In 1894, the Immigration Restriction League began in Boston,
Massachusetts, and the Republicans gained control of both Houses of Congress in off-year

7

8

Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, 35.

John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925, (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, [1955] 2nd ed., 2002), 97-101. Daniels, Guarding the
Golden Door, 30-31. David J. Goldberg, Discontented America: The United States in the 1920s
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 141-142. William Preston, Jr., Aliens and
Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1994), 23-27.

152

elections that November. The League began lobbying efforts in favor of the literacy
requirement for new immigrants.9 Their argument now degenerated into one that claimed
the United States faced the possibility of racial suicide by diluting the Anglo-Saxon gene
pool with Europeans from places such as Italy, Poland, and Russia. The restrictionists
believed that the poor from these nations, usually uneducated and illiterate, contained a
criminal element that should be barred from the United States. Although the restriction
supporters ultimately lost this round as legislation failed to gain enough support for
passage, the League and their devotees continued to consider new ideas for achieving their
goal. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), including President Samuel Gompers,
also backed immigration restrictions. The AFL excluded unskilled workers and minorities
from membership, and argued that immigrants threatened “American” jobs, but U.S.
corporations persisted in encouraging unlimited migration.10 To facilitate the ongoing
trend toward additional restriction, the BOI‘s role increasingly involved the restriction of
immigration and support for native-born laborers.
Three Commissioners of Immigration presided over the ten-year period before the
First Bracero Program including Frank Sargent from 1902 to 1908, Daniel Keefe during the
1909 to 1913 period, and Anthony C. Caminetti beginning with the Wilson administration.
Additionally, all of these Commissioners came to their position with little administrative
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background and no direct experience with the nuances of immigration policy.11 The
Commissioners had been political appointments designed to placate the burgeoning labor
movement in the United States. For instance, Frank P. Sargent had been a union official
with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen. Known as a conservative who did not favor
excessive labor actions, he remained close to Samuel Gompers, stayed committed to
immigration restriction, and opposed southern and eastern European migration.12 Also a
union man, Daniel Keefe orchestrated the affiliation of the International Longshoremen’s
Organization (ILO) with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Another conventional
unionist and Republican, Keefe’s actions eventually alienated him from the ILO and
presumably assisted with his appointment by the conservative president, William H. Taft.13
Anthony C. Caminetti had been a Democratic California legislator and Representative
to Congress during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Also a champion of
organized labor, Caminetti fought for restrictions of Japanese laborers who he believed
deprived “Americans” of jobs.14 Caminetti’s early backing of Woodrow Wilson’s
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candidacy as well as the Commissioner’s Italian-American and working-class heritage
assisted in his appointment, but an issue surfaced that almost scuttled the choice.15 Drew
Caminetti, the Commissioner’s son, and Maury I. Diggs violated the Mann Act by
transporting two females over the state line from California to Nevada in early 1913.
When their trial began in June, 1913, Commissioner Caminetti asked for a leave of absence
to assist his son. However, due to the Bureau’s restructuring associated with the setup of
the newly formed Department of Labor (DOL), Secretary Wilson saw this request as
problematic and asked U.S. Attorney General James C. McReynolds to delay the
indictment so that the Department’s reorganization could be finalized. Consequently, the
Federal District Attorney in San Francisco resigned due to this perceived “influence” from
Washington D.C. Republicans in Congress demanded to look into the matter and some
Democrats recommended that McReynolds should resign. The president stepped in and
criticized both Secretary Wilson and McReynolds, but also asked that Caminetti be allowed
to pursue the assistance to his son. President Wilson’s actions had mollified the situation
with Congress. Wounded, Caminetti and Secretary Wilson survived this scandal that
consumed the new administration throughout its first several months.16
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these three Commissioners, beholden to organized labor including the AFL, sought to
prevent immigration rather than encouraging it. Sympathetic to organized labor and
nativist factions, the law and the Commissioners now represented a bulwark against the
encouragement of immigration as the Bureau continued to evolve.
With the advent of the administration of Woodrow Wilson in 1913 and the
appointment of Caminetti, Commerce and Labor separated into two departments with the
Bureau residing in the latter of the two.17 In 22 years, since the creation of the Bureau, the
agency had experienced several changes and relocations from one administrative
department to the next, and Congress continued to pass what historian Roger Daniels has
called “piecemeal immigration restriction.”18 The Bureau’s rapid growth, in combination
with haphazard legislation and continual bureaucratic rearrangement, had created a
volatility that may be seen in the maturation of another branch of the DOL that housed a
government-sponsored employment service. By the beginning of the war in Europe in
1914, the Division of Information (DOI) began to provide details regarding employment
opportunities to all workers instead of only immigrants. Once the United States became
directly involved in the Great War in 1917, and because of the needs associated with
married men had transported the women across state lines to be mistresses, this constituted a
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increased production in both the industrial and agricultural sectors, the United States
Employment Service (USES) formed as a replacement to the DOI. Throughout the war
years, the USES operated on its own within the DOL rather than under the BOI.19 Despite
inter-agency squabbles, the USES and the BOI would have to work together on the
management of the First Bracero Program. Throughout these first decades of existence for
the BOI, continual changes in the agency’s governmental location, the evolution of
immigration law, and irregular Bureau leadership, all caused confusion and difficulties in
implementing policy.
Moreover, the BOI remained a governmental agency in transition as the patterns of
immigration changed. The Great War had dampened migration to the United States from
Europe, but the Mexican Revolution encouraged Mexican migrants to seek employment
and peace north of the border. Compounding these transformations, as discussed in
Chapter 2, African American migration to northern industrial cities created opportunities
for low-wage Mexican workers in states such as Texas. Since the Bureau now fell within
the DOL, Caminetti and his employees had to confront labor needs associated with the
Great War and the growth and power of the USES.20 The BOI, headed by leaders
unaccustomed to holding administrative positions that dealt with migration, soon had to
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contend with a restrictive law that would have far-reaching consequences regarding
Mexican immigration. During the late 1910s, immigration restrictionists finally won their
battle in passing a law that banned illiterates from entering the nation.
Immigration foes, including the Immigration Restriction League, continued to
emphasize the need for a literary requirement in laws that came before Congress in 1903,
1907, 1911, and 1913. Some of these statutes died within the legislatures, and others
suffered a presidential veto. A United States Immigration Commission, commonly known
as the Dillingham Commission, resulted in the 1911 and 1913 attempts at legislation. The
Commission had also advocated restriction of southern and eastern European immigration
to the United States.21 Finally, after two decades of political activities, the Great War
provided the restriction advocates with their victory. The fear and loathing of
“hyphenated-Americans,” Germans in this case, assisted in intensifying the argument for
restriction. The restrictionists achieved their victory with the Immigration Act of 1917,
which included a requirement that immigrants, with few exceptions, be literate before
gaining entry into the United States.22
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The Immigration Act of 1917
Historian Roger Daniels indicated that the Immigration Act of 1917 represented “the
first significant general restriction of immigration ever passed.”23 Although universally
applied to immigrants from throughout the world, the law became particularly problematic
for agricultural migrants from Mexico. The Act not only prevented illiterates from entering
the United States, but also incorporated other restrictionist measures that had originated
during the nineteenth century. Two additional sections of the Act reinforced the “Likely to
Become a Public Charge” (LPC) and “Contract Labor Law” (CLL) provisions, which
initially had been legislated in the 1880s. The new law reiterated their importance as the
strengthening of both measures demonstrated nativist tendencies within the U.S. Congress.
The LPC statute changed as migrants could now be deported within five years of their
arrival in the United States, instead of three, based on their economic status at the time of
admission. Due to ongoing concerns regarding the reduction of governmental
expenditures, the LPC portion also assisted in cutting costs by avoiding the expenses
associated with persons unable to support themselves and becoming a burden to local
officials. The CLL section flatly stated that migrants could not have been “induced,
assisted, encouraged, or solicited” to enter the nation upon promise of employment.
Finally, the raising of the head tax for migrants from four to eight dollars also came with
the passage of the 1917 Act.24 Due to the illiteracy and poor economic circumstances of
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many Mexican immigrants, as well as common practices along the border regarding labor
recruitment, these changes restricted immigration from Mexico.25 Despite the actions taken
by the Congress, many organizations and individuals, including President Wilson,
disagreed with banning illiterate immigrants.
Many U.S. citizens defended immigrants during the early twentieth century including
Upton Sinclair who wrote The Jungle that not only depicted the unsanitary conditions in
the meat-packing industry, but also the poor circumstances endured by impoverished
immigrant workers.26 Further, organizations such as the American Jewish Committee
(AJC) worked to represent immigrant interests in the face of nativists’ rancor against nonProtestant migrants.27 President Wilson’s defense of his veto of the Immigration Act of
1917 demonstrated that his ideas expressed the opinions of people such as Sinclair and
organizations like the AJC that argued against the statute and its literacy requirement. The
President stated: “It is not a test of character, of quality, or of personal fitness, but would
operate in most cases merely as a penalty for a lack of opportunity in the country from
which the alien seeking admission came . . . . Our experience in the past has not been that
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the illiterate immigrant is as such an undesirable immigrant.”28 Nonetheless, Congress
overrode his veto and the bill became law on February 5, 1917. The literacy mandate of
the new law proved problematic for low-wage, Mexican agricultural workers as
approximately sixty-eight percent of all adults in Mexico remained illiterate in 1910.29
Before the 1917 law, Mexican agricultural workers frequently traveled into the
United States to accept employment in the Southwest, particularly Texas, and regularly
returned to Mexico without any undue difficulty. The LPC and CLL statutes had been in
place since the 1880s, but they provided slight hindrance to migrants seeking to cross an
open and unpatrolled border.30 Now with the passage of the Immigration Act of 1917, all
of these regulations gained importance as, technically, most Mexican migrants could no
longer legally enter the United States based on any one of the following statutes: illiteracy;
economics due to both the LPC and additional head tax requirement; and the CLL since
many recruiters had previously crossed the border to secure workers. Moreover, U.S. entry
into the Great War assisted in perpetuating an argument that the nation required additional
farm labor. Generated by agricultural interests to keep labor costs low by creating a
surplus of workers, this contention would prove important regarding the Act of 1917 and
Mexican immigration.
Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, “Veto of Immigration Bill, 30 Jan. 1917”
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President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war against Germany on April
2, 1917, a month before the Immigration Act of 1917 became law on May 1. Since the Act
had been passed on February 5, before official U.S. entry into the war, the conflict did not
constitute a direct reason for the law’s approval. Once the United States had entered the
war, agricultural production, as well as the manufacture of many other commodities,
needed to increase to support overseas troops. This also occurred because many products
became unavailable owing to the hostilities. Further, the enlistment of recruits into the
armed forces, in addition to a lack of European migrant laborers, augmented the argument
for more laborers in agriculture. However, the new immigration law had erected barriers to
migration from Mexico and agricultural owner growers in Texas saw additional immigrants
as the answer to the problem of having sufficient labor for increased production.31
As explained in Chapter 3, Paul Schuster Taylor, writing about supposed labor
shortages in Texas during the 1912 to 1921 period, contended that farmers orchestrated
these needs to create surpluses of low-cost workers and improve their profitability.32 Texas
farmers had been long accustomed to hiring migrant Mexican laborers for this purpose
because of the porous border with Mexico as well as the availability of U.S. citizens of
Mexican heritage that lived throughout the state.33 A quotation from Victor S. Clark, who
31
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wrote for the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1908, demonstrated the attraction for
Mexican laborers on the part of Texas farmers: “he is docile, patient, usually orderly in
camp, fairly intelligent under competent supervision, obedient, and cheap. If he were
active and ambitious, he would be less tractable and would cost more. His strongest point
is his willingness to work for a low wage.”34 “Cheap labor” amounted to the primary
motivation for farmers in southern Texas to hire Mexicans laborers. Once deprived of the
workers by the Immigration Act of 1917, the agricultural community “used” the Great War
as a justification in clamoring for a suspension of the law.
On May 23, 1917, at the behest of Commissioner Caminetti, Secretary Wilson
inaugurated what became commonly described as the “special exception” to the
Immigration Act of 1917 or, as this dissertation has previously entitled it, the First Bracero
Program.35 Secretary Wilson argued that U.S. entry into the Great War amounted to an
“extraordinary situation” and that the ninth proviso to section three of the law authorized
him to take actions that would assist in the production of agricultural products. The
Secretary suspended the literacy requirement, the implementation of any head tax, and
contract labor provisions of the law to allow for the importation of temporary agricultural
workers from Mexico.36 Three days later, on May 26, workers from Canada became
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similarly exempted.37 Although exceptions for railroad workers and miners came into
force during the four-year duration of the program, agricultural guest workers remained the
most significant group. Secretary Wilson’s experiences as a laborer and union leader
unquestionably impacted his actions while serving as the Secretary of Labor, but using the
war as his justification, he approved the exception. Secretary Wilson accepted the
argument of owner growers that additional labor could only be obtained from Mexico.
William Bauchop Wilson’s labor background influenced his tenure as the Secretary
of Labor. A native of Scotland, Wilson began working as a Pennsylvania coal miner in
1871 when only nine-years old. He joined a union at age eleven and suffered several
indignities including being jailed, blacklisted, and evicted due to his union membership.
After rising to a leadership position within the Knights of Labor during the 1880s, Wilson
assisted in forming the United Mine Workers in 1890 and eventually attained several
executive positions including International Secretary-Treasurer from 1900 to 1908. Wilson
also served as the Democratic representative to Congress for a north-central Pennsylvania
working-class district from 1907 to 1913. Near the end of that tenure, buoyed by the
backing of the AFL, he attained chairmanship of the House Committee on Labor and
assisted in the DOL becoming a separate administrative entity. Subsequently, President
Woodrow Wilson, upon his ascension to the presidency in 1913 and influenced by strong
lobbying from AFL president Samuel Gompers, appointed Wilson as the first Secretary of
Labor. His background as a union member, leader, and congressional supporter of labor
37

Secretary Wilson to Commissioners of Immigration, Inspectors in Charge, and Others
Concerned, dated May 26, 1917, in Folder May-June, 1917, Box 2861, File 54261/202, RG85, NADC.

164

affected not only the president’s selection of Wilson as the secretary, but also inflated
Woodrow Wilson’s support of the working class.38
President Wilson’s most famous biographer, Arthur S. Link, described Secretary
Wilson as someone who saw his vocations as a “cross to bear” in helping others.39 Yet
Roger Ward Babson, whom the Secretary had appointed as the head of the Information and
Education Service, indicated that Wilson’s main purpose in life involved “establishing
industrial peace.” In explaining this vision, Secretary Wilson stated:
Industrial peace is both an economic and a sociological necessity. It is not an idle
dream, but a practical possibility. The chief requirement in achieving it is ability on
the part of those dealing with issues as they arise to put themselves in the other
fellow’s place; to view the question from all sides fairly and justly. To a degree there
is partnership between labor and capital.40
This viewpoint assisted the Secretary in maintaining a nonpartisan and “practical” stance as
the head of the DOL.41 Union leaders, particularly Gompers, looked to Secretary Wilson as
an essential voice for their cause within the administration, but viewed his approval of the
Bracero Program as problematic.42 However, President Wilson did not include the
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Secretary as one of his key advisors.43 This lack of support from above and fear of
alienating his colleagues from labor placed the Secretary in an awkward position when
arguments surfaced that disputed his relaxation of the Immigration Act of 1917.
The Commissioner of Immigration, Anthony Caminetti, also played an important role
in the inauguration of the Bracero Program, despite the scandal regarding his son that
plagued the administration shortly after his selection. However, the affair affected the
relationship between Caminetti and Secretary Wilson, as well as for both men with
President Wilson as the court case lingered into his second administration. The event
added to President Wilson’s not including Secretary Wilson as one of his key advisors, but
also allowed the DOL to take actions without oversight from the president. Throughout the
BOI archives on the Bracero Program, little evidence of involvement by President Wilson
exists. To deflect any expected criticism on the loosening of immigration laws from the
legislative branch, Secretary Wilson and Caminetti instituted specific rules to govern this
“guest-worker” program.
The Bracero Program
The Bracero Program proved controversial from the beginning, which Secretary
Wilson and Commissioner Caminetti realized would occur. Congress had overridden
President Wilson’s veto in implementing the Immigration Act of 1917 and would not be
43
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sympathetic to any relaxation of long-sought measures such as the ban on illiterate
migrants. Therefore, the execution of draconian rules became the primary method for
subduing any opposition, and the Great War provided the most significant justification for
the exception to the Immigration Act of 1917. Moreover, the Bracero Program, from its
beginning, remained a plan that did not necessarily fit reality as claims of labor shortages
often amounted to flooding the market with workers to maintain low wages rather than
actually filling a need. As indicated in Chapter 3, many Mexicano laborers already resided
in Texas and despite the need for additional acreage in conjunction with requirements
generated by the Great War, they could have readily filled the necessity for more workers.
Commissioner Caminetti wrote a memorandum on May 21, 1917 to Secretary Wilson
that detailed the Bracero Program. Clearly, Caminetti provided the script for the
Secretary’s order on May 23 in this rough draft, initialed as approved by Secretary Wilson
and Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis Post.44 Caminetti’s meticulous instructions
outlined the section of the Immigration Act of 1917 that justified the program and indicated
the three areas to be suspended: the literacy requirement, the implementation of any head
tax, and the CLL provisions of the statute. Although not necessarily realized by Caminetti
and Wilson, the Bracero Program would profoundly affect Anglo views of Mexicanos, no
matter their status in the United States, including U.S. citizens. Caminetti continued:
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For the past six weeks or more there has been accumulating in the Bureau’s files a
number of letters from practically all sections of the country in which various
statements are made with respect to the dearth of common labor generally, and with
respect to the apprehension of farmers and others directly interested in agricultural
pursuits that the shortage of agricultural laborers is likely to be embarrassing, if not
disastrous. Complaints with regard to shortage or prospective shortage of farm help
come particularly from the sections of the country near or immediately contiguous to
Canada and Mexico. This is doubtless due to the fact that the farmers in those
localities have heretofore been in the habit of drawing their emergency help and in
some instances even their regular help from Canada or Mexico; and the going into
effect of the illiteracy test has raised apprehension that this supply will hereafter be
shut off. The Bureau has investigated some of these allegations and in some
instances has found that the apprehension is unjustified altogether or to some extent.
However, it may be safely assumed that, especially along the Mexican boundary, the
illiteracy test will operate to keep out a great many people that heretofore have come
in for seasonal employment.45
The Commissioner utilized the word “apprehension” in regard to both a shortage of labor
and a fear that the illiteracy provision of the Immigration Act of 1917 would halt Mexican
migration and then proceeded to say that “these allegations” proved “unjustified altogether
or to some extent.” Further, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the environs of southern Texas
amounted to a “border” area all the way to San Antonio. Therefore, with this letter,
Caminetti demonstrated a few concepts that proved pervasive throughout the period of the
program: that most requests for additional workers by farmers remained questionable and
the literacy requirement impacted Mexican seasonal laborers. These two points reveal that
the farmers’ primary concern remained the availability of low-wage workers and, in the
eventual wake of the program, Mexican laborers would have an increasingly difficult time
in legally entering the United States. Secretary Wilson, in his formal pronouncement of the
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arrangement, carefully chose the wording of his order that began the Bracero Program.46
Nonetheless, outrage soon emerged from members of Congress who had long sought this
legislation, particularly the banning of illiterates.
A virulent opponent of radicalism, Democratic Congressman John L. Burnett of
Alabama worked as Chairman of the Immigration and Naturalization Committee from 1911
to 1919, and had been the primary force that led to the Immigration Act of 1917. Fearing
national exposure to radicals from foreign lands, he had been appointed to the Dillingham
Commission, 1907 to 1911, that considered immigration issues and submitted a final report
that led to the Act. Burnett served in Congress from 1899 until his death on May 13, 1919,
ironically, before the conclusion of the Bracero Program since he represented the most
vehement objection to the suspension of the law.47 In a letter dated the day after the
Secretary’s Canadian announcement, Burnett wrote to Wilson:
I understand that you are of the opinion that you derived such power from the last
Proviso of Section 3 of the recent Immigration Law. I cannot see how anyone can
construe this proviso in that way. The context shows conclusively that it was not
intended to give you the power to suspend that Law, but only to authorize you to
issue rules and proscribe conditions for the admission of those whom the law itself in
terms admits temporarily. . . . If you have the right to suspend the Law in such cases
as you have done, then you would also have the right to suspend the Law admitting
millions of people from the Barred Zone in Asia as laborers on the Pacific Coast. . . .
46
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The precedent that you have set is a most dangerous one and a gross perversion of the
law. Before taking any action by Resolution or otherwise, I ask you to let me know
definitely what action you have taken in this matter. If you persist in that opinion, I
shall certainly ask Congress to take any supposed right that you think you have under
this Section away from your Department. Please let me hear from you promptly and
oblige.48
Clearly, the Congressman could barely contain his anger toward the Secretary, especially
noted in his disparaging remarks regarding Wilson possibly admitting Asians. Secretary
Wilson answered Burnett in a lengthy letter on May 31 and, using a diplomatic tone,
explained his reasoning to the Congressman concerning the authority to launch the
temporary and emergency program. Although an overstatement, Wilson indicated that
forty-million workers had been “taken out of productive enterprises and put into destructive
enterprises,” which had generated the need for additional agricultural laborers. Rejoining
some of Burnett’s claims, Wilson indicated that some parties had urged him to allow the
importation of Asian labor, which the Secretary absolutely refused to consider. Further,
Secretary Wilson acknowledged that a number of requests for workers amounted to
attempts to obtain “cheap labor”; nonetheless, a need existed in many locations. Wilson
paraphrased Caminetti’s earlier statement in regard to the unavailability of workers by
indicating that a “state of mind rather than an actual shortage of labor” existed in many
locations. Continuing to reflect Caminetti’s ideas, Wilson reiterated that the tight
restrictions outlined in his order, as well as the possibility that the need remained contrived,
meant that a “large influx of labor” would not happen, but that it did “relieve the minds of
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the farmers,” an important factor due to the nature of the emergency.49 Since Burnett had
been one of the fifty congressmen who voted against declaring war on Germany,50 the
claims by Secretary Wilson about the needs of the Great War may have had little effect on
the Congressman.
Not to be outdone, Congressman Burnett answered Wilson’s reply on June 2 by
indicating that he had proposed a bill before Congress to nullify the provision of the Act
that supposedly justified the Bracero Program. Wilson responded to Burnett’s letter on
June 8 by stating that he understood the Congressman’s strong feelings on the matter given
the many years devoted to the passage of the bill. Secretary Wilson stressed that the
admission of Mexican laborers could be controlled more than that of any other group,
especially as compared to Asians. The Secretary repeated an earlier phrase regarding a
“state of mind,” and contended that the guest-worker exception had removed the
apprehension of farmers and blocked further discussion on a suspension of the Chinese
Exclusion Law.51 Given Burnett’s primary concern regarding the possible introduction of
radical factions into the nation, the Secretary apparently persuaded the Congressman as the
protestations ceased and nothing came of his threatened revisions to the Act.52 The
discussion of shortages as a state of mind instead of a reality recalls the discussion on
49
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sources from Paul Taylor in Chapter 3.
Sociologist Paul Taylor had contended that many labor shortages arose as a ploy to
maintain lower wages by actually creating a surplus of workers.53 Now the U.S.
government had created a program that provided de facto legalization of an oversupply of
laborers that resulted in low wages. Although Bracero Program guidelines sought to
maintain appropriate wage levels, if enough jobs did not exist for all migrants, laborers
accepted lower wages or they did not work.54 Despite the apparent skepticism of Secretary
Wilson concerning the farmers’ claims of a shortage, the perceived needs of the war had
won out. Therefore, the Bracero Program began as a ploy to insure the planting of
additional agricultural acreage without regard for the migrant laborers already present in
Texas or workers enticed into the United States for little or no work, as well as depressed
wages. Undismayed by congressional opposition, the Secretary and the Commissioner
forged ahead with guidelines designed to protect the Bureau, but not necessarily the
Braceros.
On June 6, 1917, Caminetti sent the following guidelines (paraphrased), approved by
Secretary Wilson, to all appropriate personnel within the Bureau:
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1. The exception for each alien to only last six months.
2. The exception just applied to illiteracy, the contract labor law, and the head tax.
Any other issues that rendered the alien inadmissible would prevent entry.
3. Any alien that violated the terms of the agreement would be immediately deported.
4. The program only applied to agricultural workers and the potential employer must
come to the border to make arrangements.
5. Employers should disclose the rate of pay and duration of the need to border
officials. The employer will keep the border agent apprised of any changes to the
status of the worker.
6. All border stations should have a designated person in charge of administering the
program to prevent aliens from remaining permanently or engaging in non-farm
work.55
Because of the intensity of the opposition to the guest-worker program, Caminetti and
Wilson continually made policies, such as number six above, that ensured these aliens
would not become permanent residents of the United States. George J. Harris, an Inspector
who worked for Supervising Inspector Berkshire at the El Paso office of the Bureau sent a
circular dated June 15, 1917, to all of the ports along the Mexican border that further
extended the rules set forth by Caminetti.56 In the face of Congressional opposition, these
directives demonstrated the intention of border officials to maintain tight control on both
the admitted alien as well as the contracting employer as demanded by Caminetti. Over
time, the Commissioner expanded his dependence on the recommendations of the Mexican
border supervisor and Harris’ manager, Frank Berkshire. However, in spite of all of the
arrangements by the Bureau, the program did not immediately result in significant numbers
of migrants entering the United States.
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The number of employers taking advantage of the program in 1917 and early 1918
remained small with only 5,320 workers imported by March 1, 1918 and only 315 of that
total involving “farmers” within the state of Texas. Most of the workers had been imported
by large agricultural concerns in Arizona, California, Colorado, and Idaho—operations that
continually required more laborers.57 The lack of importations by smaller farmers during
the early portion of the program occurred due to the timing of its implementation. By the
May 23 declaration of the exception, fields had been planted and labor needs provided for.
The concept of the Bracero Program involved the planting of additional crops and the need
for extra workers, which pertained more significantly to the 1918 growing season. The
lack of Mexican laborers imported into south Texas during these early days of the program
also demonstrated the presence of workers already in the state. As Paul Taylor revealed,
many laborers remained in Texas due to their alien or citizen status in the United States.58
Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the program remained in doubt as farmers and some
wartime agencies continued to demand additional workers.
Caminetti realized that although the program continued due to lobbying by the
agricultural industry as well as governmental agencies such as the Food Administration, the
contracting employers saw a continuation of inexpensive labor as a necessity. The
Commissioner updated Secretary Wilson on the program on February 11, 1918: “the
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exception made in the regulations therein promulgated was designed with a view to meet a
situation that existed among farmers of the United States, especially in the South and
Southwest, which was believed at the time to be psycological [sic] to a very considerable
extent—a belief which subsequent experience has shown to have been correct.”
Continuing, Caminetti asserted that the program “allayed the feeling of apprehension
among the farmers that if they planted an abnormal acreage their work and their seed would
be wasted because they would be unable to obtain sufficient labor to harvest an abnormal
crop.”59 Therefore, if a labor shortage did exist, the program filled the need. Braceros who
“deserted” from the original employer became a recurrent issue throughout the existence of
the Program.
Problems with the program rose quickly as the Commissioner also indicated in his
February 11 memo that “quite a few have been deported under warrants issued by the
Department, having abandoned agricultural pursuits and entered employment which,
because better paid or for some other reason, suited them better than working on a farm.”60
Although Caminetti did not offer any specific totals on these categories, a 1920 recap of the
program indicated that of 8,920 Braceros as of June 30, 1918, 2,393, or almost twenty-
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seven percent, had “deserted.”61 From the inauguration of the program, these desertions
became one of the most vexing issues for the BOI and would eventually add to a negative
perception of Mexicanos in areas of the United States unaccustomed to Mexican migrants.
Caminetti continued in his February 11 correspondence to the Secretary:
The sum and substance of the whole matter is, however, that in at least two respects
grave reason for concern and dissatisfaction exists: (1) The immigration law has been
violated quite extensively, in that numbers of illiterate Mexicans on whose account no
head tax was collected are now at large within the United States (after having
migrated in pursuance of an offer of employment), with but slight chance of the
Department ever being able to locate and identify many of them for the purpose of
removing them from the country; some being still engaged in agricultural labor, but
most having drifted into railroad, mining and other similar work. (2) Experience
gained in connection with the enforcement of the circulars has apparently shown that,
to considerable extent, the insistent cry for farm laborers has been due to a desire
upon the part of employers to have at hand or within easy reach an abundant supply
of labor, so that the tendency of wages to increase might be reduced or stopped—in
other words, in some respects and quarters the matter is simply a cheap labor
proposition.62
The Commissioner expressed alarm regarding the “drifting” of workers away from
agricultural labor and the problematic entry of illiterate workers. Caminetti proposed the
need for additional staff so that inspectors could “pay close attention to the movements of
the laborers from place to place.” He ended the letter with: “Although the Bureau feels
somewhat disposed to recommend that the circulars be withdrawn and the plan abandoned,
the matter is brought to the attention of the Department at this time for discussion, it being
61
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realized that much more is involved in its proper decision than the enforcement of the
immigration law.”63 The Commissioner apparently did not consider that workers might
have been deserting due to poor treatment by their initial employers.
Although the records of Braceros’ names at Laredo or Eagle Pass could not be located
within the Immigration Bureau’s records at federal and regional archives, such information
did exist regarding the stations at Hidalgo and Del Rio, Texas.64 The accounts from both
locations offer statistics on the workers’ experience as provided in Table 8. First,
employers from the two areas traveled much different average distances in procuring
laborers from the border (Column A). This information reflects the more populated region
around Hidalgo and the paucity near Del Rio as many of the latter workers/employers
traveled to/from the Winter Garden Area; the disparity also resulted in many more workers
crossing at Hidalgo than Del Rio (Columns B and E). The desertion rates for the life of the
program totaled over twenty-nine percent, or 21,400 out of 72,862 Braceros.65 The
desertion figures in Column C represent approximately one-half of the U.S. totals, 14.8
percent, possibly because the employers remained relatively close to the border as
compared to other areas of the United States. Workers crossing in this border region also

Ibid., 3-4. Caminetti added that formal detention in a “compound” would appear to support
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probably had greater familiarity with the employers as well as their expectations, and any
industrial opportunities in these mostly rural areas remained sparse. However, Column D
demonstrates that desertions occurred most often from Anglo employers, 50.9 percent, and
when combined with the company employers that had mostly Anglo titles, the percentage
grows to 82.3 percent. The 15.9 percent desertion rate from farmers with Spanish
surnames contrasts significantly with these totals. This difference undoubtedly existed due
to the common heritage, language, and mutual deference between Mexicano
workers/employers and may translate to the Bracero experience throughout the United
States.
Table 8: Del Rio and Hidalgo Bracero Workers, 1918-1919
Column A

B

C

D
E
F
G
Desertions by
Worker
City and
Number of
Employer
Number
employer’s
breakdown by
average
desertions
Number of breakdown by
of
ethnicity and
employers
distance
and rate per
employers
ethnicity
workers
percent to total
ethnicity
from border
worker
(surnames)
(surnames)
(surnames)
Anglo: 22
Anglo: 50
Anglo: 193
Del Rio
22
235
Company: 0
59
Company: 6
Company: 39
76.1 miles
9.4%
Mexican: 0
Mexican: 3
Mexican: 3
Anglo: 90
Anglo: 79
Anglo: 582
Hidalgo
198
1,255
Company: 69
118*
Company: 14
Company: 360
21.6 miles
15.8%
Mexican: 35
Mexican: 23
Mexican: 293
A: 112 (50.9%)
A: 129 (72.9%) A: 775 (52.0%)
220
Total
1,490
Co: 69 (31.4%)
177
Co: 20 (11.3%) Co: 351 (23.6%)
14.8%
M: 35 (15.9%)
M: 26 (14.7%) M: 344 (23.1%)
Source: Folders 2 and 3, Box 2862, File 54261/202, RG85, NA-DC. Workers who only traveled to
Del Rio (117) or Hidalgo (10) were not included in the mileage average. *2 Japanese surnamed
employers and 20 workers were not included in the ethnic breakdown.

Another indication of the positive relationship between Mexicano workers and
employers may be observed in Columns F and G. Despite having 72.9 percent of the

178

employers, Anglos hired only 52 percent of the workers. Apparently, the workers preferred
to work for a large company or a fellow Mexicano employer (compare total percentages for
column F with G). Also, based on a figure not included within this table, Mexicano
workers who deserted remained longer with Spanish surnamed employers than with
Anglos, 102.6 versus 83.0 days. The Del Rio and Hidalgo Braceros demonstrated agency
through their employer choice and by extension, this analysis may be applied to the
Program as a whole. For instance, immigration officials frequently complained about the
significant number of desertions and that the employers regularly failed to report them.66
Therefore, the percentages for desertions probably reached higher levels than the 29
percent in the final report for the United States or the 14.8 percent attributed to Del Rio and
Hidalgo. Bracero workers regularly deserted their employers and undoubtedly improved
their wages and/or employment conditions throughout the United States.67 Moreover, the
expansion of the program beyond agriculture came to a high point during the summer of
1918.
By July 10, 1918, all types of mining and railroad work, as well as “common labor in
connection with construction work being done by or for the Government in the erection of
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buildings in the state of Texas” became included, effective July 25, 1918.68 For now, with
the inauguration of the Bracero Program, non-literate migrant workers could again travel to
the United States. Nonetheless, questions regarding the actual need for the program
remained all through its existence. Although many individuals both inside and outside of
the government expressed support for the Bracero Program, arguments concerning
implementation surfaced early during its tenure and continued throughout the duration of
the guest-worker exception.
Lobbyists Supporting Less Immigration Restriction
Lobbyists in favor of the Bracero Program, and many advocating fewer restrictions, came
from different venues as support inevitably depended on what each group needed
concerning its implementation. Politicians, bureaucrats, farmers, and chambers of
commerce vocalized their support by contacting the DOL or the BOI. Two key
observations regarding the advocacy: first, because of their respective motivations, the
desire for severe or lenient restrictions varied extensively and resulted in disagreements
between different parties. Second, none of the supporters, including political leaders,
expressed concern for the migrants as the workers remained a commodity to be used rather
than protected.
Democratic Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas became a regular correspondent with
the Bureau concerning the program, particularly the possibility of extending it beyond
68

Secretary Wilson Departmental Order dated July 10, 1918, in Folder C, Box 2863, File
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agricultural laborers. On January 28, 1918, the Senator sent an inquiry to Caminetti that
included a constituent’s letter about the expansion of the guest-worker program.69 In a
lengthy reply, Assistant Secretary Post cited “embarrassing criticisms,” presumably from
politicians such as Burnett, which characterized the early days of the program and
precluded any extension of the exception. Post commented “that the criticism already
launched against it would be a mere bagatelle along side [sic] of the criticism that would
probably come if it made the plan any broader than it is at present.” He also repeated the
phrase that the need was mostly “psychological,” but that the exception had still served its
purpose by encouraging additional production.70 Politicians supported the program
because of the perceived “emergency” labor needs associated with the Great War.
Moreover, particularly in regard to congressmen who ran for election every two years,
farmers remained a key constituency and one that needed to be satisfied. The federal
government also developed several temporary agencies, such as the Food Administration,
to deal with problems associated with mobilization and management of resources to sustain
the troops.
Herbert C. Hoover, the Food Administrator during the Great War, as well as future
Secretary of Commerce and U.S. President, corresponded several times with the DOL. Not
surprising considering his position, the theme of these letters referred to the need for more
laborers to assist in the production of additional food for the war effort. Of particular note,
69
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his letter of June 4, 1918, to Assistant to the Secretary of Labor Felix Frankfurter,
contained specifics regarding his concerns. Hoover referred to apprehensions expressed to
him by Texas Food Administrator E.A. Peden about the agricultural-only provision in force
at that time; the six-month duration of the exception; that photographs had to be taken for
an identification card; and that the employer needed to come to the border to arrange for
and transport the aliens to his place of employment. Hoover also demonstrated a stereotype
concerning the photographs by stating that “The Mexican has a primitive suspicion of the
camera . . . .” The Administrator closed the letter by requesting the elimination of all of
these restrictions as soon as possible.71 Secretary Wilson handled the response to Hoover
on June 11, 1918, and observed that the Bureau had taken many precautions because of the
illiterate, contracted, and poverty-stricken nature of the workers and that all of these issues
presented obstacles to their admittance during non-war times. The Secretary emphasized
that the temporary nature of the program necessitated the ability of the Bureau to insure
that the migrants left the country once their usefulness ended. Secretary Wilson further
reminded Hoover that the program involved an exception to the law and one that should not
be expanded beyond the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1917 being used to justify
the exemption.72 A disparity definitely existed between the desired requirements of the
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program by the Food Administration versus those insisted upon at the DOL.
As with other correspondence between governmental officials, Secretary Wilson and
Hoover agreed on the necessity of the program, but not its regulatory content. Hoover
desired a virtually open border where employers could obtain whatever labor they needed
for the maximization of food production. On the other hand, Secretary Wilson preferred
that controls on the entry of otherwise non-admissible aliens be maintained as well as the
spirit of the Immigration Act of 1917. This dichotomy symbolized the primary reason for
disagreement within the administration. However, both sides of the argument never
demonstrated any concern for the workers as they either disparaged them or operated from
the assumption that laborers needed to leave the United States once the program concluded.
In all probability, neither Secretary Wilson nor Hoover understood precisely how the
program operated as they both just responded to inter-administrative challenges and
protected their own bureaucratic wellbeing. Agricultural interests that held influence with
government officials also became involved in soliciting the administration to further relax
the exceptions for Mexican laborers.
A telegram to Secretary Wilson signed by five prominent south Texas businessmen,
including Robert J. Kleberg, owner of the famous King Ranch near Corpus Christi,
recommended a ninety-day suspension of all restrictions on Mexican immigrant labor
except for health regulations. In their telegram, the participants referred to a “convention”
held on July 12, 1918, in San Antonio that included several food, labor, and farming
organizations. Clearly overstating the actual number, the telegram claimed that south
with Burnett.
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Texas alone required 40,000 agricultural laborers as soon as possible and that the entire
state needed “many times this number.” The communication further indicated that “Present
contract provisions with Mexico totally inadequate to meet te [sic] situation.”73 This last
comment on the Bracero Program represented a common complaint from agriculturalists:
that the regulations required in obtaining laborers from Mexico amounted to an obstacle
rather than a necessary system of acceptance. However, T.C. Jennings, the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the state of Texas, did not agree with the overall
findings of the conference. In a July 13 letter to Secretary Wilson, Jennings indicated that
he and District Superintendent H. W. Lewis of the United States Employment Service
(USES) did not concur with the “unanimous” conclusions concerning labor needs in Texas.
In fact, Jennings argued that many areas of Texas currently suffered from drought
conditions that would diminish the labor needs for farmers. Commissioner Jennings also
expressed fears regarding the “great danger of unrestricted Mexican immigration” and
contended that the conference in San Antonio “is misleading” in its conclusions as “the
labor shortage in Texas is not nearly so serious as the telegram makes it appear.”74
Jennings echoed the skepticism expressed by Caminetti and others about a supposed
73

J.F. Carl, et al to Secretary Wilson telegram, dated July 18, 1918, in Folder D, Box 2863, File
54261/202, RG85, NA-DC. Besides Kleberg, the telegram was signed by a lawyer, J.F. Carl, and
another rancher, T.A. Coleman. See: Jules A. Appler, Jules A. Appler’s City Directory of Greater
San Antonio (Appler Directory Company, 1918), pages 265 and 285; two other signers, Preston A.
Austin and R.F. Isbell, could not be definitively identified.
http://interactive.ancestry.com/2469/4939980?backurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ancestry.com%2fsea
rch%2fdb.aspx%3fdbid%3d2469%26path%3d&ssrc=&backlabel=ReturnBrowsing#?imageId=493
9980
74

Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the state of Texas T.C. Jennings to Secretary
Wilson, letter dated July 13, 1918, in Folder June-July, 1918, Box 2861, File 54261/202, RG85,
NA-DC.

184

emergency need for workers and implied that the demands for labor had to do with holding
down wages and maintaining a ready and available work force. As a former president of
the Texas State Federation of Labor, Jennings probably feared that the introduction of alien
labor could have a negative impact on native workers.75 The profundity of this opinion
concerning the depression of wages orchestrated by increasing the quantity of available
workers as expressed by Caminetti, Taylor, and Jennings demonstrated its validity.
Local Chambers of Commerce also regularly organized lobbying efforts that backed
the further expansion of the Bracero Program. During late-July, 1918, twenty-three
Chambers in Texas sent telegrams to Secretary Wilson urging that all restrictions on labor
from Mexico be suspended to alleviate an “acute” labor shortage. Primarily coming from
the Blackland Prairie area, the telegrams also emanated from cities such as Dallas,
Houston, and San Antonio. The July 25 telegram from the San Antonio Chamber of
Commerce serves as a representative example of all twenty-three:
Hon W B Wilson, Secretary of Labor, Washn [sic] DC. Labor shortage in this section
at acute stage and unless promptly relieved large portion of growing crops may not be
harvested if immigration restrictions could be removed except as applying to health
regulations thousands of Mexicans could be brought across the RioGrande [sic] and
both the industrial and agricultural situations be saved this labor is especially needed
during the next three months and is essential to the program of winning the war
immediate action is desired. Chamber of Commerce.76
Several points may be observed in these telegrams: that without more labor, the existing
crops cannot be harvested; all restrictions on Mexican immigrants should be removed for
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three months except for provisions regarding health; and victory in the war depended on
these changes. Because virtually every telegram contained these same points, the various
Chambers of Commerce definitely worked together on this effort. All agriculturalists in
Texas supported the concept of the program, to allow Mexican immigrants to supplement
labor needs in the United States, but they believed that the BOI thwarted entrants with
draconian rules. Undoubtedly, many of the farmers also desired inexpensive labor as lowwage workers had assisted in increasing their profits before implementation of the
Immigration Act of 1917. However, admitting this in telegrams to the BOI would tarnish
their reasons for soliciting these Mexican workers. Another issue involved the timing of
these telegrams since the extension of the program to railroad and mining industries
became effective on July 25. Because many migrants had already skipped their contracts in
favor of railroad work, the farmers may have feared competition from non-agricultural
employment opportunities. The USES, despite its location within the DOL, offered some
of the most virulent complaints concerning the limitations of the guest-worker program.
The USES, located within the DOL but outside of the BOI,77 became directly
involved in the Bracero Program after Secretary Wilson directed the Service to assist
employers in locating migrant workers.78 H.W. Lewis, the District Superintendent of the
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USES,79 regularly offered information regarding labor needs and worker availability in
south Texas. In a letter to his Washington D.C. office, Lewis wrote:
For your information will say that there are thousands of Mexican laborers just across
the border who are starving as they have no crops, and no means of earning a
livelihood. This labor can be used in this state, as well as other states, and be
admitted under the provisions of the Burnet [sic] Immigration Bill, applying to
agricultural laborers, only, for six months.80
Supervising Inspector of the Mexican Border District, Frank Berkshire then followed up
Lewis’ letter by informing the various immigration stations on the Texas-Mexico border as
to the function of the USES in support of the Bureau’s guest-worker responsibilities. As
explained by Berkshire, farmers would apply to the USES or officials from the State
Council of Defense vis-à-vis their labor needs.81 Subsequently, a war of words ensued
between the BOI and the USES beginning with correspondence from the “Examiner in
Charge” of the USES at Brownsville, Texas. Examiner T.P. Bishop, indicating that newly
installed rules regarding passport requirements had slowed migration, suggested to Lewis
that Mexican laborers who entered the United States illegally by “swimming the river”
should still be allowed to work in American agriculture.82 Lewis then forwarded Bishop’s
correspondence to M.C. Coykendall, the head of the Farm Service Division (FSD) of the
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USES in Washington D.C.83 Bishop’s suggestion that undocumented Mexican laborers be
allowed to work in a government-sponsored program definitely aggravated BOI officials,
but the USES took this proposal and similar ones seriously.
Coykendall apparently asked Howard C. Hopkins, the Assistant Chief of the FSD, to
respond accordingly to USES leader, John B. Densmore. In a July 2, 1918, letter to
Densmore, Hopkins indicated that because the Bracero Program occupied much of the
Immigration Service’s time and that they also opposed the plan, the pace of migrant
workers entering the United States had slowed. According to Hopkins, this situation would
only worsen because German agents influenced Mexican authorities for the purpose of
sabotaging the program. He proposed that “The Immigration Service should be instructed
to not only let laborers come across wherever, whenever and however they can get across,
but should encourage them to do so.” 84 In a follow-up letter to Densmore, Hopkins
discussed the German situation at length and portrayed the Constitutionalist Mexican
President, Venustiano Carranza, as “rabidly anti-American and strongly pro-German.” To
combat this situation, he recommended that the United States bribe Mexican border
officials, who could be easily swayed to allow laborers to cross.85 M.C. Coykendall soon
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offered support to his assistant in the form of a letter to Densmore.
Coykendall, in a July 5, 1918 letter, indicated that Hopkins’ four years of service in
Mexico demonstrated that his assistant maintained credibility in regard to the migration of
Mexican workers. Coykendall also believed that a single individual could better coordinate
the activities of all governmental agencies along the border and recommended a “czar” (my
terminology based on the description) for the Bracero Program. He suggested that Alfred
Hampton, the Assistant Commissioner of Immigration, be appointed as such, moved to the
Mexican border, and put a plan “into immediate execution” to meet the dire need for
labor.86 Perhaps unknowingly or maybe intentionally, Hopkins and Coykendall had
maligned the service of immigration officials, particularly Frank Berkshire.
Berkshire answered all of the correspondence from the FSD with a letter to Caminetti
on July 8, 1918. He disputed the claim that border officials had slowed immigration as
“unjustified, unwarranted and without foundation in fact” as problems with employers who
did not want to follow the established rules had caused the delays. As to the open border
suggested by Hopkins, Berkshire indicated that such a policy would only encourage
clandestine migration and make immigration regulations “farcical.” The immigration
officer added that, based on his eleven years of service on the Mexican border, migrants
interested in availing themselves of the Bracero Program would cross the boundary without
undue difficulty or delay. Berkshire closed his letter by indicating that “misinformation”
remained the most significant issue because potential employers had received reports that
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they only had to pick up workers at the border without any binding contract for
responsibility.87 Caminetti followed-up Berkshire’s letter and supported his Supervising
Inspector with a strongly worded response to the Farm Service.
Caminetti rejoined the challenges from the FSD in a nine-page letter to Secretary
Wilson on July 9, 1918, by stating that Berkshire remained “the best qualified person to
speak on these matters.” The Commissioner argued that adopting the suggestions made by
the Farm Service Division would amount to the administration usurping the power of the
legislative branch and “even the existence of the war does not justify an absolute
disregarding of any of its provisions.” The Commissioner also took exception to Hopkins’
suggestion that border agents prevented the “procurement of the needed supply of labor;”
Caminetti contended that “as Mr. Hopkins cannot be prepared to prove it, he should not
have made it.” He also rejected the idea of someone overseeing all of the border activities
because “Berkshire has met every emergency in a masterly way, and has rendered a service
to this Government the full extent and importance of which will scarcely ever be realized.”
And in closing his letter to Secretary Wilson, the Commissioner stated that to place
someone over Berkshire “would be, in the Bureau’s judgment, to offer a gratuitous insult to
a man whose official career has been such as to justify nothing but the highest encomiums
of praise.”88 This series of letters within the DOL demonstrated that although support for
the Bracero Program remained strong, the various divisions differed on execution.
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The disagreement over implementation between the Bureau and the USES had
transpired during the summer of 1918 when agricultural needs in Texas peaked,
particularly with cotton.89 At a time when both sides of the argument should have been
concentrating on maintaining the stream of workers into the United States, and insuring
their positive treatment, the quarreling probably negatively impacted the actual flow.90
Nonetheless, because the genuine need for workers remained murky, and their safekeeping
questionable, the Bureau and the USES continued to fail the workers by engaging in “turf
wars.”91 As long as some groups believed that the war effort required the importation of
foreign labor, the condition and future of the Bracero workers remained a moot point.
Apparently lost in all of this discussion between the Bureau and the USES, the
treatment of the migrant workers and the previously mentioned concern regarding the
legitimacy of the need appeared to be forgotten. Moreover, farmers, legislators,
administrators, Chambers of Commerce, and the USES all supported the program for their
own reasons and did not hesitate in proposing changes that would benefit their personal
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needs. As Braceros traveled throughout the United States, Anglos became aware of
Mexican workers in their fields, factories, and railroads. For instance, California attorney
Hugh R. Osburn wrote to the DOL after the Armistice regarding railroad workers allegedly
displaced by Mexican laborers and commented: “I respectfully submit to you that this
matter should be taken up and investigated and that the Greasers should be shut out from
taking the money that rightfully belongs to our own people . . . .”92 The need for migrant
workers existed in many places or perhaps just the inclination to hire inexpensive laborers
since, as long as the war persisted, employers could maintain a strong justification for a
continuation of the program. However, other groups and individuals found a variety of
reasons for not supporting the exception to the Immigration Act of 1917.
Lobbying Against the Bracero Program
A few members of Congress, the Mexican government, and organized labor
comprised the personalities, bureaucrats, and organizations against the program and its
continuation that contacted the BOI. Criticism of the program remained difficult because
of the supporters’ argument that additional workers sustained the war effort. During a
period when fervent patriotism flourished and dissenters faced ostracism, critics found it
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difficult to express their opposition. However, once the Great War ended, the forces
against the program could more readily vent their frustrations against its continuance.
Some Texas representatives argued against the program in spite of the state’s history
of importing Mexican migrant laborers. San Antonio Democratic Representative James L.
Slayden offered criticism in a letter to Assistant Secretary of Labor Post on June 13, 1917.
After reiterating Burnett’s arguments that the Immigration Act of 1917 did not allow for an
agricultural exception, Slayden commented that a simplification of the law might be
necessary so that “only immigrants really fit for American citizenship shall be permitted to
come into the country and be residents with the ultimate possibility of becoming
citizens.”93 In a carefully worded response, Post rebuked the Congressman for apparently
not having read the order since it contained no mention or inference of the migrants
obtaining citizenship. Continuing, the Assistant Secretary reminded Slayden that these
workers had long been able to enter the United States for seasonal purposes, but that the
new law prevented this from occurring. Post concluded by stating that if Congress had
known about the war urgency at the time the Immigration Act passed, they would have
included the exception in the original law.94 During the following year, Slayden
demonstrated that politicians sometimes changed their position after constituents contacted
the Congressman with a problem.
One year later on June 14, 1918, Slayden wrote Caminetti requesting that the program
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be extended to lignite mining operations in Texas.95 The Rockdale Consolidated Coal
Company, with offices in San Antonio, had written the Congressman asking for the
revision, stating that the demand for coal and the lack of Mexican laborers warranted this
extension of the exception.96 In his initial response to a temporary migrant program,
Slayden had responded negatively to the introduction of Mexican laborers into the country
and demonstrated his basic beliefs about people from Mexico: they should not become
citizens of the United States. Slayden had more people of Mexican heritage residing within
his district than any other congressman in the state, if not the nation, but his initial
protestation spoke to the prevailing attitude of San Antonio Anglos regarding Mexicanos.97
Nor was the Mexican government, particularly officials in areas along the border with the
United States, enthusiastic about the program.
Government officials in many of the northern states of Mexico worked to protect their
laborers from abuse in the United States. Their protestations did not criticize workers for
traveling to the United States in search of employment, but expressed concern about the
living conditions and wages that the laborers experienced after crossing the border. A
bulletin from the Mexican News Bureau dated April 4, 1918, indicated that the Mexican
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Department of State had “notified the governors of the States of Chihuahua, Coahuila,
Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and others on or near the border to discourage the organization
of parties of working men by foreigners [labor agents] for the purpose of seeking
employment in other countries.”98 After exchanging correspondence with the Mexican
government about the actual terms of the Bracero Program, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico
Henry P. Fletcher, wrote to Secretary of State Robert Lansing “that the Mexican
Government would have no objection to furnishing facilities for emigration of laborers if
the United States Government should be disposed to cooperate for the termination of the
difficulties and annoyances experienced by these laborers.”99 Within a few days of this
communication, on June 29, 1918, Lansing indicated to Secretary Wilson that word had
been received that Mexican President Venustiano Carranza had arranged for free
transportation to the border for workers seeking employment in the United States.100
Although the Mexican government had now tacitly approved the Bracero Program, as well
as labor agent activities along the border, its main concern remained the treatment of
citizens from Mexico. The Mexican government took actions that the United States had
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largely avoided: to protect migrant workers from abuses at the hands of their employers.
The AFL also regularly corresponded with the DOL about qualms concerning the
importation of workers from Mexico. However, their fears involved American laborers
rather than foreign ones.
The AFL, including its leader Samuel Gompers and union locals from throughout the
United States believed that Mexican laborers displaced native-born workers. Nevertheless,
few complaints surfaced regarding agricultural labor during the war years as most letters
concerned railroad, mining, and industrial activity. For instance, in the period when the
Bureau began to extend the program beyond agriculture, the Texas State Federation of
Labor telegraphed Secretary Wilson: “Organized labor appeals to you to stand by original
ruling on Mexican labor situation in Texas and earnestly requests your protection in the
premises.”101 After the Great War Armistice, the correspondence from Gompers and the
AFL became more relentless. The Bracero Program, after all of the additions, changes, and
complaints, continued during 1918 in this same form; however, the end of the Great War
brought up new concerns regarding the continuing viability of an exception based on the
conflict.
With the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, since the Great War
constituted the primary reason for the exception to the Immigration Act of 1917, the demise
of the program seemed imminent. Berkshire wrote a procedural letter to Caminetti
questioning some aspects of the existing program on December 4, 1918, and someone hand
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wrote across the face: “12/16. File. No answer required by reason of the certain
abolishment in the near future of the ‘Mexican laborer circulars.’ [Indistinct initials].”102
Clearly concerned about the possibility of an end to the program, George J. Harris, from
Berkshire’s office in El Paso, telegraphed the Bureau on December 10, 1918. Harris
outlined all of the pending arrangements being made for various employers in the United
States and expressed grave concern regarding the impact on the agriculture industry should
the program be immediately terminated. He believed that a more measured reduction
would be advisable:
No noticeable change since signing of armistice . . . Immediate discontinuance
generally of all existing arrangements would undoubtedly prove serious, possibly
disastrous . . . If immediate inauguration of plan looking to discontinuance of
admission of aliens under exceptions is decided upon would suggest it be put into
effect gradually or in a modified form . . . the privilege be continued for at least
nineteen months from January 1, 1919 on a gradually diminishing scale.103
Unquestionably, Harris’ letter had been influenced by Berkshire who apparently supported
the lobbying efforts of owner growers. Supposedly, the program would end on January 15,
1919, but this date proved to be fluid as it would not completely conclude until March 3,
1921, some twenty-six months after Harris’ memorandum and on the eve of Warren G.
Harding’s inauguration as president.104
The intensity of lobbying for and against the continuation of the program actually
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increased after the end of the war as both sides scrambled to rationalize their respective
positions. Due to the Armistice, individuals who supported the program needed to revise
their justification, and the opposition decried continuing the exception because of the end
of the war. Meanwhile, the employers’ desire for inexpensive labor encouraged
immigration, but as Mexican workers continued into the United States, particularly beyond
the immediate area of the border, Anglos became more aware of their presence.105 As
opponents argued more stridently for the end of the exception, their views evolved into an
argument against all Mexican immigration, and ultimately degenerated into a general
degradation of Mexicanos. Further, since Caminetti and Secretary Wilson regularly
indicated that the shortage of workers during the war remained questionable, now with the
end of the war, extending the program allowed private employers to continue manipulating
the labor market to enhance their own profits. However, once the economy sank, the
deportation of Mexicans began to increase.
The Post-Armistice Bracero Program
Four Braceros, Guadalupe and Ignacio Hernandez, and Jesus and Alcario Villanueva,
all from Monterrey, Mexico, became the center of a controversy involving the Mexican
Consulate in Hidalgo in 1919. Apparently, the four complained about their treatment at the
hands of a U.S. employer, but once interviewed by the Immigration Service, their story had
changed. In a letter to Caminetti, Berkshire suspected that the consular official,
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unsympathetic to the Bracero Program, had encouraged the grievance.106 However, on
closer inspection of the statements of the farmers who had employed these four workers,
the probable origin of the complaints becomes clearer. One farmer, Russell Rice of
McAllen, Texas, expressed his “general satisfaction” with the four workers and noted that
he had not experienced any problems with them.107 M.S. Dickson of Pharr, Texas,
provided a much different description in his deposition. When asked for his opinion on the
same four aliens, Dickson replied: “Too lazy to work, even for a Mexican.” The statement
concluded with a query as to whether or not he would consider reemploying them and
Dickson stated: “No sir, not at 10¢ a day.”108 Undoubtedly, the four laborers may have
deserted and then complained about Dickson to the consul, but had second thoughts when
interviewed by U.S. authorities who controlled whether or not they remained in the
country. This occurrence also supports the previous assertion that Anglo farmers had a
higher desertion rate even though the deserters might move to another Anglo farmer.
Of particular note regarding this incident, the statements of the Hernandez’ and the
Villanueva’s, both fathers and sons, revealed how the Immigration Act of 1917 now
impacted laborers from Mexico. Both sons, Ignacio Hernandez and Alcario Villanueva,
indicated in their deposition before the Immigration Service that they preferred to work
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wherever their father did. Although roughly 21 and 19-years old, respectively, at the time
of these interviews, both men indicated that they would follow the wishes of their fathers in
respect to future employment with Dickson.109 However, since the two fathers remained
illiterate and the sons, literate, the eventual division of the families appeared inevitable.
The Hernandez family had crossed during the period before the Bracero Program in March,
1917, without difficulty and then had returned as Braceros in 1919.110 Subsequently, the
two Hernandez men had taken advantage of the Bracero Program to obtain employment
since the literacy requirement had been waved. But now, Ignacio would not be able to
cross with his father if they were returned to Mexico. A similar situation existed for the
Villanueva’s and a solo crossing in May, 1921, by Alcario, after the Bracero Program had
ended, demonstrated the impediments now re-implemented by the Immigration Act of
1917.111 A four-year window of opportunity for men such as Guadalupe Hernandez and
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Jesus Villanueva had closed. Ricardo Rodriguez, who fought for citizenship at the
beginning of Chapter 1, could have never come to the United States if the Immigration Act
of 1917 had existed in the 1890s as he could neither read nor write. Consequently, during
the coming years, many illiterate Mexican workers opted for the “illegal” crossing of the
border in search of employment.
By December, 1918, a reevaluation of the Bracero Program began within the
Immigration Bureau. The discussion rarely involved any compassion for the workers, only
that the need had concluded or would soon end, and that the Mexican laborers should be
returned to their home country. Caminetti indicated that the conclusion of the program
would come on January 15, 1919, for those who entered before December 18, 1918.112
However, twenty-two farmers from Sabinal, Texas, a small community sixty miles west of
San Antonio, had written to Democratic Congressman John Nance Garner of Texas
regarding the need for continuance of the program.113 In a December 20, 1918, response to
that request, Secretary Wilson carefully outlined how the end of the program would
proceed. He indicated that migrants who entered and contracted with employers by the
January 15th deadline would still be allowed to work for the six-month period. The
Secretary expressed concern for the reemployment of veterans as well as others who had
been engaged in wartime industrial work and added that now the exception would only
apply to “border states” and other areas that “have long been accustomed to obtain at least
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a part of their supply of laborers from Mexico.”114 Caminetti soon followed up with a
similar communication to the Bureau in general, but added that agents should stay in touch
with those who continued to employ Braceros and that: “Should it be found that any of
these laborers or their families are in danger of falling into distress from any cause,
immediate steps should be taken toward their repatriation.”115 Not that aliens and their
families in misery should be assisted, but rather, deported . . . welcomed when needed,
expelled when not. Both defenders of the program and those who pushed for its
termination contacted the DOL and made Secretary Wilson aware of their opinions. Just as
the program had been slow developing because of its beginning date of May, 1917, versus
the planting of crops earlier in the year, now the reverse came true with its ending. Farmers
worked on an agricultural season rather than a calendar year and added production required
more time for the harvest completion. Moreover, once an industry became dependent on
the inexpensive labor from Mexico, reversing direction proved difficult.
Only two weeks after his original order on the demise of the program, Secretary
Wilson extended it for sugar-beet companies on January 2, 1919. Acknowledging the
voluminous correspondence on the issue, Secretary Wilson lengthened the program for
sugar-beet workers only until June 30, 1919.116 Secretary Wilson had created an open
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season for other agriculturalists, railroads, and mining companies to ask for extensions.
Advocating on behalf of farmers near the Mexican border, Senator Sheppard and
Representative Garner requested that the Bureau extend the program in the “Rio Grande
Valley” beyond the stated dates. On January 21, Caminetti wrote to Wilson and
recommended the same extension that had been given to sugar-beet farming.117 Despite the
end of the war, Secretary Wilson’s order concerning sugar-beet companies facilitated the
recurrent extension of the program.
Moreover, by June 3, 1919, Caminetti wrote to Wilson and reminded him of the
coming demise of the program on June 30. The Commissioner indicated that some
agricultural workers would remain until “the close of the present agricultural season” but
that all other laborers needed to be returned to Mexico. Caminetti believed in the
importance of issuing this follow-up order so “that the Mexicans are gotten back into
Mexico with sufficient rapidity and certainty to insure that by the time agricultural and
other work of the kind in which they are accustomed to engage commences to decrease
with the opening of the fall season.”118 In other words, the farmers who had used Mexican
labor in the past, presumably because of additional production acreage as well as the low
wages, must now learn to live without these workers. As the deadline approached, new
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requests for extensions followed.
Governor W.P. Hobby of Texas telegraphed Secretary Wilson on June 28, 1919:
At a meeting of prominent citizens held today in my office representing banking
mercantile and farming interests, together with representatives and senators of Travis
and Williamson Counties represent that seventy five percent of cotton crop in these
and adjoining counties has not yet been chopped, and unless labor can be obtained at
once and without delay fifty percent or more of crop may have to be abandoned.119
After this and several other letters and telegrams asking for an extension came to the
Department, including many from Chambers of Commerce in Texas, Secretary Wilson
conducted a meeting with several politicians from Texas. The gathering included Senator
Sheppard as well as Representatives Garner and Democrat John C. Box from the
northeastern part of the state, in addition to four other Texas congressmen and several
representatives from the Texas cotton industry. After listening to their pleas, the Secretary
agreed to extend the program until January 1, 1920 in “sections of the country where cotton
is raised,” presumably just Texas, and “for other agricultural work, and that stock raising
would be regarded for this purpose as an agricultural industry.”120 In a few short months,
the program had been extended several times at the behest of politicians and agricultural
interests throughout Texas. Nonetheless, many groups and individuals complained about
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the continuation of the program.
Mostly written to the DOL or directly to Secretary Wilson, two prevailing themes
dominated the letters of complaint from union locals. First, the letters indicated that
Mexican laborers worked for lower wages and second, that they displaced “American”
workers. For instance, the Oil, Gas Well and Refinery Workers of America in Goose
Creek, Texas, wrote to Secretary Wilson about a refinery in the southern portion of that
state that employed Mexicans; “Truck load after truck load is being brought in here, and
scattered in our midst.” Because of the displacement of “Americans,” the letter continued,
“We hardle [sic] care to make them one of us, as they represent the lower class of the
Nation from which they came. We are also of the oppinion [sic], that several of those
employed here, were brought into this Country at the time of the shortage of labor in
the farming Districts, and we feel that they should be returned from whence they
came . . . .”121
Just as with previous correspondence from the public, no distinction appears to have been
made between aliens and U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage. The letter from the Texas
union seems to acknowledge that not all of the workers traveled from Mexico since it
suggested that only “some” of the workers came from agriculture. Further, even if the
laborers originated in agricultural work that did not necessarily mean they lacked U.S.
citizenship. The long-time leader of the AFL, Samuel Gompers, also became involved in
vilification of foreign workers.
Although it did not happen, AFL President Samuel Gompers pushed for a two-year
moratorium on immigration beginning in December, 1918. Gompers based this proposal
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on concerns about unemployment after the war. Adding a nativist element, Gompers
contended that the nation needed to “Americanize,” and expressed fears about “foreign
elements” in the nation including the possibility of Bolshevik influence. The AFL
President had long harbored prejudicial outlooks that became more apparent during the
post-war period.122 Secretary of Labor James J. Davis apparently considered reopening a
guest-worker program for several southwestern states, and Gompers responded to him on
July 28, 1921: “With at least four million men and women of our country unemployed and
the prospects of business very small it would be a most cruel act to permit Mexicans to
come into this county and take the bread out of the mouths of already hungry millions.”123
By 1924 when Congress debated the merits of immigration restriction, Gompers had
embraced nativist ideas that contended immigrants threatened the racial integrity of Anglo
Americans.124 Private citizens also became involved in the discussion regarding the
possibility of reducing immigration by ending the Bracero Program.
Many citizens sent correspondence to the DOL complaining about the Program. A
letter from the San Miguel [California] Improvement Club asserted that the Southern
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Pacific Railroad Company maintained two siding cars that contained “dirty, filthy, immoral
and unsanitary persons of foreign birth. Shipped here as laborers on Section 35 and 36.
They are a menace to the health and morality of our citizens.” The letter also stated that
action should be taken “before the people of San Miguel attempt to take the matter in their
own hands, as was done on a former occasion, when your Company attempted to quarter a
band of undesirable Hindus in our midst.” Just as the letters from labor unions had
charged, the Improvement Club maintained that these workers displaced “Americans,”
soldiers, and, additionally, encouraged “Bolshevikism” [sic]. The letter concluded with
“San Miguel is a Banner Community in all things pertaining to the war just passed, Bonds,
Red Cross, Etc.”125 However, despite its wartime compassion, the San Miguel community
apparently remained nativist to the core. Another letter writer, Delbert R. Hayes, from
Detroit, Michigan, also referred to Bolshevism after reading a newspaper article that noted
227,000 men remained unemployed in the United States: “I suppose that they want to start
making Bolshevik out of them to add to the Foreign Bolshevik that we all ready [sic] have
with us.”126 Fears regarding Bolshevism surfaced in the wake of the Russian Revolution
and came to a climax as deportations, particularly of members of the Industrial Workers of
the World (IWW), occurred during the 1919 to 1920 period. As previously mentioned,
Commissioner Caminetti became involved in the project that became known as the “Red
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Scare.”127 These letters from the public mentioned Mexican immigration and Bolshevism
within the same context and demonstrated that fears concerning foreign political influence
also affected the perception of laborers from Mexico.
Radicalism, Nativism, and Deportations
The IWW, begun in 1905, attempted to organize the proletariat and overthrow
capitalism by whatever means necessary. Although internal squabbles often clouded their
mission, the union’s reputation as a radical and dangerous organization grew during the
1910s as they orchestrated demonstrations and strikes.128 Because of the rise of
Bolshevism and the corresponding increase of xenophobia, the IWW, along with other
groups deemed radical, became entities that the federal government conspired to destroy.129
Moreover, as historian Joseph Rayback indicated regarding the IWW: “Its campaigns
revealed, contrary to A.F.L. philosophy, that the migratory, casual, unskilled laborers, with
their diverse languages, customs, prejudices, religions, and animosities, were
organizable.”130 The IWW opposed racism and worked for the uplift of unskilled workers,
and both of these issues, in addition to the IWW’s support for the Mexican Revolution,
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attracted Mexicanos to the organization.131
In the summer of 1917, Bisbee, Arizona, became the site of one of the largest
“Illegal” deportations in U.S. history. Bisbee, and other communities in southeastern
Arizona, housed copper mines and other metallurgical operations that utilized Mexican
workers, including immigrants, as unskilled labor. Mexican workers strove for wage parity
with European migrants who held mostly skilled positions. Once labor agitation began,
mine owners successfully used Great War patriotism, IWW radicalism, and the specter of
pro-German conspirators to vilify the strikers.132 Moreover, as historian Rodolfo Acuña
indicated, even though not only Mexicanos joined the work stoppage, “their participation in
IWW demonstrations allowed pseudo patriots to paint Mexican workers as terrorists and
traitors.”133 The proximity of Bisbee to Columbus, New Mexico, the site of the Villista
raid in 1916 mentioned in Chapter 1, only added to negativity regarding Mexicanos.134 The
local sheriff, Harry Wheeler, in response to the influx of Mexicans in southern Arizona,
“believed the country was being invaded by aliens” and Villistas.135 Wheeler rounded up
1,186 strikers, placed them on manure-filled train cars, and shipped them to detainment
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camps not far from Columbus where some remained for months. Although Mexicanos
numbered 13 percent of the workforce at the Bisbee location, the deportees included “at
least” 27 percent.136 The New York Times, although not specifically mentioning the
ethnicity of the strikers, did specify that some of the IWW actions reached into Mexico and
that 52,000 Midwestern agricultural workers had been mobilized in support of the
strikers.137 Occurrences such as those in Bisbee encouraged the government and Anglos in
the United States to equate some Mexicanos with radicals and IWW members. As
xenophobia and nativism continued to rise during the post war period, deportations of
Mexican laborers soon became commonplace throughout the United States.
Writing about the suppression of radicals during the Great War and Red Scare,
historian William Preston, Jr. observed that the BOI broadened the scale of deportations
through the use of telegraphic warrants. The Bureau resided in Washington D.C., but the
detention of deportees could occur virtually anywhere in the nation. Beginning in 1908,
administrators believed that repatriations could be handled more expeditiously by telegraph
so that local police did not release a suspected illegal alien before expulsion proceedings
could begin. Moreover, according to Preston, “The conduct and customs of immigration
inspectors, district attorneys, and army officers were often the controlling factor, a situation
136

Acuña, Corridors of Migration, 204. Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War: The Rise of
the War Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 24. President Wilson
appointed a commission to look into this occurrence, but due to the president’s personal
relationship with industrialist Cleveland Dodge who also advised Wilson, nothing came of the
endeavor. See Acuña , 205.
“Entire West Alert to Suppress I.W.W.” New York Times, July 13, 1917, 3. After the Great War
Armistice, as copper prices waned, owners just hired “Americans.” See Acuña, Corridors of
Migration, 209.
137

210

which favored local discretion and administrative chaos.”138 Although aimed at supposedly
radical members of the IWW, the Immigration Act of October 1918 (186, 40 Stat. 1012)
enhanced the government’s scope in implementing deportations. This statute served as the
basis for the Red Scare of 1919-1920 as perpetrated by U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer and Caminetti.139 Berkshire’s implementation of the Bracero Program now focused
as much on expulsions as entries.
This easing of the regulations and due process concerning deportation can be
observed in the actions of border inspectors in expelling Braceros. For instance, Berkshire
corresponded with the Cleveland, Ohio, immigration office on January 21, 1919, regarding
the disposition of agricultural workers for the Continental Sugar Company. The
Supervising Inspector indicated that 144 of the 348 employed laborers had already been
returned to Laredo and left the country. However, 62 workers had accepted positions with
other agricultural businesses or the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the remainder had
deserted. Since the workers had originally crossed at Laredo, Berkshire requested that the
Cleveland office work with the Texas inspectors to finalize the arrangements concerning
these laborers.140 Within three days of his letter, Acting Secretary of Labor Abercrombie
sent a telegram to Berkshire authorizing warrants for 77 listed aliens that had apparently
138
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been located.141 Sociologist Manuel Gamio, writing in 1930, analyzed Mexican
immigration and his statistics verified the expulsion of Mexicanos during the post-war
recession.
Gamio’s information from Mexican immigration officials demonstrated the ebbs and
flows of migration to the United States during the early 1920s. The Bracero Program
would have been included in the statistics during the first two years in Table 9 as it ended
in March, 1921, and Mexican officials had no reason not to add these migrants to the totals.
Therefore, 1921 demonstrates a paucity of migrants, 9,165, to the United States when the
U.S. economy soured. Contrastingly, as the U.S. Immigration Service rounded up Bracero
workers and sent them to Mexico, the total returning inflated to 106,242. Moreover,
deportations of Mexicans expanded during the 1920 to 1921 recession, and included
Program deserters, Braceros who remained in legal employment in the United States, a
growing volume of undocumented aliens, and U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage.142
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Table 9: Mexican Immigration Statistics, 1920 to 1926

Year
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
Total

Departed from
Mexico to the
United States
50,569
9,165
33,180
80,793
57,269
41,759
56,534
329,269

Returned to
Mexico from the
United States
64,620
106,242
50,171
85,825
105,834
77,056
67,970
557,718

Net departures from
the United States to
Mexico
14,051
97,077
16,991
5,032
48,565
35,297
11,436
228,449

Source: Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States, 7.

When a recession in 1920-1921 threw many Americans out of work, employers of
Mexican workers began to lose their argument for the continuation of the Bracero Program.
Employers reduced their work force while nativists alleged that Mexicans had taken jobs
that Anglo Americans could be working. Another situation developed in many cities,
including several in Texas, regarding out-of-work and “destitute” Mexicans who drained
local welfare services. Letters to Caminetti from other Cabinet Departments, city
immigration offices, and the Mexican government described conditions in Philadelphia,
New York City, Detroit, Chicago, Denver, and other communities. Superlatives reigned
such as: “It is about as miserable a human habitation as I have ever seen,”143 and “120
Mexicans residing in various boarding houses at different locations in this city, who are

143

Commissioner of Immigration in Port Huron, Michigan, to Caminetti, letter dated December 23,
1921, in “Destitute Mexican File,” Box 4339, File 55091/006, RG 85, NA-DC. Also see: Jaime R.
Aguila, “Mexican/U.S. Immigration Policy prior to the Great Depression.” Diplomatic History,
Vol. 31, No. 2 (April, 2007): 207-214.

213

entirely destitute, without money with which to purchase food or shelter.”144 On closer
inspection, this distressed population did not constitute only workers who came to the north
by way of the Bracero program.
The circumstances of Mexicanos in Fort Worth, Texas, became problematic
according to W.H. Robb of the local Welfare Association in a letter to Clemente Idar, a
general organizer for the AFL in San Antonio. Robb claimed that ten thousand Mexicans
lived in the area and that two-thirds remained unemployed with many out of work for a
lengthy period. He went on to assert that his agency’s funding had run low as a result of
assisting these workers and that other charity groups had experienced similar results. Robb
suggested that perhaps the federal governments of the United States and Mexico could
work together in relieving the situation. He argued further that “all immigration of this
race be immediately stopped,” and that “the most logical thing to do would be to issue
instructions to the immigration officers for the arrest and immediate transportation to
border ports of all Mexicans illegally in the United States.”145 Apparently, Idar forwarded
the letter to the Amalgamated Meat Cutters union as John F. Hart of that organization soon
wrote to the Bureau. Hart observed that many Mexican laborers had drifted toward the
border from northern cities and now resided in various Texas communities. He observed
that “Not only are these Mexicans at the point of starvation, in large numbers, but their
144
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presence is forcing large numbers of United States citizens out of employment . . . .”146
Claiming that many of the workers resided in the nation illegally, neither Hart nor Robb
mentioned that some of these “Mexicans” remained in the country as citizens or legal
aliens. Presumably, Hart was concerned about the possibility of Mexican laborers being
used as strike-breakers against members of his union. Occurrences such as that at Fort
Worth added to the argument that Mexicans in the United States needed to be expelled as
soon as possible.
Nativist advocates now argued that the Bracero Program should never have been
instituted and that all Mexicanos needed to be deported; U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage,
given the Anglo opinion that all Mexicanos were the same, could not escape this mind-set.
The reason for their distressed situation did not matter even though many of these
Mexicanos had been laid off by their U.S. employers. However, the repatriation of
Mexicans did not occur quickly enough for municipal governments, and many cities took
matters into their own hands. In lieu of offering relief to Mexicans in distress, urban
officials arranged for the transportation of many laborers and their relatives back to
Mexico. These actions predated similar occurrences that transpired during the Great
Depression in the early 1930s. Sadly, the manifest for Alcario Villanueva, mentioned
earlier in this chapter as having crossed on his own in 1921, also had in large handwriting

146

John F. Hart of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters to William W. Husband, Commissioner of
Immigration, letter dated April 13, 1921, in “Destitute Mexican File,” Box 4339, File 55091/006,
RG 85, NA-DC.

215

across the document: “Repatriated Mexico 9/4/36.”147 The proliferation of Mexican-born
residents of the United States that stimulated this repatriation may be observed in statistics
from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Table 10 provides information on the depth of Mexican immigration beyond the
traditional border areas of the United States. Although the total U.S. gain from 1910 to
1920 demonstrates that Mexican-born residents increased considerably, 116.2 percent, the
gain for nine non-border “Bracero states” that attracted a considerable number of guestworkers dwarfed that increase at 184.7 percent. These nine states included Colorado, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada and Wyoming. The choice of these states

corresponds to information on Bracero Program participants who left the border areas to
work in agriculture and on the railroads. The border area states of Arizona, California,
New Mexico, and Texas already had a considerable Mexican-born population total in 1910.
Taking this same state breakdown and applying it to the Bracero Program reveals the
information in Table 11. As may be seen in the percent to total column, despite being
about one-fourth of the other U.S. states, the nine Bracero states saw a much higher
percentage of workers arriving in the period ending June 30, 1920. These numbers do not
reflect the total of all Braceros because the Annual Report for 1921 did not provide a state
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by state breakdown. However, the additional 22,010 Braceros who came during the final
nine months of the Program undoubtedly followed a similar pattern.148
Table 10: 1910 and 1920 Mexican-born Population in the United States

9 Bracero U.S. States

1910 Mexicanborn Population*
14,999

1920 Mexicanborn Population
42,704

Percentage Change
1910 to 1920
184.7%

4 Border U.S. States

200,615

422,720

110.7%

35 Other U.S. States

6,421

15,037

134.2%

Total United States

222,035

479,932

116.2%

Source: Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States, 24-25. *Arizona and New Mexico
did not become states until 1912, but were still included in the U.S. Census.

Taking this same state breakdown and applying it to the Bracero Program reveals the
information in Table 11. As may be seen in the percent to total column, despite being
about one-fourth of the other U.S. states, the nine Bracero states saw a much higher
percentage of workers arriving in the period ending June 30, 1920. These numbers do not
reflect the total of all Braceros because the Annual Report for 1921 did not provide a state
by state breakdown. However, the additional 22,010 Braceros who came during the final
nine months of the Program undoubtedly followed a similar pattern.149
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Table 11: 1917 to June 30, 1920 Bracero Program Totals
1917 to June 30,
1920 Total Braceros
9 Bracero U.S. States
7,712

Percent to total
15.2%

4 Border U.S. States

41,915

82.4%

35 Other U.S. States

1,225

2.4%

Total United States

50,852

100%

Source: United States, Department of Labor, Bureau of Immigration,
Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the
Secretary of Labor, 1920 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1920), 429-430.

Moreover, an analysis of Tables 10 and 11 reveals the impact that the Bracero
Program had on states throughout the nation. The Mexican-born population gain from
1910 to 1920 for the nine Bracero states reveals that this increase may have been impacted
by the influx of Bracero workers to those areas. In turn, this population gain, as well as the
growth of workers in need of assistance, undoubtedly drew the attention of Anglo citizens,
particularly nativists, in locations that had not previously contained a significant Mexicano
population. In the wake of this increase of Mexican-born residents, a debate about the
continuation of pre-war levels of immigration included nativist ideas concerning who
should be admitted into the United States.
Nativism rose for many reasons and manifested itself in several different ways, but
the impact in regard to immigration remains the most significant.150 Because many native-
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born Americans’ ancestors came from northern and western European locations such as
England, Ireland and Germany, new migrants from southern and eastern Europe became
characterized as less than desirable. Consequently, legislators moved to pass laws that
severely curtailed immigration from locations such as Italy, Poland, and Russia as those
areas contained populations believed to be unassimilable in the United States. One of the
beliefs promoted by nativists involved the claim that Nordic races would become diluted
through the absorption of supposedly lesser groups. This argument also applied to
Mexican immigrants who allegedly weakened the Anglo-Saxon gene pool and took white
jobs at lesser rates of pay.151 Additionally, although early-1920s immigration legislation
did not ultimately include any formal restriction of Mexican immigration, some politicians,
nativists, and labor organizations such as the AFL still clamored for the limitation of
migration from Mexico and other Latin American nations.152 One particular Texas
congressman, a foe of the Bracero Program from its inception, conducted such a campaign.
John C. Box, a nativist congressman from northeast Texas, argued against Mexican
immigration before a U.S. Senate committee conducting hearings on whether or not to shut
down immigration in anticipation of a more comprehensive law. Box reflected a
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contemporary argument concerning “anchor babies,” in which children born to aliens in the
United States automatically became U.S. citizens based on the wording of the 14th
Amendment.153 Box seemed particularly disturbed about this issue although he slanted his
discussion as supposed apprehension for the children’s welfare if the non-citizen parents
faced deportation and either the family split or U.S. citizens, the children, also faced
expulsion. However, the Congressmen’s true feelings surfaced later in his testimony when
he described Mexicans in general terms as “degraded, ignorant,” and also, “savage.” He
added that Mexicans possessed a predisposition to engage in criminal activity and cited an
article in a “San Antonio newspaper” as his proof. Box also contended that “I have not
found anywhere any class of people that were, as a class, less desirable from any standpoint
as American Citizens.” In an ironic twist to the premise of this chapter, Box also indicated
that: “we are either going to work them like slaves or peons and send them out when they
do not suit us, or that we are going to turn them out among us where they will multiply into
millions, and always fill that lower stratum of our life.”154 Perhaps unknowingly, the
Congressman had identified an attitude toward Mexican labor, established as a result of the
Bracero Program, which asserted that the workers filled a temporary need only to be cast
out once the job concluded. The Texas Congressman wanted to accelerate those removals
as fast as possible. Based on the occurrences discussed earlier concerning Ft. Worth, a city
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near his district, and as an outspoken representative of the U.S. government, he
undoubtedly succeeded in encouraging repatriation on a municipal basis, no matter what
the status of the person being deported. Individuals such as Box assisted in perpetuating an
anti-Mexican, nativist attitude in the United States during the period after the Great War.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, early twentieth-century Mexican immigrants
traveled from northern Mexico and the Monterrey Center, through the Nuevo Leon
Corridor to south Texas to accept agricultural-labor positions in cotton and onion
production, as well as pecan shelling. Until the Immigration Act of 1917, a virtually open
border had existed as migrant laborers traversed the boundary in search of employment.
Many of these workers remained in the United States as legal aliens or naturalized U.S.
citizens, but the Anglo population viewed all Mexicanos in the same way: as people suited
for agricultural or other manual labor, required sometimes, but to be removed when the
necessity concluded. Nonetheless, their presence in south Texas, as long as their visibility
remained obscure, did not constitute a problem. Communities such as the West Side of San
Antonio grew as Mexicanos came to the Alamo City during the early twentieth century.
The Immigration Act of 1917 altered this scenario with draconian regulations that
effectively halted legal Mexican immigration.
Beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the United States began to
exclude some immigrants based on race and class. During the thirty-five years that
followed, the BOI formed, but with many changes of administrations and new laws that
continued to further restrict immigration. Additionally, the Commissioners came from
backgrounds in labor or in support of labor, individuals who identified with “American”
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laborers rather than foreign ones. To supposedly provide additional labor to increase food
production in conjunction with the Great War, Secretary Wilson and Commissioner
Caminetti adopted the First Bracero Program. However, the Secretary’s support for labor
migration from Mexico mostly concerned demands by farmers rather than any regard for
the workers facing restrictions imposed by the 1917 law. Moreover, Secretary Wilson
presided over a Department wrought with strife between two internal groups, the BOI and
the USES.
The struggles between the Bureau and the USES transpired due to alternative views
on how the Bracero Program should proceed. Both groups expressed anxiety about
farmers’ needs in association with providing food for the war effort, but the Bureau desired
that controls be maintained and the USES recommended an open border with virtually no
restrictions. Other groups, notably agriculturalists and bureaucrats such as Herbert Hoover,
also lobbied for fewer impediments. None of these officials appeared concerned about the
Braceros, despite the Bureau’s wage controls. Historian Gunther Peck concluded that the
U.S. government served as a “padrone” during the guest worker or Bracero Program that
began in 1942.155 This chapter has demonstrated that the Bracero Program of the Great
War period served a similar function. Secretary Wilson and Caminetti knew that the
supposed need remained “psychological,” but continued the program nonetheless. Using
the war as a rationalization, the various rules of the program served to protect the farmers
and prevent Braceros from remaining in the United States. Moreover, as demonstrated by
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researchers such as Paul Taylor, Mexican immigrants had labored throughout south Texas
long before the beginning of the program as both legal aliens and U.S. citizens and had
traveled the state in search of work from their homes in San Antonio. However, even their
congressional representative, James Slayden, abhorred their presence until Anglo
constituents approached him with a need for imported workers. The armistice that ended
the Great War placed an entirely different perspective on the continuation of the program.
During the post-Armistice period, an exception to the Immigration Act of 1917 based
on the needs of the war became a hollow argument. Nonetheless, the agriculturalists
continued to assert that not enough workers could be found; more likely, the farmers’
contention of an insufficiency kept wages low as an actual dearth of laborers would have
driven up the cost. Despite Caminetti’s presumed desire to end the program, Secretary
Wilson continually acquiesced to the farmers’ demands and extended the exception. Frank
Berkshire, the Supervising Inspector for the Bureau on the Mexican border, now assumed a
vital role. Caminetti had inflated the Inspector’s status and relied on his expertise in
making decisions regarding the program. Berkshire, with a proclivity for following the
rules of the Bureau and the program, pursued the Braceros who skipped their original
contracts to accept alternative employment or deserted altogether. He ignored the
possibility of abuse that could be seen in the Del Rio and Hidalgo statistics regarding the
tendency of Braceros to desert from Anglo farmers.156 Berkshire effectively completed his
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task as only 11 of the 50,852 workers who entered as of June 30, 1920 became U.S.
citizens.157 The enhanced ability to deport aliens as established by telegraphic warrants as
well as the Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1918 enabled a swifter expulsion process.
Nothing else mattered since the need had ended; the workers had to leave.
In addition, due to the Bracero Program, Mexicanos had traveled throughout the
United States and labored in large urban areas such as Fort Worth and smaller communities
like San Miguel, California, that were unused to their presence.158 When the U.S. economy
suffered during a post-war recession, numerous Mexicanos fell into the ranks of the
unemployed and, in some cases, had to depend on local welfare services for basic
sustenance. Many local governments wasted little time in deporting the workers as the rise
of nativist ideas during the early 1920s, a fear of Bolsheviks, and trepidation regarding
anyone perceived as “foreign” gained popularity. As Caminetti championed such causes,
the deportation of anyone deemed “Mexican,” possibly even U.S. citizens, became
United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 75-78.
157

Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, 1920,
429-430. When the final 9 months of the program are added, the “legalized” number rises to 494 or
.7 percent of the 72,862 total. However, these figures appear suspect since a state by state
breakdown was not included as with the 1920 totals. In illustration, a comparable number died, 414
or .6 percent, and that total was evenly distributed for the life of the Program. See: Annual Report
of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, 1921, 7.
158

According to the 1920 census, Denton County, which includes Fort Worth, contained only 103
people born in Mexico. Per the claim made by the Fort Worth Welfare Association, ten thousand
indigent Mexicanos needed assistance in 1921. According to the 1920 census, San Luis Obispo
County, which includes San Miguel, contained only 221 people born in Mexico. Per the letter from
the San Miguel Improvement Club, two railroad cars alone could have contained that many people.
See: University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, “Historical Census Browser,”
for 1920: http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/php/start.php?year=V1920. To view the exact
information from this website, click on "white persons born in Mexico” on the first screen and click
submit.

224

acceptable.159 Particularly in areas of the United States far from the border, Mexican
workers had become nameless laborers, used and viewed as “peons” by agriculturalists,
Anglo Americans, and the U.S. government. Anglos perpetuated a view of Mexicanos as
unqualified for U.S. citizenship, and sometimes tried to expel them when the low-wage
employment had been accomplished.
In the wake of the Bracero Program, Mexican laborers possessed fewer choices
regarding their aspiration to work in the United States. Clearly, the banning of illiterate
migrants by the Immigration Act of 1917 had severely reduced documented migration
since the Mexican population remained 65 percent illiterate in 1921.160 However, the
Contract Labor Law (CLL) and Likely to Become a Public Charge statute (LPC) remained
a “catch-22” situation for Mexican migrants. Upon attempting to enter the country, if the
migrant indicated that someone had requested his labor in the United States, this resulted in
a denial of admission due to the CLL. Nonetheless, if the migrant said that no one had
contracted him, but yet had little money on hand because of a need for employment, this
meant a rejection of entrance based on the LPC. Obviously, the migrant had to be cautious
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in completing his application for entry to avoid refusal based on any one of the three
requirements. As a result, many turned to illegally crossing the border at a location not
supervised by the Immigration Service or, resorted to using a Mexicano labor agent to
assist in gaining entry to the United States. Although active before the advent of the
Bracero Program, the importance of labor agents to Mexican immigrants increased with the
Immigration Act of 1917. Chapter 5 examines the experiences of these labor agents in San
Antonio.
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CHAPTER 5
ETHNIC EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES IN THE ALAMO CITY
Roman Gomez Gonzalez operated as a labor coupler in El Paso, Texas, during the
first quarter of the twentieth century, but constantly struggled to make a living, regularly
reorganized his business, and eventually went bankrupt. This transpired not because of his
lack of skill at the profession, but due to the nature of the workers and competition from
other recruiters, as well as rivalries with railroad and agricultural agents. The transitory
tendency of laborers meant that the workers regularly “skipped” contracts which deprived
Gonzalez of commissions; also, due to the distance between El Paso and the place of
employment, higher wages at other businesses along the route enticed workers. Between
the many recruiters in El Paso, in addition to the ones sent by businesses to recruit labor,
the scene at the bridge crossing from Juarez, Mexico, to the United States sometimes
became a violent struggle for workers. Gonzalez’s longevity remains remarkable, despite
all of his troubles, as the average agency in El Paso lasted only 1.9 years; his background as
a youth in the local barrio and a bilingual ability, as well as a stint as a local policeman
undoubtedly assisted in this durability.1 Just as in El Paso, San Antonio provided a
meaningful location for labor agencies during the early twentieth century, because of the
Alamo City’s proximity to the Mexican border.
1
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Before the Mexican Revolution, recruiters traveled into Mexico to contract laborers,
but in the 1910s, as the conflict raged, workers headed north on their own to escape the
violence and locate needed employment.2 Chapter 2 revealed the railroad connections from
the Monterrey Center that passed through Laredo and Eagle Pass, Texas, and offered the
train transportation needed by laborers travelling through the Nuevo Leon Corridor to the
Alamo City. As discussed in Chapter 3, the growth of cotton production in the Blackland
Prairie region, the proliferation of truck crops in the Winter Garden Area, and the shelling
of pecans in San Antonio, all attracted Mexican workers to south Texas. Often utilizing
San Antonio as a home base, laborers searched for employment in these three agricultural
sectors throughout southern and central Texas. Chapter 4 reviewed the Bracero Program
that monopolized border traffic for low-wage workers during the Great War and a few
years thereafter. Mexican workers required lesser wages and remained content with an
oppressive working environment because both earnings and conditions in the United States
amounted to improvements as compared to circumstances in their revolutionary-torn land.3
Farmers in Texas grew dependent on the labor of Mexican migrants due to the increased
profitability that resulted from the use of this inexpensive labor.4 Consequently, as the
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transportation routes and agricultural needs in south Texas developed, Mexican worker
employment agencies flourished in San Antonio during the early twentieth century by
advertising for vast numbers of migrant workers, sometimes claiming a need for 5,000
laborers to complete a single assignment.5 These labor agents, often Mexican immigrants
to the United States from earlier periods, afforded a connection between the migrant
workers and their acquisition of employment. Chapter 5 examines the experiences of these
labor agents in San Antonio, particularly those of Cesario Campa who migrated to the
United States in 1914. Although Campa’s life experience produced notable successes and
undoubtedly exceeded those of the Braceros who kept him in business during the late
1910s and 1920s, similarly to Ramon Gonzalez in El Paso, this profession failed to provide
him with significant wealth.
Although this chapter focuses on labor agencies in San Antonio during the 1908 to
1925 period, because the recruiters left scant information about their businesses, the words
of their detractors have supplied the main sources. The Bureau of Immigration files
provided details on the agencies, but the inspectors operated from the premise that the
businesses exploited Mexican workers and practiced illegal activities. Further, laws passed
by the state of Texas during the period demonstrated that politicians and bureaucrats
consciously moved to curtail and, ultimately, discontinue ethnic-based labor agencies. As
discussed in Chapter 4, government officials reflected the nativist ideas that gained
influence after the Great War and encouraged a reduction of immigration with new policies
La Prensa, 4-30-1920, page 7. Readex: A Division of News Bank, “Hispanic American
Newspapers, 1808-1980,” Newspaper Titles, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iwsearch/we/HistArchive. Accessed 5/15/2015.
5
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and statutes. Since politicians and bureaucrats disparaged the enganchadores, a careful
analysis of the material assists in evaluating the labor agents, develops a more positive
view of their role within the Mexican community, and contends that their demise occurred
due to the overstated belief that the recruiters abused their relationship with workers and
farmers. Other sources, including newspapers and real estate records aid in understanding
the agencies’ growth and eventual demise as they succumbed to federal government
regulations and state laws over the course of the 1910s and 1920s.
During the First Bracero Program, because of an exception to the Immigration Act of
1917 discussed in Chapter 4, the federal government maintained a position as a padrone for
Anglo farmers and other businesses in south Texas.6 Further, as is argued in this chapter,
before, during, as well as in the wake of that program, both the federal and state
governments acted to prevent ethnic owners of labor agencies from continuing a similar
role as padrones. In the enganchadore’s place, the Texas state government came to render
the same function. This chapter will also show that the workers themselves occupied an
important position within this story, because of the agency that they exercised.
State authorities despised the enganchadores, and also criticized the workers,
particularly when they skipped contracts and/or accepted more lucrative employment from
other farmers or factories. T.C. Jennings, the Labor Commissioner for Texas from 1917 to
1921, commented in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Sixth Biennial Report: “farmers who
6

Based on the available records in south Texas that listed the importers of Mexican laborers during
the Bracero Program (Del Rio and Hidalgo, Texas), almost 73% of the farmers had Anglo surnames
and 11% applied to companies that appeared to be run by non-Hispanic persons. There were a total
of 177 importers listed with 129 Anglos and 20 for the companies. See: Folders 2 and 3, Box 2862,
File 54261/202, RG85, NA-DC.

230

are in great need of labor have paid agents as high as ten dollars per head for Mexican
laborers . . . only to have all or a part of them desert before going to work, or within a day
or two thereafter.”7 From the point of view of the Commissioner, who undoubtedly sided
with the mostly Anglo farmers, this presented a dilemma. However, for the workers who
“voted with their feet,” another employer likely meant higher wages and/or better
conditions.8 The first employer may have been interested in low-wage workers, but the
laborer had out maneuvered him by bolting to a more lucrative arrangement. The workers
could wield economic power over the employer by moving as a group or individually from
one job to another and securing the best agreement.
To assess the San Antonio labor agencies, several areas need to be reviewed.
Beginning with the 1908 to 1917 period, a discussion of how the agencies expanded and
began to gain the attention of the Immigration Service will be presented. Although all
labor agencies drew disparagement from the Immigration Service, the enganchadores or
ethnic-owned businesses appeared to be the main target of their denigration.9 Further, the
Immigration Act of 1917 and the Bracero Program changed the enganchadores’ navigation
of the border and altered their recruitment practices. As a part of how the post-Bracero
Program affected the ethnic agents, examining the career of Cesario Campa assists in
7
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understanding the enganchadores in total. Just as the story of Roman Gonzalez
exemplified the difficulties of agents in El Paso, Campa offers comparable information for
San Antonio. Finally, politicians and bureaucrats in Texas, through the passage of
restrictive laws and the development of a state employment service, expedited the end for
the enganchadores. The Contract Labor Law begins the discussion on labor agencies
during the 1908 to 1917 period.
1908 to 1917 Labor Agencies
The Bureau of Immigration began to evaluate the movement of migrants to the
United States in 1908 when it opened a new file entitled “Mexican Peon Labor.”10 One of
the early discussions in these documents concerned what constituted a violation of the
Contract Labor Law (CLL), known as the Foran Act of 1885. Although this statute would
be strengthened by the Immigration Act of 1917, the earlier law regarding the contracting
of foreign laborers primarily applied to steamship companies that prepaid the transportation
of European migrants.11 A letter written in the summer of 1908 by Frank H. Larned of the
Bureau of Immigration demonstrated how the U.S. government applied the law in respect

The term “peon” was often included throughout the files of the Bureau of Immigration.
Ordinarily, it appeared to be used in a derogatory sense and often connected to the phrase, “the
lowest class” of the Mexican “race.” See Berkshire to Commissioner of Immigration Daniel Keefe,
letter dated June 24, 1911, in Folder 031, Box 2862, File 54261/202, RG85, NA-DC. Historian
Mark Reisler wrote extensively on the term and its usage during this period; see By the Sweat of
Their Brow, 128-135. Also see: Clare Sheridan, “Contested Citizenship: National Identity and the
Mexican Immigration Debates of the 1920s,” Journal of American Ethnic History, Vol. 21, No. 3
(Spring 2002), 3-35.
10

11

Michael Lemay and Elliot Robert Barkan, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues:
A Documentary History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 56-57.

232

to Mexican laborers: “It is fairly certain that a large part of the population of Mexico is
aware of the fact that labor employment agencies exist in El Paso and large numbers of
Mexicans apply and are admitted without any definite prospects of employment.”12 In
other words, information leaked back to Mexico that agencies in border cities such as El
Paso, as well as San Antonio, hired migrants who ventured to their doorstep. Therefore,
such activities did not amount to a violation of the law. Another letter regarding a
representative incident appeared within the Bureau’s files in September, 1909, when a
Mexican citizen from Chihuahua, Mexico, accepted a contract in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico,
across from El Paso, to work in the United States. According to Will E. Soult of the El
Paso Immigration office, the laborer had been “rustled” by an employment agent in Ciudad
Juarez, but this incident failed to constitute a violation of the law since the worker had
initiated his travel to the United States for the express purpose of securing employment.13
Frank W. Berkshire, the Inspector in Charge at El Paso, also became involved in the
application of the CLL.
In a cover letter that forwarded Soult’s report to Commissioner of Immigration Daniel
Keefe, Berkshire commented that the case of the worker from Chihuahua represented a
common incident within his jurisdiction along the entire Mexican border. Berkshire
indicated that “owing to the extreme difficulty in secreting satisfactory evidence of
violations of the contract labor provisions of the immigration laws, it has not hitherto
12
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proven possible to successfully institute proceedings against importers of laborers, although
it is felt that at least technical violations of our laws are of frequent occurrence.”14 As
discussed in Chapter 4, although in his first years as the Inspector in Charge at El Paso,
Berkshire had already demonstrated his anxiety regarding rule violations. Further, a
handwritten comment to Bureau employee Frank Larned at the bottom of the first page of
Berkshire’s letter, presumably from Commissioner of Immigration Daniel Keefe, read as
follows: “Pls [sic] look over this report. It is a good review of the general situation as to
Mexican peons coming here & securing employment.”15 Berkshire’s reputation for
expertise concerning Mexican immigration had begun to develop, and other Bureau
officials looked to him for leadership regarding the implementation of the law.
The Acting Supervising Inspector at San Antonio, Luther C. Steward, joined the fray
regarding the CLL in an October 5, 1909, letter to Commissioner Keefe. Steward
addressed a directive from the Bureau “to conduct a policy of rigidly examining all of such
applicants [Mexican laborers] for admission, with a view to effecting the debarment of all
those ineligible for entry; also, the possibility of securing evidence which would justify the
institution of proceedings against alleged importers for a violation of the contract labor
provisions of the immigration laws.” The Bureau apparently sought to identify any
violation of immigration law that would prevent labor agents from securing workers in
Mexico. Steward indicated that his office had already complied with the order even

14

Berkshire to Keefe letter dated September 13, 1909, in Folder June 1908-March 1910, Box 670,
File 52546/031, RG85, NA-DC.
15

Ibid.

234

“against [those] whom the slightest suspicion of contract labor exists, large families where
there is present but one wage-earner, aliens destined to interior points without sufficient
means to reach such intended destination, and all those in any way appearing to fall below
the average, either mentally or physically.”16 Virtually any possible violation of the law
would be used to circumvent the enganchadores, and by the tone of Steward’s comments
regarding falling “below the average,” some reasons for disbarment would be contrived by
the officials at the border and not necessarily covered by applicable ordinances. Again, a
handwritten notation at the bottom of the letter indicated that the subject had been
discussed with Berkshire.
In a lengthy follow-up to Steward’s letter, Berkshire wrote to the Commissioner on
November 1, 1909. The Supervising Inspector indicated that many immigrant debarments
had already taken place, particularly among the workers who had been solicited by
“runners” that employment agents used in Mexico to identify and direct potential laborers.
Consequently, some of the railroad companies that utilized employment businesses
contacted Berkshire. Although not admitting that the CLL had been violated, the firms
requested that Berkshire set up a system that would assist their efforts in obtaining Mexican
laborers for railroad work. The Supervising Inspector believed that if each of these railroad
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firms relied on a company-hired agent rather than the supposedly unscrupulous Mexican
enganchadore, that he could more effectively control the labor flow. Berkshire contended
that the companies owned by Mexicans not only had runners on the southern side of the
border that steered workers toward certain employment agents, but that “rustlers” in the
United States then insured that the “ignorant Mexican” completed a labor arrangement.
This ridicule could be viewed as a disingenuous characterization considering the
Mexicanos proclivity to “skip” these contracts when a more lucrative arrangement became
available. Berkshire preferred that agents representing the large railroad businesses,
presumably Anglos, would have the upper hand versus local ethnic companies. In effect,
he believed that the government should act as a partner in securing labor for the U.S.
companies and remove competition with the enganchadores. Berkshire went on to suggest
that “we can exclude practically all of the Mexican aliens of the laboring class” as Likely to
Become a Public Charge; a scheme that he apparently planned to utilize if immigrants
violated his proposed procedures.17 Commissioner Keefe rejected the idea of an exclusive
railroad agent because he believed that such a policy could be construed as encouraging
immigration, an outcome which he apparently viewed as problematic. Further, the
Commissioner stated that it would place the Bureau in the position of harming independent
agencies, something that he could not condone. However, he recognized the predicament,
17
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believed that it required attention, and planned to delegate Frank R. Stone to investigate the
situation.18 An indicator of how the Immigration Service viewed ethnic-based labor
agencies came with an internal document known as the Stone Report.
Dated June 23, 1910, and named for Inspector Frank Stone, originally of the El Paso
office, the report, issued seven months after Keefe’s letter, included a 4 page index, a 102
page typed document, 28 exhibits, and 5 tables, and thoroughly investigated the movement
of Mexican laborers throughout northern Mexico and the southwestern United States. In a
cover letter that accompanied Stone’s report to the Bureau of Immigration headquarters,
Inspector in Charge Berkshire praised the account and concluded that “the immigration of
the Mexican peons is a legitimate one and . . . a natural supply of economic demands in the
Southwestern portion of the United States . . . .” Berkshire complimented the Mexican
worker, noting the “docility and law-abiding habit of the average Mexican laborer in very
favorable contrast to the Greek, Italian, Hungarian or the native Negro.”19 Nonetheless, he
believed in the need for strict border control so that debarred aliens could not easily reenter
the United States. Returning to his rejected argument from the previous year, Berkshire
requested that arrangements be made with large companies so that the supposedly
unscrupulous labor agents could be thwarted. Although the Supervising Inspector sought to
prevent “ineligible” immigrants from securing entry as well as “after debarment preventing
surreptitious entry by such debarred aliens,” he seemed more alarmed by the
18
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enganchadores than the workers.20 Berkshire’s attitude may also be seen in the Stone
Report which offered a comprehensive section on the activities of labor agents throughout
the southwest, including San Antonio.
Stone discovered connections between labor agents in Laredo and San Antonio,
although the businesses in the two cities operated under different names. The two agencies
in Laredo, the Laredo Employment Company, operated by John T. Parker, and Santiago,
Hill, and Company, owned by Jim Hill, functioned in similar ways.21 The agents boarded
the train in Nuevo Laredo, south of the border, and while enroute to the United States
offered to transport Mexican workers to locations such as San Antonio via the International
and Great Northern (I&GN) for a lesser fee than the railroad charged. By purchasing
tickets to the Alamo City in bulk, the agents obtained a lower price, but charged the aliens
$2.30 for a ticket that cost the recruiter $1.10. Despite the $1.20 profit per ticket for the
enganchadore, the migrant avoided the regular price of $4.60, twice the total that the
worker paid to Parker and Hill. Both companies also maintained rustlers in Laredo and
paid them a commission for leading other potential laborers to their businesses. The agents
then directed some workers to employment sites south of San Antonio including cotton
farms, railroads, and mines. For each “delivery” of a worker, the agent received a fee from

Ibid. Berkshire also commented that “any large employer has secured a reduction in the wage of
the common laborer through the introduction or employment of Mexicans.”
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the employer, sometimes as low as 50 cents, but mostly one dollar. Stone estimated that of
the 13,000 aliens who crossed at Laredo during 1910, a majority could be described as
“peons” or members of the Mexican agricultural working class. Moreover, labor agents
placed thousands of workers each year and derived profits from their procurement. For the
migrants who continued on to San Antonio rather than remaining in the rural area south of
the city, other agencies handled the workers’ employment.22
Although some of the agencies denied any connection, Stone argued that the Laredo
offices often “passed” laborers to San Antonio firms once the I&GN train arrived in the
Alamo City. The San Antonio firms had an ethnic character as men named Garza,
Contreras, and Sanchez operated firms. Contreras formed a partnership with both of the
other men. Garza, Contreras & Company, located on the West Side of San Antonio near
both the Missouri-Kansas-Texas (Katy) Railroad station and the I&GN terminal, utilized
rail lines for its sustenance. In placing workers on cotton farms, Garza indicated to Stone
that he received one dollar per laborer provided to the employer. Stone also visited the
Contreras-Sanchez Agency and spoke to Contreras who claimed that he placed 5,000
laborers per year, but that many of these workers skipped to more lucrative employment en
route to their initial jobs. However, since Contreras collected an extra $1.20 from each
worker before embarking for the employment site, the agent still received his
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“commission.” At 5,000 laborers per year, Contreras netted a significant total before
payment of any expenses. Stone characterized Contreras’ fee as “graft” since the workers
had paid their own way to the employment destination and then the agent obtained his fee
from the railroad rather than the employer. Although Stone did not further investigate the
assertion of corruption, it can be assumed that the employer paid the railroad for delivery of
the workers.23 Some of the labor agents apparently sensed that Stone’s investigation did
not bode well for their enterprise and contacted the Bureau.
John Parker, the labor agent in Laredo, soon communicated directly with the Bureau
regarding his operations. He wrote to Commissioner Keefe shortly after delivery of the
Stone Report and indicated that all of his workers had proceeded through the proper
channels of the Immigration Service. However, he claimed that the local inspectors in
Laredo required him to bring his laborers back to the border for another session with the
Immigration Service. His letter questioned whether this amounted to Bureau policy or an
extra provision imposed by the local authorities.24 The Agent in Charge at Laredo, Wesley
G. Staver, soon refuted Parker’s claims in a letter to Berkshire. Staver stated that agents
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such as Parker often employed workers who had surreptitiously crossed the border, and that
as many as one-third of the laborers that the agent escorted to a “second” examination had
not been previously inspected. Further, Staver indicated that Parker had a habit of rushing
the train with workers just before it left the station for San Antonio and that the
immigration inspectors could not keep up with all of the required manifests.25 Such
correspondence from a labor agent and the response from an inspector undoubtedly
affected the Commissioner as he soon approved Berkshire’s original proposal for working
with the railroads at the El Paso office.
On October 20, 1910, Berkshire outlined an agreement with various railroads that
assigned a specific individual, employed by each railroad, to work directly with the
Immigration Service in procuring workers from Mexico. In a handwritten note on the first
page, Keefe indicated his approval.26 Although considered an experiment, the completion
of this arrangement between the Immigration Service and the railroads meant that the
government now tacitly sponsored Mexican worker migration specifically for those
businesses. This policy reflected Berkshire’s disdain for the ethnic labor agents, as
evidenced by a June, 1911, letter to the Commissioner.
Apparently, because Berkshire saw the ethnic agents in El Paso as violators of the
Contract Labor Law, he came to believe that the enganchadores also illegally abused the
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immigrant workers.27 The Supervising Inspector viewed the Mexican migrant as “childlike” and susceptible to fellow immigrants, runners who led groups of workers to the
border and then passed them to the labor agent. Berkshire argued that the activity of such
agents had increased immigration from Mexico and “that it is about time to consider the
cause and effect, and take steps to put a stop to the pernicious practices of the labor agent.”
He outlined information on all of the El Paso agencies and established that the agents, not
all ethnic Mexicans, abused the workers by overcharging for their services. Berkshire
estimated that based on the fees charged and the costs involved in feeding the migrants
while en route to a job, El Paso’s Zarate and Avina agency netted a “profit” of $65,000 per
year from fees that the railroad paid for the workers. Although a large sum, the
Supervising Inspector failed to calculate anything other than the cost of the meals, and did
not consider the various people who worked for the agency, overhead for their respective
businesses, and laborers who skipped contracts.28 Despite a delay in implementing his
program due to slow border activity associated with the Mexican Revolution, Berkshire
continued to refine policies designed to impact the ethnic recruiter.
One of the “rules” in Berkshire’s scheme mandated that agency representatives could
27

Gunther Peck also characterized Berkshire as prejudiced in favor of the railroad agencies in El
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not specify the name of their company when soliciting a worker at the border. The ethnic
agencies objected to this proposition as they wanted to take advantage of their common
heritage with the worker; this rule demonstrated a bias against those agencies on
Berkshire’s part as he undoubtedly understood their opposition. The Supervising Inspector
asked that his rules be permanently instituted at the El Paso location, but that other border
locations should eventually be added as similar problems with recruiters existed throughout
the border area.29 Despite the lack of border activity due to the Revolution, Commissioner
Keefe indicated that the test of Berkshire’s rules should proceed and agreed that all labor
agencies needed to be eliminated, but that “no plan shall be adopted which will lay the
Bureau open to a criticism not readily answerable.” Therefore, he asked that the
Supervising Inspector write up an appropriate agreement for the relationship with the
railroads so that it could be scrutinized for legality. 30 Keefe’s request proved warranted as
the Zarate and Avina agency soon brought legal action against the Bureau based on
Berkshire’s program.31
By early 1912, the U.S. Solicitor General expressed concern regarding Berkshire’s
plan because it only involved one industry, the railroads, while other businesses also
wanted to work as procurers of manual workers. Further, the Solicitor made an astute
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observation: “It would seem that the mere presence at a border port of entry of large
employers of labor or their agents, necessarily well known to laborers across the line in a
neighboring country, constituted of itself a tremendous inducement to immigration,
independently of any active solicitation on the other side.”32 After additional
correspondence among the Zarate and Avina agency’s lawyers, Commissioner Keefe,
Berkshire, and others, the Solicitor determined that the program as outlined by Berkshire
could not be justified. Ironically, the Solicitor suggested that “While the arrangement
proposed might not actually result in a violation of the contract labor law, strictly
construed, it would amount to such a violation to all intents and purposes so far as the spirit
and the intent of that law is concerned.” The Solicitor also expressed unease about the
possibility of favoritism in the appointment of a few businesses.33 Commissioner Keefe
soon issued an order for the El Paso office to discontinue all elements of the program as of
October 31, 1912.34 Realistically, Berkshire had attempted to manipulate labor agent
activity at the border by imposing conditions on the free-market system of the United
States. Moreover, the Supervising Inspector’s opinion regarding ethnic employment agents
appeared to have emanated from vague assumptions.
Berkshire’s belief that the enganchadores mistreated Mexican migrants seemed to
32
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originate from questionable conclusions regarding the businesses’ profits. He extrapolated
these views into policies that created a hostile relationship with the employment agencies.
As also discussed in Chapter 4, the Supervising Inspector exercised considerable authority
within the Bureau of Immigration and utilized this power to enhance immigration
regulations to insure that Mexican migrants remained available when needed, but never to
the point of remaining permanently in the United States. As a result of their control of
Mexican workers, the enganchadores threatened Berkshire’s authority which made the
labor agents into a target for him to destroy. The employment agencies undoubtedly
wrested funds from the Mexican migrant, but to view their actions as “abusive” seemed to
overstate the situation. The immigrant worker, fleeing a desperate situation in his
homeland and thrust into the United States with little knowledge of the language and
customs of the country, certainly appreciated assistance from a friendly face speaking in an
understandable tongue. The enganchadore also offered the migrant a more gainful
existence than the one they suffered under in Mexico. However, the laborers maintained
some control over the labor agents; one immigration inspector even suggested that the
workers only “used” the agent to obtain employment and secure passage to the United
States.35 As noted before, the workers often skipped positions to accept more lucrative
opportunities which sometimes prevented the labor agent from receiving a commission.36
Berkshire had unsuccessfully attempted to undermine the recruiters’ role with his special
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railroad project and in the process, created an antagonistic relationship between the
Immigration Service and the ethnic employment agencies.37
The Supervising Inspector’s belief that migrants tended to become public charges
demonstrated his opposition to those he considered ineligible for entrance into the nation.
In 1914, a series of letters between the Inspector in Charge at San Antonio, George G.
Pulsford, and Berkshire further demonstrated the Supervising Inspector’s attitude toward
Mexicanos, as well as his propensity to follow and even enhance immigration policies.
Pulsford called Berkshire’s attention to a situation in San Antonio in which many
Mexicanos had applied for humanitarian relief from the local government that now found
itself strapped beyond an ability to offer further assistance. The mayor and a county judge
asked Pulsford whether or not the Immigration Service could help and “take charge of the
refugees and furnish their maintenance.” Pulsford explained to the officials that such a
request remained outside of his official responsibilities, but he also asked for additional
information on the destitute persons. Apparently, Dr. Berry, the County Health Officer,
had few specific facts about the Mexicanos, basically only their names. Pulsford concluded
that “It appears to be simply a supposition of the part of the County Officials that these
persons have recently come from Mexico, and, in fact, Dr. Berry states that it will be
impossible to obtain evidence showing definitely that they have so come.” The Agent in
Gunther Peck further reviewed Berkshire’s actions in regard to ethnic agencies in El Paso; see
Reinventing Free Labor, 109-114. He commented: “[Ethnic agencies] varied by how well contract
labor laws were enforced, what kinds of agents sought to enforce them, and how effectively border
officials policed padrones or competed with them.” See page 113. Also, James R. Grossman, in
his discussion of the Great Migration of Blacks to the northern United States, reviewed the
disparagement of labor agents by White southerners; see Land of Hope: Chicago, Black
Southerners, and the Great Migration (The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 44-47.
37
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Charge continued, clearly considering the possibility of deportation, but noted that: “As
these people are scattered through a large and legitimate Mexican population, the
difficulties in making this examination would require the presence of more officers than are
at this station.”38 Berkshire soon responded to Pulsford’s request for counsel by
concentrating only on the possibility of expulsion. Completely ignoring Pulsford’s
inference that many of these Mexicanos could be legally in the country or even U.S.
citizens, Berkshire commented: “It is suggested that you formally request the
commissioners to cause aliens who apply for charity to be temporarily detained on some
pretext until you have had an opportunity to examine them . . . .”39 Berkshire had again
revealed his bias against Mexicanos, particularly those who could become public charges,
and saw the only solution as deportation, discounting any possibility that they held U.S.
citizenship.40 Many such examples exist within the Bureau’s files as the inspectors
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inventively applied the rules in the debarment of Mexican immigrants.
Due to the devastation of the Mexican Revolution, many poor migrants made their
way to the border in the hope of gaining admittance to the United States and for the
possibility of a job. The Immigration Service, in maintaining the Bureau’s directives
regarding the Mexican migrants, resorted to creative interpretations of the law and used any
violation as a pretext for denying admittance. Juan Cervantes crossed the border at Laredo,
Texas, on May 8, 1916, after traveling from Saltillo, Coahuila, with his wife, Rafaela, and
their four children, all six years of age and under. Apparently, just the appearance of a
Mexican laborer with five dependents caused the inspector to hold a Board of Inquiry
based on a Likely to Become a Public Charge possibility. During the hearing, Juan
indicated that he had received information concerning a job in Lytle, Texas, twenty-five
miles southwest of San Antonio, from his brother-in-law. Thus, he had violated the
Contract Labor Law, and the Board of Inquiry excluded him from entering the United
States. The board also banned his wife and four children under the Likely to Become a
Public Charge statute, the original reason for the inquiry.41 With the banning of Juan, his
family could not be admitted, all because he had inadvertently acknowledged knowing
about a specific job in the United States. Juan had ventured almost 200 miles to the United
States in the hope of obtaining employment—all for naught. Subsequently, the passage of

Berkshire’s planned arrangement with the railroads appears surprisingly similar to how the Bracero
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the Immigration Act of 1917 created an unambiguous situation concerning Mexican
migration, and thereafter, the Immigration Service would no longer have to resort to any
creative application of the law. The Immigration Act of 1917 contained unequivocal
language in regard to the ban on the contracting of foreign laborers, defining them as:
persons hereinafter called contract laborers, who have been induced, assisted,
encouraged, or solicited to migrate to this country by offers or promises of
employment, whether such offers or promises are true or false, or in consequence of
agreements, oral, written or printed, express or implied, to perform labor in this
country of any kind, skilled or unskilled; persons who have come in consequence of
advertisements for laborers printed, published, or distributed in a foreign country.42
The new wording, particularly in regard to advertising, included more specifics, and labor
agencies in cities such as San Antonio would have to devise creative ways to assist
migrants in crossing the border and locating employment. While the law from the 1880s
dealt primarily with European immigration and the steamships that transported them to the
United States,43 the new statute appeared to target land borders such as the southern
boundary of the United States. Now the ethnic-owned labor agencies along the Mexican
border, in addition to the adversarial nature of their relationship with immigration
inspectors, had to contend with a federal law that specifically outlawed many of the
common practices utilized in the recruiting of workers.
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Post Immigration Act of 1917 Labor Agencies
The Immigration Act of 1917 erected barriers that prevented uneducated and
impoverished Mexican laborers from entering the United States. In addition to the literacy
provision of the Act, a renewed emphasis on the restrictions imposed by the Contract Labor
Law and Likely to Become a Public Charge statute meant that entry had become
increasingly problematic. Also, an increased head tax and the need for a passport
complicated the possibility of crossing the border. During the late 1910s and the 1920s,
when immigration from Mexico became more challenging, Mexican workers frequently
ended up not crossing because of one of these restrictions. Some especially egregious
situations demonstrate the depth of the problem for the migrants.
During the Bracero Program, in mid-February, 1919, Francisco Garcia, thirty-threeyears-old and a literate farmer from Zaragoza, Coahuila, attempted to join his cousin,
Francisco Gonzalez, in Hondo, Texas, located forty miles west of San Antonio. Listed in
good health and possessing a Mexican passport, Garcia crossed the Rio Grande at Eagle
Pass with $6 in his pocket, had paid his own way, and planned to remain permanently in
the United States. He intended to work with his cousin who farmed near Hondo on
“halves” with John Griff, meaning that a fifty-fifty arrangement had been agreed upon with
the landowner who supplied credit and equipment in exchange for labor. In the course of
an investigation by the inspectors at the border, Garcia indicated that his cousin had written
him a single letter regarding the opportunity in Texas; an invitation that amounted to a
violation of the Contract Labor Law. Per the Board of Special Inquiry: “He has been
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solicited to migrate to this country by an offer of employment as a farm laborer . . . .”44
Similar exclusions exist within the Bureau of Immigration files pertaining to letters from
relatives in the United States who undoubtedly had no idea of the legal ramifications
involved in sending such correspondence. Ironically, throughout a brief period during and
after the Great War, migrants who utilized the Bracero Program experienced a temporary
respite from such restrictions.
The Bracero Program, the focus of Chapter 4, had negated most of the applicable
obstacles of the Immigration Act of 1917 in the spirit of a war emergency. From the
initiation of the program in May, 1917, until its demise in March, 1921, illiterate and
impoverished Mexican laborers could more easily traverse the border and obtain
employment in the United States. A lack of attention regarding labor agents within the
governmental files on the Bracero Program indicates that the agencies operated without a
great deal of notice during this 1917 to 1921 period. Since the stated impetus for the
Bracero Program involved support for the Great War effort, any additional methods by
which employers could obtain workers, such as those carried out by labor agencies, would
have been readily accepted. Nonetheless, in early 1918, the Mexican Department of the
Interior complained about the treatment of its workers at the hands of labor agents. The
protest involved information received from “reliable sources” concerning agents who lured
migrants to the border with promises of employment that could not be kept due to U.S.

44

Board of Special Inquiry, Immigration Service, Eagle Pass, Texas, February 13, 1919; El Paso
District Investigative Files, 1911-1919, Box 10, File 5020/197, Record Group 85, NA-FW.
Hereafter, this record group will be referred to as RG85, NA-FW to distinguish it from the federal
archive in Washington, D.C.

251

immigration laws.45 However, this claim led U.S. officials such as the Food Administrator,
Herbert Hoover, to request that all restrictions on Mexican labor be suspended.46 Hoover’s
correspondence demonstrated the U.S. Government’s lack of concern regarding the actions
of labor agents during the Great War period. As the Bracero Program became controversial
after the end of the war, and the restrictive nature of the Immigration Act of 1917 barred
many migrants, the workers found other methods for crossing the border.
After an inspection trip along the Texas border, Berkshire wrote to Commissioner
Caminetti on April 30, 1920. In complaining about a lack of personnel to police the border,
Berkshire contended that many migrants now crossed the border illegally, particularly in
the Laredo area. He believed that “there are 200 to 300 aliens illegally crossing the river in
the vicinity of that point daily” and the “entrants do not even attempt to conceal their
movements by crossing during the hours of darkness.” Berkshire related a specific story in
which he personally witnessed 21 migrants meet a truck, presumably headed for San
Antonio, after crossing the river to the U.S. side.47 Now the draconian policies of the U.S.
government and the strict implementation by the Immigration Service became problematic
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as migrants turned to crossing the border illegally and avoiding all of the pitfalls involved
in following documented procedures. After traveling to the border, in some cases for many
miles, the migrants often turned to ethnic labor agencies to finalize their passage.48

Figure 9: The Alamo City Employment Agency. Photo courtesy of: The Photography Collection,
Harry Ransom Center, The University of Texas at Austin.

The hand written English caption on the bottom of Figure 9 reads: “The C. Campa
Labor Agency & W.J. Lewis of the Alamo City Employment Agency, distributing bread
three times a day to Mexicans who are in distress waiting for a job.”49 Although the
precise purpose for the panoramic photograph taken on March 22, 1924, in San Antonio
cannot be determined, the content provides information regarding the various subjects.
Hugo L. Summerville took the photograph, but his negatives came into the possession of
Eugene O. Goldbeck, a more well-known San Antonio photographer. Linda Briscoe
48
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Myers, the archivist at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center in Austin, Texas,
which houses the photograph, indicated that photographers such as Summerville intended
to sell reprints to the subjects of the photograph. This information only adds to interest in
the picture as these immigrants probably would be unable to afford the photos, at least until
after they found employment. The most logical assumption involves the commissioning of
the photograph by the labor agencies for marketing purposes in appealing to potential
employers of the workers. This supposition emerges from the use of English in the
description since the workers spoke Spanish, but a U.S. employer would respond to an
English caption.
The Alamo City Employment Agency recruited the roughly 250 Mexican men in the
photograph, enganchados, to work in temporary agricultural positions or railroad jobs in
San Antonio and beyond.50 Although their attire could be construed as more than casual,
the state of their coats, pants, and shoes indicated their readiness to work. These laborers
comprised the anguished Mexicans from the photograph’s description. In addition to the
food, many hold a possibly complimentary La Nacional newspaper from Mexico; both
items intended to assist labor agents in maintaining a ready labor force. The migrants left
their families in Mexico and gravitated to the vibrant and growing mission city in search of
temporary employment along traditional migratory routes such as the Nuevo Leon corridor,
enhanced by the development of the railroad, which they also worked to build.51 The
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building in the photograph stood only one block from the I&GN Railroad station on the
West Side of San Antonio.
The only women in the photograph stand at the center behind the baskets of food and
appear to be in charge of the distribution. Aspiring agents, several men in coats and ties
without vests, remain just behind the front row, probably employed as runners or rustlers,
and possibly anticipating an opportunity to start their own agency. Ads published in La
Prensa (The Press), the Spanish language Alamo City daily, and the San Antonio City
Directory reveal the operation of at least twelve such labor agencies during early 1924;52
seasonal in their scope due to the nature of the employment, these employers regularly
relocated with the jobs and the workers. To the front in the photograph stand the recruiters
or “couplers,” who matched immigrant Mexicans with jobs in the United States. These
four agency owners remained apart from the rest in tie, vest, and suit. The recruiters
presumably stood in front of their own buildings, with “C. Campa” being the mustached
and slender man to the immediate right of the women.53 Cigar in hand, he appeared ready

in the newspaper.
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http://interactive.ancestry.com/2469/5074691?backurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ancestry.com%2fsea
rch%2fdb.aspx%3fdbid%3d2469%26path%3d&ssrc=&backlabel=ReturnBrowsing. Accessed May
15, 2015.
52

53

Audra Rice Allen, a descendant of Cesario Campa, identified his photograph to this writer during
an interview in San Antonio on March 22, 2014. His identity was also confirmed by an obituary
that included a photograph: “Death Takes Mobster Little Caesar,” San Antonio Light, November
15, 1963, page 19.

255

to seal another deal with a group of migrant Mexican workers, arrange for their passage, or
keep them in food and a newspaper until the next opportunity arose.
Although difficult to view in the panoramic photograph, the beginning of Cesario
Campa’s name may be seen in the lower right hand corner along with the address of his
agency, 1401 West Commerce, three blocks away from the Alamo City Agency at 111
North Frio Street. Campa’s name may also be observed on the storefront glass to the right
of the Alamo City Agency’s entrance; this lettering reads: Casa de Cambio Monterrey—
compro y vendo dinero Mexicano—vendemos giros para mexico—C. Campa (Home of the
Monterrey Exchange—buy and sell Mexican money—sell money orders to Mexico—C.
Campa). Campa not only ran a nearby labor agency, but also arranged for workers to
obtain the proper currency or send their pay home. The reference to Monterrey indicates
an immigrant connection, discussed in Chapter 2, between this establishment and the
nearest city of significant size south of the border. Born of Mexican parentage, Campa
represented a common characteristic amongst agency owners who utilized their heritage
and Spanish language communication skills to relate to the workforce.54 The photograph
affords a momentary glimpse into a world created by the economic desirability of a low
wage, reliable, and transient workforce whose readiness depended on their ability to
negotiate the crossing of the border by whatever means necessary. The U.S. Immigration
Service continually scrutinized recruiting activities such as those practiced by the Alamo
54
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City and C. Campa agencies. Mexican worker employment agencies flourished in San
Antonio by filling the labor need left by Anglos not interested in low-wage jobs, the Great
Migration that saw many African Americans leave the South, and a decrease in European
immigration. As the migrant connection from the Monterrey Center and use of the I&GN
expanded, the San Antonio labor agencies gravitated toward the railroad’s terminal on the
West Side of the city.
Although the two agencies in Figure 9 failed to publicize in La Prensa, they remained
similar to businesses that waged a running advertisement “battle” in the Spanish-language
newspaper’s want ads.55 Despite requesting large numbers of workers, which probably
amounted to a marketing ploy, economic conditions in Mexico did generate a significant
supply of workers.56 The building sign, Oficina de Enganches de Braceros Mexicanos
(Office of Mexican Bracero Workers), refers to the purpose of the agency: placing
Mexican immigrant workers. The further claim on the sign, Salidas para todas partes de
Estados Unidos (departures for all parts of the United States), apparently held true as other
La Prensa advertisements offered work throughout the Midwestern and Western United
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States.57 For instance, one regular advertisement during the summer of 1920 promoted an
Alaskan project for 200 workers.58 However, many other advertisements offered local
agricultural work such as the September, 1920, plea from the Garza Labor Agency: “Se
Necesitan Mil Pizcadores de Algodón” (Needed Thousand Cotton Pickers).59 In addition to
Campa’s currency exchange, another establishment in the far right of the photo, displayed
signs that advertised a barber shop, tailor, and bathrooms. The name of the business, La
Sultana del Norte (The Sultan of the North), a common reference to Monterrey, further
demonstrated a connection to the Monterrey Center. Cesario Campa, similarly to Ramon
Gonzalez, possessed many traits common to enganchadores including a Mexican heritage.
Campa, born in Mexico in 1884, married Antonia before the family migrated to the
United States in 1914 along with three children. He registered for the World War I draft in
1918 and indicated a position of “broker,” working for himself in San Antonio at 1326
West Commerce where he also lived. In 1918, the Campa family had four offspring
including Eva, Cesar, Mario, and Enriqueta, and by 1920, Campa still spoke only Spanish
and remained an alien, but the family had gained another child, Antonia. Now his
employment status indicated “proprietor” of an employment agency, at 1217 West
Houston, and he rented a home at 1221 West Houston, probably both in the same building
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and near the I&GN station.60 Campa continued various enterprises during the 1920s as
evidenced by his name on over forty deeds or deeds of trust in which he sold or purchased
property. He also began a new partnership in 1925 with M.A. de la Peña for the labor
agency at 1401 West Commerce Street. This new arrangement occurred after the taking of
the photograph in 1924 as Campa now required the need for a partner, probably because of
the fierce competition with other agents.61 Campa’s transition by 1930 reflected a lack of
immigrant labor to couple, due to the repatriation of Mexicans brought on by the Great
Depression, as well as restrictive emigrant agent laws that circumvented the
enganchadores’ activities. He reported himself as a bus line proprietor, but unemployed;
however, he now owned his home, valued at $1,000. The household size increased as his
oldest daughter, Eva, married another Mexican immigrant, Roberto Valencia, and they had
a son, Robert, Jr.; this extended family all lived at the same address. According to the U.S.
Census in 1930, everyone in the family spoke English, and all except Antonia, Cesario’s
spouse, and Roberto were citizens, but only Eva remained employed, as a seamstress in a
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garment factory.62
Campa’s obituary, published in 1963, provides evidence regarding his life after
leaving the labor agency business. Apparently a very dapper individual, the newspaper
article stated that “Campa, garbed nattily in a white suit with a red carnation in his
buttonhole was a familiar figure at West Side political events prior to World War II.”
Nonetheless, the headline demonstrated a disparaging of Campa by referring to him as the
“Mobster Little Caesar” even though nothing in the article indicated any connection with
organized crime or criminal activities. Perhaps the political leaning of the newspaper
resulted in this description as according to the narrative: “He organized Gran Club
Democratica and rallied a strong organization behind it.” His political activity apparently
came during the 1930s, but he ended up in jail for representing himself as a U.S. citizen.
The article suggested that the incarceration occurred due to political rivalries.63 During the
early twentieth century, besides Campa and the Alamo City Employment Agency in Figure
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9, many other such businesses existed near the I&GN terminal on the West Side of the city.
A storefront agency such as Campa’s proliferated throughout the near west
commercial side of San Antonio during the 1910s and 1920s.64 On Figure 10, the twelve
numbers designate the locations of labor agencies clustered around the I. & G.N. Depot
(A). These businesses represent those listed within the city directory for 1924 in addition
to any that advertised in La Prensa.65 Other related locations on the map include Milam
Square where some workers waited to be hired (B); the Mercado or Mexican market (C);
the Bexar County Jail (D); Sociedad de la Unión, the most prominent mutualista in the
vicinity (E); and hotels that advertised for families as well as single men at “comfortable”
prices (F).66 Additionally, numerous money exchange businesses occupied smaller
buildings near the labor agencies. For instance, an advertisement for Casa de Cambio
(Exchange House) at 214 N. Medina, directly across from the station, guaranteed the
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transfer of funds. As mentioned in Chapter 3, demand for workers occurred during specific
times of the year, especially throughout the spring agricultural season.

Figure 10: West Side of San Antonio Map, 1920s

Based on city directories, labor agencies on the West Side of San Antonio peaked in
1924 with nine listings, up from only one in 1919, and falling to zero by 1934.67 March,
1924, the date of the Alamo City Employment Agency photograph, represented an
important period for the twelve labor agencies on the map as many sugar companies
solicited for Mexican laborers to work in beet fields. A two-column display want ad from
67
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the Great Western Sugar Company in Denver, Colorado, repeated weekly in La Prensa
throughout the month. The advertisement committed to the payment of transportation to
and from locations in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, and Wyoming. Headlined “Se
Necesitan Trabajadores (Workers are needed),” the notice indicated that many Mexicans
had taken advantage of the opportunity—10,000 workers in the past year. Additionally, the
advertisement listed eight agencies to contact, including the Sunshine Labor Agency and
the Aldrete Employment Agency, both in San Antonio, as well as ones in Dallas, Denver,
El Paso, Fort Worth, Houston, and Laredo.68 Six of the agencies listed on Figure 10
regularly ran want ads for betabeleros (beet workers) during the month as the battle for
laborers in San Antonio continued; several of these agencies also mentioned Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio as possible destinations for jobs.69 Most of the agency
owners had ethnic names such as Toscano, Garza, and de la Peña, but the proprietor of the
San Antonio Labor Agency, Martin L. Osborn, identified himself in the advertisements as
El Colorado (red) which undoubtedly referred to his hair color and marriage to a Mexican
national.70 All of this activity in La Prensa further supports the marketing purpose of
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Figure 9. Those two businesses, the Alamo City Employment Agency and the C. Campa
Labor Agency, failed to utilize the print media, but apparently relied on the photograph to
entice potential employers during this important period. The two agencies may have
succeeded beyond their expectations as the location of the photograph, the 100 block of
North Frio Street in San Antonio, still serves today as a viable location for obtaining day
laborers.71 Evidenced by the amount of advertising and the employment of food,
newspapers, and free transportation as incentives, as well as using nearby stores as
attractions, competition among the various agencies remained fierce and resulted in a
regular turnover of the businesses.72
The owners of these agencies operated on a tight budget. La Prensa ads show the
enganchadores’ names changing at the same address from season to season. During the
period from 1919 to 1931, the San Antonio City Directory listed labor agencies at 28
different locations on the West Side of the city.73 Others pooled resources to survive. A
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lease signed in August, 1920, indicated that two regular advertisers, Martin L. Osborn and
C.G. Garza, combined in a building rental beginning in October that year for $1,400.74 In
another document from 1922, the same C.G. Garza sold all his interests in the Sunshine
Labor Agency to A.C. Lewis for $398.54. Therefore, Garza combined with two other
recruiters, but then sold out to the second, all in less than two years.75 Not all successful
recruiters came from a background common to the workers that they served as evidenced
by Roscoe C. Burbank.
Another photograph, Figure 11, provides an unfortunate characterization of the
workers. The handwritten information on the photograph describes the situation as:
“Shipment to Beet Fields in Colorado. Shipped by RC Burbank Labor Agency, 1308 W.
Commerce, San Antonio, Tex.”76 The writer, presumably Hugo L. Summerville, the
photographer who also took the Alamo City Employment Agency photograph, apparently
saw the laborers as a “shipment.” However, if the agency utilized this photograph as a
marketing piece, then the business owner approved of this caption.
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Figure 11: Shipment to Beet Fields in Colorado. Photo courtesy of: The Photography Collection,
Harry Ransom Center, The University of Texas at Austin.

Roscoe Burbank, a native of Laredo, Texas, born to U.S. citizens, owned the R.C.
Burbank Labor Agency. A former switchman on the Southern Pacific and brakeman on the
SAU&GE and I&GN railroads, these occupations, as well as his birthplace, possibly
assisted Burbank in dealing with Mexicanos despite his lack of a common heritage.
Burbank also lived in various locations on the West Side of the city and operated a labor
agency from 1921 to 1930.77 The panoramic photograph shows Mexican migrants down
both sides, and in the far right corner, the upper portion of the I&GN station can be seen.
Although undated, based on the address of the R.C. Burbank Labor Agency, the photo
probably appeared in 1921.78 Different from the Alamo City photograph, the roughly 300
77
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people in this one included many women and children since the workers would soon be
leaving the city. Because these laborers headed for the beet fields, where “solo” males
ordinarily ventured and regularly “skipped” their contracts, Burbank may have encouraged
the workers to include their families and avoid losing his commission.79 Never married and
a veteran of the Great War, Burbank apparently viewed his charges with some disdain as
evidenced by the caption on the photograph.80 By contrast, Cesario Campa could utilize
his Spanish language and common heritage in appealing to workers from Mexico.
Campa’s history is illustrative. Although his life experience produced notable gains
and exceeded those of the workers who kept him in business in the late 1910s and 1920s,
this profession failed to provide him with significant wealth, but did afford him the
opportunity to establish his family in the United States and achieve some prominence in his
community. El Paso’s Ramon Gonzalez and San Antonio’s Cesario Campa shared many
similar characteristics and experiences. Moreover, their professional lives as
enganchadores demonstrate the significance of the Mexican migrant corridors to the
respective cities. Despite the disparity in incomes between enganchadores and
enganchados, the workers appreciated the efforts of the agents in securing their passage to
the United States and the acquiring of employment. As Mexican immigration via the
Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2011.
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I&GN developed due to the proliferation of ethnic labor agents, the area around the railroad
station experienced expanded activity.
Due to the labor agencies, currency exchanges, inexpensive hotels, and other related
businesses, the vicinity adjacent to the I&GN witnessed increased foot traffic. Ethnic
employment agents and their clientele added significantly to the visibility of Mexicanos on
the streets of San Antonio. Figures 8 and 10, although photographed exclusively on the
near West Side of the city, demonstrate the remarkable achievement by the agencies in
attracting workers, but not only Mexicanos passed through the areas around the I&GN
terminal. Alamo City Anglos undoubtedly witnessed these events or viewed the
photographic marketing which added to their already established fears concerning the
increase of Mexican immigration to the city discussed in Chapter 1. Based on Berkshire’s
description regarding the many undocumented Mexicans entering the United States, the
success of the labor agencies probably heightened the concern of some Anglos in San
Antonio. As a result of these observations, the degradation and stereotyping of Mexicanos
as poor immigrants continued and expanded. Moreover, the ultimate demise of the ethnic
labor agencies came at the hands of legal authorities who believed the padrones abused
their relationship with the workers, but in reality, perhaps the downfall also occurred
because the agents enjoyed a degree of success.
Legal Demise
Nativism expanded throughout the United States during the 1920s, a decade that
historian John Higham referred to as the “Tribal Twenties.” Higham discussed the rise of
the Ku Klux Klan during the late 1910s and early 1920s as the nativist organization spread
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across the entire nation, including Texas.81 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the KKK enjoyed
considerable political power in Texas during the early 1920s by electing a majority of the
members serving in the 38th Legislature and gaining as many as 170,000 paid subscribers
by 1924.82 Also on a national level, the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924
epitomized nativism by restricting immigration from specific areas of Europe and Asia.
Although the Act only limited Eastern Hemisphere immigration, the rejuvenation of the
Immigration Act of 1917 after the demise of the First Bracero Program and the beginnings
of the Border Patrol in 1924 negatively impacted the ability of Mexican migrants to
traverse the border in search of employment.83 The Bracero Program, the primary focus of
Chapter 4, became a catalyst for Mexican workers to locate throughout portions of the
United States unaccustomed to their presence. Not surprisingly during this nativist period,
the state of Texas also took bureaucratic actions and passed laws that restricted the
activities of ethnic employment agencies.
The Texas Bureau of Labor Statistics (TBLS) became an important bureaucratic
entity in implementing laws for the purpose of corralling, and eventually eliminating, the
81

John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925, (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, [1955] 2nd ed., 2002), 264-299.
82

Charles C. Alexander, Crusade for Conformity: The KKK in Texas, 1920-1930 (Houston: Texas
Gulf Historical Association, 1962), 43, 57.
83

Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton
University Press, 2004), 7-9, 19-20, 58-71. Ngai also argued that during the 1920s, persons of
Mexican heritage born in the United States became known as “alien citizens” who could not shed
their racial background even with U.S. citizenship. Although the Immigration Service maintained
mounted agents who patrolled the boundary, the actual U.S. Border Patrol did not begin until 1924.
Kelly Lytle Hernández argued that the Border Patrol “Mexicanized” the concept of illegal
immigration. See Migra! A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2010), 1-14.

269

ethnic labor agencies. Begun in 1909 by the Texas State Legislature, the governor
appointed a TBLS Commissioner for a two-year term that began on February 1 in every
odd-numbered year. The commissioner oversaw “the collection, preservation and
dissemination of labor statistics in Texas, and declaring an emergency” should a labor
shortage in critical areas persist.84 Several years later, in 1915, the Texas legislature
expanded the reach of the TBLS to include the regulating and licensing of private
employment agencies. The new law also mandated the payment of a $25 license fee and
the acquiring of a $500 bond for operating a labor agency that charged for its services.
Record keeping requirements included maintaining the personal information of each
applicant as well as the potential employer. Further, a charge of no more than $2 could be
levied upon the applicant and that the fee had to be refunded if the labor agent had not
secured employment for the candidate within 30 days. Various other penalties, fines, and
definitions rounded out the law which took effect on June 22, 1915.85 At this conjuncture,
while the laws certainly curtailed the activities of employment agencies in general, the
statutes did not target ethnic-owned businesses.
However, the language in the Fourth Biennial Report, 1915-1916, of the TBLS,
admonished the public regarding the use of non-citizens for public-works projects and
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designated Mexican migrants as the primary problem. Citing similar laws in Arizona and
California, C.W. Woodman, the Commissioner of Labor, stated:
It is badly needed in Texas because of the steady stream of Mexicans across the
border, a class of labor that will work for a wage and work under conditions
intolerable to an American citizen. In many occupations in Texas, Mexicans have
supplanted both white and negro [sic] labor. This condition must be remedied, else
each year will find more and more of our citizens thrown out of employment.86
The report also singled out a practice allegedly committed by labor agents who dealt with
farm employees. Since ethnic agencies usually placed agricultural laborers, the account
undoubtedly referred to them. Referred to as “man-catching,” the scheme involved agents
who transported up to one-hundred men to distant work areas and then “peddled” them to
the farmers. Both the workers and the employers paid for this “service,” and the agents
sometimes re-sold the workers to another farmer at a higher price. Foreshadowing the
direction that Texas would take in the future, the report indicated that if the state could
institute a free employment agency, it would “break up this abominable practice.”87
Commissioner Woodman decried both the activities of Mexican laborers and ethnic
employment agents within the first pages of his report. Particularly regarding the workers,
the Commissioner failed to consider the possibility that some “Mexicans” held U.S.
citizenship or had been legally admitted to the country for the purpose of securing such
employment. For instance, according to information from 1915 to 1925 concerning the San
Antonio mutualista Sociedad de la Unión, 45.5 percent of the applicants who self-identified
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as “laborers,” also indicated Texas as their place of birth.88 Based on the Biennial Report,
Woodman saw the adoption of free employment bureaus by the state of Texas as a panacea:
“We believe the securing of employment should be free.”89 The TBLS Commissioners, as
appointees of the Texas governor, most likely catered to Anglo public opinion in their
directives to enhance the popularity of their respective administration. With the adoption
of additional statutes, ethnic employment agencies became a more specific target.
In late 1917, the Texas legislature passed an “Emigrant Agent” law designed to
restrict the activities of agencies that placed workers outside of the state. The statute
required the agents to apply for permission to conduct such activities and provide
“affidavits of at least three credible men that the applicant is to [sic] good moral character,”
and added that the commissioner could also require “additional evidence of the moral
character of the applicant.” A $50 fee and $500 bond also applied for each county in which
the agent planned to solicit potential employees. The record-keeping requirements
remained, including the $2 limit on fees and 30-day refund. The lawmakers suspended
provisions regarding the public reading of the bill due to the emergency situation that arose
from the “great abuse and many injustices” perpetrated by emigrant agents and because no
“adequate laws” to curtail these evils existed in Texas.90 Since the local English
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newspapers, the Express and the Light, did not advertise out-of-state opportunities, this law
appeared to be aimed at the ethnic agents who sent workers outside of Texas. Shortly
thereafter, the campaign to eliminate ethnic labor agents continued.
The new TBLS commissioner, T.C. Jennings, an appointee of Governor William P.
Hobby, wrote on employment agencies in the 1917-1918 Biennial Report. He indicated
that the number of licensed agencies in the state had increased from 45 on September 1,
1917, to 56 on the same date in 1918. However, during the two-year period of his report,
permits had expired for another 44; this attrition demonstrated the regular coming and
going of such businesses. Jennings utilized three categories of workers—white, “negro,”
and “Mexican”— lumping all persons of Mexican heritage into one category. Since most
employment went to workers that Jennings designated as “Mexican”—almost 74 percent—
it can be assumed that a majority of the now defunct agencies had hired Mexicano laborers.
Jennings noted regarding the high numbers of Mexican applicants: “There is a greater
tendency among Mexicans to roam than whites or negroes, [sic] and he is of a more
credulous nature and falls more readily into the meshes of the recruiting agent.” The
Commissioner specified that, based on mandatory reports from the businesses, the average
figure of 89 cents per worker provided to the agent for registering did not account for all
costs, as the employer paid a fee to the agent, and often, “the laborer was charged more
than was shown in the reports.” Moreover, Jennings believed that as many as 150,000
workers had been shipped out of Texas during the past two years.91 Jennings’ fears also
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surfaced in correspondence with federal authorities during the Bracero Program.
The Commissioner communicated with the Department of Labor in a letter, described
in Chapter 4, that decried the supposed need for additional workers during the summer of
1918. The letter expressed concern regarding the entrance of too many Mexican migrants
and the introduction of “cheap alien labor.” He further wrote that “strict measures should
be maintained whereby a check can be kept on all who are admitted in order that the
government will be in a position to return them to their own country after the war when
they are no longer needed here.” In addition, the Commissioner expressed his support for
the United States Employment Service (USES), a division of the Department of Labor also
reviewed in Chapter 4, and asserted that “with a proper distribution of the labor now
engaged in nonessential industries, [the USES] will meet the demands for farm and other
essential labor, with the importation of a comparatively small number of Mexicans.”92
Jennings maintained a critical view of Mexican immigration, but harbored an even more
disparaging opinion of the labor agencies, businesses dominated by persons of Mexican
heritage.93
Commissioner Jennings indicated that dealing with private labor agencies occupied
more of the Bureau’s time than any other legal issue. He argued that all such statutes
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should be repealed and two new ones instituted. First, he supported a ban on the collection
of any fee for providing jobs to workers, and second, that a State Free Employment Bureau
(SFEB) should be created. The Commissioner contended that the SFEB would be most
effective by cooperating with the USES. Since the USES had worked with the Bureau of
Immigration on the implementation of the Bracero Program, a free service to employers,
Jennings believed that a similar arrangement could be continued in the post-war period.94
Although the previous commissioner, C.W. Woodman, had recommended state agencies,
Jennings, previously a deputy under Woodman, became a more vocal supporter of this
idea. Proposals for state agencies grew to be popular in the United States during the war,
paralleling the activities of the USES. Historian William J. Breen described the situation
before the war as “characterized by considerable unemployment and irregularity of
employment” which mostly involved “unskilled or semiskilled workers.” Breen noted that
despite efforts by a few individual states, fee-based private agencies remained the norm as
the federal government stayed out of any attempts to manage the labor market. However,
due to needs associated with the Great War, the USES provided an apparatus for obtaining
workers in various industries.95 So too, Commissioner Jennings planned to create a state
employment bureau that did not charge for its services, more effectively administered the
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labor market, and eliminated the ethnic labor agencies that he so despised.96 Just as the
federal government had operated as a padrone during the Great War in conjunction with the
Bracero Program, the state of Texas now conspired to create a similar operation. As postwar nativism became more common, Jennings obtained an appointment from Governor
Hobby for a second term as Commissioner for the 1919 to 1920 period.
By the time of the Sixth Biennial Report, covering 1919 to 1920, Commissioner
Jennings claimed that “The demand for common or unskilled labor has been so great, and
the profits so large to the crooked man-catchers, that they do not hesitate to engage in the
business illegally.” After describing some of the allegedly despicable acts, he continued:
“This kind of graft is not confined to unlicensed man-catchers, but is practiced by many
licensed agencies as well.” Jennings argued that numerous migrants secretly crossed the
river, as many as 150,000 in the past year, and that labor agents then convinced the
migrants to accept their assistance for a two to five dollar fee. Next, another agent took
control of the workers in San Antonio for an additional charge. The employment
companies then shipped most of the aliens out of the state except during the cotton-picking
season. Further, Jennings claimed: “Owing to the fact that practically all of the labor
handled by these crooked agents is low grade common labor, the kind most commonly used
in farm work and on railroad track repair, the farmers and railroads are the chief sufferers
96

Another historian has written about the development of the state employment service in Texas.
However, his perspective remained solely in support of the actions by the state as negative
comments regarding the ethnic employment agencies were taken at face value and primarily based
on reports by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See: Coalson, The Development of the Migratory
Farm Labor System in Texas, 46-55. Whereas, historian Neil Foley characterized the situation as
racial since farmers desired inexpensive labor, but “were sensitive to charges that they were
sacrificing the whiteness of America for higher profits.” See The White Scourge, 53.

276

from their grating methods.”97 Maintaining that the agency’s reports did not reflect
accurate totals, Jennings still listed the numbers as indicated in Table 12.
Table 12: Private Employment Agency Records

Fiscal
Total
Year applications
Ending
8/31/19
Ending
8/31/20

44,338
121,127

Hired by race and percent
to total
White
Black Mexican
4845
11.3%
12,785
11.3%

451
1.0%
2,480
2.2%

37,632
87.7%
98,030
86.5%

Total
hired

Total fees

Fee per
position

42,928

$32,579

$0.76

113,295

$135,169

$1.19

Source: Sixth Biennial Report, Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Texas (Austin: Von
Boeckmann-Jones Co., 1921), 18.

The high percentage of Mexicans utilizing the agencies as indicated in Table 12
signifies the importance and proliferation of ethnic recruiters. As previously mentioned,
Jennings asserted that agencies over-charged workers and doctored their records.
However, by multiplying the “fee per position” by three times, a considerable increase that
allows for Jennings’ contentions, the probable charges of $2.28 to $3.57 per worker do not
seem out of line. Many Mexican immigrant workers probably gladly paid the fees for more
lucrative jobs in the United States, particularly when a person of Mexican heritage assisted
with their passage and employment. Further, given the strong chain of information going
back to Mexico concerning the availability of employment in the United States, the almost
tripling of applications and hiring between 1919 and 1920 suggests that Jennings’ claims of
worker abuse were overstated. These laborers apparently remained content with the
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situation, and the fees charged, to the point of greatly increasing their participation. This
approval may be further observed in an increase in the number of “emigrant” labor
agencies in Texas, those that sent applicants out of state, from 25 at the end of 1919 to 45
by the close of 1920.98
Because the scope of the Bracero Program became more limited after the war ended
in 1918 and the restrictive nature of the Immigration Act of 1917 returned, the possibility
of poor and illiterate Mexicans entering the United States on a legal basis dwindled.
Therefore, as the Bracero Program wound down, undocumented migration proliferated, and
many of the workers included in the Table 12 undoubtedly crossed the border
surreptitiously.99 Additionally, the increase in labor agencies during this period when the
Bracero Program waned resulted from a renewed dependence on recruiters. Despite
Jennings’ claims to the contrary, the ethnic labor agencies remained popular amongst
Mexican migrants and the farmers who sought to employ them.
Commissioner Jennings also mentioned in his report that he received assistance in
dealing with enganchadores from the Texas Rangers and federal immigration officers, but
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Many sources have discussed the number of undocumented Mexican migrants entering the
United States during this period. From sociologist Manuel Gamio to the present, various methods
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that county officials declined to become involved in any restriction of the labor agents.100
While the Texas Rangers’ reputation for dealing harshly with Mexicanos has been
documented by other historians,101 this chapter also demonstrates the negative views of the
Immigration Service concerning ethnic employment agencies. The county officials, those
closest to the farming communities and elected by the farmers, apparently did not believe
that the actions of the labor agents amounted to a problem.102 During the Bracero Program
when Jennings made these claims regarding employment businesses, letters to the Bureau
of Immigration from farmers did not complain about the agents. Instead, they continually
demanded more workers. It appears that the private labor agency “system” worked for
both the laborers and their farmer employers.103 Undoubtedly, abuses sometimes occurred
as a result of actions taken by the agents, the farmers, and the laborers. However, Jennings
appeared intent on adopting a state-controlled arrangement based on anecdotal information
concerning mistreatment, in addition to rough estimates regarding undocumented
immigration.
Jennings seemed primarily interested in assisting farmers and increasing production
100
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with “a uniform distribution of labor.” The Commissioner once more “recommended that
the present system of fee-charging agencies be abolished” . . . and “that a law be enacted
authorizing the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to establish free
employment bureaus in principal labor centers in the State.”104 As Governor Pat M. Neff
took office in 1921 as a reformer and prohibitionist, a new commissioner, Joseph S. Myers,
assumed office after Jennings had completed two terms under Governor Hobby. Also, an
anti-immigrant group gained control of the state legislature during Neff’s second two years
in office.
Convened in January, 1923, the 38th Texas State Legislature contained a majority of
lawmakers who identified with the Ku Klux Klan. Considered a high point in the
organization’s power within the state government, the KKK undoubtedly influenced the
passage of legislation.105 Additionally, Governor Neff’s apparent unwillingness to speak
out against the group may have also contributed to some of the Klan’s legislative
activities.106 In February, 1923, the Texas legislature made operating a labor agency in
Texas almost impossible for Mexican-born residents. A law passed on February 28
included a tripling of the license fee per county to $150 and an increase by ten times of the
required bond to $5,000. Another portion of the statute designated the TBLS
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Commissioner as the adjudicator of all issues regarding the employment companies. Most
importantly, the “morality clauses” of the new legislation required the prospective agent to
obtain five statements testifying to their good character from U.S. citizens who had resided
in the respective county of operation for three years and also attest “that the applicant is or
are citizens of the United States of America.”107 Although many persons of Mexican
ancestry held U.S. citizenship, others, including labor agents such as Cesario Campa, did
not. This stipulation may have encouraged Campa to begin naturalization procedures as he
completed a Declaration of Intention on May 2, 1923.108 TBLS Commissioner Joseph
Myers had only briefly mentioned support for state agencies in the Seventh Biennial
Report, for 1921-1922.109 However, assisted by the legislation passed in early 1923, Myers
launched the free employment bureau in his subsequent term.
Beginning in June, 1923, the State Free Employment Bureau (SFEB) opened offices
first in San Antonio, and then in Waco, Ft. Worth, Dallas, Amarillo, and El Paso. These
bureaus became fully operational in the fall of 1923, and in spring, 1924, the San Antonio
office recruited laborers “for clearing land, chopping cotton and other farm work.”

General Laws of the State of Texas, Thirty-eighth Legislature Regular Session, “H.B. No. 13:
Employment Agents—Authorizing the Regulation and Enforcement of,” (Austin: A.C. Baldwin &
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107

108

Declarations of Intention for Citizenship and Petitions for Naturalization 1915-1925, Series from
Record Group 21: Records of District Courts of the United States, 1685 - 2004, National Archives,
Fort Worth, Texas. No evidence can be found that indicates Campa completed a Petition of
Naturalization. Campa also attempted to join Sociedad de la Unión in October, 1923, but for
unknown reasons, he was rejected. See: Libro de Actas, 1922-1926, October 29, 1923, page 251.
Libro de Actas, 1922-1926, November 5, 1923, page 253.
109

Seventh Biennial Report, Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Texas (Austin: Von
Boeckmann-Jones Co., 1923), 11-12.

281

Laborers hired in the lower Rio Grande Valley contributed to the seasonal cotton picking
and then traveled to the “central and northern parts of the State.”110 In other words, as
described in Chapter 3, the state’s program mirrored the efforts ordinarily accomplished by
the migrants, agents, and farmers.
About the same time, the Bureau began what could be described as a harassment
campaign against ethnic labor agents. For instance, the San Antonio Express reported that
the C. Campa Agency failed to provide a receipt to a laborer who had paid a $2 application
fee. After a jury trial, a local judge fined Campa $50 plus costs in ruling against the
agency.111 Additionally, the Texas legislature passed a statute that further exacerbated the
ability of Mexicanos to operate a labor agency in the state.
Subsequently, Commissioner Myers took action against Campa by charging him with
not paying some of the required fees and for illegally operating an emigrant employment
agency in the state given his Mexican citizenship. According to a newspaper article, the
complaint arose from allegations that Campa, and other San Antonio agents, had sent
workers to Ft. Worth who became unemployed and stranded some distance from their
homes.112 Campa sought handling of the case in federal court due to his Mexican
citizenship and argued that he had only operated a car service rather than a labor agency.
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Newspapers in Texas described the legal action as a test of the new labor agency law.113
However, because Campa persisted in operating an agency and the Texas law continued to
stand, nothing meaningful came of the case, probably because of his “only a car service”
defense.114 Nonetheless, this event and the previous one concerning the lack of a receipt
demonstrated the harassment that ethnic labor agents began to experience. Several
employment agents soon pushed back against actions by the state of Texas.
During the summer of 1924, seven San Antonio labor agencies, including the one
operated by Cesario Campa, brought suit against the state regarding the SFEB operated by
M.A. Dominguez and A.L. Garrett in the Alamo City. The legal action alleged two issues:
first, that an employee of the State Labor Commission whose job description involved the
gathering and distributing of labor statistics had no authority to operate a labor agency, and
second, that the plaintiffs paid a license fee and other related taxes that the state-operated
business had not been charged.115 Judge Ben M. Terrell of Ft. Worth’s Tarrant County,
“dismissed the application and commended the work of the Bureau as an important and
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beneficial public service.”116 Such favorable legal decisions certainly assisted Myers in
expanding the employment bureaus. Moreover, citing many positive reports from around
the state, Commissioner Myers recommended the continuation of the state free agencies.
In discussing the work of the state offices, Myers concluded: “It will be noted that the
work has been confined exclusively to the recruiting and distribution of farm labor. The
very nature of the work renders it impossible for the private employment agencies, with
their necessarily limited field of operations, to render effective and economical service.”117
This disingenuous comment ignored the previous successes of the ethnic employment
agencies in placing workers around the state as well as the nation. With a change in the
governorship to Miriam A. Ferguson in 1925, a new commissioner, E.J. Crocker, continued
the SFEB into the next biennial period of 1925 and 1926.
E.J. Crocker became the new head of the TBLS in 1925 and continued the SFEB, but
with a new collaboration. In a letter to Ferguson, Crocker commented:
I take pride in reporting the work of the State Free Employment Offices. In
connection with the same the Commissioner early in his administration found it
advisable that the State Free Employment Service co-operate with the Federal
Employment Service and the various Chambers of Commerce throughout the State, to
the end that there be no duplication of effort or overlapping of purpose. This has
been successful beyond the wildest dreams of the Commissioner, so startling that I
think it will be well to attach a full report of its activities, the difficulties encountered
and the obstacles overcome.118
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Realizing that an overlap existed between the USES and the SFEB, Crocker took steps to
combine their efforts. The Farm Placement Service of the USES had existed since 1918,119
but now occupied a role alongside the SFEB. Crocker contended that the new law had
reduced the functions of private labor agencies by about 50 percent and that he would
prefer to see them totally eliminated. By 1929, the Texas legislature confirmed the
downfall of the agencies by changing the Emigrant Agent Law to include a $5,000
licensing fee to the state and a $2,500 charge for every respective county. Further, each
prospective employee had to be bonded by a county judge before their removal from Texas.
Because Texas needed the workers within the confines of the state, such provisions were
viewed as a necessity.120 Between the exorbitant fees and the exaggerated bonding
requirement, ethnic agents could no longer remain in business. However, a sugar beet
company in Michigan successfully went to federal court to restrain the legislation.121
Although the legislature subsequently passed less draconian measures,122 the inevitable
demise of the businesses came for the C. Campa Agency around 1928 and for Roscoe
Burbank’s by 1930. During the fiscal year ending on August 31, 1930, only two San
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Antonio agencies managed to obtain an emigrant license, and they shipped a mere 373
workers out of the state.123
Beginning with actions by the Immigration Service during the period before the Great
War, labor agents found themselves increasingly restricted in their mission to obtain
Mexican workers. Although barred from taking actions that would have controlled the
agencies at the border, Berkshire’s inspectors continually harassed labor agents with rules
that affected their ability to bring workers to the United States. The Bracero Program,
thoroughly reviewed in Chapter 4, prevented several of the restrictive provisions of the
Immigration Act of 1917 from being implemented. However, as the restraints resumed
after the war, many illiterate and poor immigrants crossed the border without inspection.
Undocumented Mexican migrants, those who traversed the border legally, and U.S. citizens
of Mexican heritage continued to fill agricultural-worker needs throughout the state.
Illiterate and economically-deprived Mexican workers had accepted manual labor jobs in
agriculture before the Immigration Act of 1917 without difficulty, but now labor agencies
assisted with their passage and coupled them with employers. Motivated by the nativist
ideas discussed in Chapter 4, the state of Texas took legislative and bureaucratic action to
lessen the hold that labor agents maintained on immigrant workers. By continually
restricting the recruiters through increased fees and stringent rules over the course of fifteen
123
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years, the state prevailed by 1930. Citing economic abuse of the workers as the primary
reason for diminishing the employment agents’ role, the state also expressed concern over
the distribution of labor and the farmers’ prosperity, both seemingly threatened,
respectively, by the ethnic agency’s practices and fees.124
In the wake of the ethnic labor agencies’ demise, farmers had experienced an
exchange in costs. Agriculturalists could no longer flood the market with a surplus of labor
and had to pay higher wages, but conversely, they avoided costs associated with the
employment businesses. Laborers now escaped fees connected with employment, but had
to deal with a state agency which could prove problematic for undocumented aliens. If
U.S. citizens, the workers likely gained by not having to pay for employment. However,
because of being lumped together with immigrants as “Mexicans,” they undoubtedly
resented dealing with Anglos who regularly stereotyped them.125 The state had achieved
precisely what it desired: free employment agencies at the expense of the ethnic labor
businesses. Mexicano workers, who previously could more readily skip contracts for a
more favorable situation with another employer, could no longer operate in this manner as
the state of Texas more directly controlled their employment. Several commissioners of
the TBLS, beginning during the mid to late 1910s, had called for an end to the recruiters.
By eliminating the ethnic labor agencies, Texas now operated as a padrone over the state’s
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agricultural workforce, which remained primarily Mexicano.
The state of Texas also institutionalized the concept of “disposable labor,” discussed
throughout this dissertation. In 1931, Ernesto Galarza, the “John Higham” of Mexican
immigration, wrote: “When Congress threatens to restrict immigration from the southern
republic, those who employ him long and cheaply jump to his defence[sic]. He is pictured
as persona absolutamente grata.” With the end of the ethnic employment agents, Texas
had assumed the enganchadores’ role in obtaining workers for farmers throughout the state.
That this amounted to an improvement for the Mexican labor force can be questioned since
now the worker had become obligated to a new padrone. Disposable labor or the concept
that Mexican workers, in the eyes of the farmer, remained a commodity that could come
and go as needed, still persisted in the southwest. Galarza concluded with an anecdote
about an employer who spoke to a young Mexican laborer: “When we want you, we’ll call
you; when we don’t—git.”126
Historian Emilio Zamora characterized the actions taken by the TBLS during the
1910s and 1920s as an attempt to “immobilize” Mexican labor. He asserted that
organizations such as the Texas State Federation of Labor (TSFL), an affiliate of the AFL,
feared competition from Mexican laborers and preferred that the workers remain in the
fields rather than the increasingly industrialized cities. Anglo workers had deserted manual
agricultural employment and now sought jobs in industry which the TSFL believed could
be threatened by inexpensive alien labor. Citing Commissioner T.C. Jennings former
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position as the president of the TSFL, Zamora demonstrated that the state cooperated with
the labor union in securing this immobilization of agricultural Mexican workers.127
Beginning with a general discussion about the AFL, the next chapter establishes the
union’s attitude toward immigrant labor. AFL President Samuel Gompers made public
statements in support of the Mexican Revolution and its commitment to improvements for
labor, as well as being the driving force in the creation of the Pan American Federation of
Labor (PAFL), a group devoted to Western Hemispheric workers’ rights. However, while
he continued his PAFL affiliation until his death in 1924, Gompers adamantly refused to
endorse Mexican immigration that emanated from the Revolution.128 This apparent
dualism in Gompers’ thinking will be explored in the following chapter. The voluminous
correspondence of Clemente Idar, the primary focus of Chapter 6 and a Spanish-speaking
labor organizer for the AFL in south Texas, will be used to evaluate how persons of
Mexican ancestry born in Texas dealt with the increasing immigration from Mexico.
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CHAPTER 6
AFL ORGANIZER CLEMENTE IDAR AND MEXICAN
IMMIGRANT NATURALIZATION
In several popular U.S. novels, Anglo protagonists such as Atticus Finch, Lieutenant
Dunbar, and Skeeter Phelan save minorities from various difficulties that occur due to
racial or ethnic strife.1 Without these courageous individuals, the non-white people in the
novel would surely flounder and suffer. These characterizations may be described as
disingenuous, reflections of an Anglo populace rationalizing centuries of poor relationships
with subaltern peoples. In early twentieth-century south Texas, Anglos with similar
positive aspirations proved to be few and far between. Nonetheless, Mexicanos possessed
agency as typified by Tejanos such as Clemente Idar. A complex individual, Idar struggled
with his heritage because of the significant influx of laborers from Mexico during the
period.2 Although sometimes reluctant in his support of Mexican immigrants, Idar
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continued to assist U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage, as well as those who emigrated from
Mexico, despite the convictions of his employer, the American Federation of Labor (AFL).
He succeeded beyond his expectations by contributing to the beginnings of Mexicano
acceptance in U.S. society.
This chapter covers two topics: the American Federation of Labor, particularly its
General Organizer Clemente Idar, and the naturalization of Mexican immigrants. The
discussion regarding the AFL begins by demonstrating how President Gompers became
interested in recruiting U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage to be members, in addition to the
union’s inauguration of an organization committed to assisting labor organizations in Latin
America. Frank Morrison, Gompers’ long-time secretary, became the contact connecting
the union and organizers such as Idar, and, therefore, provided an important link between
the field and the main office in Washington D.C. However, the most important individual
within this chapter remains Texas-born3 Clemente Idar who became one of the few
Spanish-speaking organizers with the AFL at an opportune time for both the union and the
Tejano. He occupied a unique position that enabled him to alter the face of the AFL and by
doing so, assisted in the uplift of Mexicanos in the United States, both U.S. citizens and
immigrants. However, one of Idar’s goals, the naturalization of Mexican immigrant
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workers, proved futile despite his successful efforts in organizing both U.S - and Mexicanborn workers. Mexican immigrants resisted the acquiring of U.S. citizenship due to their
poor treatment by Anglos as well as their desire to maintain a meaningful connection with
their homeland.
Many historians have described Gompers’ role in immigration restriction and
discussed his long-held antipathy toward foreign labor. Gompers argued that immigrant
laborers took jobs away from “American” workers by accepting employment at lower
wages. Further, Gompers remained a racist who believed in pseudoscientific theories such
as eugenics that claimed the United States had moved toward genocide by diluting the
nation’s gene pool by accepting immigrants from less desirable places.4 However, at the
same time that Gompers worked to prevent immigration from Mexico, he also formed and
led the Pan American Federation of Labor (PAFL) until his death in 1924.5 The other key
member of the AFL hierarchy at this time, Secretary Frank Morrison, followed through on
implementing Gompers’ directives and “stood for moderation and cooperation with the
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government as well as pure-and-simple unionism.”6 As the primary conduit to field
organizers, Morrison’s role in communicating with Clemente Idar offers insight into the
development of the Tejano’s ideas on Mexican immigrants. Moreover, due to his ability in
connecting with Mexicano workers in the United States, Idar proved to be a man in high
demand as an organizer with the AFL.
Idar’s communication talents as a Spanish-speaking labor organizer drew requests
from throughout the United States for assistance. Born in 1893 and living in a modest
house at 219 Keller Street in San Antonio with his wife, Laura, the couple raised six
children.7 From this home just to the east of the lowest income area of the West Side of the
city, Idar corresponded with AFL union locals from around the nation who requested his
assistance in translating bylaws and correspondence. In one letter to the Tucson Building
Trades Council, Idar indicated that he had requests for his services from “four national
conventions and two conferences in different parts of the United States” as unions
attempted to appeal to Spanish-speaking workers and their respective mutualista
organizations.8 Clearly, unions in the United States had begun to recognize the value of
increasing their membership rolls by tapping into the potential offered by U.S. citizens of
Samuel Mitrani, “Morrison, Frank (1859-1949) American Federation of Labor,” in Encyclopedia
of U.S. Labor and Working-Class History, Volume 2, edited by Eric Arnesen (New York:
Routledge, 2007), 925-926.
6
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AFL General Organizer Clemente Idar to E.H. Sisterson of the Building Trades Council in
Tucson, letter dated April 23, 1921, in Box 2, Folder 13, Clemente N. Idar Papers, 1875-1938,
Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas, 1 University Station, Austin,
TX (Hereafter referred to as “NLBA”). Another request came directly from Gompers to Idar in a
letter dated July 25, 1921, on behalf of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners; See Box
3, Folder 9, Clemente N. Idar Papers, 1875-1938, NLBA.

293

Mexican heritage. At the same time, the AFL officially maintained an anti-immigration
position, and Idar’s attitude remains unclear regarding this directive since he took actions
both for and against Mexican migration. Nonetheless, before Idar came to the AFL in
1918, the AFL in Texas had already been successful in organizing new unions.
Organized labor in Texas had gained significantly during the early 1910s so that “By
1915, the federation claimed six hundred AFL-affiliated locals with a combined
membership in the order of fifty to ninety thousand members. Twenty percent, or between
ten thousand and eighteen thousand workers, belonged to the railway brotherhoods.”9
However, up to 1920, very few U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage had joined the AFL since
most skilled occupations, the union’s primary membership, denied their acceptance.10 As
the sole person of Mexican heritage in a leadership role with the AFL in Texas and a
regular correspondent of Gompers, Idar occupied a position that could have been extremely
useful to proponents of Mexican immigration to the United States. Although sometimes
experiencing difficult relationships with his AFL superiors, Idar managed to placate
Gompers while remaining true to people of Mexican heritage including immigrants to the
United States. One of Idar’s convictions involved his belief that Mexican migrants should
naturalize and become U.S. citizens. Nonetheless, such a goal, as also demonstrated by
George Sánchez in his scholarship on immigrants to Los Angeles, proved elusive as most
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migrants maintained their Mexican citizenship.11
Unable to attain full equality within an Anglo-based organization such as the AFL
even when recruited by a person of Mexican heritage, Mexican migrants retained not only
their identification with Mexico, but also their foreign citizenship. The meager percentage
of Mexican migrants who became U.S. citizens demonstrated their unwillingness to
connect with a new homeland as compared to groups from many other nations.12 As
identified in Chapter 3, migrants who completed a Declaration of Intention to become a
citizen could participate in U.S. elections. Consequently, some Mexican migrants
submitted a Declaration just to satisfy their U.S. employers by enabling their ability to vote.
However, before continuing about Idar’s career as a union organizer and the lack of
Mexican immigrant naturalization in San Antonio, a short examination of the relationship
between the AFL and Mexico during the early twentieth century follows. This segment
includes a review of how Gompers’ opinion regarding the recruiting of minorities to
become members of the AFL, particularly U.S. citizenry of Mexican descent, evolved
during the 1900s and 1910s.

11

12

George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 4-14.
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The American Federation of Labor
Gompers favored business expansion and endorsed capitalism in Latin America as
well as AFL-type unions that would assist in minimizing revolutions that threatened U.S.
hegemony.13 However, further engrained in these attitudes toward Latin America, and
particularly Mexico, remained the idea that if political and economic stability could be
maintained in those areas, migration would be thwarted and native U.S. workers protected
from low-wage competition. Gomper’s strategy sometimes led to the endorsement of
individuals considered by many as radical.
Magonistas referred to the title given to supporters of Ricardo Flores Magón. A
Mexican writer who began the radical newspaper Regeneración (regeneration) in 1900,
Magón had fled Mexico to escape the repression of the Diaz administration. The
newspaper was published in San Antonio beginning in 1904, and Magón became associated
with many local critics of the Porfirio Diaz presidential regime in Mexico, including the
exiled revolutionary leader, Francisco Madero. By 1906, Magón’s activities led to the
founding of the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM) as well as involvement in labor activities in
the United States and Mexico.14 In 1907, after U.S. newspapers publicized a plot that
implicated Magón and his associates in a conspiracy to assassinate Diaz and start a
13
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revolution, Anglos in the United States began to pay attention to the revolutionary.15
Gompers’ early support for Magón reflected a rejection of the Diaz government and its
suppression of Mexican workers, a view shared by many other labor leaders in the United
States such as the legendary organizer for the United Mine Workers (UMW), Mary Harris
“Mother” Jones.16 However, Gompers tended to see which way the wind blew before
sanctioning the various factions that rose and floundered during the eventual Mexican
Revolution.
Once Magón endorsed anarchism and U.S. President William Howard Taft moved
troops to the border of Mexico in 1911, Gompers and the executive council of the AFL
shied away from supporting any actions regarding the developing revolution. Nonetheless,
after the resignation of President Diaz and the ascension of Madero, less radical than
Magón, the AFL endorsed the new Mexican president in the fall of 1912. When the
relatively conservative Madero presidency began to unravel just as Woodrow Wilson began
his administration in the United States, Gompers altered his anti-imperialist stance and
supported intervention in Mexico. However, another Mexican leader, Victoriano Huerta,
seized power in an early-1913 coup that ultimately saw Wilson’s retaliatory seizure and
occupation of Vera Cruz in April, 1914. Once Huerta resigned in July, 1914, a battle
between Constitutionalists and popular leaders such as Francisco “Pancho” Villa and

For instance, a page one headline, “Charge Plot by a Former San Antonian to Kill Diaz,”
undoubtedly gained the attention of Anglos in the San Antonio as a continuing string of articles
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Emiliano Zapata began. Although the Constitutionalist leader, Venustiano Carranza,
proved to be a reluctant ally with an urban labor organization, Casa del Obrero Mundial
(Casa), their “red battalions” assisted him in battling peasant leaders Villa and Zapata.
Despite Carranza’s ambiguous support of Casa, his connections with organized labor in
Mexico opened the possibility for Gomper’s endorsement of the Constitutionalist
government. In September, 1915, Gompers wrote President Wilson and encouraged him to
recognize the Carranza government. Three weeks later, the President expressed de facto
support for the Constitutionalists.17 Thus began Gompers’ active involvement in U.S.Mexican relations.
While Gompers’ support for the recognition of the Constitutionalists did not
necessarily sway the president’s decision, the labor leader could claim that it did. This
perception aided the AFL leader in pursuing relationships with Mexican labor officials.
Gompers also saw the benefits of extending this good will beyond Mexico to Latin
America in general. When Wilson backed a Pan American Financial Conference, Gompers
moved ahead with his plans for supporting labor movements in Latin America. The AFL
leader maintained a good relationship with President Wilson, as discussed in Chapter 4, and
hoped to take advantage of this connection to further his interests. Nonetheless, with the
Great War already taking place in Europe, Gompers had to move carefully to insure that his
support for Latin American labor did not conflict with U.S. geopolitical concerns.18
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Despite Wilson’s tacit endorsement of Carranza, relations between the United States
and Mexico remained weak, and Gompers harbored his own unease about the Mexican
leader. Carranza’s views included being anti-Roman Catholic and wary of U.S. business
interests in Mexico, and in addition, his actions against organized labor resulted in the end
of Casa.19 However, Gompers still saw an opportunity to assist in improving U.S.-Mexican
relations by building the mutual labor connections.20 Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution of 1917 had confounded U.S. business interests in Mexico by ceding
ownership of natural resources to the Mexican government. Believing that this action
could result in U.S. intervention, Gompers offered to mediate between the two
administrations. In early 1917, in the face of deteriorating relations between the United
States and Germany, a nation allied with Carranza, the AFL President began to formulate
ideas regarding a Pan American Federation of Labor (PAFL). Since Carranza’s proGerman stance became more problematic after the United States entered the Great War in
April, 1917, Gompers thought that a labor relationship between the two nations could
negate German influence. A new national labor union in Mexico, La Confederación
Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), formed on May 1, 1918, and assisted Gompers in
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building a relationship with Mexican labor.21
The PAFL held its first convention in Laredo, Texas, on November 13, 1918, and
Gompers’ “secret aim of the PAFL was to use Mexican labor to secure Carranza’s support
of the Allied war effort.”22 Ironically, the conference began two days after the Great War
Armistice. Gompers still hoped that this relationship between organized labor in the
United States and Mexico could be beneficial to his organization. As the CROM gained
strength in Mexico, the possibility of a “post-war influx of cheap Mexican labor”
lessened.23 Also, the manufacture of additional products in the United States could assist
Mexico in its resurgence after the Revolution and provide more employment for U.S.
workers. As the CROM became closely aligned with the AFL, “Gompers emerged from
the Laredo conference with the Mexican labor movement more firmly in tow.”24 The AFL
President believed that greater Mexican immigration could lead to the displacement of
workers, mostly Anglo, not only in the agricultural fields, but also in industry. 25 When
considered strictly on their long-range possibilities, Gompers’ ideas relative to immigration
from Mexico came ahead of their time.
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In the 1996 edition of Immigrant America: A Portrait, Alejandro Portes and Rubén G.
Rumbaut made what could be considered a radical suggestion. Portes and Rumbaut argued
that one solution for stemming the tide of undocumented immigration from Mexico
involved the expenditure of aid to Mexico that would assist the U.S.’s southern neighbor in
improving its economy so that potential migrant laborers could locate employment in their
home nation. Remarkably, this idea paralleled what Gompers had suggested. Although he
had arrived at his scheme through racist and nativist predilections, both recommendations
involved taking action in Mexico. For Gompers, this meant building up Mexican labor.
For Portes and Rumbaut, it involved spending U.S. capital in Mexico, but by reallocating
funds currently spent on preventing undocumented immigration.26 To assist in the
implementation of such ideas, Gompers relied on the efforts of his long-time colleague,
Frank M. Morrison.
Most scholarship on the American Federation of Labor contains little information on
its Secretary, Frank Morrison, despite his holding of that position from 1897 to 1939.27
Born in Canada, Morrison became involved with the International Typographical Union
while working for a Chicago newspaper. One source described him as “a close associate
and collaborator of AFL Presidents Samuel Gompers and William Green and . . . one of the
26
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leading architects of the American labor movement . . . [as well as] a skillful administrator
who efficiently managed the routine affairs of the AFL.”28 Based on available scholarship
and Clemente Idar’s records, the “close associate” and “skillful administrator” descriptions
provide a precise assessment. Although Gompers died in 1924, his autobiography,
originally published in 1925, only briefly mentioned Morrison in connection with two
activities in which the president had also participated.29 Nonetheless, Morrison became the
most important connection between Idar and the AFL executive council.
Throughout his correspondence with Idar, Morrison’s primary motivation appears to
have been productivity. This efficiency included the holding down of costs and the skillful
scheduling of organizers to maximize their recruiting of additional workers. While he
regularly quoted AFL policy, of which he remained acutely aware, Morrison did not reveal
any personal beliefs or inspirations. The secretary remained loyal to the AFL and
subservient to Gompers, with little or no inclination to extend his own agenda beyond the
organization and its clearly-defined power structure.
Although less clear than Morrison’s relationship with Idar, Gomper’s role in dealing
with the only Spanish-speaking organizer in the AFL during the late 1910s and early 1920s
appeared to be primarily positive. But Gompers may have also allowed Morrison to fill the
28
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function of maintaining order within the ranks of the organizers so that the president could
applaud and encourage the field workers. Throughout 1921 and 1922, Gompers regularly
communicated with Idar by sending him supportive directives. This correspondence
indicates the high regard that the president held for the organizer, as well as Idar’s
usefulness in Gomper’s strategy to build up labor unions in Mexico and prevent the
immigration of low-wage Mexican workers to the United States. Idar’s contacts and
travels in south Texas and Mexico made him a valuable link for Gompers with the Spanishspeaking workers in both nations. But as a Tejano, Idar occupied a more privileged
position in the United States than most Mexican immigrants.
AFL Organizer Clemente Idar
A tension sometimes existed between Tejanos, persons of Mexican heritage born in
Texas, and immigrants from Mexico. Historian David Gutiérrez explained this contempt
between Mexican migrants and Mexican Americans:
Many Mexican immigrants expressed their own ambivalence, if not outright
resentment, about their experiences with Mexican Americans in the United States. . .
they believed themselves the only true Mexicans and often dismissed the Mexican
Americans, whom they called pochos (faded or bleached ones), as a mongrel people
without a country or a true culture.30
Gutiérrez also quoted a Mexican migrant who spoke with sociologist Manuel Gamio’s
research team in 1931: “I would rather cut my throat before changing my Mexican
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nationality. I prefer to lose with Mexico than to win with the United States.”31
Another historian, Neil Foley, utilizing the work of sociologist Paul Taylor, argued
that economic conflict developed between immigrants and Mexican Americans as the latter
attempted to embrace whiteness. Persons of Mexican heritage born in the United States
usually attained a higher level of income than the Mexican laborers who had just crossed
the border in search of employment. Therefore, the antipathy between the two groups often
encompassed economic differences rather than those of birthright.32 Foley also
commented: “For many white Texans, a Mexican American was simply a contradiction in
terms, a hybridization of mutually exclusive races, nationalities, and cultures.”33 Added to
that characterization, as discussed earlier, many Anglos viewed all Mexicanos as
agricultural laborers to be used and then discarded. Therefore, in discussing Clemente Idar
as an organizer for the AFL, the importance of his Tejano roots assists in understanding his
outlook regarding Mexican immigration.
Nicasio Idar, Clemente’s father, was born to Mexican parents in 1855 in St. Isabel,
Texas, only a few miles north of the border.34 Despite his U.S. citizenship, Nicasio lived in
Mexico during the late nineteenth century and co-founded one of the first national unions
in Mexico, La Orden Suprema de Empleados Ferrocarrileros Mexicanos (The Supreme
31
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Order of Mexican Railroad Employees). Begun in 1890, the union organized workers on
the Mexican National Railway that terminated in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico.
With the downfall of the union in the late 1890s due to a company scheme to discredit the
organization, Nicasio moved to Laredo, Texas.35 By 1900, he lived a few blocks north of
the Rio Grande in Laredo, Texas, with his wife, Jovita, three daughters, and three sons
including Clemente Nicasio Idar.36 The elder Idar began publishing La Crónica in Laredo
and dedicated the newspaper to “al beneficio de la raza méxico-texana” (the benefit of the
Mexico-Texas race).37 Although Anglos may have perceived all persons of Mexican
heritage as a homogenous group, Mexicanos viewed definite differences among
themselves.38
Laredo remained an anomalous community compared to other Texas areas as both
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Anglo and Mexican-heritage leaders dominated the social, political, and economic realm.
When working-class Mexicanos seemingly spoiled the image of higher-class Mexicans
through excessive drinking and immoral actions, the elite decried their activities and
attempted to subdue such behavior. For instance, Laredo mutualistas led by higher-class
Mexicanos developed rules designed to control what they considered to be offensive
conduct by the laboring membership. After some working class members began to identify
with leftist ideas, one of the newspapers published by influential leaders in Laredo, El
Demócratica Fronterizo, moved to differentiate itself from Magón’s radical ideas as well
as those of revolutionaries opposed to the Diaz regime, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.
Further, the disparities between higher and lower Mexicano economic groups became more
obvious after the formation of the Federal Labor Union (FLU) in 1905.39
The FLU organized workers who labored in U.S. facilities that supported the Mexican
National Railway. When a strike ensued in 1906, the newspapers, including Nicasio Idar’s
La Crónica, spoke out against the union, disparaging the working-class laborers. Further,
the Anglo manager of the railroad, responding to differences between the pay rates for
Anglos and Mexicanos, contended that “Indios” did not have the right to complain about
such disparities. Thus, the workers had been maligned based on their economic and racial
classification. Because it considered the workers’ actions to be demands rather than
requests, El Demócratica Fronterizo criticized the laborers for this “uncivilized” method of
dealing with such issues.
As the twentieth century unfolded, Mexicanos experienced increased violence and
39
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disparities in treatment based on their race. As a result, Nicasio Idar moved toward racial
solidarity by promoting events such as El Primer Congreso Mexicanista (The First Mexican
Congress) in 1911.40 Within the context of an evolving situation for Mexicanos in south
Texas, Clemente Idar assisted his father in organizing the Congress and began a career in
labor organizing.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, The First Mexican Congress met in September, 1911, to
protest the poor treatment of Mexicanos in the state. Because of the noteworthy attendance
at the Congress, it represented the zenith of Nicasio Idar’s political power amongst Tejanos
in south Texas, but he also served as a Laredo city marshal and justice of the peace. After
Nicasio’s death in 1914, three of his children carried on their father’s mission of assisting
Tejanos in their struggles within the state. Clemente, the first born, along with Jovita and
Eduardo, the second and third, became active in the publishing of the newspaper, and all
three went on to activist careers throughout Texas and Mexico.41 Born to a father in search
of full rights for persons of Mexican heritage in Texas, Clemente Idar inherited his father’s
interest in advocating for Tejanos. Clemente also belonged to an elite class of Tejanos who
had not migrated from Mexico, enjoyed a higher standard of living, and did not suffer the
severe treatment that many Mexicanos experienced in south Texas. To put it simply, this
group that historian Elliot Young described as gente decente (decent people), claimed to be
40
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“whiter.”42
Having learned the importance of aggressiveness in the business world from his
father, Clemente Idar wrote to the Laredo Board of Trade in 1909 inquiring about a job as a
translator.43 Two years later, after helping plan the First Mexican Congress, Idar wrote of
his support in La Crónica for all Mexicanos in Texas and “urged his readers to assist the
more recent arrivals in adjusting to their new life in Texas.”44 Nonetheless, Idar also
demonstrated his “membership” in the Laredo elite when writing to Congressman John
Nance Garner in 1913. Lobbying for T.A. Bunn to be appointed as the Laredo Postmaster,
he indicated having known him for twenty years. Citing identification with the elite as a
reason for his support, he wrote of Bunn: “He will be acceptable to the best elements of
our citizens, both Americans and Mexicans holding him in the highest esteem . . . .”45
Thus, Idar began his professional career as a member of the gente decente. When the AFL
began a search for a Spanish-speaking organizer, Idar seemed to be the ideal candidate.
Young, “Deconstructing La Raza,” 227-259. Young described the gente decente as similar to
the progressives throughout the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. He considered Nicasio Idar and his newspaper, La Crónica, to be part of this group.
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During most of the first two decades of the twentieth century, the AFL excluded all
Mexicanos from membership. However, in 1918, the union adopted a new strategy related
to Gomper’s interest in persuading Latin American labor leaders to adopt AFL-style
organizations. As a part of that approach, Gompers “appointed” Clemente Idar to assist in
organizing Mexicanos as full members of AFL-affiliated unions, but with one essential
compromise. The acceptance of Mexicanos included only those born in the United States
or naturalized.46 However, the first contact between the AFL and Idar within the
organizer’s personal papers appears to have been with Frank Morrison. The AFL Secretary
had responded to a letter from Idar that concerned which “printers” in Laredo could be
unionized by a yet-to-be-named organizer.47 Apparently, this communication between
Morrison and Idar began his relationship with the AFL. The secretary, aware of Gompers’
desire to organize Mexicanos, moved to initiate the association with Idar. Further, given
the AFL’s intention to hold the first PAFL conference in Laredo during November, 1918,
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locating a Spanish-speaking emissary would be essential to the success of that mission.48
Idar proved to be the precise person, in the right place, and at an opportune time for the
AFL. Morrison quickly seized the opportunity.
In anticipation of the PAFL conference, Idar soon began to organize local unions in
Laredo and, in the process, established his credentials as an effective organizer. In Idar’s
correspondence, the use of the term “Mexican” remains ambiguous and only through a
thorough reading of the context can the precise meaning become clear. Sometimes he
referred to persons of Mexican heritage who had been born or naturalized in the United
States, and in other documents he meant all those who had cultural connections to Mexico
or, as this dissertation has utilized the term, Mexicanos. A letter to John Murray, an
avowed socialist who worked with the AFL and Gompers and supported the freeing of
political refugees such as Magón, demonstrates this linguistic issue.49 The correspondence
also reveals Idar’s early success at organizing in Laredo while still in his first few months
with the AFL:
That the National and International Organizations must be notified officially by the
A.F.L. and by the Pan-American that Mexicans will be henceforth welcomed into
regular organizations of this county, treated with equal rights in every respect and that
their fellow-workers in the United States will do every thing [sic] in their power to
help uplift them and to heartily assist them in emulating the spirit of organization and
efficiency that is found among American workingmen to a very reasonable degree in
all parts of the country . . . . Having organized and cooperated in the establishment of
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ten labor unions in this city recently created, I know that our Mexican brothers are
anxious and very willing to be organized.50
Since the AFL did not have any unions that only included laborers at this time, and
Mexican immigrants mostly belonged to that class of workers, Idar’s use of the term
“Mexican” did not include migrants. The organizer’s initial commitment, per Gomper’s
convictions, remained the instituting of an equitable situation for persons of Mexican
heritage who held U.S. citizenship. During this beginning period for Idar, Morrison
worked to orient the AFL organizer to his new position.
Throughout Idar’s papers, Morrison continued as the omnipresent link between the
Washington, D.C. office of the AFL and Clemente Idar. He received Idar’s reports and
provided training information, assessed his expenditures, directed his movements, and
chastised the organizer when he apparently felt the need to do so. For instance, in regard to
Idar’s reports and training during the organizer’s first few months on the job, Morrison
offered detailed information on how to fill out an application for a central labor union in
Laredo. He also added: “Glad to hear that you will have nearly two thousand men
organized before leaving for other localities. Kindly advise me what efforts, if any, you put
forth in San Antonio.”51 Apparently, Morrison intended his letter to push Idar on to greater
levels of organization, beyond the two thousand that he recruited in Laredo.
Approximately six months after beginning his employment with the AFL, Idar and
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his family relocated to San Antonio, and resided at 525½ Market Street near the city’s
downtown area.52 Idar lived at one other location near downtown before finally settling at
219 Keller Street in January, 1920, just a few blocks from the most depressed area of the
West Side.53 Although Idar now comingled with many prominent labor leaders, he
discovered that the gente decente of his upbringing did not extend far beyond Laredo. His
family continued to reside in this small house on Keller Street until his death from
pulmonary tuberculosis at age 50 in 1934.54 Idar had relocated from Laredo where an
affable relationship existed between affluent Mexicanos and Anglos. Conversely, San
Antonio must have seemed to be a different world to Idar, particularly the severely
impoverished West Side. In San Antonio, groups comparable to the gente decente were
known as the ricos (rich), and even by 1930 such families only numbered about sixty
scattered throughout the city. Since these wealthier families lived outside of the Mexican
barrio, where Idar resided, he probably did not come into significant contact with them.
Further, most of these families traveled to the United States to escape the mayhem of the
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Mexican Revolution and remained loyal to conservative principles and the Porfiriato.55
Therefore, the elements of the Revolution that supported organized labor would have been
antithetical to them as well as the unionization of Mexican immigrants as implemented by
Tejanos such as Idar. Moreover, Idar maintained a prolific work ethic and never seemed
satisfied with the significant progress he made in organizing.
Idar traveled throughout the southwestern United States as well as Mexico during his
over fifteen years with the AFL. Some of these trips involved long stints in hotel rooms
away from his family such as during a period in 1919 and 1920. After Idar spent six weeks
organizing in El Paso in late 1919, returning home only for the holidays, his weekly reports
indicated that he returned to the west Texas city for twenty-four more weeks in early 1920,
followed by a trip to Arizona, presumably directly from El Paso. He had been away from
his family for one-half year. In a letter to his wife, Laura, Idar demonstrated his
homesickness and commented, “You can not [sic] imagine how I long to be at home all the
time, instead of being away . . . . There is so much work to do everywhere.” The letter,
written in English, established that Laura more than likely did not speak Spanish. Also, his
narrative verified that Laura’s mother, presumably not of Mexican heritage, lived with
them and regularly criticized her son-in-law.56 Other travels to small cities northeast of San
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Antonio, as well as Fort Worth, Houston, Galveston, Phoenix, Tucson, and several
locations in Mexico could be seen in his reports up to the end of 1925.57 All the while,
Morrison constantly urged him to continue the current mission in addition to staying in
touch with the other cities where he had worked on organizing. Morrison wrote in one
letter: “When I advised that you could put in two months in El Paso, I meant that you
could put in approximately that time but with the understanding that you would keep in
touch with San Antonio.”58 Adding to his work load, Idar constantly received requests for
assistance from Mexicano laborers throughout south Texas; this correspondence came from
industrial and agricultural workers who requested his assistance in becoming members of
existing unions or organizing new ones.
Workers from many Texas cities asked for Idar’s aid and even contacted Gompers to
that end. A letter signed by five Spanish-surnamed officials of the Hod Carriers union in
McAllen, Texas, to the AFL President complained about Mexican workers being “freely
permitted to cross the border” and then abused by the corporations who arranged their
passage. The correspondence continued by requesting that Idar be dispatched to McAllen
along with “an American brother of good faith and conscious of his duties, so that they may
both help us in settling our difficulties with these corporations.”59 In another letter
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concerning a similar issue to an undetermined recipient, but presumably from a union
member, the writer stated that Idar “seems to be afraid to come to this town to help us due
to threats that were made against him when he first came to organize and install us. The
City Mayor and City Marshall ordered him to leave the city and not to organize the
Mexican wage-earning element.”60 Idar had to deal with discrimination by racist local
officials who did not believe that Mexican Americans should be organized. However,
Idar’s own views on Mexican immigrants evolved.
In a letter to a San Antonio union contact, U.S. Bratton, on March 19, 1920, Clemente
began to reveal his ideas regarding Mexican immigration. The general tone of the letter
indicated that Mexican immigration had been increasing for some time and that the
migrants usually ended up in agricultural or railroad work. Since this letter emanated from
the Bracero period, some of the escalation of migration occurred as a result of that
government operation. Idar began quite simply in explaining his belief regarding the
increased immigration:
Cheap labor; Open Shop. The matter of patriotism, Americanism, citizenship and the
right of the freemen born in this county to labor assiduously for their individual and
collective betterment as wage-earners, is a problem relegated to oblivion. We must
become beggars within the territorial boundaries of our own country, permitting
aliens to be imported avowedly to crush American living and wage-earning
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standards.61
At this point, the organizer believed in the basic principles of the AFL’s immigration
policy, that inexpensive foreign labor hurt native workers by undercutting their wages and
failing to organize. In another letter from the same time period to A. Persion, General
Secretary-Treasurer of the International Hod Carriers Union, Idar elaborated on his
convictions regarding Mexican immigrants: “Coming into the United States, they are a
menace to the much more highly improved economic conditions of the organized wageearners of the land, who are striving to establish recognized American living and wageearning standards.” Idar went on to request that the official send organizers to the
southwest to assist in unionizing Spanish-speaking Americans and that he would help with
whatever translations may be needed.62 In correspondence that, based on context, may
have represented a response to the Persion letter, F.E. Milling of the Dallas Hod Carriers
union commented, “We shall be overwhelmed by the importation of Mexican laborers
unless compatriots of theirs like yourself shall be enabled to induce them to join hands with
us in maintaining adequate wages and proper working conditions.” Although this
commitment went beyond AFL policy concerning the treatment of foreign workers by
suggesting that they “join hands,” Idar still noted what he considered a disparaging remark
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regarding “compatriots” as he penciled in the margin, “I am an American citizen.”63 He
struggled to maintain his gente decente status, but some correspondence from Morrison
may have negatively affected Idar’s view of the AFL.
Morrison worked to keep “field organizers” in line, although that title remained
elusive for Idar. In April, 1920, the AFL Secretary responded to Idar’s request to represent
a local union at one of their conventions: “It is not customary for organizations of the
American Federation of Labor to attend conventions as delegates representing local
unions.” Continuing, Morrison chastised Idar: “You were put in the field as an interpreter
and hence were not given a commission. There is no reason why you should receive a
commission as organizer, and the matter will be taken up with President Gompers as soon
as he returns to headquarters.”64 Nearly two years after recruiting members and
establishing local unions throughout south Texas, including Laredo, San Antonio, and El
Paso, Morrison still did not consider Idar to be an official “organizer.” The AFL Secretary
appeared to be miffed by Idar’s actions regarding his possible representation of a local
union at their convention, and decided to put the employee “in his place” by reminding Idar
of his lack of an official position. Tellingly, a document signed by Gompers that certified
Idar as an organizer and also dated during April, 1920, represented how the scenario raised
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by Morrison eventually played out upon Gompers return.65 Nonetheless, the incident may
have soured the organizer’s relationship with the Federation.
In another letter to Pierson, Idar suggested that a new publication, “Labor
Continental,” be instituted in an attempt to organize Mexican laborers before they entered
the United States. By utilizing this concept, Mexican immigrants would be more likely to
continue their affiliation with the unions once in the United States and, thereby, not accept
inexpensive wages or succumb to the lure of the open shop movement. This idea would
not have pleased Gompers who wanted Mexican workers to adopt AFL-style unions, but
believed that allowing those union members to migrate to the United States was
unacceptable.66 Apparently attempting to convince Pierson of his resolve, Idar closed the
letter: “If the enterprise is properly supported by two or three crafts I expect to resign my
position as a general organizer for the A.F. of L.”67 Idar struggled with AFL policy and
attempted to find other methods for dealing with Mexican immigration. The previous
month’s reprimand from Morrison may have played a role. However, since this letter came
after Idar had spent months on the road in El Paso, it could have also represented
frustration with his current situation away from home. During this period, Idar wrote to
Morrison on several pending issues in Arizona where the organizer spent time during the
summer of 1920 before finally returning to San Antonio.
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While visiting Arizona, Idar had occasion to meet and speak with General and soon to
be President of Mexico, Álvaro Obregon, who introduced him to the Consul General of
Mexico in El Paso, Luis Montes de Oca. The Consul General told Idar of a new
governmental body in Mexico, the Protective Agency for Mexican Labor, which planned to
establish labor agencies in the border towns with the United States that would better control
the flow of labor. Idar expressed his endorsement of such an idea to Morrison and
suggested that this Mexican program could work with the AFL in organizing workers
before they entered the United States.68 As Idar continued to consider Mexican
immigration, he soon seized upon an idea regarding the legitimizing of the alien
population.
During preparations for the third PAFL Convention, scheduled for January, 1921,
Idar corresponded frequently with Leroy Kennedy, the President of the Arizona Federation
of Labor. Idar referred to “The Mexican Labor problem.” In discussing the issue, he
reiterated the commonly held view that unorganized laborers from Mexico and “large
numbers of the same racial element who reside in the United States” hurt American labor
due to the sub-standard wages that they accepted. However, he argued that these workers
did not understand the economic structure of the United States and were “not responsible
for the detrimental effects” of their acceptance of low wages and organized labor. He
resurfaced the idea of having Mexican labor bureaus that worked “in harmony with the
point of view of American labor.” In other words, Idar believed that the AFL should help
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organize non-citizen immigrant workers. He alluded to the importance of the PAFL in this
regard, an organization that the AFL brought into existence. Most importantly, Idar
discussed citizenship:
I do not agree with this viewpoint—before you can have a labor union card, you must
surrender your [Mexican] citizenship. The naturalization laws of the United States
condemn that attitude when they clearly define that an alien must declare a bona fide
intention to become a citizen of the United States and it is also declared as unlawful
to encourage a man to become a citizen, when that encouragement becomes the
strongest actuating motive for the declaration to be made. Citizenship is something
we can not [sic] barter away. Citizenship is the foundation of our government and
our civilization. Those reasons impel me to believe that we must throw the bars down
in all American labor organizations so as to properly assimilate the alien element of
the United States, of which the Mexican is an integral part.69
Idar hoped that Mexican migrants would become citizens, but he did not believe that the
issue should be forced. His views would continue to progress and may have been
influenced by the virulent racism that Idar confronted in rural areas of Texas.
Idar organized cotton-farm workers in several small communities in the Blackland
Prairie region of Texas and wrote Morrison regarding his experiences. In a rural area about
fifty miles northwest of San Antonio, two of the union members, Francisco Becerra and
Miguel Pavía experienced an attack by someone named Harris while a deputy sheriff
looked on. He further indicated that other members “have been told that they will have no
contracts for the coming year due to their affiliation with our Federation.” Shaken by such
incidents, Idar indicated that “In spite of the fact that I am a native citizen of the United
States there are places in the towns mentioned where I can not [sic] enter a hotel, get a
shave or a meal because being of Mexican extraction I am a Mexican forever. My
69
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citizenship is not recognized. You have no idea under what conditions I have struggled
while traveling in that section.” He went on to describe the difficult conditions that
Mexicano workers endured by describing the verbal contract that the entire family worked
under, the monopolization of materials by the local Anglos, and the few dollars gained by
the end of the season. Idar declared: “It is a state of peonage worst [sic] than the peonage
conditions that used to exist in Mexico.” He added a sarcastic note at the end: “Chester
Wright [an AFL writer] should come to write Barbarous Texas,”70 a reference to the John
Kenneth Wright book, Barbarous Mexico, which uncovered some of the worst abuses in
Porfirian Mexico.71 A test of Idar’s resolve regarding Mexican immigration came when a
post-war recession severely hurt the U.S. economy.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, economic problems began to occur not long after the
Great War ended. Perhaps because the AFL President had begun to appreciate Idar’s
usefulness in adding to the union rolls and dealing with the frequent need for a Spanishspeaker, Gompers wrote to the organizer repeatedly during a two-year period beginning in
March, 1921. Gompers began by instructing Idar to “immediately” assist the Amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen in Fort Worth, Texas, regarding the possible use of
Mexican strike breakers should the union vote to strike. In a postscript that referred to the
Bracero Program, Gompers indicated that although the government plan would end, “In
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any event, you go to Fort Worth.”72 According to his weekly report for week ending April
2, Idar worked with the local union officials to meet with the thousands of unemployed
Mexican immigrants in the city, the group mentioned in Chapter 4. He described the
“deplorable conditions of unemployment and hunger among 2000 Mexican men now in
this city being cared for by [the] Welfare Association of Fort Worth.” Adding a postscript
to his account, Idar indicated that he would come back to the area in June in the event of a
strike and that in the meantime, he would “see if it is possible to get [the] Mexican
Government interested in Mexican unemployed workers now found idle by the thousands
all over the state.”73 In his following report, Idar wrote that he met with the men on
Sunday, April 3, 1921, and that “Efforts [are] being made to help them return to their
country.”74 The organizer from San Antonio now understood firsthand the problems
confronting Mexican immigrants in both rural and urban Texas communities. He soon
would have to face such issues head on.
On April 6, 1921, Idar sent a telegram written in Spanish to Gompers. Although the
reason for the non-English communication remains unclear, it may have been to prevent
management in Fort Worth knowing its contents. Apprising the president of the situation,
Idar asked for Gompers’ approval in contacting the Mexican consul regarding the
72
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unemployed Mexicanos in Fort Worth.75 In an April 6 response, also in Spanish, Gompers
granted Idar discretion in the matter, but urged him to be mindful of maintaining good
relations between the United States and Mexico.76 Later the same month, in a letter to
Morrison, Idar seemed hopeful that the situation could be resolved as he now stated, “I can
organize common laborers in Fort Worth.”77 By early June, the President of the Fort Worth
union, John Malone, urged Idar to return and help with organizing Mexican workers,
presumably not immigrants. Malone wrote: “in order to have our Organization in the
shape it should be in the event we are forced on strik [sic] in September we will have to get
the Mexican workers into our Organization as well as the colored and the other workers
and their [sic] is not a chance to get the Mexican workers unless we have the assistance of
some one who can talk to them . . . .”78 Malone needed Idar’s assistance in organizing
Mexican workers in Fort Worth. Presumably, these workers did not include the potential
strike breakers, Mexican immigrants, who Idar would now work with to insure their
repatriation. Even as he continued to attend to the Ft. Worth situation, he aided other
Mexicanos with their plight in rural areas in Texas.
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Writing from Martindale, Texas, one of the previously mentioned rural areas where
Idar had organized farm workers, he apprised Mexican President Álvaro Obregon of the
local situation. Idar wrote regarding this second trip to the Blackland Prairie area: “Al
hacer esos dos recorridos, he recogido impresiones que nunca podré olvidar con referencia
a los sufrimientos, la tiranía y de semi-esclavitud en que viven los mexicanos que se
dedican a las labores de la agricultura. (By doing these two tours, I collected impressions
that I can never forget with reference to the suffering, tyranny and semi-slavery in which
Mexicans engaged in the work of agriculture live).” Continuing, he asked that the
president send someone to assist in documenting the situation so that it may be brought to
the attention of the Texas state legislature for resolution. He ended the letter with the
“Barbarous Texas” analogy that he had previously utilized.79 Nothing in the Idar papers
could be located that confirmed any action on Obregon’s part, even a letter of
acknowledgement. Nonetheless, that he wrote to the Mexican president regarding the
plight of agricultural workers in rural Texas suggests that some immigrant laborers in the
Blackland Prairie area had joined the union.
To verify that farm workers from Mexico joined an AFL-sponsored union, Morrison
finally answered a June 13 letter from Idar on August 19, 1921. The AFL Secretary
responded,
If workers from Mexico are being treated in violation of the laws of Texas or of the
United States, I should like to have a statement of specific instances of violation.
Should these be given, I would be in position to advise as to a course of action. If the
Mexicans are held to labor against their will, or if they suffer physical punishment by
79
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their employers in such degree as to constitute assault, the laws of the United States,
in my opinion, provide adequate means for redress.80
Again, nothing in the archive indicates any forthcoming action as a result of this
correspondence, but Idar had begun to sign up Mexican immigrants to be union members,
and secondly, he at least attempted to improve their conditions of employment. Idar also
contacted San Antonio groups in his efforts to resolve the depressed situation for farm
workers in rural Texas.
The Liga Instructiva Mexicana (Mexican Instructional League), also known as the
Mexican Protection League (MPL), operated as a “mutual legal aid society” that published
a handbook for members and assisted them in understanding their rights as well as
addressing “harassment by law enforcement officials.”81 Idar wrote to one of the lawyers
connected to the Liga, B.F. Patterson in San Antonio, asking for assistance in regard to the
agricultural labor unions in towns such as Luling, Fentress, and Martindale, northeast of
San Antonio. The AFL organizer contended that, “The members have hundreds of
complaints to make at all times of the year against the cruel treatment they ordinarily get
from the land-owners with whom they raise cotton crops on fourth, third or half terms of
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agreement. These men are treated brutally, abused and robbed, as you know.” Idar went
on to describe specific difficulties that two of the men had suffered including one who had
been hurt in an automobile accident, but the justice of the peace had not moved to punish
the perpetrator. A second case involved a man who had been ill for a few days and then
fired without notice and “he and his family were left in a public road.”82 Although Idar
never mentioned whether or not any of the men in these rural communities included
immigrants, given the influx of Mexicanos drawn by farm work and the Bracero Program,
as well as the communication with Obregon and Morrison, undoubtedly some had recently
migrated from Mexico. However, unlike the immigrant Mexicanos in Forth Worth, whose
potential role as strike breakers threatened the integrity of an AFL union, the rural workers
took relatively low-paying agricultural work and became distressed due to their treatment
at the hands of farmers and local officials. No matter the farm laborers’ status in the
United States or with the union, Idar believed these Mexicanos needed his help.
During the next few months, Idar made arrangements for the repatriation of
Mexicanos from Fort Worth by communicating with Mexican leaders such as Luis
Morones, the Secretary-general of the CROM.83 He arrived in Fort Worth again on July
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16, 1921 and met with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen.84 Within
the following week, Idar spoke of continual meetings, but they mostly concerned the
organization of union members. Apparently, the company had success in bringing workers
into the “Company union,” and the AFL had signed up only 300 of a possible 1500.85
Although Idar’s weekly report from July 30 was not present in the archive, the August 6,
1921, document continued to speak of the organization of Mexicans into the packing
houses associated with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen union.86
Idar also became involved in the repatriation of Mexican immigrants from Fort Worth, but
this incident has been portrayed in a variety of ways.
Gompers, in a letter written on July 28, 1921, to Secretary of Labor James Davis,
complained about the use of Mexican immigrant labor in the United States and claimed
“that 35,000 have returned to Mexico in the last few weeks.” He added that the “Mexican
government has expended $250,000 to facilitate and expedite the transportation of these
laborers.” Due to persistent unemployment following the Great War, the AFL President
believed that Davis needed to end any continuation of Mexican-worker immigration. He
claimed that many meat-packing and railroad employers desired to “have in readiness a
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sufficient number of docile and servile laborers.”87 Although some historians have cited
35,000 returnees verbatim, the sum may have been inflated in an attempt by Gompers to
bolster his argument to the Secretary of Labor. Gompers asserted that this number
demonstrated the depth of the issue regarding the continued importation of laborers from
Mexico, particularly since such a large total needed to be returned.88 That Gompers
inflated the total seems to be verified by a letter that Idar sent him on August 5 from
Oklahoma City, another community with severe problems regarding distressed Mexican
immigrant workers:
I am now trying to compile the necessary information in order to comply with the
wishes you express in that letter [of July 28] and to that end, I have written today to
the Consul General of Mexican at San Antonio, Texas, requesting him to furnish me
official information as to the number of Mexican citizens that have returned to
Mexico through the ports of our southern border, asking for all the details that he
can possibly give me on the subject and also of how the Mexican government
carried out their plan of expediting the return of their laborers to their country.89
The 35,000 number may have been correct by the time all of the repatriations had been
completed, but Gompers did not appear to have known this on July 28 when writing to
Davis. Further, any claim that Idar had been a part of the repatriation of, allegedly, 35,000
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Mexican immigrants during the middle of 1921 could make him appear to be callous.90
However, when more closely inspected, his anxiety for the immigrants as people in distress
becomes clearer.
Within the same correspondence from August 5th to Gompers, Idar wrote:
I have just read statements in the leading dallies of Oklahoma City showing that
American unemployed workers resent the opportunity being given there to many
Mexicans to work at wages much lower than what the average American worker
would be inclined to accept in view of the present cost of living conditions. We must
be very clear in stating that these are not race riots. They are hunger riots. They arise
from the deplorable industrial condition in which our country finds itself today, and I
feel very happy over the fact that the consular representatives of Mexico in this
country have visualized the problem in that light and guided by such observations, I
am quite certain that the Mexican Government acted very promptly in order to avoid
consequences that might have been of a very serious nature.91
Idar expressed concern for both the “American” workers and the Mexican immigrants.
Further, he believed the Mexican government, that he had encouraged in the repatriation
efforts, had acted quickly and prudently. In this short paragraph, he had satisfied Gompers
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because this exodus program assisted native workers and demonstrated the benefits of
maintaining a close relationship with the Mexican government, the mantra of the PAFL.
But he also expressed his concern for the plight of the immigrants on a moral basis rather
than a racial one. Idar’s views regarding Mexican immigration would soon be further
displayed by his contributions to a fledgling Mexican American organization.
The Order Sons of America (OSA) began in San Antonio on October 13, 1921, as an
organization devoted to improving the lives of persons of Mexican heritage. The OSA
restricted membership to native-born or naturalized U.S. citizens of Mexican or Spanish
descent. Some of the founders included Manuel C. Gonzales of the MPL, James Tafolla, a
district clerk in the criminal court of Bexar County, and Clemente Idar.92 Tafolla, a
childhood friend who lived in San Antonio, communicated with Idar on a regular basis and
kept him up to date on the club’s machinations as the AFL organizer traveled throughout
the southwest. In a September, 1922, letter to Tafolla, Idar mentioned that he had worked
to arrange a similar group in El Paso where he continued to organize for the AFL.93
Shortly thereafter, Tafolla indicated that some “weeding out” of the organization needed to
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take place so that those with an “axe to grind” could be removed.94 Idar and Tafolla, along
with another member, Ramón Carvajal, wrote the constitution of the OSA.95
The OSA’s constitution, with Idar’s input, included principles in support of Mexican
farm workers and, by extension, Mexican immigrants. Undoubtedly, this language arose
from Idar’s experiences in the rural areas northwest of San Antonio. Two of the sixteen
“Declaration of Principles” in the constitution demonstrated his contribution:
Fourth—We especially denounce the system of peonage, slavery or
maltreatment perpetrated upon persons of Mexican blood by being compelled to labor
in the farming districts of some of our States for a number of hours daily that go
beyond human endurance, for wages that keep them undernourished and under most
abominable housing and living conditions.
Fifth—We pledge ourselves to investigate the conditions under which farm
laborers and tenants of our race work and operate in Texas and in other States of the
Union.96
So despite the rhetoric of the organization about citizenship, just as Idar hedged this belief,
so did the OSA. Apparently, due to the AFL organizer’s input. Nonetheless, Idar’s
connection with the OSA, given the insistence on U.S. citizens only as members,
demonstrated his belief in the importance of committing to the nation as not only a
resident, but as a citizen. The AFL organizer dedicated himself to the notion that Mexican
immigrants should become U.S. citizens.
Despite his efforts to assist Mexican immigrants in the cities and rural areas of Texas,
Clemente Idar harbored a frustration regarding the migrant’s status in the United States. As
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a Tejano, he wanted the immigrants to become U.S. citizens and soon began to work to
organize and naturalize Mexicano laborers. Canuto Vargas, not only a PAFL official, but
also Idar’s friend, wrote to his fellow Mexicano in 1923 on whether or not to combine labor
organizing with naturalization efforts. Vargas made a very simple statement: "DON'T DO
IT." He elaborated:
Latin-Americans don't take kindly to the suggestion that they become American
citizens, or citizens of any other country, for that matter, and the ignorant, narrowminded ones among our people see with distrust any one of their own blood who
comes with the suggestion. You were born in this country, Idar, but if you had only
been raised here, or had come to this country in your youth, or already grown-up, for
that matter, the chances are ten to one that you would still be a Mexican citizen. So,
don't force the issue.97
Vargas, born in Mexico and brought to the United States at a young age, had a different
perspective from his friend.98 Whereas Idar had been born in the United States and raised
in a fairly prosperous household, Vargas emigrated from Mexico with his family and could
more fully understand the resistance to U.S. citizenship by Mexican immigrants. However,
between his membership in the OSA and a continuing devotion to converting immigrant
workers to not only become AFL members, but also U.S. citizens, Idar apparently did not
take his colleague’s views to heart. Although Idar’s views of Mexican immigrants varied
from those of Gompers’, late the following year, he would lose his AFL mentor, when the
president and founder died.
During the Fourth Congress of the PAFL, held in Mexico City in December, 1924,
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Gompers took ill and his fellow AFL officers rushed him back to the United States where
he succumbed in San Antonio on December 13, 1924.99 William Green took Gomper’s
place in early 1925, and Idar soon communicated with the new leader.100 Idar reiterated
many of his previous stands regarding the importance of labor organizing in Mexico so that
workers who came to the United States already possessed an affiliation with a union. But
he also took the new president to task on the AFL’s stance regarding minority workers:
The problem or [sic] organizing the Mexican and the Negroe [sic] in the United Staes
will never be solved until the executive officers and subsequently the membership of
the affiliated crafts of the A.F. of L. take interest in it. I have often noticed that our
affiliated crafts through their general officers display interest in behalf of organizing
the Mexican worker, but that interest is not general and systematic.101
Nonetheless, the organizer still committed to the laboring class in broad terms and
expressed confidence in the new leader’s ability to maintain what Gompers had already
accomplished. Ever the advocate of Mexicanos, Idar had brought a new reality to the AFL,
that the Mexican worker, whether native or immigrant, had to be dealt with. As historian
Emilio Zamora has written: “Idar did not abandon Mexican immigrants. In fact, he urged
their incorporation while organizing in Mexican communities.” However, despite
Zamora’s further argument that Idar “did not deny that his allegiance as a trade unionist
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was with the U.S.-born and naturalized,”102 he also operated from the premise that Mexican
immigrants should be incorporated into both the AFL and the nation. Although the gente
decente never totally left Idar, his experiences with urban and rural workers assisted him in
creating ways of helping Mexicanos with their situation, both by repatriating and by
organizing. But his true wish remained that Mexican immigrants unionize before leaving
Mexico and then adopt the United States as their new nation once becoming an employed
resident.
In the world outside of Laredo where some Mexicanos continued to be viewed in a
stereotypical manner as the proverbial migrant worker, Idar made a name for himself as a
person of Mexican descent. Unfortunately, he also worked himself to death. His extensive
travels, regular illnesses noted throughout the archives, and diabetes eventually caught up
with him and led to his death in 1934. The AFL furloughed the organizer without pay, at
least three times in the early 1920s, but Idar continued to work and send in reports, often
from locations far from his home.103 Moreover, Idar’s determination regarding immigrants
becoming citizens only led to frustration. Despite the many immigrants who came to San
Antonio during the timeframe of this dissertation, based on a review of the Declaration of
Intention and Petitions of Naturalization records for the city, very few finalized their
applications for citizenship.
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Mexican Naturalization
A review of the records of Declarations of Intention and Petitions of Naturalization
completed by Mexican nationals in San Antonio during the 1915 to 1925 period reveals
their lack interest in becoming U.S. citizens. The number of Declarations of Intention, the
initial step toward citizenship during this ten-year timeframe, 1,046, demonstrates this
indifference. Based on a further analysis of the records, the number of declarations
becomes even less significant because many of the documents apparently came at the
insistence of an Anglo employer who wished to add more voters to their respective political
party.104 The paucity of Mexican immigrants completing Petitions of Naturalization, the
final citizenship step, remains even more startling with only 129 completions. Historian
George Sánchez suggested that this low rate of naturalization represented the existence of
an “in-between culture,” one that resisted abandoning Mexican citizenship even while
living in the United States.105 Further, as discussed in Chapter 1, Mexicanos’ identification
with Roman Catholicism also contributed to the resistance to naturalize because many
Anglos in the United States disparaged that religion during the early twentieth century.
Nonetheless, the experiences of Mexican immigrants who completed the naturalization
process varied significantly.
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Candido Garcia first came to the United States from Gomez Farias, Tamaulipas, in
October, 1899, through Laredo by way of the Mexican National Railway. Born in 1873,
Candido remained employed as a laborer during his thirty-five year residence in Texas until
his death in early 1934 at the age of sixty. In 1919, he joined Sociedad de la Unión, a San
Antonio mutualista, completed a Declaration of Intention in 1920, and finalized his
naturalization in 1922. Living within the West Side of San Antonio, Candido’s residences
remained within a small radius from at least 1910 to 1934. During most of the period he
lived on a diminutive street referred to as Montezuma Alley with his wife, Ricarda, also
from Gomez Farias, and twelve children. Although his exact status as a laborer remains
mostly unknown, the 1930 census, completed less than four years before his death, listed
him as a “sweeper” for the city of San Antonio. While Candido continued as a laborer for
thirty-five years, he did manage to own his home and all twelve children, ages nine to
thirty-one, continued to live with him in 1930. Although meager, his income probably
produced a higher standard-of-living than he would have experienced in Gomez Farias, a
small town of 1,698 inhabitants in 1921.106 Nonetheless, other petitioners enjoyed a higher
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standard of living, possibly because of their occupations.
Juan Rodriguez Guerra worked as a musician, a livelihood that proved fruitful for
many Mexican immigrants. He immigrated to the United States from Matamoros,
Tamaulipas, on Christmas Day in 1898, crossing into Brownsville by ferry boat. Born in
1866, Juan continued to work as a musician, but also operated a grocery store, presumably
on the West Side of the city. After immigrating to the United States, he submitted a
Declaration of Intention in 1918, a Petition for Naturalization in January, 1920, and joined
Sociedad de la Unión a few weeks later. Juan also lived on the West Side of San Antonio
at 604 South Pecos Street during at least the period from his declaration until the 1930
census with his wife, Refugio, also from Matamoros, and six children, three of whom had
been born in Mexico. Living longer than Candido, at least until 64-years-old, Juan owned
his home on the West Side and probably enjoyed a more prosperous living due to his
occupation as a musician which allowed him to also operate a retail store. These two
individuals, Candido and Juan, one an unskilled, blue-collar laborer and the other a low
white-collar musician, despite their willingness to become U.S. citizens, continued to live
within a ghetto-type environment on the West Side of San Antonio.107 Their occupations
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probably had more to do with their economic fate in the United States than their
naturalization. No matter the background of the applicants, residency requirements had to
be fulfilled before beginning the process of achieving citizenship.
During the 1915 to 1925 time frame, naturalization required a waiting period that
extended from the beginning of residency to the filing of the final petition. After an
applicant had been present in the United States for two years, they submitted a Declaration
of Intention and indicated their “bona fide intention” to renounce their current
citizenship.108 Once the declarant fulfilled at least a five-year residency requirement,
during which time a Declaration of Intention was filed, the migrant completed a Petition for
Naturalization to become a citizen of the United States. At that point, the petitioner had to
be at least eighteen-years-old, literate, and obtain the endorsement of two U.S. citizens.109
In considering the extent of Mexican naturalization from 1915 to 1925 in San
Antonio, since the naturalization process occurs over at least a five-year period, it makes
sense to utilize the total Mexican-born population increase from 1910 to 1920 as a basis
point. Table 13 includes that population information and then compares the change to the
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actual declarations and petitions completed by Mexican immigrants. As may be seen, the
incredibly low .65 percent naturalization rate for Mexican immigrants in San Antonio
demonstrates a great resistance on the part of Mexicanos to becoming U.S. citizens. This
percentage becomes even more startling when compared to all foreign-born residents of the
United States in 1920. According to the U.S. Census in 1920, 49.5 percent of the over 13
million foreign-born for whom citizenship statistics were known, had finalized their
naturalization by that year.110 As mentioned, Clemente Idar grew frustrated with his
inability to convince Mexican immigrants to naturalize. Although Canto Vargas made
valid points regarding the reason for the lack of naturalization in his plea to the AFL
organizer, an in-depth analysis of the statistics for San Antonio reveals additional
information.
Table 13: Bexar County Mexican-born Population Versus Declaration and Petition Totals

1910 and 1920
U.S. Census
Population
increase

Bexar County
Mexican-born
population
13,226
32,934
19,708

San Antonio
Declaration of
Intention

San Antonio
Petition for
Naturalization

1915-1925

1,046

129

Percent to
population
increase

5.3%

.65%

Source: University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, “Historical Census
Browser,” http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/. Declarations of Intention for Citizenship and
Petitions for Naturalization 1915-1925, Series from Record Group 21: Records of District Courts
of the United States, 1685 - 2004, NA-FW. As mentioned previously, San Antonio is in Bexar
County and contains most of the population therein.
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Mexican-born immigrants who became U.S. citizens demonstrate a demographic
exception to the average migrant from Mexico. To assist in illustrating these differences,
Table 14 offers a comparison of the declarants and the petitioners, during the 1915 to 1925
period. As may be observed in the table, the petitioners had greater job skills, were older,
and more likely to be married. More “settled” in their lives, the petitioners had enjoyed
superior benefits from their experience in the United States, and therefore, would more
likely accept the opportunity to become a U.S. citizen. Contrarily, the declarants had fewer
job skills, were younger, commonly unmarried, and less settled in the community.
Table 14: Comparison of San Antonio Declarants and Petitioners, 1915-1925
1915-1925

Declarants of Intention

Total Number
Laborer occupation
Age
Married
Born in three Mexican
border states
Last lived in three
Mexican border states

1,046
44.5% (465)
34.9 years
61.8% (646)

Petitions for
Naturalization
129
25.6% (33)
42.2 years
83.7% (108)

57.0%

68.2%

73.6%

80.6%

Source: Declarations of Intention for Citizenship and Petitions for Naturalization
1915-1925, Series from Record Group 21: Records of District Courts of the United
States, 1685 - 2004, NA-FW. The three border states include Coahuila, Nuevo
Leon, and Tamaulipas.

The higher marriage rate of the petitioners becomes more apparent when considering
the trend for all Mexican immigrants. According to U.S. Bureau of Immigration Reports,
only forty-five percent of males who migrated from Mexico during the early 1920s had
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already married.111 The difference in their birthplaces and last foreign address also
demonstrates that more of the declarants came from elsewhere in Mexico than the
petitioners. Most importantly, that the petitioners emanated from communities close to the
border reveals that still being near their homeland which facilitated regular return trips may
have contributed to the aspect of being more satisfied with their U.S. residency. A closer
look at the occupational categories of these two groups further adds to the distinctiveness
of the petitioners.
Table 15 provides more specifics regarding the employment type for declarants and
petitioners during the 1915 to 1925 period. High white collar includes accountants,
doctors, engineers, pharmacists and superintendents—professions that needed a college
education. Low white collar comprises employees working in any type of non-manual
labor profession, and consisted of agents of any kind, journalists, and the largest of this
group, musicians. In the blue collar section, the skilled workers encompassed anyone who
had long labored in their occupation to learn a skill such as tailors, carpenters, barbers, and
mechanics. A semi-skilled worker ordinarily refers to a machine operator in a factory, but
few of these men occupied such a category; painters and chauffeurs best represented this
grouping. Finally, a large percentage of both groups indicated “laborer” as their
employment or journalero in Spanish, and this livelihood encompassed most of the
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Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, 1920,
100. The 1920 report showed 28,425 males coming as immigrant aliens of which 12,615 (44.4%)
were married. Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of
Labor, 1921, 38. The 1921 report, a lesser period of immigration, totaled 14,054 males with 6461
(46.0%) married.
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unskilled workers.112 As may be noted in this table, the white collar percentage of the
petitioners exceeds the declarants. Further demonstrating the established nature of these
aspirants for citizenship, their standard-of-living probably surpassed the other group due to
the higher white-collar percentage and, as previously noted, fewer of the petitioners
occupied the laborer category. Although these findings slightly contrast with those of
historian George Sánchez regarding Los Angeles, similarities may also be noted.
Table 15: Occupation Categories of San Antonio
Declarants and Petitioners, 1915-1925

High white collar
Low white collar

Percent of 1,033
Declarants that listed an
occupation
2.9% (30)
16.26% (168)

Total white collar

19.17% (198)

31.7% (40)

Skilled blue collar
Semi-skilled blue
collar
Unskilled blue collar

20.91% (216)

31.0% (40)

11.13% (115)

8.5% (11)

48.79% (504)

27.1% (35)

Total blue collar

80.83% (835)

68.3% (86)

Occupation category

Percent of 126 Petitioners
that listed an occupation
3.1% (4)
27.9% (36)

Source: Declarations of Intention for Citizenship and Petitions for Naturalization 19151925, Series from Record Group 21: Records of District Courts of the United States, 1685 2004, NA-FW.

Sánchez’ white-collar declarants remained within a five percent variance from those
in San Antonio, but the laborer total in the Alamo City far exceeded that in Los Angeles.
The white-collar similarity represented, as Sánchez also indicated, that group’s propensity
112

The categories used in this chart derive from Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 192-193.
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to make the United States their home. However, a wide disparity existed in unskilled bluecollar workers as Sánchez discovered slightly less than thirty percent compared to the
almost fifty percent in Table 15.113 Perhaps, since a majority of the migrants to San
Antonio came from the three northern border states (see Table 14), whereas Sánchez’
declarants journeyed from central Mexico,114 the cost of the trip impacted who could afford
to come. Laborers, with few job skills, not only in the United States, but also in Mexico,
probably had lesser resources than those with a more lucrative occupational background.
Therefore, the relatively short trip from northern Mexico to San Antonio contrasted with
the longer distance from central Mexico to Los Angeles, and the expenses in traveling to
the two cities varied appreciably. By analyzing just the statistics for married petitioners,
that group’s characteristics may be further evaluated.
Generally, immigrants to the United States who married outside of their ethnic or
racial group tended to integrate more readily into U.S. culture or, at least, their children
did.115 When assessing Mexican petitioners in San Antonio from 1915 to 1925, the definite
scarcity of marrying outside of their ethnicity becomes apparent. Of the 108 married

113

Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 192-194. Although Sánchez did not specifically
indicate the dates of these declarants, based on the context, they emanate from a similar time period
to this dissertation.
114

115

Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 46.

For instance, historians Roland L. Guyotte and Barbara M. Posadas demonstrated this tendency
in regard to Filipinos who came to Chicago after World War II. They wrote of interracial couples
and their children: “Although these families were bi-cultural, and typically preserved elements of
the ethnic heritage of both parents, emphasis on the American as defining the children’s future
success was paramount.” See “Interracial Marriages and Transnational Families: Chicago’s
Filipinos in the Aftermath of World War II,” Journal of American Ethnic History, Winter-Spring
2006, Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3, page 151.

343

petitioners, none can be identified as unquestionably having married a non-Mexicano.
Many of them did marry someone born in the United States, fifty men or roughly forty-six
percent, but almost every given name of the spouse could be identified as Mexicano (e.g.
Concepción, Jesusa, and Maria) and often included a pre-marriage Latino surname. In six
cases, the given name could have been “American,” but the names have been commonly
used in both Mexico and the United States (e.g. Georgia, Lydia, and Sarah).116 Mexican
immigrants resisted naturalization and remained in allegiance to their home nation, and
even those who did follow through on becoming a U.S. citizen, still married a woman
closely identified with Mexico rather than the United States. Between the treatment they
received from Anglos in the United States and the closeness of their country, Mexicanos
saw little reason to naturalize.
Another area to consider with regard to the likelihood of naturalization, the rate of
illiteracy, which can only be analyzed with regard to the declarants, totaled 14.5 percent or
152 of this group and provides a contrast with Mexican citizens in general.117 The
illiteracy rate of the declarants, roughly one in seven, illustrates that these applicants had
attained a higher educational level than their countrymen since Mexico remained 65
percent illiterate in 1921.118 This statistic probably indicates that Mexican immigrants
116

Petitions for Naturalization 1915-1925, Series from Record Group 21: Records of District
Courts of the United States, 1685 - 2004, NA-FW.
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Declarations of Intention for Citizenship 1915-1925, Series from Record Group 21: Records of
District Courts of the United States, 1685 - 2004, NA-FW. Petitioners were required to be literate
and, therefore, an “analysis” would not be appropriate.
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Estados Unidos Mexicana, Departamento de las Estadística Nacional, Censo General de
Habitantes (Talleres Graphicos de la Nación, 1921), 198.
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tended to be more educated. Nonetheless, many of the 1,046 declarants did not apply for
the purpose of attaining citizenship; they may have just hoped to keep their job. As
mentioned in Chapter 3 regarding the five men who worked for George Hindes, Anglo
employers sometimes coerced their Mexicano workers to declare because this action
allowed them to vote. Charles Baumberger, Jr., the President of the Alamo Portland
Cement Company in San Antonio apparently engaged in such a practice. Coming from a
long-time Republican family, Baumberger operated not only the company, but also
provided employee accommodations located near the factory. Commonly referred to as
“Cementville,” the company town housed mostly Mexicano workers.119 Of the 1,046
declarants, 68 listed Cementville or “Rock Quarry” as their home address and another 15
used 1634 Jones Avenue, a nearby grocery store address where some cement workers
received their mail. Many of the Cementville declarants came to the court in groups of 8 or
9 and a total of 29 filled out their papers in one week during September of 1915. Of
particular note, all of the illiterate workers from Cementville during that week in
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Chas G. Norton, ed., Men of Affairs of San Antonio (San Antonio Newspaper Artists
Association, 1912), 133. Arthur J. Simpson, ed., The Century in Southwest Texas, Business and
Professional Directory (San Antonio: Southwest Publications, 1935), 135. Ancestry.com. Texas,
Death Certificates, 1903–1982 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc.,
2013. http://search.ancestry.com/cgi-bin/sse.dll?gss=angsc&new=1&rank=1&gsfn=Charles&gsln=Baumberger&msypn__ftp=San+Antonio%2c+Bexar%2c
+Texas%2c+USA&msypn=76338&msypn_PInfo=8%7c0%7c1652393%7c0%7c2%7c3249%7c46%7c0%7c302%7c76338%7c0%7c&_83004003n_xcl=f&cpxt=1&cp=12&MSAV=0&uidh=jr5&pcat=34&h=1543355&recoff=9+10+53+54&db=t
xdeathcerts&indiv=1&ml_rpos=2. “Cementville, Texas,” San Antonio Light, June 26, 1983,
section C, page 1. “Death of a Company Town,” San Antonio Light, February 2, 1986, page 51.
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September, a total of 17, had their declaration witnessed by Baumberger himself.120
Apparently, Baumberger arranged for the men to visit the U.S. District Court in downtown
San Antonio on a regular basis to file their papers. It remains unclear as to whether the
employees received pay for their time at the court as the cement company laborers worked
12-hour days as late as 1919.121 Baumberger apparently arranged for 83 of the 1046
declarants from 1915 to 1925 to file, nearly 8 percent. Many more of the candidates for
citizenship may have been handled in a similar matter, even if not by such a large-scale
employer.
Clarence Jeffries, a Laredo area contractor and long-time friend of Clemente Idar,
commented on the practice of having an employee declare so that he could vote as the
employer directed. Jeffries, a supporter of Mexican immigration, including the Bracero
Program, and a person who seemed genuinely concerned about the treatment of Mexicanos,
wrote to the AFL organizer in February, 1920, regarding Mexican immigrants:
[The Mexican has] been lied to about the voting privilege and told that in taking out
first papers he was not compromising his Mexican Citizenship but that all residents
had a right to vote and that it was the duty of all good residents to lend his assistance
in the elections. I have always as you know insisted that the Mexican who took part
in the American elections more sinned against than sinning in this matter and that the
Disgrace attached to the transactions were on the American who knew better and who
took advantage of the Mexican. . . . in most cases he was told by these people that the
declaration of intentions was simply a form by which he was giving his place of
residence and that no oath of Allegiance was ever read to him. Time and again have I
read this to Mexicans who proudly told me, ‘Yo no he tomado juramiento alguno.
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Declarations of Intention for Citizenship and Petitions for Naturalization 1915-1925, Series from
Record Group 21: Records of District Courts of the United States, 1685 - 2004, NA-FW.
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Pycior, “La Raza Organizes,” 164-165.
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Siendo asi tender que estudiarlo (I have not taken any oath. As such I have to
qualify).’”122
Jeffries, an employer himself, had provided a succinct description of what transpired
between many employers and Mexican immigrant employees throughout south Texas. The
total of 1,046 declarants in San Antonio included many aspirants who had been deceived or
coerced into completing the document. Therefore, even the paltry 5.3 percent of the
population increase noted in Table 13 did not accurately reflect Mexicano interest in
completing first papers. The real percentage was probably much lower. Unlike some
Texas employers, Clemente Idar attempted, without much success, to encourage Mexican
immigrants to naturalize for the purpose of integrating them into U.S. society.
Historian Emilio Zamora wrote that “Idar worked diligently in Texas and contributed
significantly to the organizing and chartering of Mexican unions. He was also responsible
for both improving racial relations within Texas labor and furthering the influence of the
AFL and trade unionism in Mexico.”123 I mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter
that Idar succeeded beyond his expectations. Although this did not hold true for
encouraging the naturalization of Mexican immigrants, a goal that could only fail at this
122

Clarence Jeffries, Laredo contractor to Idar, letter dated February 15, 1920, in Box 1, Folder 21,
Clemente N. Idar Papers, 1875-1938, NLBA. The poorly conjugated Spanish in the last sentence
still roughly reads as stated in the translation.
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Zamora, The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas, 202. Another historian, Cynthia Orozco,
added that Idar was “Recognized as an eloquent orator, his missing fingers must have impressed
worker;.” See No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed, 103. Orozco noted that Idar had lost three
fingers in a printing press accident which disqualified him from the Great War draft; see page 101.
F.A. Hernández, a tenant farmer from Nordheim, Texas, about seventy miles southeast of Texas,
worked with the Socialist Party and predated Idar in efforts to bridge the relations between Anglos,
Tejanos, and Mexican immigrants; see Alter, “From the Copper-Colored Sons of Montezuma to
Pancho Villa,” 25-26.
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time, he did begin the process of blending working-class Mexicanos into U.S. society
through their membership in the American Federation of Labor. While this progress
primarily involved U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage or, in a few cases, men who had
naturalized, by uplifting these individuals, he assisted in beginning the process of
Mexicano acceptance in U.S. society. As mentioned in the beginning of the section on
Idar, many Anglos in Texas saw all Mexicanos as disposable workers, no matter their
citizenship. Therefore, when Mexicanos recruited by Idar attained more economic and
social achievements as members of the AFL, all persons of Mexican ancestry experienced
success through association with the same ethnic group, no matter how minimal. Idar
possessed agency as a member of the gente decente and utilized this advantage to assist his
Mexicano brethren despite the prejudicial policies of the AFL toward immigrants. At a
time when most Anglos discriminated against all Mexicanos, Idar used his position and
relationship with the AFL, particularly with Gompers and Morrison, to rise above the
condemnation and progress forward regarding the acceptance of his ethnicity. Idar took
advantage of the opportunity afforded him as an organizer for the AFL.
Clemente Idar, through his efforts in support of Mexicanos with the AFL, and
mutualista groups such as Sociedad de la Unión that accepted members of any birthplace,
both worked to uplift persons of Mexican heritage. Nonetheless, the existence of
organizations such as la Unión, which emphasized ethnic solidarity as well as possibly
being a response to discrimination, indicated that Mexicanos joined a mutualista rather than
renounce their Mexican allegiance and become U.S. citizens. During the early twentieth
century, la Unión and other mutual assistance associations proliferated in San Antonio and
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provided Mexicanos with many substantial, as well as intangible benefits that are examined
in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7
SOCIEDAD DE LA UNIÓN AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
As discussed throughout this dissertation, the 1915 to 1925 period in San Antonio,
Texas, saw the development of additional negativity toward the growing Mexican
population. For the most part, Anglo society harbored fear and resentment regarding this
burgeoning group located primarily on the West Side of the city. However, other elements,
both within Mexican society and without, strove to uplift this populace through various
means. Mutualistas developed during the late 19th century in the city, but came to a high
point of effectiveness between 1915 and 1925. Operating under a “collectivist spirit,” these
mutualistas labored to assist Mexican immigrants and native Texans of Mexican ancestry
in dealing with the problems of the day. During the early twentieth century, by comparison
with other states and documented in Chapter 1, Mexicanos in Texas experienced more
abuse, including lynching, at the hands of Anglos, particularly the Texas Rangers. As
additional Mexicans migrated to San Antonio, an increased negativity regarding all
Mexicanos flourished and included the denigration of U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage.
Within the substandard West Side barrios of San Antonio, mutualistas offered tangible
benefits and ethnic fraternalism. Another organization, the Roman Catholic Church,
sought to assist Mexicanos in their plight, but mostly from outside of the barrios and

350

without the “ethic of mutuality” demonstrated by the mutualistas.1
Based on the information reviewed throughout this dissertation, the success of mutual
assistance organizations for Mexicanos appears reasonable. Sociedad de la Unión offered a
respite from the problems, mistreatment, and discrimination that Mexicanos encountered
and maintained the largest membership of any mutualista in San Antonio from 1915 to
1925. Therefore, in relation to this dissertation, La Unión offers the most significant
information on mutualistas and their benefit to the Mexicano community in the Alamo
City. Such organizations provided “agency” to people who otherwise suffered under the
yoke of oppression from the Anglo society.
Sociedad de la Unión
Jose G. Schodts came to Sociedad de la Unión in January, 1906 and rose to be the president
of the organization in less than nine years. Born on August 11, 1875, in Texas to a Belgian
father and Mexican mother, Jose obtained a college education and worked as a bookkeeper
and accountant in central San Antonio for various companies throughout his entire adult
life. In 1900, the twenty-five-year-old Jose lived only with his mother, Jesrisa Gutierrez.
Jesrisa, born in Mexico in 1841, had come to the United States in 1875. She only spoke
1

Emilio Zamora, The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas (College Station: Texas A & M
University Press, 1993), 86. Jose Armaro Hernandez, Mutual Aid for Survival: The Case of the
Mexican American (Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1983) 62-64. Timothy
Matovina, Guadalupe and Her Faithful: Latino Catholics in San Antonio, from Colonial Origins to
the Present (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 100. Julie Leininger Pycior,
“La Raza Organizes: Mexican American Life in San Antonio, 1915-1930, as Reflected in
Mutualista Activities,” (PhD. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1979), 20. Pycior covered
all of the mutualistas in San Antonio from 1915 to 1930 and offered mostly general information on
Sociedad de la Unión. However, because this mutualista remained the largest in the city during the
period, she wrote more on la Unión than any other organization.
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Spanish and although listed in the 1900 Census as “married,” there is no indication that her
husband, Jose’s father, lived with them in their rented home on the edge of the most
rundown area of the San Antonio’s West Side. Subsequently, Jose and his Mexico-born
wife, Concepción, raised four sons in two locations in a slightly more affluent section of
the West Side of San Antonio. They owned both properties free and clear, and the second
one, considering the home’s location, became worth a sizeable $4,500 by 1940. According
to his 1918 Draft Card, the bilingual “Joe” Schodts, stood at medium height, slender build,
and already grey haired by 1918, at 43 years old. In many ways, Schodts represents an
exception to the majority of Sociedad de la Unión members. Most of the organization’s
associates labored in working-class occupations or in unskilled positions. As a collegeeducated, white collar, bilingual, native Texan, Schodts, and particularly his rise to the
presidency of the organization, suggests an antithesis compared to most of the membership.
These differences became problematic when issues arose within the organization regarding
his presidency in 1920.2

Libro de Actas, 1916-1919, July 8, 1918. Pycior, “La Raza Organizes,” 62. Ancestry.com. 1910
United States Federal Census [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc,
2006. Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910 (NARA microfilm publication T624, 1,178
rolls). Records of the Bureau of the Census, Record Group 29. National Archives, Washington,
D.C. Year: 1910; Census Place: San Antonio Ward 2, Bexar,
Texas; Roll: T624_1531; Page: 1B; Enumeration District: 0007; FHL microfilm: 1375544.
http://search.ancestry.com/cgibin/sse.dll?db=1930usfedcen&h=65538769&indiv=try&o_vc=Record:OtherRecord&rhSource=244
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Ancestry.com. U.S., World War I Draft Registration Cards, 1917-1918 [database on-line]. Provo,
UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2005. United States, Selective Service System. World
War I Selective Service System Draft Registration Cards, 1917-1918. Washington, D.C.: National
Archives and Records Administration. M1509, 4,582 rolls. Registration State: Texas; Registration
County: Bexar; Roll: 1983587; Draft Board: 2. http://search.ancestry.com/cgibin/sse.dll?indiv=1&db=WW1draft&rank=1&new=1&MSAV=1&msT=1&gss=angsd&gsfn_x=1&gsln=Schodtz&gsln_x=1&dbOnly=_F0006EAE%7c_F0006EAE_x&uidh=jr5&pcat
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Mexican mutualistas originated in Mexico during the late nineteenth century as the
presidency of Porfirio Diaz transformed into what many considered a dictatorship. Lower
economic status males formed these organizations of mutual support that provided several
member benefits in return for various fees and dues. Medical assistance, funeral aid, and
often small loans constituted some of the most important advantages of belonging to these
groups. Mutualistas soon sprang up in states throughout Mexico and sometimes provided
other assistance such as education and recreation. Members wrote constitutions, elected
officers, and held regular meetings. However, in contrast to labor unions and political
parties, the mutualistas banned discussion of religion or politics. Presumably, these
prohibitions emanated from a fear of reprisals from officials within the Diaz government
and that airing opposing opinions could have proved divisive. By 1890, mutualistas

=MIL_DRAFT&fh=0&h=17271947&recoff=&ml_rpos=1.
Ancestry.com. 1920 United States Federal Census [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA:
Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2010. Images reproduced by Family Search. Fourteenth Census of
the United States, 1920. (NARA microfilm publication T625, 2076 rolls). Records of the Bureau of
the Census, Record Group 29. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Year: 1920; Census
Place: San Antonio Ward 3, Bexar, Texas; Roll: T625_1777; Page: 11A; Enumeration
District: 42; Image: 112. http://search.ancestry.com/cgibin/sse.dll?db=1930usfedcen&h=65538769&indiv=try&o_vc=Record:OtherRecord&rhSource=244
2.
Ancestry.com. 1940 United States Federal Census [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA:
Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2012. United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth
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69.
Schodts may have joined earlier, this 1906 date is based on a memo within the minutes and cited as
the first item in this footnote. However, a San Antonio Light story on the July 4th parade lineup
from July 3, 1898 shows “Joe Schodtz” as the marshal for Sociedad de la Unión. Perhaps, this
Schodtz was the father of the man in this dissertation.
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throughout Mexico boasted an overall membership of around 50,000.3
Because of the increase in Mexican immigration to Texas, a pattern of abuse at the
hands of Anglos, and an interest in obtaining benefits, the state became the first in the
United States to see the development of mutualistas. Although founded at various times
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nineteen mutualistas formed in
San Antonio between 1875 and 1925. Of those groups, the second oldest (1886), largest,
and wealthiest, Sociedad de la Unión, continued to exist into the twenty-first century, even
after all of the others had long since ended operations.4 This chapter will examine the 1915
to 1925 period for “La Unión,” as it became known, and utilize the organization’s history
during this period to evaluate the denigration of Mexican culture as well as the importance
of such organizations to the community. The mere existence of nineteen groups organized
for mutuality in San Antonio supports the notion that Mexicanos flocked to these
associations to escape the poor treatment being meted out by Anglos as well as the
importance of the benefits received from belonging to a mutualista. Several authors have
attempted to quantify the membership totals for all of these exclusively male associations

Pycior, “La Raza Organizes,” 22-25. Zamora, The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas, 92-93.
Pycior also points out that mutualistas in Mexico began to decline as those in the United States
rose. Other authors have also discussed that Mexicanos in the United States had a greater proclivity
to organize than those in Mexico. See Manuel Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States
(University of Chicago Press, 1930), 132 and Hernandez, Mutual Aid for Survival, 61.
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Hernandez, Mutual Aid for Survival, 65. Emilio Zamora, Cynthia Orozco, and Rodolfo Rocha,
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Association, 2000), 85-86. Miguel David Tirado, “Mexican American Community Political
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in San Antonio during this period. The estimates range from eight percent of adult
Mexican males in the city to a total of 3,000 in all of the mutualistas. However, these
enumerations prove difficult to confirm due to the lack of definitive statistics regarding the
number of persons of Mexican origin living in the city as well as a scarcity of
organizational records. In fact, many of the totals discussed in some of these publications
provide misleading or incorrect statistics. Nonetheless, many Mexicano adult males did
join these groups and in numbers much higher than contemporary political or union
organizations.5
Sociedad de la Unión maintained prolific minutes throughout the 1915 to 1925 period
that prove invaluable in tracing the organization’s history. The high point of membership
occurred on July 5, 1920 when 832 males belonged to the association. However, this
figure represents a misleading total as a surge in applicants during the period leading up to
this apex dissipated shortly thereafter. During the late 1910s, the average number of
members remained under 500, and throughout the early 1920s, it ordinarily totaled about
650.6 Calculating what portion of the Mexicano population in San Antonio belonged to La
Unión at any given time is difficult, but the following information provides an
approximation of the total. The 1920 U.S. Census aggregate for the Mexican-born residing
Pycior, “La Raza Organizes,” 1. Kathleen May Gonzalas, “The Mexican Family in San Antonio,
Texas,” (Thesis, The University of Texas, 1928), 1. Neither Pycior nor Gonzalas indicated
precisely how they determined these amounts. Emilio Zamora indicates that in 1915, the year with
the largest number, about 1000 members existed within Mexican socialist unions throughout all of
Texas. See The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas, 133. Also, Local 93, an “umbrella” union
organization in San Antonio, reported a peak membership of 383 in 1920; Zamora, 167,212.
5

6

Libro de Actas, 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921, 1922-1926. Note: the 1922 to 1925 minutes
(Libro de Actas) offer the most definitive information. The rest of the data was disseminated
through a complete review of the material.
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in San Antonio totaled 28,444.7 However, only males could join La Unión and, with very
few exceptions, applicants comprised those of working age, 16 to 55.8 The breakdown of
the birthplace for La Unión applicants from 1915 to 1925 indicated that 54 percent
originated in Mexico and 44 percent in Texas. None of the candidates designated any other
U.S. state, and the remaining two percent migrated from other countries or the minutes did
not clearly indicate the place of origin. By using the La Unión breakdown as a formulaic
guide for the total Mexicano population in San Antonio, the 28,444 foreign born from the
Census (54 percent) extends to an aggregate of about 23,503 born in Texas (44 percent)
and a total of the two at 51,947.9 The U.S. Census does not break down gender totals by
ethnicity. However, it does separate males aged 18 to 44, the approximate age span of La
Unión applicants, and this group totals 24.4 percent of the overall population. Therefore,
roughly 12,675 Mexicanos in San Antonio were males between the ages of 18 and 44 (24.4
percent of 51,947).10 Finally, this compilation assists in estimating, based on La Unión’s
650 member average, that about five percent of the population of male Mexicano workers
United States Bureau of the Census, 14th Population Census, 1920, Volume III (Bureau of the
Census. Washington, D.C., 1921), 1027.
7

8

Libro de Actas, 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921, 1922-1926. The minutes contained 1183
applicants from 1915 to 1925 and only five individuals were over 55. Those under 16 were usually
listed as “student” and included another affiliate, probably a family member, as the person
responsible for them. The average age was 34.7 years.
9
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number (1027) from the U.S. Census. However, this obviously represents a best guess on her part,
since that page of the Census does not contain any definitive information on persons of Mexican
ancestry born in the United States. See Pycior, “La Raza Organizes,” 16.
United States Bureau of the Census, 14th Population Census, 1920, Volume III (Bureau of the
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between 18 and 44 (12,675) in San Antonio belonged to the organization. While this effort
may seem tedious, these estimated totals indicate the popularity of this organization in San
Antonio, especially considering that eighteen other mutualistas existed within the city. The
question remains: why La Unión?
Sociedad de la Union followed some of the same guidelines as mutualistas in Mexico
as well as others in San Antonio.11 The primary benefits of joining the organization
included medicines and employment insurance for the sick, funeral cost assistance for
members’ families, loans when debts became too much to handle, and legal aid. Associates
needed to be employed at the time of application, have no criminal record, secure two
sponsors from the current members, and attend general meetings and funerals. They paid
dues of 50 cents per month and a one dollar assessment required from all whenever a
member died. Most associates joined after learning of the organization and its benefits
from friends, neighbors, and co-workers, but newspaper advertisements and the expectation
of members to recruit candidates also played a significant role.12 However, due to La
Unión’s status as one of the oldest mutualistas in San Antonio and because its membership
remained significantly larger than similar organizations, affiliates also joined due to the
instability of other groups within the city. This last point became exceedingly clear in
November, 1919 when La Unión raised its funeral benefit well above the other San
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Antonio organizations from $325 to $500.13 Within the next four months, new members
inundated La Unión as 442 joined and more than doubled the total membership to 778.14
Records do not exist regarding the applicants’ possible previous membership in other
groups. Nevertheless, many of these new members probably came from other San Antonio
mutualistas as publication of the increased interment assistance within the most popular
Spanish-language daily newspaper in the city, La Prensa, certainly assisted. The
newspaper article indicated that the initiative provoked “some discussion,” but that it “will
definitely stay approved.”15 Attrition over the next several months indicates that many of
these new enrollees came to the organization without a great deal of thought and only
represented a hasty reaction to the raising of the funeral benefit. By July, 1920, the
membership totaled 832, a peak for La Unión, but the next several months saw some of the
largest numbers of members being expelled for not paying dues. The minutes for July 5
indicate that the organization suspended over 100 members on that date for non-payment
and expelled 41 shortly afterward.16 Despite this attrition, interest in joining the strongest
organization supports the belief that Mexicanos believed that mutuality would assist in
coping with the degradation they suffered at the hands of Anglos in San Antonio. The
“insurance policy” offered by organizations such as Sociedad de la Union provided
Libro de Actas, 1919-1921, November 10, 1919, pages 79-80. “Una Junta en la Sociedad de la
Unión,” La Prensa, November 12, 1919, page 8. Emilio Zamora also mentions that in San
Antonio, political groups “often found it necessary to increase their following by advocating
material improvements for local Mexicans.” See The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas, 74.
13
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working-class Mexicanos with a security that otherwise proved elusive within the city of
the Alamo.
Although La Unión remained the largest, wealthiest, and most influential of the
mutualistas in San Antonio, several others occupied a meaningful position within the
community. Benevolencia Mexicana (1875) and Orden Amigos de Pueblo (1887)
organized within a similar time period to La Unión and remained viable into the early
1930s. Both offered similar benefits to La Union such as the payment of funeral expenses
and the camaraderie of belonging to an association of fellow Mexicanos. Benevolencia, the
only mutualista in San Antonio that predated La Unión, formed after a meeting of a dozen
men at a private residence in 1875. Although La Unión owned a meeting hall within a few
years of its foundation, Benevolencia continued to meet in members’ homes for many years
before inaugurating its own building in 1915. Both clubs added auditoriums to their
primary buildings, La Unión in 1919 followed by Benevolencia in 1921. Benevolencia
contrasted with La Unión by donning black uniforms with a special insignia during funeral
processions and even fined members who failed to attend, but had to suspend payment of
death expenses during epidemics. By the early 1920s, Benevolencia dealt with problematic
nonattendance, a possible symptom of decline, by changing their weekly meeting date from
Thursday evenings to Sunday mornings when more members could be present. Attendance
issues also created concerns regarding leadership positions.
Due to the proliferation of mutualistas in San Antonio, some members served as
officers in more than one organization. For instance, in 1922, Juan S. Niño served as the
Vice President of Benevolencia while also holding the secretary’s position at another
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association, Sociedad Amado Nervo; within the next few years, he would hold additional
offices at two other groups, Sociedad Mutualista Mariano Escobedo and Sociedad Allende.
Such crossover indicated that some of the mutualistas chose to maintain their group for fear
of losing their official positions and organizational independence. Competition from larger
and wealthier mutualistas such as La Unión probably impacted the viability of other
associations.17
Orden Amigos del Pueblo represented an alternative strategy to that followed by the
other mutualistas in San Antonio by organizing branches around the state rather than
continuing membership in only the San Antonio club as La Unión practiced. Amigos del
Pueblo continued to attempt creative strategies to assist members such as an abortive effort
to form a bank for associates as well as a community-wide hospital in 1923. Despite this
failure, led by shoemaker Máximo Vera, Amigos del Pueblo boasted $1000 monthly
revenue by the mid-1920s which rivaled a similar amount collected by La Unión. Just as
La Unión suffered internal strife, Amigos del Pueblo saw dissension among members
during the early 1920s over implementation of the rules. Notwithstanding such turmoil,
this enforcement probably assisted in the longevity of mutualistas that adhered to their
internal guidelines and, thereby, minimized the possibility of future discord. Amigos del
Pueblo also built a theater in 1922 on their property, joining La Unión and Benevolencia in
such an endeavor. Because all three of these organizations, La Unión, Benevolencia, and
Amigos del Pueblo, constructed theaters at a time shortly before some mutualistas began to
experience a drain on membership and finances, these theatrical endeavors probably added
17
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to the longevity of the organizations through ticket sales. During the early 1930s, all three
clubs remained in existence within a few blocks of each other within the poorest portion of
the West Side of San Antonio. Only La Unión survived well beyond that time period.18
The minutes of La Unión reveal a strict regimen that reflected on the proceedings
themselves. Held weekly every Monday evening, the meetings began at 8:30 PM at La
Unión’s main hall located within the West Side of San Antonio at the northwest corner of
Matamoros and Pecos Streets. The minutes from December 17, 1917 offer a representative
sampling. After the call to order with 42 members present, the secretary reviewed the
previous meeting’s minutes. Next, the Salubrity Committee Report presented medical
information on ill members and indicated the appropriate compensation based on the
number of sick days. Provided that a doctor signed an “illness certificate,” members
received 50 cents for each day they could not work. The Finance Committee Report
followed, but little needed to be discussed for this particular meeting. Next, the Rules
Committee Report took place and involved a review of the rules and a discussion of likely
violators. Possible infractions included engaging in political or religious conversations,
using profane language during a La Unión meeting, disparaging another member, and
failure to pay dues. Subsequently, the Treasurer Committee Report reviewed the status of
the organization’s second property on San Saba Street in San Antonio, as well as the
income and expenses for the buffet portion of the meeting. The minutes then listed all of
the current applications which provided a full record of each candidate including their
name, occupation, age, birthplace, current address, and marital status. The birthplace
18
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indicated the name of the respective community and, usually, the state in Mexico or the
United States. A “Pending” discussion on the disposition of the applicants came
afterwards. Finally, a “General Matters” discussion included correspondence, issues with
members, a listing of checks issued, and any general discussions from the membership.19
During the first meeting of each month, a few added agenda items may be seen as in
this example from April 3, 1921. The “Collector” reviewed the dollar quantity of dues and
other fee collection for the previous month and sometimes added information on the
membership total, suspended associates, and member terminations (from 1922 on, this
additional information became more regular). Also, the Treasurer provided a report that
reviewed the expenditures for the previous month and the total account balance for the
organization. The Collector of Rents Report provided information on the rental of the
association’s main hall at Matamoros and Pecos Streets, usually to other mutualistas, as
well as the previously mentioned property on San Saba Street. La Unión collected
approximately $100 a month during 1921 in rentals, but spent most of the funds on needed
improvements to the buildings.20
Whenever a member died, La Unión conducted a special meeting to finalize the
funeral arrangements. For instance, one such meeting took place on February 3, 1918 after
the death of member Juan Perez Garza earlier that morning in his home at 522 Arbor Place
on the near West Side. According to a listing in the front of one of the ledgers for the
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minutes, Juan had died of pneumonia. The minutes indicated that arrangements for the
funeral on the following day had been finalized including a list of the eighteen people
attending as representatives of the organization as well as preparations for funeral
procession vehicles. Five days later, on February 8, 1918, Reimundo Villarreal also
succumbed to pneumonia, and La Unión proceeded with similar arrangements for another
fallen member.21 Although the records and dates of La Unión members’ deaths contain
omissions, the period from 1916 through 1925 saw a listing of 85 funerals paid for by the
organization. Further, the cause of death was indicated for 41 of the 48 members who
expired from 1916 through 1921, and nineteen of those individuals died of pneumonia,
tuberculosis, or some other lung related issue. Considering the influenza epidemic of the
late 1910s throughout the world, and the almost 600,000 who died during 1918 in the
United States alone, these figures appear low for a group of individuals living in
substandard housing. Obviously aware of the epidemic and fearing contagion, La Unión
even suspended its meetings in late October and early November, 1918, but continued to
assist members who fell ill.22 Perhaps, the recording of death causes did not accurately
reflect reality or, for some unknown reason, La Unión members avoided such diseases.
Membership in a mutualista evoked a certain status for the associate in the
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neighborhood and holding office elevated this ranking even higher.23 The officers of La
Unión served for a full year after a general election during the second week of July which
also involved a celebration of the organization’s anniversary. This commemoration of La
Unión’s founding involved refreshments, speeches, and dancing for members and their
families.24 La Prensa often reported on the event as it did in 1918 for the 32nd anniversary
celebration at the association’s building at Matamoros and Pecos Streets. The newspaper
referred to it as a literary and musical evening that numerous families from the organization
enjoyed.25 Other mutualistas in San Antonio often attended each other’s events in a spirit
of congeniality among the Mexicano groups within the city.
Just as the predecessor Mexican mutualistas had done, the organizations in the United
States did not permit the discussion of religion or politics at their meetings. They
commonly believed that such dialogue could only prove divisive to the mutuality for which
most members joined. The president had the authority to expel any member who violated
this principle during a meeting.26 Also, the expectation of proper moral behavior occupied
a prominent place in mutualistas as the ethical posture of members remained a steadfast
principle of these organizations.27 This probably emanated from a belief that following
these strict codes demonstrated to Anglo society that Mexicanos could maintain such
23
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standards as well as upholding La Unión’s status within the Mexican community in San
Antonio. Despite such safeguards, even the officers of the organization allegedly
dishonored these expectations and suffered the consequences as did Jose Schodts.
Elections at La Unión sometimes proved to be more raucous than the celebrations that
took place on the same date. The following offices stood for election each year: President,
Vice President, Recording Secretary, Corresponding Secretary, Supply Secretary,
Treasurer, Collector, Assistant Collector, Accountant, Porter, Finance Chairman, Salubrity
Chairman, Rules Chairman, and Standard Bearer. After being unopposed for election for
President during most of the years from 1915 to 1920, Jose Schodts resigned in November,
1920 due to health reasons as well as alleged financial mismanagement. Schodts, a
bookkeeper and accountant by trade, had supposedly revealed La Union’s finances to some
of his fellow business associates. Rather than being seen as corrupt, the organization
viewed his actions as unbecoming an officer and had “afecto su reputación” (affected his
reputation). Schodts’ Vice President, Pedro Garza, assumed the office for the remainder of
the term only to be soundly defeated in 1921 by long-time member Guadalupe Baez.
During the nomination phase of the 1921 election, Schodts asked for the consideration of a
third candidate, only to be refused by the election commissioners Ezequiel Solis and
Adolfo Fuentes. Subsequently, all but one of the previous officers either lost the election
or was not nominated. Apparently, a general consensus developed that due to the issues
that had occurred with Schodts, this also tainted his fellow officers, including several who
had held their positions for a few years. The one election exception, Feliciano Rendon,
won the Supply Secretary position by three votes, although he had been the Corresponding

365

Secretary, an apparently more prestigious position. Further, the two election
commissioners, Solis and Fuentes, won the elections for Vice President and Corresponding
Secretary respectively. With the exception of this 1921 election when the balloting
occurred on a separate day, the other 1916 to 1925 contests took place on the regular
meeting night. In 1921, the regular meeting took place on Sunday and the election the
following day on Monday, July 11, perhaps to avoid the expected tension as a result of the
polling. Near the end of the election, when Schodts was nominated for the office of Porter,
the debate became “acalorado” (hot) over the dissension between rival factions. Some of
the former president’s defenders indicated that such a position would be disparaging to
someone who had been the head of the organization for several years. Apparently in
derision, the minutes indicated that “Schodts dice que si fuere electo para semejante puesto
lo desempeñara con gusto.” 28 Roughly translated, Schodts indicated that he would serve
such a post if elected, but this comment seemed to be delivered in disdain at the slight of
being nominated to such a lowly position after serving many years as the president.
The 1921 election did not appear to have settled the issues between rival groups
within La Unión. Pedro Garza ran against Baez for president in both 1922 and 1924, losing
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the first contest by a fairly close vote. Jose Schodts continued to submit contrary ideas
regarding the day to day operation of the organization and even nominated candidates for
president and vice president in 1925 and seconded others, mostly men who had served with
him in 1920. In a few cases, Schodts’ former treasurer, Feliciano Acosta, assisted with
offering nominations and seconding others. With regard to less prestigious offices, Baez
also nominated candidates, a highly unusual move for a sitting and already re-elected
president. Although the opposition candidates lost, some by a close margin, these rivalries
demonstrated a continuing tension within the organization.29 Although Schodts appeared
to have followers who had not achieved a similar employment or education level, some of
the divisiveness among La Unión’s members may have emanated from jealousy or
resentment of Schodts due to his background and subsequent success. Schodts may have
prevailed as president for many years, but since he presumably revealed organizational
details to his current employer, the Jewish-run M. Halff & Brother,30 this proved too much
of an insult for some members. Perhaps, to these individuals, Schodts represented the
Anglo hierarchy in San Antonio that suppressed the Mexican population.
29
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Guadalupe Baez possessed a much different background than Schodts, but one that
more precisely represents the typical mutualista member. Although much older than most
members when elected president at around 55 years of age, after having been a member of
the organization since 1896, he would continue as president for 16 years and, therefore,
leave office in his early seventies with over 40 years of service to the association.31 Baez’
birth place remains uncertain as the 1880 and 1920 U.S. Census schedules indicate that he
was born in Mexico to Mexican parents, but the 1930 and 1940 documents specify Texas
as his place of origin. Also, his birth year remains elusive since the census data from the
various years shows a range from 1858 to 1866, but perhaps the translation from his native
language of Spanish to the official record in English reflects discrepancies. He and his
wife, Catarina, also born in Mexico, had at least three sons and one daughter, but the lack
of an entry for them in the censuses from 1890 to 1910 hinders this assessment. Catarina
passed away sometime during the early 1920s, but two sons, Miguel and Ernesto, in their
thirties and then forties continued to live with him in 1920 and 1930 along with a nineteenyear-old grandson, Ruben Galvan in 1940. Working as a herder and cowboy, Baez spent
most of his adult life in the San Antonio Stockyards, located just to the southwest of the
West Side neighborhood, and his sons apparently joined him by being employed as
butchers or in stock yards positions throughout the 1920 to 1940 period. Ernesto had lost a
leg for unknown reasons by the time of his registering for the draft in 1917 and a third son,
Enrique, also worked in the stock yards. Baez owned his home on South Comal Street free
Libro de Actas, 1916-1919, July 8, 1918, page 439. Pycior, “La Raza Organizes,” 62. The
founders of La Unión were a grocery owner and mason, but one of the other early leaders was a
laundry worker; see Pycior page 36.
31
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and clear in 1920 and by 1930, he resided at another address about a block away in a house
worth $500 that rose to $800 in value by 1940. Both of these addresses, 1117 and 1203
South Comal Street, remained located in a portion of the West Side of San Antonio
considered to be the most substandard in the city.32 Never having attended formal
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schooling and possibly transformed by the relatively early loss of Catarina in her middle
fifties in addition to apparent hardships with his son Ernesto, Guadalupe Baez still attained
a significant status within the community due to his affiliation with La Unión. Serving for
many years as president of an important organization within the West Side of San Antonio
undoubtedly inflated Guadalupe’s standing as a vital member of the community.
The description of these two men, Schodts and Baez, affords a glimpse of the
leadership of La Unión during the 1915 to 1925 period. One man educated and,
apparently, well off financially contrasted with the more typical experience of another who
suffered the hardships of being Mexicano in San Antonio during the early twentieth
century. Baez represents the kind of person for whom La Unión originated, and Schodts, in
some ways, the type of person who might oppress Mexicanos in San Antonio. However,
Schodts’ background with his Mexican mother and continuing to live on the West Side of
San Antonio opened the possibility of Jose experiencing two different worlds within the
Alamo City. Due to his employment as an accountant, Schodts worked in downtown San
Antonio away from the West Side. However, Jose lived within the barrios and led an
organization for several years that worked to uplift members who resided in that same
community. Baez’ background and life experience demonstrates what was possible for
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working class men who joined an organization such as La Unión as he rose within the
organization to accept a meaningful societal position in the San Antonio Mexicano
community. However, La Unión did not remain unaware of popular culture activities
within the Anglo community that disparaged Mexicanos, and they sometimes took
measures to defend their heritage.
La Unión acquired a property in the 200 block of South San Saba for the purpose of
creating a theater in June of 1919. About two blocks from La Unión’s main location at the
corner of Matamoros and Pecos Streets, the San Saba property never saw service as a
theater, but continued to be rented out for other purposes and, thereby, created more
income. La Unión eventually built a theater that provided revenue, but as an annex to the
organization’s primary building.33 The timeframe of the construction of this theater and the
showing of Spanish-language Mexican films probably came not only as a celebration of
their culture, but also as a reaction to anti-minority films being produced by the U.S. film
industry. Birth of a Nation and Martyrs of the Alamo from 1914 and 1915 respectively and
discussed in Chapter 1 represent two examples of such cinema.34 Moreover, La Epoca, a
Spanish-language weekly newspaper published in San Antonio, printed a front-page article
that outlined a campaign by several mutualistas, including La Unión that objected to the
generally racist tone of U.S.-made films and their depiction of Mexicanos. The
33
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organizations had petitioned U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and other government
officials to ban films that “ofenden a nuestra raza, y contribuyen a que existan odios y
desconfianzas entre dos pueblos” (offend our race, and contribute to the hatred and mistrust
that exists between two peoples). Further, the newspaper article discussed the portrayal of
Mexicanos as “pueblo degenerado y envilecido” (degenerate and debased people) in
supposedly “historical” films, a description that mirrors their depiction in Martyrs of the
Alamo. Although no evidence may be found that any of these protests resulted in a change
within the cinema industry, President Schodts of La Unión also contacted the mayor of San
Antonio, Sam C. Bell, as well as the Mexican Consul in the city in regard to the content of
some U.S. films.35 However, the theater did produce considerable income and undoubtedly
added to La Unión’s status on the West Side.
The financial picture of La Unión remained strong throughout this period although it
did tend to fluctuate with membership ebb and flow as the monthly dues affected the totals.
The expenditures of the organization continued to rise during the 1915 to 1925 period:
calendar 1916 saw the association spend $16,319.57, and for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1920, the amount rose to $29,125.03. By fiscal 1924, the organization spent $48,812.15.36
Although a substantial portion of these totals went back to the membership in funeral and
sick expenses, the association also maintained other endeavors such as the theater and the
rental property. La Unión’s balance of funds regularly increased. Table 16 represents the
“Labor de Unión y Amistad,” La Epoca, June 23, 1918, pages 1 and 12. Libro de Actas, 19161919, June 17, 1918, pages 432-433. Also see: Matovina, Guadalupe and Her Faithful, 104.
35
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Libro de Actas, 1916-1919, January 29, 1917, page 245; Libro de Actas, 1919-1921, July 5, 1920,
page 171; Libro de Actas, 1922-1926, July 14, 1924, page 334.
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fund total from the first meeting of the year in 1915 through 1925. Although no obvious
reason may be discerned for the drop off in 1917, the increase in 1921 reflects the
significant influx of new members and the gains in 1924 and 1925 reflect another, smaller
surge in applicants, and also the financial profitability of their properties.

Table 16: January La Unión Fund Balance in U.S. Dollars, 19151925
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Source: the first Libros de Actas, 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921, and 1922-1926
in January of each year during 1915 through 1925.

Table 17 shows the number of applicants during the same time period and offers a
comparison to the fund balance in Table 16. As the total of new members began to wane
and many of the not so serious ones left the organization in 1921, the funds began to
decrease, but then came back with increased membership that did not join just for the sake
of one benefit, the funeral expense payment. Due to his occupation as an accountant and
bookkeeper, Jose Schodts probably assisted in paving the way for La Unión to become a
self-sustaining and financially viable institution. Although not the president during the
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period when the funds increased to their highest level, he did lead the organization during
the earlier period, 1917 to 1920, when a regular growth began.

Table 17: Applicants to Sociedad de la Unión, 1915-1925
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Source: Libros de Actas 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921, 1922-1926 and again, from
the 1915 through 1925 period. Although many months had no such activity, most had
some. The two highest dates of 79 and 69 applicants came respectively on December 29,
1919 and January 26, 1920. La Prensa noted the December 29 occasion with an article
on January 4, 1920. The total applicants during the period are 1,183, although a handful
of those were repeated ones.
As previously stated, the membership of La Unión included mostly “blue-collar”
workers with a man such as Guadalupe Baez representative of this group. The information
in the minutes on the applicants contains some useful data for determining the make-up of
the membership in general. Despite their status as applicants rather than members, the
organization approved virtually every one of them. Of the 1,183 candidates, 1,076 had a
listed and legible profession, and the other 107 were students, “dependents,” or their
employment status remained unclear. Table 18 demonstrates the various categories of their
occupations.
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Table 18: Occupation Categories of La Unión Applicants, 1915-1925

Total quantity
High white collar
Low white collar
Total white collar

9
91
100

Percent of white
or blue collar
group
9.00%
91.00%

Percent of the 1076
listed occupations
0.84%
8.46%
9.29%

Skilled blue collar
449
46.00%
41.73%
Semi-skilled blue collar
90
9.22%
8.36%
Unskilled blue collar
437
44.77%
40.61%
Total blue collar
976
90.71%
Source: Libros de Actas 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921, 1922-1926, from the 1915
through 1925.

To repeat the examples of these categories as discussed in Chapter 6: high white
collar includes the college educated such as doctors, engineers, pharmacists and
superintendents. Although no accountants applied for membership during this period,
Schodts would also fall in this group. Low white collar comprises employees working in
any type of non-manual labor profession, agents, journalists, and musicians. In the blue
collar section, the skilled workers encompassed anyone who had long labored in their
occupation to learn a skill such as tailors, carpenters, barbers, and mechanics. At the point
he became a cow “puncher,” Baez’ profession applies to this segment because it involved a
specific talent, but not when he worked as a “herder,” an occupation not associated with a
special ability. A semi-skilled worker ordinarily refers to less accomplished professions
such as painters and chauffeurs, who best represented this grouping regarding the members
of Sociedad de la Unión. Finally, a large percentage of the applicants, almost 40 percent of
the grand total, indicated “laborer” as their employment, and this livelihood encompassed
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most of the unskilled workers.37 The roughly equal number of skilled and unskilled
workers indicates the wide variety within the membership of La Unión as many of these
associates worked in skilled professions that required years of service, but a similar number
took any type of manual labor job available.
San Antonio’s labor market in the early twentieth century included jobs in agriculture
within the adjacent trade area, light industry in the city itself, and a growing military
presence as four bases existed in the community by the 1930s. Light industry consisted of
“railroad yards, packing plants, military bases, garment factories, service establishments,
and the retail trade,” all of which used Mexicans as an inexpensive labor source.38
Therefore, just because an applicant said he was a carpenter, did not necessarily mean that
he worked as one. While light industry included positions for workers with specific talents,
many of the skilled workers probably labored in unskilled jobs. Although an applicant
needed to be employed to attain membership in La Unión, many worked in jobs that made
it difficult to support a family.39 Along with racial segregation, this economic hardship
meant that their substandard West Side homes provided the only affordable domiciles in

37

The categories used in this chart derive from George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American:
Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), 192-193.
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Richard A. Garcia, Rise of the Mexican Middle Class: San Antonio, 1929-1941 (College Station:
Texas A & M University Press, 1991), 28-29.
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During the early twentieth century, unskilled and low-wage Mexican workers had a difficult time
supporting their family. See: Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 189-196. Also, Herbert G.
Gutman, “Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919,” The American
Historical Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (June 1973), 531-588.
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which to reside; even white-collar workers had few housing choices.40 The West Side of
San Antonio housed almost 75 percent of the total La Unión applicants and over six percent
lived near a rock quarry on the north side known as “Cementville,” because the residents
worked at the San Antonio Portland Cement Company. Eight percent resided in other
Mexican enclaves around the city; for the final eleven percent, the address in the La Unión
minutes did not clearly identify the location. Close to one-third of all applicants lived in
the poorest portion of the West Side of the city in an upside-down triangular area bounded
by West Commerce Street on the north, Alazán Creek to the southwest, and San Pedro
Creek to the southeast. This area has been described as housing with tin sheets for walls
and no plumbing; Baez lived in this area, but Schodts resided outside of the triangular
boundary in the West Side.41 Therefore, demonstrating the social and economic
segregation of San Antonio, almost 81 percent of La Unión applicants—over 90 percent
where the address could be confirmed—lived either in the West Side or Cementville areas.
Segregated in the poorest neighborhoods of San Antonio, Mexicanos turned to mutualistas,
and especially La Unión, to supplement their meager incomes by taking advantage of the
benefits of membership.
Figure12 provides context for the physical situation on the West Side. La Unión (A)
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Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 189. For a broader look at segregation on the West Side
of San Antonio, see Flores, Remembering the Alamo. Also, Garcia, Rise of the Mexican Middle
Class.
Pycior, “La Raza Organizes,” 39, 45, 111. The statistical information comes from a review of
Libro de Actas, 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921, and 1922-1926 from 1915 through 1925.
Cementville was also the site of worker and self-help organizations such as a chapter of the
Woodmen of the World; see Zamora, The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas, 75.
41
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at 321 Matamoros Street may be seen in the center of the map at the northwest corner of
Matamoros and Pecos Streets. The San Saba property (B) was situated directly west of the
shaded rectangular block, known as Washington Square, and located to the northeast of La
Unión’s main hall. At the bottom center of the map, the two lines indicating the locations
of Alazán (approximate) and San Pedro Creeks that can be seen running to the northwest
and northeast respectively. Along with Commerce Street that runs east and west near the
uppermost section of the map (below D and E), these creeks form the upside down triangle
that encompassed the most substandard portion of San Antonio’s West Side. Note that La
Unión’s property remains in the central residential portion of this poorest section of the
city. Also close by, the Mercado (C) or market that continues in operation in the present
may be seen as the horizontal rectangular block directly north of Washington Square. The
block north of the Mercado housed Milam Park (D) where poor Mexicanos gathered on a
daily basis in an open air labor market until solicited for employment. Other places of
interest on the map include the International and Great Northern Railway (E) terminal and
the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad depot (F), commonly known as the “Katy Line.”
These two railroad lines, thoroughly reviewed in Chapter 2, proved especially important to
Mexican immigration and employment. The far West Side of central San Antonio
including the river of the same name remained positioned to the east of San Pedro Creek.
In the southwestern portion of the map, the large square represents San Fernando Cemetery
(G), the Roman Catholic burial ground in the Alamo City. A predominance of alleys

378

existed in this poverty-stricken portion of the city and many of the La Unión applicants
lived in such accommodations as noted in Chapter 6 regarding Candido Garcia.42

Figure 12: West Side of San Antonio. Source:
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/arc/maps/images/map6253.jpg

As reviewed in Chapter 2, immigrants to the city that joined La Unión ordinarily
came through one of the two railroad entry points of Laredo and Eagle Pass, Texas. Based
on a review of the 1,173 legible entries of the 1,178 total for applicants in the minutes,
around 54 percent indicated Mexico as their country of birth and 44 percent designated
Pycior, “La Raza Organizes,” 39. Gonzalas, “The Mexican Family,” 4. Libro de Actas, 19161919, July 8, 1918, page 439. Libro de Actas, 1919-1921, June 9, 1919, page 35. Hugh Hemphill,
The Railroads of San Antonio and South Central Texas, (San Antonio: Maverick Publishing Co.,
2006), 19-27, 55-60. Note that the Katy terminal had not been constructed at the time this street
map was made, 1909; it comes from the Texas State Library and Archives Commission, Map of the
City of San Antonio, https://www.tsl.texas.gov/arc/maps/images/map6253.jpg. Accessed May 1,
2015.
42
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Texas. Further breaking down those that indicated Mexico, the totals for the eight most
frequently mentioned Mexican states appear in Table 19.

Table 19: La Unión Applicants' Birthplace, 1915-1925
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Source: Libros de Actas 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921,1922-1926 for the
1915 through 1925 period. The quantity breaks down as follows: Nuevo León192, Coahuila-161, Tamaulipas-85, San Luis Potosi-61, Guanajuato-25,
Zacatecas-20, Jalisco-17, and Durango-13.
Although also thoroughly reviewed in Chapter 2 regarding the Monterrey Center and
Nuevo Leon Corridor, the discussion of northern Mexico can be further applied to La
Unión applicants. The first three states, Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas, run across
the northeastern border of Mexico with the United States; San Luis Potosi lies directly
south of Nuevo León. Based on the available railroad connections, Nuevo León and
Tamaulipas migrants would most likely cross at Laredo; Coahuila sojourners, at Eagle
Pass. These distinctions provide important information in determining the migratory
tendencies of Mexicanos who settled in San Antonio. First, the three states represent close
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to 70 percent of the migrants who applied to become members of La Unión. This total
stands in contrast to Mexicanos who journeyed to other locations such as Los Angeles
during this period as that group tended to have been born in central states such as
Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Michoacán. The poor economic conditions in the central plateau
of Mexico had driven rural workers first to the cities of their particular states, then to more
prosperous areas in the northern portion of Mexico, and finally to the United States.43 This
migration from Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Michoacán ordinarily moved on the railroad
through El Paso, Texas, toward Southern California and Los Angeles.44
Second, immigrants from northern Mexico, particularly Monterrey, often had
different motives versus those from the central regions as they remained closer to their
homeland which encouraged cyclical migration. In general, Monterrey also enjoyed
greater economic security due to its proximity to the United States and comprised the
largest single birthplace of La Unión applicants at over 17 percent (110) of the total from
Mexico.45 Manuel Gamio, the famous sociologist who studied Mexican patterns of

Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 38-46. The table on page 46 entitled “Origins of Adult
Male Mexican Immigrants” shows these three states representing sixty percent of the total that sent
money orders from California. Sánchez does indicate that some of these sojourners migrated to
northern Mexico including Nuevo León and Coahuila before coming to the United States, but those
who joined La Unión were born in these northern states. Also see: Gamio, Mexican Immigration to
the United States, 13-19.
43
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Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American, 48. The table on this page shows that over fifty-eight
percent of male migrants to Los Angeles came through El Paso.
45

Alex M. Saragoza, The Monterrey Elite and the Mexican State, 1880-1940 (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1988), 32-33, 35, 36-37. Vivienne Bennett, The Politics of Water: Urban Protest,
Gender, and power in Monterrey, Mexico (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 11-12. Mario
Cerutti, “Monterrey and Its Ambito Regional, 1850-1910: Historical Context and Methodological
Recommendations,” in Mexico’s Regions: Comparative History and Development, edited by Eric
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migration during the 1920s, discussed differences between northern and central Mexican
migrants. Mexicans from the northern portion of the nation, due to their knowledge of the
United States gained from closer proximity, possessed more revolutionary tendencies in
reaction to the poor conditions in which they lived. Gamio believed that rebellious activity
also manifested itself in the Mexican labor movement which “gained much ground in little
time.”46 Further, the north led the agrarian movement that culminated in the ouster of longtime Mexican President Porfirio Diaz. Gamio also included a review of railroad passenger
traffic in his 1930 publication by studying the second-class manifests from many different
states in Mexico to the “border stations” with the United States from mid-1926 to mid1927. He incorporated both the traffic to and from these locations, and offered information
on the likelihood of immigrants to return to their home areas. In his study, the three central
Mexican states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Michoacán represented a much smaller rate of
return in comparison to the three northern states of Nuevo León, Coahuila, and
Tamaulipas.47 In further analyzing this data, two conclusions can be made: first, the
northern states saw more cyclical migration. Next, since many more applicants came from
northern towns and cities, this demonstrates that the Nuevo León, Coahuila, and
Tamaulipas migrants had more of a tendency to rebel against economic suppression by

Van Young (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1992), 155.
46
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Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States, 159-161.

Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States, 162-169. The comparison breaks down as
follows: 57,168 traveled from the northern states and 39,391 returned for a 68.9 percent rate of
return. The southern states had a 17,882 exodus quantity and 7548 returned for a 42.2 percent rate.
In the text, Gamio explained that since many of the sending communities are small but the number
of immigrants is large, that “it is fair to assume” a large percentage were migrants. See page 165.
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migrating to the north. Therefore, migrants from Mexico who applied to become members
of La Unión, because of their adherence to rebellious thinking, believed that a mutualista
afforded them a better chance for support within the Texas city of San Antonio than relying
on the Anglo hierarchy.
Next, in studying all of the municipalities on Figure 13 (also see Table 4 in Chapter
2), only Monterrey (A), Saltillo (B), and Matamoros (E) had more than ten applicants to
Sociedad de la Unión. Monterrey, the capitol of Nuevo Leon as well as the largest city in
all of northern Mexico, occupied the most central location within the three states, and
Saltillo lies about 90 kilometers west of this key metropolis. Further, these two cities
represent nearly twenty-five percent of all the Mexican-born aspirants to the mutual
organization. Therefore, this urban geographical area within the middle of the three state
area, the Monterrey Center, constitutes the most prolific area for sending migrants to San
Antonio. Tampico (L), Torreon (M), San Pedro (N), and Victoria (O), regardless the size
of their combined population, sent less than one percent of the applicants to La Unión
during the 1915 to 1925 period. These four municipalities, located far from the border in
the western portion of Coahuila and southern part of Tamaulipas, do not provide pertinent
immigration data for this dissertation. Also, the communities of Montemorelos (C) and
Linares (D), located 50 and 130 kilometers respectively southeast of Monterrey, despite
their smaller size, sent more applicants to the San Antonio organization than the much
larger-sized Tampico, Torreon, San Pedro, and Victoria. This Monterrey Center,
comprised of Monterrey, Saltillo, Montemorelos, and Linares (A, B, C, and D) contributed
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the largest overall total of the Mexican-born applicants to La Unión at over twenty-six
percent.48

Figure 13: Northeastern Mexico. Source:
http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=5089&lang=en.

Finally, the significantly-sized border municipalities of Matamoros and Nuevo
Laredo, Tamaulipas (F), and Piedras Negras, Coahuila (G), in addition to the close-to-theboundary and sizeable communities of Lampazos, Nuevo Leon (H); Mier, Tamaulipas (I);
Monclova (J) and San Buenaventura, Coahuila (K), totaled almost twenty percent of the
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Libro de Actas, 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921, 1922-1926. The number of applicants to
Sociedad de la Unión and included in this discussion amounts to 1178.
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Mexican-born applicants.49 Not surprisingly, the border municipalities, no matter their
size, saw higher levels of migration due to their proximity to the United States as these
migrants could more readily learn of employment opportunities on the other side of the
boundary. Moreover, all together, the Monterrey Center, the border communities, and the
close-to-the-boundary municipalities amounted to over forty-six percent of the total from
Mexico. When evaluating just the states of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas, the
sum rises to 67.6 percent. Clearly, the Monterrey Center and communities on or near the
border contributed the most migrants to San Antonio that joined La Unión during the 1915
to 1925 period. The remainder emanated from smaller communities throughout the three
states or scattered locations farther away from Monterrey or the border.50 Since most of the
membership came from the three northern states of Mexico, they probably enjoyed the
camaraderie attached to such background. However, applicants were occasionally rejected
from becoming members.
La Unión ordinarily accepted applicants without any significant debate. The
requirement of two recommendations for each aspirant from current members failed to be
included in the minutes until after an event on October 29, 1923. Cesario Campa, a labor
recruiter and owner of a currency exchange in San Antonio discussed in Chapter 5, applied
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The populations of these other municipalities not in Table 4 in Chapter 2 follow: Nuevo Laredo,
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for membership in La Unión, but faced considerable opposition to his candidacy. Although
the opposition to Campa never became specific in the minutes, the main reason emanated
from his “conducta reprochable” (reprehensible conduct). Initially, seven voted against
him when only two meant rejection. Jose Schodts asked for a second vote, but five still
cast no votes. After referring the situation to the Rules Committee, during the following
meeting on November 5th, Campa lost his bid for membership. Thereafter, the names of
the members who recommended an applicant began to appear in the minutes.51 A few
conclusions may be drawn from this incident. Apparently, although Campa’s address of
1215 W. Houston Street placed him within the West Side neighborhood and he met the
qualifications for membership, some in the Mexican barrios possessed a less than desirable
reputation. This is particularly fascinating due to Campa’s profession as a labor recruiter
and currency exchange owner. This event occurred about eight months after the Texas
legislature had made owning a labor agency very difficult for persons born in Mexico.
Campa, in continuing to operate as a “car service” rather than a labor agency, may have run
afoul of some of La Unión’s members when making that transition, just as he did with
governmental officials. However, other applicants gained valuable connections regarding
their employment possibilities.
In many cases, both father and son or other family member combinations joined La
Unión. Adolfo Arispe and his son, Adolfo Jr., became members of the organization after
living in Texas for some time. Adolfo Sr. apparently came to the United States before his
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family, a fairly common occurrence. The rest of the family, including his wife and five
children, emigrated shortly thereafter in 1912 and 1913, crossing at Laredo, Texas, after
coming from Monterrey. Employed as a barber, Adolfo Sr. joined La Unión in December,
1916, at a time when the family lived at 423 South Pecos Street, only one-half block from
the organization’s main hall. Adolfo Jr. joined La Unión when he was 21 years old in
September of 1917 while working as a motion picture operator. When registering for the
draft during the following year, Adolfo Jr. indicated that he worked at the Queen Theater
that was located just north of Alamo Plaza in downtown San Antonio. In other city
directories from 1916 to 1918, Adolfo Jr. listed theaters in central San Antonio as his
employer including the Wigwam, Pearl Theatre, and Royal Theater. In 1918, Adolfo Sr.
operated a barber shop at 210 South Santa Rosa Avenue, a few blocks away from his home
and La Unión, but by 1919, the address served as both his business and residence as
Adolfo, Jr., now 23 years old, also resided there. Eduvije Arispe, the wife and mother of
the family, died on June 26, 1918, during the early stages of the influenza epidemic, and
her death may have impacted the decision to live in the place of business. Adolfo Sr.
struggled in his professional life thereafter as his vocation subsequently became a store for
hats and then groceries during the next few years. Adolfo Jr. also made a transition as he
worked as a musician by 1919.52
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The changes in the lives of the two Arispe men represent disparate experiences within

ftp=Mexico&rg_fa2__date=&rs_fa2__date=0&f16__n=&f17=&f25=&f18=&rg_f19__date=&rs_f1
9__date=0&fa10=&f21=&fa8=&f22=&fa4=&gskw=&prox=1&db=1920usfedcen&ti=0&ti.si=0&g
ss=angs-d&pcat=35&fh=0&h=77381483&recoff=&ml_rpos=1.
Libro de Actas, 1916-1919, December 4, 1916, page 210 and September 10, 1917, page 355..
Ancestry.com. U.S., World War I Draft Registration Cards, 1917-1918 [database on-line]. Provo,
UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2005. United States, Selective Service System. World
War I Selective Service System Draft Registration Cards, 1917-1918. Washington, D.C.: National
Archives and Records Administration. M1509, 4,582 rolls. Registration State: Texas; Registration
County: Bexar; Roll: 1983585; Draft Board: 1. http://search.ancestry.com/cgibin/sse.dll?indiv=1&rank=1&gsfn=Adolfo&gsln=Arispe&sx=&f3=San+Antonio&f2=Bexar&f1=T
exas&f20__ftp=&f16=&f15=&rg_f14__date=&rs_f14__date=0&f18=&gskw=&prox=1&db=ww1
draft&ti=0&ti.si=0&gss=angs-d&pcat=39&fh=0&h=17368931&recoff=&ml_rpos=1. Adolfo Jr.
was probably one of the Mexican nationals who got caught up in the idea that they were going to
have to serve in World War I. Only U.S. citizens were required to register for the draft. See Mark
Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow, 25-26.
Jules A. Appler, Jules A. Appler’s City Directory of Greater San Antonio (Appler Directory
Company, 1916), page 200.
http://interactive.ancestry.com/2469/4911001?backurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ancestry.com%2fsea
rch%2fdb.aspx%3fdbid%3d2469%26path%3d&ssrc=&backlabel=ReturnBrowsing.
Jules A. Appler, Jules A. Appler’s City Directory of Greater San Antonio (Appler Directory
Company, 1917), page 208.
http://interactive.ancestry.com/2469/4909138?backurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ancestry.com%2fsea
rch%2fdb.aspx%3fdbid%3d2469%26path%3d&ssrc=&backlabel=ReturnBrowsing.
Jules A. Appler, Jules A. Appler’s City Directory of Greater San Antonio (Appler Directory
Company, 1918), pages 209, 582, 571, 589, 620, 700.
http://interactive.ancestry.com/2469/4939980?backurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ancestry.com%2fsea
rch%2fdb.aspx%3fdbid%3d2469%26path%3d&ssrc=&backlabel=ReturnBrowsing.
Jules A. Appler, Jules A. Appler’s City Directory of Greater San Antonio (Appler Directory
Company, 1919), page 210.
http://interactive.ancestry.com/2469/4901555?backurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ancestry.com%2fsea
rch%2fdb.aspx%3fdbid%3d2469%26path%3d&ssrc=&backlabel=ReturnBrowsing,
Jules A. Appler, Jules A. Appler’s City Directory of Greater San Antonio (Appler Directory
Company, 1921), page 225.
http://interactive.ancestry.com/2469/4924747?backurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ancestry.com%2fsea
rch%2fdb.aspx%3fdbid%3d2469%26path%3d&ssrc=&backlabel=ReturnBrowsing.
Ancestry.com. Texas Death Index, 1903-2000 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com
Operations Inc, 2006. Texas Department of Health. Texas Death Indexes, 1903-2000. Austin, TX,
USA: Texas Department of Health, State Vital Statistics Unit. http://search.ancestry.com/cgibin/sse.dll?rank=1&gsfn=Eduvije&gsln=Arispe&=&gsby=&gsb2co=1%2CAll+Countries&gsb2pl
=1%2C+&gsdy=&gsd2co=1%2CAll+Countries&gsd2pl=1%2C+&=&=&=&sbo=1&sbor=&srchb
=r&prox=1&db=&ti=0&ti.si=0&gl=allgs&gss=&gst=34&so=3. Eduvije Arispe’s death falls
during the main period when members of La Unión died of influenza or related diseases. Her
funeral would not have been covered by the organization as females could not be members.

388

the San Antonio barrios. Adolfo Sr. attempted to continue his business by catering to
fellow barrios residents, but it is highly unlikely that anyone other than the populace in this
poorest of the poor neighborhood partook of his services. Undoubtedly, this added to the
difficulties of attempting to make a business successful. By regularly changing businesses,
he obviously struggled. On the other hand, Adolfo Jr. left the West Side for his
employment by working in theaters located within central San Antonio. Although
employed by others rather than managing his own business as his father did, Adolfo Jr.
experienced a more lucrative employment situation despite regularly moving from one
theater to the next. His father regularly changed his business category, whereas Adolfo Jr.
maintained a single focus and eventually achieved even more success as a white-collar
performer by becoming a musician. In speculating about how La Unión may have assisted
these two men, it can be assumed that whatever business success that Adolfo Sr. did enjoy
may have emanated from his camaraderie with fellow organization members. Many La
Unión members worked as musicians, Adolfo Jr.’s eventual profession, and these fellow
Mexicanos may have influenced his decision to embark upon a new line of work. He
continued to regularly cross the Mexican border during the early 1920s, presumably
working in his new profession as a musician on both sides of the Rio Grande.53
Adolfo Arispe Jr. completed a Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the
53

As previously indicated, over 3% of La Unión applicants indicated that they were employed as
musicians. See: Libros de Actas 1914-1915, 1916-1919, 1919-1921, 1922-1926 for the 1915
through 1925 period. Ancestry.com. Border Crossings: From Mexico to U.S., 1895-1964 [database
on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2006. http://search.ancestry.com/cgibin/sse.dll?rank=1&gsfn=Adolfo&gsln=Arispe&sx=&rg_f20__date=&rs_f20__date=0&f13=&f21
=&f14=&rg_f39__date=&rs_f39__date=0&f34=&f35=&f40=&f44=&f43=&f30=&gskw=&prox=
1&db=mexborder&ti=0&ti.si=0&gl=&gss=mp-mexborder&gst=&so=3.

389

United States on January 28, 1920. He self-identified as a motion picture operator,
indicating that his becoming a musician continued as a work in progress. Other than
“laborer,” musician was the most commonly identified profession for La Unión applicants
that completed either of the citizenship forms. Twelve of the 51 or 23.5 percent of La
Unión applicants who applied for citizenship, not including Arispe, indicated that they
worked as musicians; this compares with a little over three percent of La Unión applicants
that indicated musician as their occupation. By way of comparison, seventeen of aspirants
that filled out final citizenship papers designated laborer as their work status; this 33
percent of the total slightly trails the forty percent specified by La Unión applicants in
general.54 Although the citizenship group represents a small sampling, the percentage of
musicians provides a sizeable number. As the recording industry began to flourish during
the 1920s, and because of the possibility of selling music to Mexicanos, this profession
offered an increasingly lucrative niche for making a livelihood in the United States.55
Perhaps, similarly to musician Juan Guerra from Chapter 6, this satisfaction with
employment generated a stronger interest in citizenship for La Unión applicants such as a
former theater worker and now aspiring musician, Adolfo Arispe, Jr.
As discussed in Chapter 6, naturalization did not provide a panacea for Mexicanos to
gain improved acceptance from the Anglo population. Victor Aleman immigrated to the
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United States in 1891 from San Luis Potosi, Mexico, and naturalized by 1897. He joined
La Unión on October 23, 1916 while living and working as a laborer in Runge, Texas,
about 65 miles southeast of San Antonio in Karnes County, a significant agricultural
production area that included cotton as one of the main crops. On October 1, 1917, La
Unión received a letter from Aleman claiming that he had been poorly treated by the farmer
that employed him. Although the specific amount of support given by La Unión to Aleman
to assist with this problem is not known, the organization did read his letter into the
minutes and agreed to support him. The minutes finalized the situation as such: “que el
asunto queda a cargo del Sr. Presidente para que haga lo que sea posible para ayudar a
nuestra con socio evitando las abusos de que es objeto” (the matter is left to the President to
do whatever possible to help with our partner avoiding the abuses he suffers). Although
this solution appeared ambiguous in the minutes, the organization’s offer of any assistance
to a laborer many miles away from the main location of La Unión remains impressive.56
By 1920, Aleman lived in San Antonio at 511 West Durango Street with his wife, Amelia,
in the middle of the shoddiest area of the West Side, and worked as a “Retail Fruit
Merchant,” selling fruit in the local Mercado or as a sidewalk vendor.57 Clearly,
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naturalization did not change his personal plight. However, La Unión did take some action
in support of this worker after he received abuse at the hands of an employer. Since
Mexicanos often suffered more mistreatment in rural Texas than in the cities, Aleman came
to San Antonio for work as a street vendor after his difficult experience in Karnes
County.58 Life within a community of people that endured similar hardships contributed to
Mexicanos’ desire to reside within this area or commute from it to rural farming
employment. Joining a mutualista benefitted the membership not only with specific
advantages, but also contributed to a mutuality that could not be found within the more
sparsely populated countryside or from having become a U.S. citizen. However, due to
their employment situation in south Texas, many members could not regularly attend
meetings.
Despite the expectation that members attend the weekly Monday night meetings of La
Unión, the total number present never reached close to fifty percent during the period from
1918 to 1925. During that timeframe, attendance ran at ten to fifteen percent of total
membership, 50 to 75 persons. The election meetings constituted an exception and saw the
largest percentage of the respective year at about twenty percent. The highest total number
of members at a meeting in this period came during the contentious election of 1921 when
296 or over one-third of the membership turned out.59 However, the attendance also
swelled at election time since a festival in celebration of La Unión’s anniversary occurred
5_x&uidh=jr5&pcat=35&fh=0&h=77383741&recoff=&ml_rpos=1.
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at the same time. Many members worked long distances from San Antonio. Therefore,
given the large number of members who self-identified as laborers, these attendance
numbers confirm that San Antonio remained a home base for migrant farm workers.60
Sociedad de la Unión worked to assist Mexicanos in San Antonio by working within the
community. Other institutions also operated inside the West Side of the city, but
Mexicanos did not lead these organizations.
The Roman Catholic Church in San Antonio
The vision of the Virgin Guadalupe that purportedly appeared to the peasant Juan
Diego in 1531 began the process of more widespread acceptance of the Roman Catholic
Church by the indigenous and Hispanic peoples of Mexico. Emerging as a dark-skinned
version of Mary, mother of Jesus, Guadalupe resonated with the local population as one of
their own. The canonization of Juan Diego by Pope John Paul II in 2002 demonstrated that
the celebration of the Virgin of Guadalupe as the national symbol of Mexico and the
foremost evangelizer of Mexicanos continues into the present century. The frontier town
of San Fernando de Béxar, today’s San Antonio, adopted the Virgin as its primary
patroness as early as 1738.61 The Guadalupan traditions insured that the Roman Catholic
Church and the nation of Mexico remained intrinsically entwined, despite any efforts by
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political leaders to sever the ties in the name of modernity.62 These religious customs that
linked being Mexican with practicing Catholicism influenced Mexicanos’ character as
“culturally Catholic,” a disposition that continued with migrants coming to the United
States.
An occurrence that parallels the journey of Mexican immigrants to San Antonio
involves migrants who traveled from Italy to New York City. In a new Introduction to The
Madonna of 115th Street, first published in 1985, Robert Orsi discussed the concept of
“lived” religion, an evolving cultural aspect that operated within a sphere disapproved of
by the traditional Church. This non-doctrinal belief held a great deal of power over the
congregant, but these worshipers also possessed influence over the religion itself. In regard
to this lived religion concept, Orsi studied Italian immigrants in New York City during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Orsi argued that the Roman Catholic Church
hierarchy in the United States viewed the Italian tendency to participate in their own
religious festivals and not attend services as problematic. However, Italians who followed
such practices continued to perceive of themselves as good parishioners. To these
immigrants, the festivals represented the very essence of their religion as they imparted a
significant importance to the Italian domus or extended family that also extended to fictive
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relatives. The festa of the Madonna of 115th Street, venerated in 1903 by Pope Leo XIII as
an official church “devotion,” became the most important Italian religious festival in New
York City. The Pope’s actions supported his Italian immigrant compatriots versus the
Irish-dominated American Catholic Church. Further, since the Madonna statue had
originated in Italy and “traveled” to the United States, she also symbolized the journey of
Italian immigrants and assisted in lessening the travails that occurred as a result of
migration.63 The Virgin of Guadalupe represented a similar devotion for Mexican
immigrants that the Madonna provided for Italians. Guadalupe afforded Mexican
immigrants a connection to their home nation, a fellow “traveler” in whom they could seek
comfort despite the sometimes threatening environment in which they resided.
The often hostile reception that Mexicanos experienced in San Antonio encouraged a
reliance on institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church for support. As immigration
from Mexico began to escalate during the early twentieth century, Anglo hostility
manifested itself in many ways. For instance, due to the Texas state legislature’s mandate
for English-only educational instruction, Anglo public school students organized “SSS
Clubs” (Stop Speaking Spanish) to assure compliance. To make certain that Mexicanos
remained within the heavily segregated West Side of San Antonio, real estate redlining
prevented purchases within the Anglo-dominated northern neighborhoods. Moreover, even
some Anglo members of the Roman Catholic faith turned against immigrants by insisting
that their churches remain segregated and that Mexicanos belonged in their own parishes.

Robert A. Orsi, The Madonna of 115th Street: Faith and Community in Italian Harlem, 18801950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, [1985] 2nd ed., 2002), ix-xxiv, 60-64, 74-85, 163-168.
63

395

Such actions assured that the Mexican population in San Antonio remained in poverty
within the West Side of the city. The Mexican barrios, located directly west of the
downtown area, consisted of shacks with no plumbing and dirt floors that Anglos referred
to as “corrals.” Nonetheless, due to the inherent connection between Guadalupan
Catholicism and their home nation, Mexicanos remained faithful to the religion, but
usually, in their own way.64 Throughout its history, the city of San Antonio existed as an
important Catholic outpost.
The Roman Catholic Church provided a draw to San Antonio as the city had a long
history as a northern refuge for Catholics dating back to religious persecution during the
administration of Benito Juárez in the mid-nineteenth century. During the early twentieth
century, the Mexican Revolution created increased pressure on Catholics as a new
constitution mandated secular education, state marriages, and other religious restrictions.
Subsequently, churchmen escaped the mayhem in Mexico and sought sanctuary in San
Antonio. The activist policies of newly arrived clergy resulted in the Church’s greater
presence in the city as additional immigrants arrived. This activism also derived from the
city’s position as a center for revolutionaries from Mexico. Several of the long-shuttered
San Antonio Missions, originally constructed during the eighteenth century, reopened for
services during the 1910s as the city’s parishes received one of the highest totals of
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refugees and exiles in the United States.65 Additionally, a seminary opened in 1915 in
Castroville, Texas, just west of San Antonio, as the need for priests expanded due to the
continual flow of Mexican migrants into the Mission City.
Despite the marginalization of Mexicanos in San Antonio, the church served as an
anchor of stability within this often hostile environment, as well as providing an ethnic
connection to the immigrants’ Roman Catholic origins in Mexico. Due to their common
association with religion in Mexico, Mexicans and Mexican Americans came together in
Church activities that assisted in their mutual acceptance of one another.66 However,
although some positives emanated from the Church, other actions demonstrated that
religious leaders held Mexicanos “at arm’s length.” For instance, priests brought to San
Antonio from Spain to work in the barrios experienced little progress in elevating
Mexicanos, and Mexican priests left the city once the Revolution ended. Further,
segregation existed within the Churches.67
San Fernando Church, the oldest parish in Texas, located within an area on the west
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side of downtown San Antonio known as Plaza de Armas or Military Plaza. Long
considered the central location within the city, Plaza de Armas and the adjacent Main Plaza
relinquished this position during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the
commercial emphasis of the city transitioned to Alamo Plaza on the east side of downtown.
Symbolic of the central space’s changeover from a Spanish model to an American one, this
alteration in the physical space of the city also indicated the lessening of Catholic Church
influence. San Fernando Church now became more associated with the Mexican
population that resided a few blocks farther to the west.68 For instance, San Fernando
Church regularly maintained relationships with secular mutualistas such as Sociedad de la
Unión through Catholic social organizations including Unión Católic Central and Sociedad
de San Fernando.69 San Fernando evolved to be a primarily Mexicano Church by 1930
with more Mexican members than any other Alamo City Roman Catholic Church.70 As the
Mexican population increased, the Church realized that its primary mission lay in serving
this burgeoning population within the city, as well as in the vast agricultural area
surrounding San Antonio. The Church also became increasingly dependent on the West
Side community for their participation and financial support as approximately ninety-five
percent of Mexicanos remained Catholic.71
To assist in these endeavors, various Catholic missionary organizations came to the
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Alamo City to offer uplift to the growing Mexican population. A Claretian missionary
group, made up primarily of Spaniards, provided support to the San Fernando Church and
its continually increasing number of Mexican parishioners. However, the Claretians often
expressed displeasure with what they considered the poor religious habits of the Mexicanos
including their lack of knowledge regarding the principles of their faith and inconsistent
attendance. In turn, some of the Mexicano congregants believed that the Claretians looked
down on them and became intolerant and domineering. However, the Spanish priests also
worked to support many of the most venerated Mexicano-related activities including a
public Guadalupan observance. The Claretians undoubtedly viewed the dark-skinned
Guadalupe as a link for maintaining and attracting Mexicanos to Catholicism. By 1926, the
devotion to Guadalupe significantly expanded to become a public celebration. This annual
Guadalupe triduum soon consisted of three days of masses, sermons, and additional
religious commemorations including a reenactment of Juan Diego’s spiritual revelation.
The expansion of the devotional coincided with the increase of Mexicano parishioners
within the San Fernando Church caused by escalating immigration from Mexico. The
devotees’ often demonstrated support during the festival for events in Mexico such the
“Christian soldiers” battling government troops during the Cristero Rebellion in the late
1920s. For this celebration, one of the main plazas of the city turned into a sea of red,
white and green flags as Mexicanos sang and praised the Virgin of Guadalupe. Some
parishioners even contended that due to the persecution of Mexican Catholics, Mexicanos
in San Antonio maintained a greater faith than those in their home nation. Further, they
declared that Mexicanos in the southwestern United States worked to reclaim the lost lands

399

of the Mexican American War and by maintaining a devotion to Guadalupe, the Catholic
spirit of Mexico remained intact within the United States. This religious devotion to
Guadalupe and the San Fernando Church offered a sanctuary for Mexicanos within the
antagonistic environment established by Anglos in San Antonio.72 Other Catholic churches
in San Antonio, beyond San Fernando, served the Mexican population within their own
communities.
By the end of the 1915 to 1925 period, seven of the twenty Roman Catholic Churches
in the San Antonio area served the burgeoning Mexican population. Of the seven, five
covered the west side district of the city and included Sacred Heart, Immaculate Heart, St.
Philip of Jesus, Our Lady of Guadalupe, and St. Alphonsus, the last two of which opened
near the end of the time period to accommodate the growing Mexican populace in the area.
The Churches remained absolutely segregated. The most obvious demonstration of this
fact involved two Churches on the southwest side of the city. St. Henry, located at 1717
South Flores Street, was listed as “English and German” within the Official Catholic
Directory published by the Roman Catholic Church in the United States. Another church,
St. Philip of Jesus at 131 Bank Street and located one-half mile from St. Henry, was
recorded in the same publication as “Spanish.” The Roman Catholic Church did not utilize
languages other than Latin in the Mass for some decades to come; therefore, although
sermons and confessions remained in the language of the worshippers, this probably also
indicated who belonged to the parish. For instance, the Annual Reports of St. Philip of
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Jesus to the Diocese indicated that a handful of “non-Mexican” families remained with the
church until 1923 and zero thereafter as the “Mexican” total continued to swell. In a letter
concerning the building of the Guadalupe Church from Bishop Arthur J. Drossaerts of the
San Antonio Diocese in 1924, he indicated that “We are planning to erect a new parish for
Mexicans only in the city of San Antonio.” The letter also outlined the parishioner limits
of the new church; a segment that included a portion of the substandard area of the West
Side as well as a two-square mile section immediately to the west, also part of the Mexican
barrio.73 The Annual Reports beginning in 1925 indicated that no Anglo families ever
became members; only Mexicanos attended. Also, these documents recorded the
membership in separate categories for “white” and “Mexican.”74 San Antonio cemeteries
connected with the San Fernando Church allowed persons of all ancestral origins to use
their burial grounds. However, Anglos and Mexicanos remained segregated after death as
some Bexar County town cemeteries denied Tejano internment.75
Two other Catholic Churches in the San Antonio area, located outside of the West
Side in smaller Mexican neighborhoods, also administered to Mexicanos. Our Lady of the
Sorrows, at the corner of Jones Avenue and Mistletoe Street on the north side, served the
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Mexican population that lived near and worked at the “Cementville” rock quarry. On April
25, 1913, the Bishop of San Antonio, J.W. Shaw, had appealed to the Catholic Extension
Society for assistance in building a facility for the Cementville parishioners:
I should like to have this kind donation applied to a new Chapel which we hope to
build for the Mexicans residing near the Rock Quarries here in San Antonio. There is
quite large number of them who have at present no chapel & who are too far from the
Cathedral to attend there. The new Chapel will be served from the Cathedral & we
shall hope to put up a school before long. I was at the closing of a Mission given for
two weeks for these poor people by two of the Cathedral Fathers in a large tent: there
were hundreds there & they were most edifying: it was very sad to see this big
congregation without even a roof or an Altar & I think that this gift is surely an
answer to their prayers for they wish for a Church & have already set to work to try &
collect as far as their poor means will allow.76
Francis C. Kelley, director of the Catholic Extension Society subsequently financed the
movement of several Oblate Fathers from a community on the U.S.-Mexican border to
serve the Mexicanos at Cementville. The “church” was originally set up within a “motor
chapel car” that involved a truck body refurbished into a small sanctuary on wheels which,
when suitably parked, allowed parishioners to gather around for services. With the name,
“Motor Chapel St. Peter” stenciled on a panel behind the driver’s compartment of the
vehicle and “Catholic Extension Society of the United States” along the top of both sides,
the car gave the appearance of a converted panel truck with a heavenly theme.77 Based on
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further correspondence between Vice President and General Secretary of the Extension
Society E.B. Ledvina and Bishop Shaw, the motor chapel car became operational near
Cementville in late May or June, 1914. By July 23, 1914, Ledvina wrote: “Indeed, we are
very much pleased to learn that the Motor Chapel ‘St. Peter’ is doing so much good in and
around An Antonio; and that the Spanish Fathers are proving themselves very good
chaplains of the Car.”78 Apparently, the chapel car proved useful for more than just the
supplementation of temporary services in the Cementville area. The Oblates continued to
also use temporary tents for a short period and then gathered in a local mutual aid society
before construction began on the permanent facility, Our Lady of the Sorrows, during the
following year.79
The second church located beyond the West Side, Our Lady of Perpetual Help,
situated east of downtown at 2123 Nebraska Street, served a small enclave of Mexicanos
living on that side of San Antonio. In 1913, Bishop J.W. Shaw had encouraged one of the
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Order of the Redemptorist Fathers, John Muehlsiepen, to organize a parish for these
worshippers. The Fathers came to San Antonio to minister to Anglo American migrants,
but apparently, the Mexicanos needed to be housed in a separate facility. A 1924 Report of
Work done Among the Mexican Population indicated that “we take only Mexican children”
in response to the question “What provision is there in the parochial school for the children
of Mexican parents?” The 1926 report’s answer to the same question was simply,
“Exclusively Mexican” as the church did not draw from other ethnicities in close
proximity. Nonetheless, “Padre Juan,” as Muehlsiepen came to be known, administered a
parish that served as a home base for priests conducting missionary work throughout South
Texas. The Redemptorist Fathers also served in the reestablishment of old mission
churches located just south of San Antonio in addition to aiding immigrants on the West
Side of the city at St. Alphonsus Church which they founded in 1925.80
The Catholic Church also attempted to serve the Mexicano community by beginning
a Community House in 1919 at 520 Matamoros Street, one and one-half blocks from La
Unión’s main hall. Best described as a “settlement house,” it offered English language
classes for kindergartners and an employment center intended for immigrant women.81 A
national effort by the Roman Catholic Church to erect such facilities in many urban
communities began during the late 1910s. Since San Antonio contained the largest
Mexican community in the United States, the Church believed that a successful community
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house in the Alamo City could augment similar efforts around the southwest.82 At a fund
raiser for the facility, Miss Margaret Hall of the Catholic Congress of the United States
explained that the Community House would offer cultural, physical, and moral support to
the population on the West Side of San Antonio. This assistance provided hygiene and
sanitation information including medicines and medical assistance from nurses and
physicians.83 Community House also stressed that Mexicanos needed to Americanize and
conform to the dictates of the Church in the United States. Ultimately, the settlement house
proved to be mostly unsuccessful as resistance to the mission of Community House
emanated from the Mexicano community who viewed this effort as a cultural attack and
their reverence to Guadalupe. Anglo Catholics in San Antonio also provided little support
for the facility and criticized Mexicanos’ belief in “alternative” symbols such as the
Guadalupe.84
Other religions also offered services to Mexicanos on the West Side of the city.
By the mid-1920s, several Protestant denominations, including Baptist, Presbyterian,
Methodist, Lutheran, and Disciples of Christ, maintained at least one Spanish-language
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congregation in San Antonio.85 The Wesley Community House, a settlement facility
connected to the Methodist Church, located at the corner of Colima and Leona Streets, a
few blocks south of La Unión’s main hall, and represented a “competitor” to the San
Antonio Catholic Diocese’s effort with Mexicanos.86 Attempting to counter the challenge
of the Methodists, the Catholic Diocese generated a “Report of Work done Among the
Mexican Population,” for churches within its jurisdiction, and included questions such as
“What efforts are being made in your parish to wean away the Mexicans from their
Catholic Faith?” and “How many of your Mexicans have embraced Protestantism?” Such
queries demonstrated the Catholic Diocese’s fear of Protestant denominations. A 1925
report from Our Lady of the Sorrows mentioned a Methodist Mexican Church and its
Protestant missionaries who “go to homes of Mexicans.”87 Near the end of Catholic
Community House’s longevity, in 1924, a new leader, Martina Pleace, actually embraced
negative racial views regarding Mexicanos, indicating that “the problem Mexicans faced
derived from innate racial characteristics that inhibited their ability to meet the challenges

85

Matovina, Guadalupe and Her Faithful, 99.

“Una Sra. Mexicana Extraviada de su Residencia,” La Prensa, May 27, 1924, Page 10. As early
as 1913, Bishop Shaw lamented to Father Kelly of the Catholic Extension Society that Methodists
had built a “Settlement House” on the West Side for the purpose of converting “our” Mexicans, see:
Shaw letter to Kelly dated April 25, 1913, Extension Society Box, Folder 1, SAACA. There were
also community centers run by the Presbyterians and Baptists on the West Side, see Badillo,
Latinos and the New Immigrant Church, 26.
86

“Report of Work done Among the Mexican Population 1925,” by Our Lady of the Sorrows,
1920s Folder, SAACA. The Diocese of San Antonio was elevated to an Archdiocese in 1926; see
Matovina, Guadalupe and Her Faithful, 99. As early as 1913, Bishop Shaw wrote to Father Kelley
of his concerns regarding a “new difficulty” posed by the opening of a “Settlement House” by the
Methodists. See J.W. Shaw letter dated April 25, 1913 to Francis C. Kelley, Catholic Church
Extension Society Director, Extension Society Box, Folder 1, SAACA.
87

406

of modern society.”88 Although Pleace also emphasized a program of pure Americanism
for Mexicanos, she specified that despite any indiscretions on the part of the West Side
faithful, Anglo Catholics should still assist their fellow brethren. Moreover, just as the
national effort failed, the mission closed without having solved the “Mexican problem” as
Mexicanos maintained “their religious and cultural identity.”89
Manuel Gamio’s sociological work concerning Mexicans during the late 1920s
included many testimonials offered by immigrants. Generally, most of the interviewees
indicated that they remained Catholic because their parents had introduced them to the
religion, but that their occupations in the United States often precluded them from
attending Mass. This comment from Jesús Garza, a twenty-four-year-old immigrant from
Aguascalientes was typical: “I am Catholic and although I almost never go to Mass or
pray, I do keep Holy Thursday and Friday every year for I am accustomed to do that. At
home I was very Catholic but that was on account of my parents.”90 Asunción Flores, who
migrated from Michoacán, offered a particularly pertinent story as he had worked in many
places in the United States including El Paso and Miami. Apparently, Asunción achieved
some status with his employers as he described being in charge of others on several
occasions. However, this caused him some consternation due to feelings of inadequacy:
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But at night when I go to my room I prayed three Aves Marias and a Lord’s Prayer to
the Guadalupana so that she would inspire me, and then as if dreaming there appeared
to me the way to put the tracks and I did it exactly that way without making a mistake
the next day, and so my work was always very well done. In that way Our Lady of
Guadalupe protected me. I am a Catholic and pray in my house, but I hardly ever go
to church for many reasons, and especially because in all the years that I have worked
at the mine I have worked during the day. Day work is the best and since they don’t
stop a single day at the mine, I don’t have a chance to go to church.91
Asunción not only maintained his Catholic faith in the United States despite the obstacles
generated by his work schedule, he had sustained his cultural Catholicism by worshiping
the Virgin of his home country while simultaneously utilizing that faith to contend with the
tribulations of his adopted nation.
In his book, Guadalupe and Her Faithful: Latino Catholics in San Antonio, from
Colonial Origins to the Present, Timothy Matovina compared the experiences of
mutualistas and Catholics: “Just as economic reciprocity and ethnic solidarity were the
foundation of mutualistas and reciprocal intercessory prayer and mutual support were
central to pious societies, Guadalupan devotees perceived their relationship with Guadalupe
as one of mutuality.”92 This chapter demonstrated the importance of mutualistas and
primarily, Sociedad de la Unión, as well as the Roman Catholic Church in providing
support to Mexicanos. However, although the Church’s efforts included meaningful
sustenance, for the most part, it emanated from Anglo leaders who lacked sensitivity to the
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Mexicanos’ plight. While they spoke the same language, priests from Spain failed to
connect with Mexicanos on a cultural or national basis. The resultant lack of Mexican
priests in the San Antonio area added to the disparity between clergy and laymen among
the Mexicano community. Bishop Shaw acknowledged this deficit by writing in 1914:
“We have at a very conservative count at least seventy thousand . . . Mexican Indians.
They are of course all baptized but owing in the past to the inability of providing priests,
churches and schools for them, large numbers of them are very poorly instructed in our
holy faith.”93 In analyzing Shaw’s comments, his use of the terms “Indians” and “them”
versus “our” seem to indicate that even the Bishop of San Antonio failed to see Mexicanos
as a part of “the” faith. Mexicanos remained “Indians” in his mind, a group to be set aside
and not assimilated into the larger Church community. Just as the Irish Catholic Church
kept Italian immigrants at arm’s length in New York City, so too did the Anglo hierarchy
contend with Mexicanos in San Antonio.
Conversely, Sociedad de la Unión offered mutual support from within the
community. Although they sometimes fought among themselves, the mutualista leaders
rose to prominence from inside of the organization, lived within the West Side barrio, and
often worked there as well. The “ethic of mutuality” among the members who voluntarily
joined La Unión offered a strong network of support within a hostile community.
Culturally Catholic Mexicanos also benefitted from their connection to the Church, but the
Anglo leadership of the institution could hardly connect with their parishioners in the same
way that La Unión’s officers could. One of the main reasons that Mexicanos continued to
93
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identify with the Church, as symbolized by the Virgin of Guadalupe, emanated from
Mexico, not the United States. The situation for Mexicanos with the Church in San
Antonio mirrored other portions of the United States.
Robert A. Slayton offered an important analysis of a primarily Eastern European
ethnic neighborhood in Back of the Yards: The Making of a Local Democracy. Slayton’s
book emphasized the parallel, yet different roles of social groups and churches in a Chicago
neighborhood dominated by the meat-packing industry.94 In his work on Chicago, Slayton
also briefly analyzed the Mexican population that began to appear in the Back of the Yards
during the early 1920s and he revealed some significant differences between the
circumstances for Eastern Europeans and Mexicans in Chicago. Many of the
characteristics of the Chicago Mexicans corresponded to the Eastern Europeans including
the poor living conditions, the use of boarders to supplement income, and the propensity to
form ethnic organizations. However, Slayton also indicated that the Chicago Mexicans
suffered greater discrimination and police abuse. Most importantly, he argued that
although nationalism flourished among the Mexican community as it did for Eastern
Europeans, it remained less fervent due to the comparative ease of returning to Mexico.
Further, although the Mexicans formed a Guadalupan society in Chicago, they did not build
their own church until twenty-five years after their initial arrival in the United States.
Slayton attributed this lack of a church to the continuing connection to Mexico and that,
resultantly, Catholicism in the United States maintained a lesser influence on the Mexican
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parishioners.95 Slayton’s findings provide a parallel to the secondary significance of the
Roman Catholic Church in San Antonio. In the Alamo City, the Church used non-Mexican
priests and the parishioners identified more with the Virgin of Guadalupe than the Anglodominated U.S. Church. Consequently, in the vacuum left by the Roman Catholic Church,
La Unión became a greater influence on the Mexicano population in San Antonio.
These two entities, Sociedad de la Unión and the Roman Catholic Church worked to
uplift the Mexicano community in San Antonio during the 1915 to 1925 period. However,
due to the increasingly negative view of Mexicanos by the Anglo community in San
Antonio, La Unión made the most significant progress in assisting the people of the West
Side. The general tone of La Unión concerned the well being of the people that it served.
Assistance with funeral costs, payments when illness struck, loans for emergencies, and
more came as welcome relief to people treated as disposable workers who lived in
substandard housing with tin walls and no indoor plumbing. At a time in the United States
without unemployment compensation or federal welfare—a period in Texas when many
Anglos saw Mexicanos as a problematic part of the population—help from La Unión had
considerable meaning to the people who received it and demonstrated Mexicano agency.
Moreover, because of the mutual and fraternal nature of the organization, the assistance
from La Unión went beyond the tangible benefits of membership. Support for fellow
businesses on the West Side, social camaraderie, and the esteem of membership in a
meaningful organization added to the experience. Although the Roman Catholic Church
assisted West Side residents, the Church still represented the Anglo hierarchy that
95
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suppressed Mexicanos as evidenced by the segregation of congregations throughout the
city. Most importantly, because Sociedad de la Unión emanated from within the Mexicano
community, not only could problems be more readily addressed, but Mexicanos also more
willingly accepted the efforts of fellow mutualista members.

CONCLUSION: DISPOSABLE LABOR

Deportee (Plane Wreck at Los Gatos)
The crops are all in and the peaches are rott’ning
The oranges piled in their creosote dumps;
They’re flying ‘em back to the Mexican border
To pay all their money to wade back again
Goodbye to my Juan, goodbye, Rosalita,
Adios mis amigos, Jesus y Maria;
You won’t have your names when you ride the big airplane,
All they will call you will be “deportees”
My father’s own father, he waded that river,
They took all the money he made in his life;
My brothers and sisters come working the fruit trees,
And they rode the truck till they took down and died.
Some of us are illegal, and some are not wanted,
Our work contract’s out and we have to move on;
Six hundred miles to that Mexican border,
They chase us like outlaws, like rustlers, like thieves.
We died in your hills, we died in your deserts,
We died in your valleys and died on your plains.
We died ‘neath your trees and we died in your bushes,
Both sides of the river, we died just the same.
The sky plane caught fire over Los Gatos Canyon,
A fireball of lightning, and shook all our hills,
Who are all these friends, all scattered like dry leaves?
The radio says, ‘They are just deportees’
Is this the best way we can grow our big orchards?
Is this the best way we can grow our good fruit?
To fall like dry leaves to rot on my topsoil
And be called by no name except ‘deportees’1

Woody Guthrie, Deportee, also known as “Plane Wreck at Los Gatos,” 1948.
http://woodyguthrie.org/Lyrics/Plane_Wreck_At_Los_Gatos.htm. Accessed December 4, 2015.
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These lyrics by Woody Guthrie, written in 1948 about an incident in which 28 Mexican
agricultural workers died enroute to Mexico, offer a fitting opening to the conclusion.
Deported for various immigration violations, the 28 laborers remained unnamed within
news reports regarding the incident.2 Guthrie abhorred the tragedy not only because these
laborers had lost their lives, but also due to the anonymity of the media reports that
included information about the crew, and named the workers as “deportees” who ended up
buried in a mass grave. He assigned a few names to the victims in protest to their treatment
in the news reports on the accident.3 Similarly, beginning during the early twentieth
century, Mexican laborers became anonymous entities, enticed by owner growers
interested in increasing their profits, but discarded “like dry leaves” when no longer
needed. As this dissertation has previously labeled it, Anglo attitudes toward Mexicanos
throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries identifies them as “disposable
labor.” In the case of south Texas, Mexican workers began their trek into the United States
with the development of the railroad.
While the Mexican Revolution and economic hardships in Mexico provided the
impetus for immigrants to leave their home nation, the railroad and the agricultural
expansion in south Texas offered the means and the attraction to migrate to the United
States. The first three chapters of this dissertation reviewed the situation in northern
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Mexico and south Texas as well as the railroads and agricultural employment possibilities.
During the early twentieth century, the Monterrey Center developed as the primary place of
origin for migrants from northeastern Mexico who searched for a better life in the United
States. Subsequently, due to the presence of railway routes from the Monterrey Center that
traveled through Laredo and Eagle Pass and on to San Antonio, migrants could readily
journey into Texas. Once in south Texas, cotton, truck crops, and pecan shelling offered
the most likely possibilities for agricultural employment. Often exploited by their
employers, these dependable and inexpensive laborers found ways to persevere by
deserting untenable situations and moving on to more worthwhile ones. Moreover,
government programs and local employment agencies proved important to both the
ongoing Mexican migration and their reception in the United States.
Although Mexican immigration had already begun to increase by the middle of the
1910s, government bureaucracies and fee-based businesses added to the condemnation of
the burgeoning Mexican population in south Texas as well as the United States. This
dissertation focused on these two entities in the fourth and fifth chapters, specifically, the
First Bracero Program and ethnic employment agencies. Chapter 4 reviewed the
government program as well as a law that became important during the early 1920s, the
Immigration Act of 1917. The First Bracero Program had eclipsed the spirit of the Act by
suspending its portions regarding literacy, contract labor, and an increased head tax under
the guise of Great War labor requirements in the United States. Due to nationwide needs
associated with the war, a more extensive movement of inexpensive and reliable Mexicano
workers began into areas of the United States unaccustomed to their presence.
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The difference between 1910 and 1920 Censuses, which encompassed the 1917 to
1921 Bracero Program, demonstrate the depth and location of the Mexican-born population
in the United States. The numerical increase of the Mexican-born population in the four
U.S. states that border Mexico, 222,105, and in the nine non-border states that also saw a
significant rise in the number of Bracero workers, 27,705, easily surpassed the remaining
thirty-five states, 8,616.4 When nativism began to expand during the early 1920s, Anglos
amplified the propensity to reject the presence of Mexicanos in these thirteen “Bracero
states.” Further, a post-Great War recession, in which many laborers of all ethnicities lost
their jobs, added to the denigration of a group perceived as foreign. Often this discernment
took place in regard to all Mexicanos, no matter their citizenship status. As a result of the
manner in which it administered the Bracero Program, the U.S. government also had a role
in this vilification of Mexican immigrants.
The Bureau of Immigration and its director, Anthony Caminetti, as well as the head
of the Mexican border area, Frank Berkshire, continued the First Bracero Program despite
the knowledge that the need for workers amounted to a ploy for the continued availability
of inexpensive labor. As the exclusive agent in the placing the workers, a padrone, the
Bureau maintained a view of migrants as nameless laborers. Through these actions, and
their endorsement of deportations as the Program waned and the economy weakened,
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Caminetti and Berkshire, the federal government’s primary link to Mexican immigration,
promulgated the disposable labor model. They knew the Program assisted farmers in
maintaining reliable and inexpensive workers, but when the end came, the two bureaucrats
simply saw the laborers as a “workforce,” rather than people and, therefore, disposable.
Subsequently, with the end of the Program, the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1917
and its literacy clause threatened to stall Mexican migration after farmers had become
accustomed to the low-cost and dependability of the workers. Labor agencies in cities such
as Laredo and San Antonio had supplied agricultural workers in the past, but now their
importance took on a new dimension. Since Mexico remained a largely illiterate nation,5
immigrant workers often avoided border officials and needed the assistance of an
enganchadore in obtaining employment in the United States.
As seen in Chapter 5, ethnic employment agencies had existed long before the end of
the Bracero Program, and immigration officials believed that the enganchadores abused the
workers and their relationship with farmers. Although the agents sometimes gouged both
employees and employers, their role in continuing the importation of foreign laborers from
Mexico became increasingly important due to the provisions of the Immigration Act of
1917. Enganchadores maintained a cultural connection with the workers in addition to
their unique ability to communicate with laborers in a common language. However, the
resurgence of nativism during the early 1920s and organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan,
as well as the Texas government’s movement toward free employment agencies, placed the
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ethnic recruiters in a vulnerable position.6 Xenophobia, particularly encouraged by a fear
of Bolshevism in the wake of the Russian Revolution, contributed to a disparagement of
most immigrants during the post-war period.7
Moreover, in the wake of the First Bracero Program, enganchadores placed workers
in many of the same thirteen Bracero states in addition to several other Midwest states. 8 As
a result, additional Anglos in the United States became exposed to Mexicano agricultural
laborers. In the meantime, the state of Texas, throughout the 1915 to 1925 period,
continually restricted the activities of fee-based agencies, particularly those that sent
workers outside of the state.9 San Antonio enganchadores such as Cesario Campa
attempted to survive by reinventing his business as a car service, but the Texas government
still prevailed. By 1930, ethnic employment businesses, for all intents and purposes,
ceased to exist, and free state employment agencies had assumed their role. Not only had
the U.S. government acted as a padrone during the Bracero Program, now the state of
Texas had assumed a similar role.
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Deportations marked the end of the Bracero Program as the economy fell and
employment possibilities faded. Events in Fort Worth during 1921 offer a pertinent
example. Although the actual total of deportations remains murky, Chapter 6 revealed that
roughly 35,000 Mexicanos left the United States as a result of efforts by local governments
as well as the Bureau of Immigration.10 Clemente Idar played a role in this process, and
acted in the interests of his employer, the American Federation of Labor, but also in
support of his fellow Mexicanos. Idar occupied a unique position with the union as the
only Spanish-speaking AFL organizer during this period. A person of Mexican heritage
born in Texas, he could have used his position to only assist fellow U.S. citizens, but he
evolved during his tenure with the union to emphasize a qualified acceptance of migrants.11
Idar stressed that immigrants should become U.S. citizens rather than remain aliens and,
despite AFL formal resistance to such activities, organized unions that included Mexican
migrants. Although citizenship proved a fruitless endeavor, this failure probably reflected
Mexicano treatment in the United States rather than any deficiency on Idar’s part.
Clemente Idar’s individual actions demonstrated the agency that Mexicanos exercised in
support of their fellow persons of Mexican heritage. Further, some Mexicano groups also
worked to support their fellow nationals as well as native U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage.
10
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Sociedad de la Unión, a mutual help organization based in San Antonio, provided
benefits to its members who remained segregated and without assistance from the Anglo
population. The mutualista maintained an affiliate base that consisted of both immigrant
Mexicanos as well as U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry. The largest of nineteen
mutualistas in San Antonio, La Unión provided funeral assistance, short-term loans,
camaraderie, and support to members in the spirit of ethnic mutuality.12 By owning two
buildings within the West Side of the city, La Unión offered Mexicanos a respite from the
negativity associated with their relationship with Anglo employers and civic leaders.
Although the Roman Catholic Church possessed a cultural relationship with all Mexicanos
based on the ethnicity’s long-time tendency to remain loyal to the religion, the Church
failed to deliver the strong support that La Unión did. A lack of empathy for Mexicanos
from the Anglo church hierarchy and the propensity to bring priests from Spain into San
Antonio impacted the Catholic Church’s ability to relate to the immigrants.13 La Unión, by
maintaining Mexicano leaders who emanated from the West Side of the city, provided
benefits to their ethnic associates without the disparagement associated with San Antonio’s
Anglos. Although the various presidents and officers of the mutualista may have wielded
greater power than the individual members, regular elections and strict parliamentary
procedures kept the organization focused on its mission. La Unión demonstrated collective
Mexicano agency.
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Despite the disposable labor mentality of Anglo employers as well as U.S. and Texas
government officials, individuals such as Clemente Idar and organizations like La Unión
strove to support the Mexicano population no matter their citizenship. Further, Mexican
immigrants sought their own relief from the disparagement by finding preferable employers
during the Bracero Program and when dealing with employment agencies. Nonetheless,
the categorization of Mexicanos as disposable labor that began during the 1910s and early
1920s persisted long after the period as subsequent twentieth century events demonstrated
the persistence of this adverse perception.
Once nativism expanded and a recession befell the nation during the early 1920s,
Mexicano workers faced expulsion by those that despised their continued presence.
Despite the relatively low total of deportations during the early 1920s in comparison to the
repatriation of the 1930s, about 400,000, and the apprehensions during the 1950s, over
800,000, the 1920s expulsion of Mexicanos provided a precedent for such mass
operations.14 Each mass removal of migrants began due to specific circumstances;
however, these events also possessed commonalities. During the 1930s, unemployment
associated with the Great Depression encouraged the removal as officials believed that
repatriation remained a lower cost alternative than administering welfare to needy
migrants.15 “Operation Wetback,” the unfortunate name of the 1950s episode, actually
served to change the status of many workers from undocumented to U.S. government14
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sponsored laborers as part of the “Second” Bracero Program16 which contained few
protections from abuse.17
Seen as a replay of the First Bracero Program, the World War II era project also arose
after owner growers lobbied the federal government for a guest-worker arrangement.18
During the World War I project, the political situation in Mexico remained more tenuous
due to the Mexican Revolution, but the Mexican government became more directly
involved in the institution of the second program.19 Moreover, unlike the relative quick
demise of the first plan, the World War II program lasted almost two decades after the
global conflict, ending in 1964. Although a brief suspension of the program occurred in
late 1947 and early 1948, cries of labor shortages from farmers resulted in a new accord
and, beginning in 1950, the Korean War enhanced the “war emergency” argument by
owner growers. Finally, in 1951, PL 78 officially voided the prohibition against foreign
contract labor and for all practical purposes created a permanent guest-worker
arrangement.20 This program allowed for wages to be set by the growers before the
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seasonal needs arose so that few domestic workers applied, and then the farmers could
claim a shortage and import workers.21 The agreement also managed to combine a wage
decline with a labor shortage, quite the opposite of what usually would have occurred under
the rules of supply and demand.22 To maintain their reserve of inexpensive workers,
growers preferred the elimination of contracts as they believed such an arrangement only
served as a barrier to easily obtain the laborers.23
As with the First Bracero Program, the view of workers as objects rather than people
persisted. Congress regularly held hearings during the arrangement’s tenure, but no
laborers ever testified as to their experiences.24 The President’s Commission on Migratory
Labor (PCML), established under President Harry Truman, produced reports that the PL 78
seemed to ignore:
[Growers] want a labor supply which, on one hand, is ready and willing to meet the
short-term work requirements and which, on the other hand will not impose economic
and social problems on them or on their community when the work is finished . . . .
The demand for migratory workers is thus essentially twofold: To be ready to go to
work when needed, to be gone when not needed.25
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As demonstrated throughout this dissertation, this observation by the PCML could have
been utilized in regard to the First Bracero Program and related events during the 1915 to
1925 period. Just as the World War I arrangement saw the workers as objects to be used
and discarded, so too did the mid-century plan. In the lyrics at the beginning of this
conclusion, Woody Guthrie characterized the treatment of migrants during the late 1940s as
being nameless persons discarded “like dry leaves.” Thirty years after the demise of the
first government guest-worker program, the second one continued the same view of
Mexican labor as disposable.
In the Introduction, I suggested that writing in history involves the piecing together of
a puzzle, but done in the absence of viewing a full picture. Evidence has been presented
including the origin of Mexican migrants in south Texas during the 1915 to 1925 period as
well as their modes of transportation and employment endeavors. Further, the experiences
of the workers during the First Bracero Program, in addition to those that utilized the
services of ethnic employment agencies, demonstrated the disparagement and disposable
status of the workers. Tejanos such as Clemente Idar and mutualistas like Sociedad de la
Unión offered assistance to Mexican migrants and lessened the impact of the denigration.
However, despite these examples of agency on the part of individuals and organizations
that represented Mexican culture, Anglos maintained a stereotypical view of Mexicanos as
disposable labor that began during the 1910s and has continued to the present. Although
the rationale may have evolved with each removal, the premise remained the same: the
migrants had fulfilled the labor need, time for them to leave.
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